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
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THE
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AND
CLASSICAL REVIEW.

CONDUCTED BY REV. W. H. BIDWELL.



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ARTICLE I.

SKETCHES IN GRECIAN PHILOSOPHY.

By Prof. WM. S. TYLER, Amherst College, Mass.

WORKS OF ARISTOTLE.

ARISTOTLE was a voluminous writer. Like the great metaphysician and divine of New-England, he seems to have observed, reflected, and read with his pen, as it were, always in his hand. We have it on the authority of Diogenes Laertius, that there were 445,270 lines in Aristotle's manuscripts. All that the fruitful imagination of the Greeks ever *accused* Homer of writing, scarcely amounted to a tithe of that number. But Time has handled his works roughly, and given them a severe sifting. Less than one quarter of them have come down to us. He is said to have composed above 400 different treatises. Fabricius has collected the titles of 250 of his books, which are lost. Only 48 entire treatises are now extant. Many of them, however, consist of several books. And the existing remains of Aristotle, we believe, still exceed in bulk those of any other classic author. They were reckoned by folios, when folios were in fashion; and in the compact ~~orn~~ of the Tauchnitz editions, they occupy sixteen volumes.

The books of Plato are contained in eight volumes, in the same series. The Iliad and Odyssey fill only two. And what is altogether paramount to the mere bulk of his remains, his most *valuable* works have been preserved. Indeed, the same is true of the classic authors in general, not excepting the Greek Tragic Poets, nine-tenths of whose productions have perished. Sincerely as we must regret the loss of so considerable a portion of the Greek and Latin Classics, we may console ourselves with the reflection that it is still our privilege to read those pieces of nearly every classic author, which were most admired by the Greeks and Romans themselves. Never was a close observer and deep thinker more misled by a fancied analogy, than Bacon was, when he said : " Time seemeth to be of the nature of a stream, which carrieth down to us that which is light and blown up, and sinketh and drowneth that which is weighty and solid." A more just analogy would have been this : Time seemeth to be of the nature of a flood, which sweepeth away that which is light and blown up, and leaveth that which is weighty and solid fast anchored at the bottom. So it is in fact in the history of literature. So it must be, as a general rule, from the nature of the case. The more important works of Aristotle, and so of all the ancients, have been in too common use and too high esteem in all ages and countries to perish every where and for ever. They were cherished in too many libraries and monasteries to perish even in the Dark Ages.

The remains of Aristotle may be classed under the heads of Physics, Metaphysics, Mathematics, Ethics, Logic, Rhetoric, Politics, and Poetry. Several of these heads, however, comprise a number of distinct treatises, as they were composed and arranged by the author.

His physical works bear the following titles, most of which, of themselves, indicate with sufficient clearness, the subjects of which they treat : On the Heavens ; on the Production and Dissolution of Natural bodies ; on Meteors ; of Animal Life ; Physical Miscellanies ; on the Natural History of Animals ; on Plants ; on Colors ; on Sound ; A Collection of Wonder-

ful Facts ; against the Doctrine of Xenophanes, Zeno, and Gorgias ; on the Wind ; on Physiognomy ; Miscellaneous Problems ; on the Doctrine of Nature. This last is the work which is usually known by the name of Aristotle's *Physics* ; and which professes to explain, not so much the properties of matter, as the metaphysical nature of time, place, motion, and the like abstractions.

The metaphysics are contained in fourteen books, which treat of Being, considered abstractly, of Deity, and of the Human Soul.

Aristotle's Logic, so called, consists of a number of distinct works. These are, the Categories or ten general Heads of Arrangement ; the Explanation of Nouns and Verbs, a work which explains the philosophical principles of grammar ; Analytics, including the doctrine of Syllogism and Demonstration ; Topics, or Common Places, from which *Probable Arguments* may be drawn ; and Sophistical Refutations, which teaches the art of replying to an antagonist. These logical treatises are usually published together, under the general title of the *Organon* of Aristotle, in allusion to which, Bacon gave the name of *Novum Organum* to his counter system of induction.

The pieces on mathematics which Aristotle has left, are an obscure, and probably incomplete, treatise on Incommensurables, and a book of questions in Mechanics.

His system of Ethics is contained in ten books to Nicomachus ; seven to Eudemus ; two entitled the Greater Morals ; and a book on Virtue and Vice, which aims to define the several virtues and vices.

His political writings consist of two books on Economics, and eight on Politics, or the Science of Government.

His Rhetoric comprises three books. His Poetic, as extant, is contained in a single book, though it was originally an extended treatise.

The following remarks on the present state of these several works, are from Krug's *Encyclopædia of Philosophy* :

“The Poetic is a mere fragment of a larger work. The

same is true of the Politics, which a learned Florentine nobleman has undertaken to restore by the addition of two books in the Greek language. On the other hand, the Ethics to Eudemus and the Lesser Rhetoric, dedicated to King Alexander, are probably spurious. The Metaphysics also neither received that title from Aristotle himself, nor could it have proceeded from his hands, with all its contents, and in its present state. Among the physical treatises, again, is probably found much that is spurious; e. g. the Botany, the tenth book of the History of Animals, the piece on the World, and the Physiognomy. The rest, however, particularly the Physics, strictly so called, and the treatise on the soul, are probably genuine. Lastly, the genuineness of the logical pieces is acknowledged, with the exception of the last part of the treatise on the Categories, which contains the doctrine of the so called Post-predicaments. These logical pieces taken together, have in later times received the appellation of the Aristotelian Organon, because they were regarded as an *instrument* in reference to all the other sciences; for which reason, also, the teachers of logic in the universities were called "Professores Organi."

It may be doubted whether scholars, and Krug among the rest, have not carried their skepticism too far in regard to the genuineness and integrity of Aristotle's works. It has been customary to speak of them as singularly corrupt; and, by way at once of confirming the fact and explaining the reason, reference is made to the singular history of the Aristotelian manuscripts. The account appears first in Strabo's Geography, and then in Plutarch's life of Sylla; whence it has found its way into nearly all the commentaries and histories of philosophy of a later date. It is concisely as follows: Aristotle left his literary property, consisting of his library and manuscripts to Theophrastus, his most illustrious pupil, and his successor in the Lyceum. Theophrastus again bequeathed them to his scholar, and perhaps near relative, Neleus, who carried them to his native city Scepsis, and left them with the rest of his property to his lawful heirs. They, being uneducated

men, kept them under lock and key, unused and neglected, till they heard that the king of Pergamus, within whose dominions they lived, was ransacking his kingdom for books to form a large library, when, fearing that the despot might seize upon their collection, they hid their books in a subterranean apartment, where they lay buried 130 years, "a prey to dampness and worms." Raised at length from their tomb, they were sold for a great sum to Apellicon of Athens, who, though an admirer of the Peripatetic school, was more an antiquarian than a philosopher, and a lover of books rather than a genuine scholar. Finding the manuscripts injured by time, he had them transcribed, and, with ill-judged industry, supplied by conjecture such passages as had been defaced, or had become illegible. History has not informed us what became of Aristotle's original manuscripts. But the copy made by Apellicon, together with his large and valuable library, was seized by Sylla in his conquest of Athens, and conveyed to Rome. Here it was found by Tyrannio, who, though a learned Greek, rather multiplied than diminished the errors and corruptions in the text, by employing incompetent amanuenses to take copies, which he suffered to pass out of his hands without proper correction.

Such is the eventful, not to say romantic, history of Aristotle's manuscripts. And now, if these mutilated and corrupted copies were the only extant sources of Aristotle's works, as Strabo and most of those who have copied the story from him, have gratuitously inferred, then there is good reason for skepticism in regard to them, and *no wonder that there are in them some things hard to be understood!* But while we are not disposed to deny the truth of the principal facts in this narrative, we do not, on the other hand, feel obliged to admit the justice of the inference. It will be seen that this inference proceeds on the assumption that Aristotle's works were not published during his lifetime, but, existing only in the single manuscript in the Lyceum, were lost in that manuscript, and only recovered with it a century and a half after his death. Now we have the most decisive evi-

dence that he began to publish during his first residence at Athens, while he was *still connected* with the *Academy* ; since Cephisodorus censures him as having done an act unworthy of a philosopher, in publishing a book of Proverbs, and implies in various ways, that this was not the only book which he had then given to the public. And in the *interval* between his *leaving* the *Academy* and *establishing* the *Lyceum*, we find Alexander complaining in a letter to Aristotle, that he had published his Esoteric, as well as his Exoteric Philosophy. But, admitting that his principal works were not published during his lifetime, but were intended to be the exclusive property of the Lyceum and its pupils, (a supposition, by the way, as inconsistent with the well known disposition of Aristotle, as with the well authenticated facts just mentioned,) still it is utterly incredible, and not the less, but the more incredible on the above supposition, that the original manuscripts would have been allowed to pass out of the Lyceum, unless copies had been already taken and preserved. If the original manuscripts were the only copies in existence, Theophrastus would have bequeathed them, not to Neleus, but to Strabo, his successor in the Lyceum. Again, it rests on good authority that Aristotle's works were in the library at Alexandria in the days of Ptolemy Philadelphus ; and though these must have shared the fate of that library, still the fact shows that there were copies in existence at the very time when the originals are affirmed to have been buried at Scepsis. Finally, there are evidences too numerous to mention, which have been gleaned by recent German critics, and which justify them in the conclusion, that the works of Aristotle were actually read, during the period of their alleged inhumation, not only in the Lyceum, but by other philosophers and scholars.

It is not at all improbable, however, that when the original manuscripts were disinterred, and imperfect copies multiplied, they became the occasion of corrupting the copies derived from other sources. And it is impossible to decide how much, by this means, the edition now in use may have been

affected. It is admitted on all hands, that the received text demands the application of more enlightened and elaborate criticism, than has yet been bestowed upon it. At the same time, it is beginning to be acknowledged that the books of Aristotle, in their present state, are not the mass of corruptions and interpolations which literary skeptics have been ready to pronounce them to be.

As to the style of Aristotle, it is quite amusing, and not a little perplexing withal, to compare the encomiums which were lavished upon him by the ancients, with the severe animadversions of the moderns, and with the concise, clumsy, and jejune diction of his existing works. Cicero not only adverts to the ornaments of his style, and speaks of him as pouring forth a golden flood of eloquence, but he has preserved specimens of his writings that are quite rhetorical. He even wrote poetry in early life, though with what success does not so clearly appear. Quintilian speaks of the sweetness of his style, as not less wonderful than his knowledge or his acuteness. We think it must be admitted, that some at least of those works which are lost, were composed in a more flowing and popular style, than any which are now extant. Perhaps the following from Krug's *Lexicon* is as satisfactory a solution of the difficulty, as we can arrive at:

“The writings of Aristotle, like his spoken discourses, were partly exoteric and partly esoteric. According to an old expounder of Aristotle, (Ammonius Hermiae ad Aristot. *Categ.* fol. 2, 6,) the former, like Plato's dialogues, were composed in the form of conversations, while in the latter, the author spoke in his own person. The form of dialogue was in very common use among the philosophers of that day. It was also far better adapted to an exoteric discourse, than to an esoteric, which required to be strictly scientific, and arranged in logical order. And it is quite probable, in the nature of the case, that Aristotle may have used that form in his exoteric writings; if indeed Cicero has not expressly affirmed it in his letters to Atticus (IV. 16. XIII. 19.) But since not a single dialogue is found among the existing works of Aris-

totle, and since in these works reference is repeatedly made to his exoteric, or, as they are also called, encyclical writings, we must suppose, *that all the exoteric productions of this philosopher are lost, and only the esoteri remain*, while exactly the reverse has happened to Plato."

Of the animadversions of modern critics on the style of Aristotle, the following from Enfield's History of Philosophy may serve as a specimen: "No writer ever afforded more frequent examples of the poet's maxim,

————— Brevis esse laboro,
Obscurus fio, —————.

He affects close periods and a concise diction. He often supposes things to be known, which have either not been before explained, or may easily have escaped the reader's memory. Sometimes he makes use of different terms to express the same idea, and at other times, annexes different ideas to the same term. It is not an uncommon practice with him to use new words in an artificial and technical sense, which nevertheless he does not clearly define. His transitions are frequently so abrupt, or his progress from his premises to his conclusion so rapid, that it is extremely difficult for the reader to perceive the train of his reasoning. Through artifice, negligence, or a change of opinion, many contradictions occur, which the ingenuity of criticism has never yet been able to reconcile. His general propositions are frequently obscure for want of examples; and even his examples themselves, when he condescends to use them, are often as incomprehensible as the doctrines they are intended to elucidate. Mathematical ideas, with which he was exceedingly conversant, he sometimes applies to subjects to which they have no natural relation, and thus encumbers with artificial difficulties disquisitions which in themselves are sufficiently obscure. Lastly, in quoting the opinions of former philosophers, whether to examine, confirm, or confute them, he takes so little care to mark the transition from their words to his

own, that the reader is frequently at a loss to determine whether Aristotle is giving his own opinion or reporting that of some other philosopher."

We have nothing to add, except that *this witness is true*. The criticism of Lord Monboddo upon some portions of *Tacitus* would apply with more justice to no small part of *Aristotle's* writings. They scarcely deserve the name of *composition* at all, but seem rather like a rapid *outline* of *topics* and arguments, sketched as a guide to spoken discourse. But we have already said enough on this subject in our introductory article. We now proceed to give some more particular account of some of Aristotle's works, not in the form of an abstract or synopsis of his philosophical opinions, which of course would be very much colored by our own, but, in accordance with the method heretofore pursued, allowing the author to utter his own sentiments in his own order and manner, though of course much abridged and condensed, and then leave the reader to judge for himself. Some of the smaller and more practical treatises will be the most convenient for this purpose. A further reason for selecting these is also found in the fact that, while they are among the most satisfactory and valuable of Aristotle's works, they have seldom been duly appreciated. We begin with the

Rhetoric.

Rhetoric is defined to be an art which, on every subject, considers the capability of persuasion. It is not confined to any particular province, like medicine, geometry and arithmetic; but, like logic, it extends to every department of life, and aims at conviction and persuasion on every variety of subject. Genuine rhetoric has little to do with those modes of instruction which are frittered away in the manufacture of exordiums, perorations, and other artificial divisions of a discourse. Its main efficacy, nay, in the language of the author, its whole art, lies in the skilful use of *proof*. Proof is of two kinds—the one independent of the orator's art, such:

as testimony, torture, contracts, laws and other written documents; the other such as the orator can draw from his own character and history, or that of his client, from the dispositions, feelings, and circumstances of his audience, and from a skilful presentation in his discourse of collateral principles and facts. The orator, then, should apply himself to the study of three things: skill in the art of reasoning, acquaintance with the manners and characters of men, and the science of conducting the passions.

The reasoning employed by the orator differs from that of the logician, only in being less rigid and formal, so as to be adapted to popular discourse. The logician reasons by syllogism and induction; the orator's proofs consist of enthymemes and examples. The enthymeme is essentially a syllogism, abridged by suppressing one of the terms, which, being readily supplied by the hearer, need not be expressed. In like manner, examples are abridged processes of induction, in which the inferences or applications, instead of being formally stated, are left to be understood from the connection in which they are introduced. The essential principles of logic are, therefore, of indispensable use to the orator; and Aristotle's rhetoric, while itself wears to us, in considerable extent, the aspect of a modern treatise on logic, abounds in references to his logic for a fuller discussion of the same subjects.

Under the head of Enthymemes belong *signs*, which are of two kinds—the one arguing from particular to universal, the other from universal to particular. For instance, a sign that all men of ability are virtuous is, that Socrates, who was a man of ability, was also virtuous. This is a sign of the first class—from particular to universal. This, however, is not a necessary or convincing sign. The following, which belongs to the same class, is demonstrative proof: A sign that such a man is sick is, that he has a fever. Or a sign that such a woman is a mother is, that she has a breast of milk. Signs of the other class, from universal to particular, are never demonstrative, inasmuch as the universal may be

the sign of *any* one of a number of particulars, instead of the one specified. The following is an instance of such a sign: A sign that such a man has a fever is, that he is sick, or that he does not breathe freely.

Examples are arguments neither from particular to universal, nor from universal to particular, but from one particular to another, which is like it. For instance: if I wished to prove that, when Dionysius of Syracuse demanded body-guards, he intended to become a tyrant, I might say, that Pisistratus in like manner first demanded body-guards, and then seized upon the government; or I might adduce other instances in which men had become tyrants in the same way.

Those familiar with Whateley's Rhetoric will perceive, at once, its striking resemblance in this part to Aristotle's; and they need not be further taught, what no one indeed can fail to see, the importance to the popular orator of a practical acquaintance with this subject of signs and examples.

As to the *materials* or *means* of proof, the orator should be well furnished with what Aristotle, in common with other ancient rhetoricians, calls *Places* or *Topics*. These are of two kinds, common places and places proper. Common places are such as will serve for proof on any subject, whether of jurisprudence, or physics, or politics, or whatever it may be—such, for instance, as the argument *a fortiori*, which may be employed in any one department as well as any other. Places proper are such as apply only to one subject or department—to physics, for instance, to the exclusion of ethics, or to ethics in distinction from physics. These latter being more definite and appropriate to the case in hand, are the more satisfactory and useful. And since they vary with the subject or the circumstances of the case, it is obvious they will be different in the different kinds of eloquence. It becomes necessary, therefore, at this point to inquire how many and what these kinds are, that the way may thus be prepared to furnish the orator in each kind with appropriate topics of argument.

Aristotle makes the threefold division of eloquence, which has been adopted by most subsequent rhetoricians, into the

deliberative, the judicial, and the demonstrative. The deliberative respects the future, and is appropriately addressed to a legislative assembly. The judicial respects the past, and appeals to a bench of judges. The demonstrative has reference chiefly to the present, and its hearers are *simple* hearers for the sake of instruction or gratification. The deliberative has to do chiefly with the useful and the hurtful, and its office is to persuade to the former and to dissuade from the latter. The judicial has to do with the just and the unjust in the way of accusation and defence. The demonstrative has more to do with the honorable and the dishonorable in the way of praise and censure. Such is the peculiar and appropriate province of each kind of eloquence, though neither is absolutely confined within its own sphere.

Now, to each of these three kinds of eloquence there are topics or places, which are appropriate, and as the orator's success will depend entirely on his mastery and use of them, the remainder of the first Book is devoted to the purpose of furnishing him with a store of propositions, which he may use, as occasion requires, whether he speaks at the bar, at a funeral solemnity, or before the popular assembly. These propositions pertain to a great variety of subjects, which the author takes up successively, and discusses with the particularity almost of an ethical and political philosopher.

Those appropriate to the deliberative orator relate to such subjects as these: Finance, Peace and War, Garrisons, Exports and Imports, the Enaction of Laws, the *Summum Bonum* or Chief Felicity, with all those circumstances that contribute to it, such as health, strength, beauty, offspring, rank, reputation, friendship, riches, honors, the gifts of fortune, and the virtues of the soul,—the different forms of Government, such as Democracy, Oligarchy, Aristocracy and Monarchy, with the manners and dispositions characteristic of each. By a knowledge and a skilful use of these propositions on these numerous topics; the orator will be able to prove that the measures which he recommends are good, and that in a high degree, and those of his adversary highly evil.

in their tendency. In like manner, the author provides beforehand the demonstrative orator with the means of showing that a certain character is praiseworthy or censurable, and the judicial orator with proofs that such an action is just or unjust, and has or has not been done. In so doing he does not hesitate to teach the art of sophistry. Take, for instance, the following methods of false panegyric and inculpation. "In speaking against a man who is really brave, but who makes use of stratagem in war, we might call him a poltroon, whose courage is efficient only in detecting treasons and laying ambuscades. On the other hand, if the niggard is to be praised, we have only to extol his parsimony as economy and prudence. To the man who is insensible to insult, we might apply the terms mild and peaceful. While in speaking of a rough and choleric man, we would say, he is candid and open, and cannot dissemble. Besides the sophistry which may thus be practised in names, a thing may be made to pass as virtuous by a false course of reasoning, as thus: the man who unnecessarily runs into danger, may be expected to perform wonders when borne thither by the call of honor."

Under the head of judiciary rhetoric, the author dwells at great length on the means of showing that a particular action has or has not been done, and to this end enters into an elaborate analysis of the motives which impel men to action, of the classes of men that are likely to injure others, and of the kind of persons that are likely to be injured, thus enabling the advocate to confirm the testimony in his favor by setting forth its probability in the nature of the case, and to discredit the evidence against him or his client by exhibiting the intrinsic improbability that *such a person* should have done *such an act* under *such circumstances*. He then concludes that subject and the first Book by a lawyer-like discussion of the nature of law, and the kinds and degrees of evidence.

The second Book is made up of what we should call a philosophical treatise on the passions and dispositions of man-

kind.* He never loses sight, however, of the rhetorical application of his philosophy. He is still the practical, as well as the analytical philosopher, and practical in the truest and best sense. For the only solid basis for rhetoric, as for all those arts which have any thing to do with *men*, is a sound system of *Anthropology*. In connection with his analysis of each passion, he inquires, what persons are likely to be the subjects of it, and what objects or circumstances are fitted to excite it, that the orator may know when and how to raise or allay each several passion, as his interests may require. For the same purpose and in the same manner, he treats of the manners and habits which belong to different ages and conditions of men. And in conclusion, he deduces from these illustrations of human nature, places or topics of proof, which are alike applicable to all the several kinds of eloquence. After some remarks upon the use of Parables, Fables, and *Sentences*, (by which he means the opinions of wise and great men,) and after a chapter each on Sophistical Propositions and their refutation, the author passes to the third and *last Book*, which relates to the

Orator's Style and Manner.

Style and manner is manifestly quite a secondary affair in our author's estimation, and, as such, is treated in a brief and unsatisfactory way. He does indeed say, that of all the orators who appear in public, those only bear away the prize who are distinguished by a happy diction and a pleasing elocution. But he adds, that this results from the degeneracy and corruption of the age. And he manifestly feels that when the orator has brought forward satisfactory proof, that is enough, and nothing more ought to be required of him. Still he analyzes with profound skill, and *illustrates* with boundless

* I find it strange, says Lord Bacon, that Aristotle should have written divers volumes of *Ethics*, and never handled the affections, which is the principal subject thereof—and yet in his *Rhetoric* he findeth a place for them, and handleth them well for the quantity.

learning, the several figures of speech, the difficult kinds of style, and the successive parts of a complete discourse, little as he made of this branch of rhetoric comparatively. Subsequent rhetoricians have been indebted to him for not a few of their best thoughts and illustrations on the subject of style. And the young writer or student of modern times would do well to give heed particularly to what he says of the chief excellences of style, as consisting in a *transparent clearness* and a *happy adaptation* to the subject of which the writer treats, or the end which he aims to accomplish.

But we have already exhibited enough of Aristotle's rhetoric, to show its leading characteristics. It places the art of rhetoric on its true basis—viz. a thorough and profound acquaintance with mankind. It presents a just and instructive analysis of the human intellect and the human heart. It bids the young orator look chiefly to the discipline of his mental powers, to the acquisition of valuable knowledge, and to the skillful use of those powers and acquisitions for success in the art of conviction and persuasion. It diverts his attention from mere words to things—from all that is showy and frivolous, to all that is solid and substantial. In making so much of proof and so little of every thing else, Aristotle is not so partial or defective as, at first sight, he might appear to be. For, by proof he means whatever is fitted to affect and move the whole man—man as he is, and not merely as he should be—the particular men, whom the orator has occasion to address, whether governed by reason, or swayed by passion. Perhaps he ascribes too much to reasoning, and is too ready to suppose all men as purely intellectual as himself. Doubtless he attaches too little value to the cultivation of style and manner. But yet, if we must choose between the merely thoughtful and philosophical treatise before us, and the mere *word-mills*, *figure-machines*, and *sentence-factories*, that are too often dignified with the name of Rhetoric, give us Aristotle with all his faults.

The early Greek critics agree in ascribing to Aristotle's rhetoric the high honor of having formed the oratory of De-

mosthenes—an oratory which was as thoughtful and manly, as argumentative and compact, as the Stagirite himself would have it, but which was as pregnant with passion, as it was with observation and reflection—an oratory, which had for its body logic and common sense, but which had also a soul, and that a soul of true Promethean fire. Cicero entertained the highest respect, not only for Aristotle's genius as a philosopher, but for his skill and discernment as a critic.¹ Quintilian lauds him as if himself a pattern of the eloquence he teaches.² Lord Bacon thinks Aristotle exceeded himself in his rhetoric, because the competition of the Sophists here drove him into the field of observation and practical life, where alone true wisdom is to be found, and where, after all, the real strength of the Stagirite lay. We pass now to

The Poetic.

Only a single Book of this remains. But it is full of sound, valuable, and condensed matter. Like every other work of Aristotle, it goes to the bottom of things, strips off their forms and penetrates to their essential, living principles.

The essential principle of poetry consists in its being an *imitation*. It differs from history for instance, not in that the former is written in verse and the latter in prose; for the narrations of Herodotus would be a history though rendered into verse, while the Mimes of Sophron are poetry, though written in prose. On the other hand, Homer and Empedocles both wrote in verse; but the one is a poet, while the other is only a naturalist. But history is a *reality*; poetry an *imitation*. History relates to what has actually been done; poetry, what may or might be done. Poetry is, therefore, more instructive than history; for history details particular facts, while poetry teaches general truths.

¹ Quis omnium doctior? quis acutior? quis in rebus, vel inveniendis, vel judicandis, acrior Aristotele fuit? Cic de orat.

² Quem dubito scientia rerum, an scriptorum copia, an *eloquendi suavitate*, an inventionum acumine, an varietate operum, clariorem patem.

The several kinds of poetry are all imitations. But they differ from each other in three respects: by using means of imitation different in kind, or by the difference of the things imitated, or by imitating in a different manner. The *means* of imitation in poetry are language, harmony or music, and rhythm or movement. The dance imitates by rhythm alone; epic poetry, by language only, oftener verse, but sometimes prose; lyric, by language and harmony; dramatic, often by rhythm, language, and harmony combined.

The *things imitated* in poetry are the actions and characters of men. Tragedy represents its characters greater and better than they are in real life; comedy, worse than they are; epic poetry, sometimes better, sometimes worse, sometimes as they are, according to the genius of the poet.

As to the *manner* of imitation, it may be entirely by narration, as in lyric poetry; or entirely by representation, as in dramatic; or partly by narration and partly by representation, as in the Homeric Poems.

Poetry originates in and is based upon two principles in our nature—love of harmony and fondness for imitation. So strong is the latter principle, that things which we view with pain in themselves, we love to see represented as accurately as possible.

Homer may be regarded as the father of dramatic as well as epic poetry, since his works are full of dramatic representation; and the elements of comedy are found in the *Margites*, as the materials of tragedy are in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. The Dorians laid claim to the invention of dramatic poetry, and in proof referred to the *words* drama, tragedy, and comedy, which are all of Doric, not Attic, origin. But the Attics soon improved the drama and appropriated it almost exclusively to themselves.

Six parts enter into the nature and merits of a perfect tragedy: the fable or plot, the manners or characters, the language, the sentiments, the apparatus of the theatre, and the music. The plot is the chief part; and the characters, the second in relative importance—the former being, as it

were, the soul, and the latter the coloring or complexion of the piece. Sentiment holds the third place, and its merit lies in being consonant with the plot and the characters.

A well-planned or well-plotted tragedy is an imitation of a perfect and *entire* action and one of *suitable magnitude*. An entire thing is that which has a beginning, a middle and an end. A beginning is that which need not be preceded, but must be followed by some other objects or events. An end is that which may not be followed but must be preceded by something else. A middle requires other circumstances, suitably related, both to precede and to follow it. Accordingly a good plot does not begin nor proceed nor end casually or disconnectedly.

Magnitude no less than symmetry is an essential element of beauty. No very small animal can be beautiful; for the view, being crowded into an almost imperceptible time as well as space, will be confused. Neither can a very large one be beautiful, for, as the whole view cannot be taken in at once, its unity and completeness cannot be seen. Suppose for instance, an animal 10,000 stadia in length! So the dramatic plot should be of such a length, that the connection of the story may be readily remembered, and that, by a natural and a probable succession of incidents, there may be a change of fortune from happiness to misery, or from misery to happiness. In fact a tragedy is seldom allowed to embrace the incidents of more than one day. The unity of a plot does not consist in its relating to one person only. There may be many actions of the same man, that have no important connection with each other; while on the other hand, the actions of several men may be so intimately connected, that they cannot be separated. The action, or combination of actions, must be one in such a sense, that no part can be altered or taken away without confusing or destroying the whole.

The *Peripetia* or catastrophe of a tragedy is an unexpected reverse of fortune arising naturally out of the incidents. As in the *Oedipus Tyrannus*, a person coming with the idea of consoling the prince and removing his apprehensions, produces

the contrary effect. Persons of extraordinary virtue should not be represented as falling from happiness to misery, as that would offend our sense of justice, and excite disgust. Still less should vicious persons pass from misery to happiness, for the same reason. Neither should a very bad man be represented as falling from happiness to misery; for, though agreeable to our wishes, that would not excite either pity or terror—the passions appropriate to tragedy. The proper character for tragedy is the medium between these—not distinguished for virtue, nor reduced to misery by his villainy; but some one in high reputation and prosperity, suffering through ignorance and human frailty, like Oedipus and Thyestes. Double plots, like the *Odyssey*, having a different catastrophe for the virtuous and the vicious, are allowable, but less tragic. Single plots, in which the characters all pass from misery to happiness, are entirely inappropriate to tragedy, since they excite neither terror nor pity. On the same principles the tragic effect is best produced, not when an enemy kills an enemy or a stranger injures a stranger, but when a friend unintentionally or unknowingly involves a friend in evil, or occasions his ruin.

The *manners* or *characters* should be essentially good, characteristic of the class or condition, suited to the persons, and consistent throughout. The *sentiments* to be conveyed, and the manner in which they are to be conveyed, our author treats slightly, as belonging rather to the province of rhetoric. For a similar reason, he might have passed over the *language* as belonging to the department of grammar. But he has chosen rather to introduce a treatise on grammar; for such, or rather a treatise on grammar and rhetoric combined, is his whole discussion of the language of the drama. It may not be amiss to notice in passing, that Aristotle makes but four parts of speech, viz., article, noun, verb, and connective, including under noun the adjective and pronoun, under verb the participle and adverb, and under connective conjunction, preposition, and interjection. A like disposition to simplify and generalize is seen in the application of the single term

case to the changes of termination in the verb, as well as the noun.

The concluding chapters institute a comparison between the tragic and the epic poem by way not only of pointing out their differences, but also of determining their relative excellence. They agree in most of their essential elements. But the epic dispenses with music and scenic preparations. It is confined for the most part to hexameter verse, and it admits of greater length. The drama does not admit of long episodes, while the epic derives its length from them. The main story of the *Odyssey* may be told in three sentences. It is the episodes that stretch it into twenty-four Books. In like manner, the *Iliad* also contains many fables or plots for the drama.

Heroic verse certainly surpasses in dignity and elevation the Iambic, which is often used in animated conversation under the promptings of nature. The epic may also be said to be superior to the tragic in dispensing with music and action, and so addressing itself more exclusively to the eye and ear of the mind. But a good tragedy will bear to be read, as well as a good epic. And the music and action, when skilfully applied, afford so much additional pleasure and excitement. Tragedy has also more perfect unity, and being more concentrated, is more intense in its impression and effect.

Such is an outline of Aristotle's justly celebrated *Poetic*. We have not followed exactly his arrangement throughout. We may have failed, in some instances, to catch his idea, for this work, like others of the same author, is not without its disputed points. We have often simplified his language and made it more conspicuous. But we have doubtless obscured his meaning in many parts by the brevity which we have been obliged to consult. On the whole, we believe we have given a fair representation of the work. And though it is only an abstract of a fragment, with which we here present our readers, yet we think they cannot but be struck with the profound thought and masterly analysis with

which the author treats so vague and so subtle a subject. A like thorough and philosophical discussion of the theory of all the fine arts were a treasure indeed. More nearly such, doubtless, was the entire work. Such at all events the author was manifestly capable of furnishing. This treatise is founded deep in the nature of the human soul. At the same time, it is constructed with constant reference to the *jus, et norma, et usus loquendi* of the best poets. It is replete with original thought. It is also fraught with various learning, though we have been obliged to sacrifice to conciseness his copious and pertinent illustrations.

For ages, the Poetic of Aristotle ruled with as absolute sway in the world of letters, as his philosophy did in the theological world. The great French dramatists in particular, were far more afraid of sinning against the unities of Aristotle than against the law of God. They thus hampered their genius and impaired the value of their productions. But it was the abuse of a good thing. We might have had some better poetry, but we should have had a vast deal of worse, if Aristotle had never written. German authors and scholars for the most part complain that the Poetic is not sufficiently ideal, and adheres too strictly to the "*empirical stand-point of his philosophy.*" But now and then one of them is extravagant in praise of it. Thus Lessing pronounces it as infallible in its principles and as incontrovertible in its arguments, as the Elements of Euclid! The Poetic is well worthy of a place among the Classics in every system of liberal education. No modern treatise on *Æsthetics* can wholly supersede it. The moderns may produce works, that are fuller and more complete, but none more acute or more profound. In our opinion it is one of the very best of all the works of its illustrious author.

After so copious an analysis of the doctrine, and so full an illustration of the manner of Aristotle in the foregoing treatises, we shall content ourselves with a brief abstract of the other works which we shall mention. And first, of

The Ethics.

When we look at man as he acts under the promptings of his own nature, we see that he seeks some things for their own sake, and other things for the sake of their consequences—in other words, that he seeks some things only as means, while he seeks other things directly as ends. That which he always seeks for its own sake, and for the sake of which he seeks every thing else, is *happiness*. *Happiness*, therefore, is his *ultimate end* or *chief good*.

The highest felicity or chief good appropriate to *man* must be found chiefly, though not exclusively, in the exercise of those *faculties* which distinguish the *human species*. These are understanding and will, the former possessing reason essentially in itself, the latter capable of being associated with, and assimilated to, that divine principle. From these two powers of the human soul, result two classes of virtues, the intellectual and the moral. Sagacity, penetration, intelligence, wisdom, are virtues of the understanding. Gentleness, temperance, fortitude, justice, are virtues of the will or heart. The former consist in the proper disposition and habit of the intellectual part of the soul; the latter in the proper disposition and habit of the inclinations and passions, which, being found subordinate to reason, perform their duty, only when they implicitly obey its dictates. The intellectual virtues depend chiefly on exercise and education; the moral proceed entirely from habit, whence they derive their name (*ἦθος*, *Mores*, *Morals*).

Virtue is a practical art, and, like all the arts of life, can be acquired only by practice. It is neither natural, nor yet contrary to nature. We are born capable of attaining it, but the attainment must be made and perfected by habit. The virtues, consisting in a proper moderation of the faculties or feelings, from which they spring, lie in a medium between the extremes of too little and too much. Thus to fear every thing is cowardice; to fear nothing is audacity. True cour-

age fears that which is formidable, and fears nothing else. Temperance is a medium between the excessive pursuit and the entire renunciation of the pleasures of sense. As men are more inclined to the excess than to the defect in this case, the former only is called intemperance; but the latter is also a vice, and may be called insensibility. In like manner, generosity is the mean between avarice and profusion; modesty, between pride and diffidence; gentleness, between irascibility and softness; magnificence, between ostentation and parsimony, etc. etc. In a word, *every virtue consists in a mean between two vicious extremes*. And a virtuous person is one who is in the *habit* of maintaining this due medium.

There are many, and those among the most important virtues, the exercise of which, at first, is not attended with pleasure. Such are temperance, fortitude, prudence, patriotism, friendship, justice, which often require, at first, much self-denial, pains-taking and persevering effort. But by habit they all become sources of pleasure; and the pleasure with which we practise them, is the very *test and measure* of our *virtues*.

The moral virtues, according to Aristotle, cannot subsist without some mixture of the intellectual; but the intellectual may subsist by themselves alone. Moreover, the moral virtues depend upon circumstances for their exercise. We may have the virtuous dispositions or habits, and yet not have the means wherewith, or the objects whereupon, to exercise them. But the intellectual virtues are independent of outward objects. They require only the contemplative mind, and they may be exerted under any circumstances. They afford pleasure in their very exercise, and are in themselves sufficient and complete. Accordingly, Aristotle agrees with Plato in finding the highest felicity of which man is susceptible in the exertion of his rational powers, and in the exercises of contemplative wisdom.

Aristotle's Ethics is chargeable with the same faults, which we have discovered in his other works—an excessive disposition to simplify and generalize—an excessive fondness for the

intellectual and the abstract. According to his own definition, he certainly is not a virtuous philosopher. He carries every thing to an extreme. And the intellectual extreme in morals is particularly vicious, because it strikes out the corner-stone of virtue. Well might Bacon say: "I find it *strange* that Aristotle should have written divers volumes of ethics, and never handled the *affections*, which is the *principal subject* thereof!" Never were two ethical systems more entirely at variance as to the nature of virtue, than those of Aristotle and President Edwards. Edwards on the Affections would have been quite as effectual a *poser* to Aristotle, as Edwards on the Will is to certain modern admirers of Plato. With Aristotle, virtue is not *love* to any thing—least of all, "*love to being in general*." The great *source* and *sum* of being is *struck out* of his system of morals. Instead of basing his ethics upon theology, as Socrates did, he has built a temple without a god, and without any place for one. And as he acknowledges no all-seeing eye to discern the heart, so he pays no regard to the motives and springs of human action. He recognizes no higher guide of moral conduct than *reason*, and no deeper foundation of moral character, than *habit*. The Ethics is therefore false in theory and of little use in practice.

But it abounds in important thoughts, ingenious speculations, and able reasonings. The definition of virtue, as consisting in a mean between two extremes, and the test and measure of virtue as lying in the pleasure with which we practise it—both these, though hasty generalizations, which will not bear so universal an application, are certainly happy thoughts, which are well worthy of our attentive consideration. And his view of habit as constituting the character, becomes a truth of vast importance, if only extended so as to embrace, not merely the habitual conduct, but the habitual motives by which it is prompted. Aristotle's Ethics made a bad standard of theology for the doctors and divines of the middle ages. It would not make a good text-book of moral philosophy for the professors of our day. But no curious and reflecting mind

can read a page of it without finding ample stimulus and food for thought.

In close connection with his Ethics, Aristotle composed his treatise on

Politics.

In his view the community, or the state, is prior, in the intention of nature, to the individual, as every whole is prior in the intention of nature to its parts; and the individual can no more attain to the perfection of his nature, or answer the end of his existence without the state, than the hand or the foot can live and move and have its being without the body. Man is born a gregarious, nay a *political* animal. He seeks political society instinctively, as flocks herd and bees work together under the guidance of instinct, and his nature demands association and law and government, as much more than theirs, as he is more highly endowed with the gift of communication and the capacity for social improvement. To suppose that he was not made for society, were to impeach nature (who never does any thing without an object) of folly, in endowing him with speech. And to suppose that he was not made for *political* society, were to suppose that he was meant to be the worst of animals; for such man uncivilized and ungoverned always is, while man perfected by the offices of social and civil life, is by far the best. Thus government, as well as society, is the dictate of nature and the result of necessity.

Political society is defined to be a sort of community or partnership, existing for the benefit of the partners. Its germ is to be found in the family. The family grows into a canton or clan. And the clan increases, till it becomes a nation. Hence the earliest form of government known in history, is the monarchical, which is a modification of the patriarchal.

Aristotle justifies *slavery*, as founded in nature and sustained by analogy. Some are born to command, others to obey; some to think and others to labor; and as the soul is master of the body, so the intellectual and the wise should be mas-

ters of the imbecile and the ignorant. And such subjection is for the good of the slave, just as it is for the good of the body to be subject to the soul. This principle, however, justifies slavery no further than it is for the mutual benefit of both parties, and only where the master is as fit to command, as the slave is to obey. Liberty is the right of the slave just so soon as he is worthy to obtain it and capable of enjoying it. And just so soon it is the duty and the interest of the state to see that he is emancipated.

The principle of this argument, Aristotle contends, will not justify the enslavement of women. For women, as a sex, nature has made *different* from men rather than *inferior* to them ; and so fitted them to be their partners, but not adapted them to be their slaves. To enslave them is proof of barbarism. Barbarians reduce their women to the level of slaves, because they have not themselves risen to the rank of men.

A *community* of women and children, (which Plato so earnestly recommends in his Republic,) to say nothing of its tendency to licentiousness, incest, parricide, and every crime against nature, paralyzes exertion, precludes home education, and annihilates natural affection. If it checks self-interest, it does so only by the extinction of all interest ; if it represses self-love, it does so only by smothering all love. As a drop of honey is dissipated and lost in a pail of water, so the sweet affection of love perishes by too extensive a diffusion.

Similar objections lie against a *community* of goods (which is another of Plato's darling day-dreams). It cuts the sinews of industry and blinds the eye of vigilance. It multiplies occasions for dissension in the very effort to procure harmony. It destroys the pleasure of saying This is mine—a pleasure as natural as self-love, and as innocent. It precludes the privilege of giving to others. Destroy marriage, and what room will be left for the virtue of chastity ? Destroy property, and what room will be left for the virtue of liberality ? A false principle deceived Plato. He took for granted, that the union of his citizens could not be too intimate ; whereas this union, if it could be carried beyond certain lim-

its (as it cannot be), would destroy the commonwealth, and make the community a unity. Symphony is good, and metre is good ; but symphony is destroyed when it is changed into sameness of tone, and metre is destroyed when it is changed into sameness of time. The greater the variety of tones, the richer the music, if the chords are preserved. So the greater the individuality of the citizens, the better the commonwealth, if harmony is maintained.

So of all forced schemes for equalizing property. Shares may be all equal ; and yet they will all be too small, if they foster sloth and luxury. Mediocrity ought to be the aim of legislation ; but this object will be better attained by moderating passion, than by levelling property.

This whole Book (the *second* Book in which Aristotle comments with singular good sense on several model Republics, both real and ideal, particularly on the Republic of Plato) we would recommend to the attentive perusal of the Fourierists and other levellers of our day. It concludes with some very sensible remarks on innovation, which might be useful to all our people, and which we would gladly extract for the readers of the Repository ; but it would lead us too far from the main purpose of these Sketches.

To return now with our author to a more general view of the nature and end of government. As every partnership is formed for the interest of all the partners, so the end of government is the good of all the citizens, including the rulers *as citizens*. Such a government is rightful and useful, whatever be its form. If administered by one man, it is called a monarchy ; if by a few, an aristocracy ; if by the many, a republic. When the good of the rulers instead of the citizens becomes the end, then a monarchy is perverted into a tyranny, an aristocracy into an obligarchy, and a republic into a democracy. For a democracy may be selfish and exclusive as well as an oligarchy or a tyranny itself. It may seek the good of a greater number, and so be a less wrong ; but if it seeks the good of a class and not of the community—of part and not of the whole—it is still oppressive and unjust.

No government can be truly good which is not administered agreeably to an established constitution and laws. And it matters little as to the result, whether it be an individual tyrant, or a tyrannical few, or a tyrannical majority, that tramples on the constitution and governs without law ; in either case it is a despotic and not a free or rightful government. When they rise above law and the constitution, the votes of the majority are as tyrannical as the ordinances of the oligarchy, or the edicts of the autocrat. And as the court-flatterer in the one case, so the popular demagogue in the other, is usually the real despot, carrying every thing in his own way, and making sport and havoc of the true interests of the people. It not unfrequently happens, that the constitution is one thing *de jure*, and quite another thing *de facto*. Manners prevail over the laws, and the law remains a dead letter ; while they who have effected the change become masters of the commonwealth.

Political institutions are best fitted for promoting human happiness, when they are best adapted to the character and sentiments of the people, and to the circumstances of the age and country. No one political system will suit all countries. Government being an arrangement, the best government is the best arrangement ; and the best arrangement is that which the materials to be arranged are best fitted to receive and to preserve. The materials of the statesman are the number and character of the people, and the extent and quality of the country. Pure democracy is suited only to a limited territory and a uniform population. An agricultural people are most likely to possess this social equality, while their habits and pursuits produce also the sound and healthy state of *body*, *mind*, and *heart*, which is essential to the maintenance of a democracy. Aristocracy is suited only to a people where there is a great natural and social inequality between one class and all the others. On the same principle, pure monarchy theoretically requires that one man—if hereditary, one *family*—possess a like superiority over all others ; though the habit of loyalty and veneration may perpetuate

such a distinction in feeling long after it has ceased to exist in fact.

But no government can make a people happy, that are not in a good degree virtuous. No relation of superiority to other nations can make a people happy, that have not the elements of happiness in themselves. Wealth, power, prosperity, is not happiness any more than a *lyre* is *music*. The happiness of a nation rests on the same basis as the happiness of an individual, viz. virtue—intellectual and moral excellence. Men make governments, not governments men; and by no political arrangements can a happy commonwealth be formed of tyrants or slaves, profligates or cowards, knaves or fools. The virtues of a good citizen and a good man are not identical, neither are they independent of each other. He will hardly be a good citizen, especially in a *republic*, who is not also a good man. He can hardly be expected to treat his country better than he does his neighbors and himself.

That government is the best which most powerfully stimulates the energies of the people to beneficial purposes, and restrains them from hurtful pursuits. That, in most cases, must be a system of freedom, tempered with order and moderation. Mixed governments, wisely formed and balanced, best correspond to the state of mankind. Democracy, though apparently most agreeable to the rights of men, and perhaps preferable to either of the other simple forms of government, is not adapted to his wants. It requires more virtue than the mass of mankind can be expected to possess. Besides it is too apt to run into excess. It is at once too precipitate in deliberation and too tardy in execution. Simple monarchy and simple aristocracy are equally inexpedient; and being the subjection of the many to the few, are even less just. For these reasons Aristotle recommends a constitution that combines and balances the three forms, as most likely in general to promote the good of society. Such a mixed government would not properly bear the name either of a monarchy, an aristocracy, or a democracy. Aristotle calls it by way of eminence a *πολιτεία*, or a republic. The strength of such a

government lies in the middle classes of citizens—those who are neither very poor nor very rich ; and it cannot well be maintained, unless this middle class exceed in number and power either, if not both, of the extremes. The policy of a republic, therefore, is not to cater to the very rich nor the very poor, but to legislate with a chief regard to the middling classes. And, indeed, since this is the best form of government, the wise legislator, keeping it in view as his *beau idéal*, will always and every where strengthen the middling classes just so far as the peculiar circumstances of his people will allow.

Aristotle makes three departments of the government, corresponding in nature, though not exactly in name, with our Legislative, Judiciary, and Executive ; and he lays down distinctly the doctrine, well enough understood now, though little known in his day and *too little practised in ours*, that these departments should be kept distinct. The concentration of them all in the same hands, whether it be of one, of the few, or the many, is fatal to liberty and justice.

Laying, as he does, the foundation of political freedom and happiness in individual intelligence and virtue, Aristotle must of course attach great importance to *popular education*. His last book is devoted to this subject, which he discusses at length and with great ability. Education, he says, must be universal, uniform, public (under the control of law), and adapted to the genius and institutions of the people. The people must be early taught, not only to understand the political institutions under which they live, but to cherish the corresponding habits and the *needful virtues*. The youth of a democracy, for example, should be taught, not, as many suppose, to regard their own will as law, but to honor their superiors, obey their parents, and reverence the laws of the land ; for they only are fit to command, who have learned to obey. On the same principle, the noble youth in a monarchy or aristocracy should be disciplined to moderation toward their inferiors.

Aristotle would not allow of marriage till the age of thirty-seven for males and eighteen for females ! Children should

be subjected to no tasks till they are five years of age, and should be educated at home till the age of seven. Physical education should precede mental ; and moral discipline should go before that which is purely intellectual. Laborious exertion of the body and the mind ought not to be exacted at the same age, since both task and exhaust the same vital energies. In short, the fundamental principles of this treatise are strikingly coincident with those of the Combes and the Brighams, the Taylors and the Humphreys of our day. It goes for slow development, and home education, and division of labor. It goes against infant schools, (my readers will pardon the *apparent anachronism*,) and manual labor schools, and boarding schools for babies. And after all the experiments that have been crowded into the last quarter of a century, the judicious part of the American public are coming back to the principles of the Stagirite in education ; as we have before seen, they are coming back to the Aristotelian systems of rhetoric and logic.

There are other points in this little treatise on education to which we intended to advert, such as the cultivation of *music* to refine the sentiments, and *drawing* to form an eye for natural beauty, etc. But we have already extended this notice of his politics far beyond our prescribed limits. The fact is, it is not an easy matter to *condense solid gold*. In his Politics, the practical good sense of the author shines out with unclouded lustre. How unlike the dreams of Plato ! How superior to all the speculations and all the actual experiments of antiquity ! How anticipative of the results of modern experience ! It is a noble and lasting monument of political sagacity. It could have been reared only by one, who united study with observation. Aristotle proceeds throughout on the principle, that *men are depraved and selfish*, and so steers clear of all Utopian projects. He carries this principle too far, however, especially in regard to the *masses*, whom he is too much inclined to give over to hopeless degradation. At the same time he freely concedes the superior honesty (in intention) of the many, and their superior intelli-

gence too, *other things being equal*. Two eyes, he says, are better than one, and many are better than two.

Aristotle's *Politics* is radically defective in one particular, which we have already mentioned as a serious defect in the *Ethics*. It has nothing to do with religion—nothing to say of a God. This is a common fault in political treatises; but it is a fatal one. Socrates would as soon have recommended a state without a magistrate, as without a God. He would as soon have thought of governing a people well without law, as without religion. And so would any other wise legislator. It is not perhaps to be wondered at, that overlooking this controlling principle, he should despair of the elevation of the masses.

Aristotle could have formed no conception of a republic so vast as ours is. In his view, such a state would have appeared as unwieldy as the ship of two furlongs, which he speaks of in his *Politics*, and as monstrous as the animal ten thousand stadia long, which he imagines in his *Poetic*. The principle of representation was not then understood, which gives an indefinite expansibility to republican government. Still there are hints in Aristotle about the dangers of too extensive a territory, and too rapid an influx of foreign population, which are full of truth and signification to us. His Book on the causes of dissolution and means of preservation to governments, (the 5th Book, which we have been obliged to pass over entirely,) is full of instructive facts drawn from the history of a multitude of ancient states. And the grand principles of the science of government, as he has laid them down, will never become obsolete. The experience of ages has served only to establish them. To this day, we know of no political manual which can claim to supersede Aristotle's *Politics*, on the ground either of a comprehensive induction of facts or a profound investigation of principles. And it is greatly to be regretted, that it has fallen so extensively into disuse among our statesmen and scholars.

Had we space, we would speak of the *Natural History of Aristotle*, which is a vast collection of physiological and

anatomical facts from accurate observation, and which presents the author in a very honorable contrast with most of the other naturalists of antiquity. While the other philosophers of the age scorned to investigate the actual structure of natural objects, he seems to have dissected many animals, and illustrated them by drawings as well as descriptions.

If we would do full justice to the genius of Aristotle, we must remember that this same nice observer, and accurate writer in Natural History, is also the author of a system of *Logic* so perfect that, in the language of Kant, "Logic has neither advanced nor receded a step, since the days of Aristotle."

But the loftiest powers fall from the sublime to the ridiculous, when they attempt impossibilities. If the reader would see a striking illustration of this, and at the same time enjoy a hearty laugh, let him read over a summary of the contents in Tauchnitz's or any other good edition of the *Physics*, and observe what Aristotle's ideas were of the proper province of physical science. Then open at any page and see how ingeniously he handles his shadowy topics—with what sober earnestness he argues about entities and quiddities, or rather *nonentities* and *nihilities*—and with what magic skill he conjures up spectres and then conjures them down again! Turn, for instance, to the chapter on *Time*, and read the following argument on the question, whether it belongs to the category of existences or non-existences: That it does not exist at all, he says, or that it can hardly be said to exist, one might readily presume. For part of it has been, and so exists no longer; another part is to be, and so does not yet exist. And of these parts time unlimited and successive is made up. But that which is made up of non-existences, can hardly be said to partake of existence! Besides, if any thing divisible into parts exists, it must needs be that, when it exists, some or all of its parts exist. But of the parts into which time is divisible, some have been and others will be, but none of them *is*. For the *present* is *not* a *part*, for a *part* is always a measure of the whole, and the whole is made up of its parts;

but the present is not a measure of all time, nor is all time made up of presents.

Again, in regard to the *now*, which seems to separate between the past and the future, it is no easy matter to determine, whether it is always one and the same now or an unlimited succession of different ones. If we suppose an unlimited succession of different ones, then, since different nows cannot coexist, each former now must have perished. But if it has perished, it must have perished at some *time*; and of course either in itself or in some other now. But it could not have perished in itself, for then it was existing. Neither could it have perished in some other now, for in that case, the two nows must have coexisted and been one and the same now!! Equally absurd and impossible is it to suppose that the now remains always one and the same. For the now is the limit or boundary line of time; and time, like every thing else that is finite and divisible, has more than one limit or bounding line!!!

But enough of these abstractions. We think our readers will all agree, that the *now we live in is a very different one from that in which Aristotle did battle so valiantly with these spectres!* The *times* have greatly altered since such demonstrations were deemed conclusive, or such speculations thought to have any thing to do with physical science.

ARTICLE II.

PECK'S DIVINE RULE OF FAITH AND PRACTICE REVIEWED.

By Rev. JOHN MCCLINTOCK, Professor in Dickinson College, Pa.

Appell from Tradition to Scripture and Common Sense; or an answer to the question, What constitutes the Divine Rule of Faith and Practice? By GEORGE PECK, D.D. New-York: Methodist Episcopal Press. 1844.*

LORD BACON believed that in his age men might devote themselves to good learning, because they had "consumed all that can be said in controversies of religion, which do so much to divert them from other sciences." Had he foreseen the future in this matter, as well as in many others, he would have put in a saving word or two. All has been said, perhaps, in controversies of religion, that can be either *new* or *true*; but as for the mere faculty of *saying*,—of forging new lies, and revamping old ones—of uttering words without knowledge to darken counsel,—men have it in full perfection in this nineteenth century. And the very controversy which, of all others perhaps, the great philosopher thought to be most fully settled,—the controversy of the Church and the Scriptures, the Tabernacle and the Testimony, the husk and the kernel,—is as fiercely waged now, as it had been in the century preceding his own, when the storm swept over all lands, and bore down, in its impetuous course, the massive fabrics of falsehood, which ages of priestcraft had so toil-somely built up on the sands of superstition. In the nineteenth century we have to fight over again the battles of the sixteenth; and, to say truth, with this disadvantage, that we have to contend not merely with open enemies but with treacherous friends. The enemy is in our own camp. There

* The article would have appeared soon after the publication of Dr. Peck's book, but for the long continued illness of the author.

are men bearing the name of Protestant, who use the influence of that name to give force to Romish weapons ;—who get their bread and their character in a church whose foundations they are laboring to undermine. There are not wanting now, to quote Lord Bacon again, “a kind of persons which love the salutation of Rabbi, Master ; not in ceremony or compliment, but in an inward authority which they seek over men’s minds, in drawing them to depend upon their opinions, and to seek knowledge at their lips.” In fact, this is an age of hot theological controversy. Nor is this so bad an omen as some suppose. “There is a stirring and far-heard music sent forth by the tree of sound knowledge when its branches are waving in the storm.” If there is not peace in an age when the winds of controversy are abroad, there is at least life. The present activity of the Church of England, bad as is the direction which much of it has taken, is better than the torpid, or even ghastly formality of former ages in its history. The ghosts of old errors are revived, it is true,—but they will be laid again : and, in the mean time, living men will have been startled from their slumbering propriety. In this, as in all other controversies, truth has nothing to fear, but cowardly supporters ; and even this danger in the present instance is over, for her champions have started up at the sound of the trumpet, with bold hearts for the combat, and with strong arms to wield their well-forged weapons. But it is not to be denied that the use of these weapons has been forgotten by too many ; and herein will be found one of the good results of the present warfare, that men will be trained again to use them, and perhaps better than ever. We do not share, then, in the fears of those who find, in the renewal of the great controversies of the Reformation, ground of apprehension for the real welfare of the church. Out of this general activity great good will come. Men will be led to take deeper views of church government and church authority, than they have ever done before. The *Idea* of the church, which, after all, is the central question in the present controversies, will be brought out boldly before many

minds that have conceived it heretofore only vaguely and indistinctly. The study of antiquity, always an ennobling one when rightly followed, will take its proper place among the pursuits especially of clergymen; and in its strong light they will see how weak a thing human judgment is, whether the private judgment of unlearned individuals or the collective judgment of grave and reverend doctors, synods and councils. True Protestantism has no fear of antiquity; nor, although she refuses that blind reverence which believes every old doctrine of theology to be true, does she deny, on the other hand, that every true doctrine is old. That Protestants, at least many of them, have gone too far in isolating the present history of Christianity from the past, and in rejecting, or rather neglecting, the witness which Christ has left of himself in all ages among his people, is too plain a fact to be denied. But the true spirit of Protestantism is not the ephemeral thing which some suppose it to be; it is not the spirit peculiarly of the nineteenth, the sixteenth, or any other century; but the spirit of humble trust in the Revelation of God, as the guide to all truth, and of Faith in Christ as the ground of all salvation. It is not a mere negative Rationalism, elevating human reason into the seat of God, on the one hand; nor a babbling and persecuting Fanaticism, substituting feeling for faith, on the other; nor a gloomy asceticism, crushing man's will and passions; nor a lawless licentiousness, emancipating them from all control; but an humble consecration of will and sense, of feeling and reason, the devotion of all without the destruction of either, upon the sole altar which Christianity admits, the lowly altar of the heart, on which each single Christian, himself a Priest unto God through Christ, offers up the "living sacrifice" which God demands of all men, as their "reasonable service."

Nor yet does Protestantism, as its revilers say, in thus denying that there can be any intervention between man and his Maker, except the one Mediator, cut off individual men from fellowship with each other and nullify the Church of Christ. In CHRIST believers are one, and in CHRIST alone. As CHRIST

is the Mediator between God and man, so too, he is the bond of union between man and man, in the fellowship of his Spirit. The genuine believer, united with Christ, is united with all that are His, in this land, and in all lands, in this age, and in all ages. And this is the Church, as the true Protestant and the true Christian have always held. This Church of Christ has never been wanting upon Earth, since the day when the Master, ascending from Bethany, gave the last look of blessing to his disciples. Its apostolical succession of faithful preachers has never failed. Its apostolical tradition of Christ's truth, "written for our knowledge," has never been lost, and shall never be,—not one jot or tittle of it. Amid all trials, of pagan persecutions and imperial cruelties, of false prosperity and deep adversity, of cringing priests and lordly bishops, it has never yet been overthrown, nor shall it be, for the "gates of hell shall not prevail against it." To this Church of Christ the heart of the true Protestant clings, and however the Romanist or the Puseyite may stigmatize it as a "chimera" because "invisible," the Protestant, not without knowledge of the history of the past, and not without earnest hopes for the future, still professes, in that creed worthy to be named Apostolic, his belief in "the Holy Catholic Church, the communion of saints," and loves it not the less, believes in it not the less, that it presents no outward tabernacle, that it enthrones no visible Head, that it supports no proud hierarchy, that it claims no degrading homage, that it utters no fearful anathemas.

Closely connected with this question of the true idea of the Church, or indeed identical with it in the last analysis, is that of the Rule of Faith. *In causis spiritualibus necessarius admittendus aliquis supremus iudex controversiarum* is the old postulate of those who contend for a visible Church endowed with God's own infallibility. Grant them their postulate, in their own sense of it, and the whole theory of "Church principles," as the modern successors of Hildebrand complacently name their dogmas, will inevitably follow. On the

other hand, let it be settled that the Scriptures, and the Scriptures alone, constitute the true rule of Christian faith and practice, and we shall have done for ever with the juggling priestcraft which has so long disgraced Christianity, and which finds its only hope of support in ecclesiastical tradition. The question, then, is a vital one. It is not a mere matter of detail, about which men can differ at pleasure. It is the Rubicon which separates Protestantism from Popery. It involves "a choice between the Gospel of Christ, as declared by himself and his apostles, and that deadly apostacy which Paul in his lifetime saw threatening,—nay, the effects of which, during his captivity, had nearly supplanted his own gospel in the Asiatic churches, and which, he declares, would come speedily with a fearful power of lying wonders."* In such a strife there can be no neutrality; the line is distinctly drawn, and every man must take his position on the one side or the other. The Church of God, according to the Protestant, is built upon the "foundation of the prophets and the apostles, Christ himself being the chief corner stone;" according to the traditionist, upon the sands of antiquity as well. From the beginning the question has existed; from the beginning men have made the word of God of none effect through their traditions.

So much has been written upon the Rule of Faith, and the questions collateral to it, that nothing absolutely new, as we have hinted before, can be said upon the subject. But the advocates of a traditional faith and traditional interpretation are reviving long-exploded fallacies, and presenting them in new forms, so that it is necessary to meet them by direct refutations, as well as to make men familiar with the general ground on which the argument rests. New books, even upon old subjects, and presenting only old arguments, find many readers who could have no access to original authorities. A judicious selection, too, can be made from the vast mass of materials which ages of controversy have accumulated, and

* *Arnolds' Life*, II. 110.

offered in a shape convenient and agreeable for general perusal. Such books are necessary, not merely for the laity, but for many of the clergy, who have neither the time nor the means for making extensive original researches. The Puseyites are diffusing their poison in every shape; in heavy octavos on the Church, in pretty duodecimos containing prayers and pictures, in attractive three-volume novels, and one-volume poems, and in light-winged tracts scattered by thousands throughout the land. A commendable activity, truly, if it were only employed in a better cause. But the example must not be lost. It is the duty of all friends of the Bible to emulate and surpass its enemies in learning, zeal, and industry. We rejoice to say that this duty is felt, and, to a considerable extent, met. Since the commencement of the controversy, there have appeared, both in England and America, a number of valuable works, meeting the foe at all points.

Among the best and most useful of the publications, which the Oxford Tract Controversy has called forth in England is, "Goode's Divine Rule of Faith and Practice," which has been reprinted in this country, and has obtained, as it has deserved, extensive circulation. But it is too copious a work to be generally used by any but clergymen, and, with all its excellences, (which are manifold,) it is not a well-arranged nor well-written book. Moreover, it goes into full detail upon subjects collateral to the main question, such as the Apostolical Succession, the Eucharistic Sacrifice, etc.; a course which, while it was necessary for Mr. Goode's special purpose of refuting the authors of the Tracts for the Times, destroys, to some extent at least, the unity of his book as a Treatise on the Rule of Faith. It is to be remembered too, that Goode is a Church of England Divine. While we are grateful for all the contributions to theological literature made by the clergy of that Church, we cannot but perceive that their *stand-point* is, in many respects, an unsuitable one for viewing the great questions involved in this controversy. It is only the mind of a master, such as Whately or

Arnold that can relieve itself of all the difficulties of such a position ; and our sympathy is often called forth even for these, when we find them struggling with obstacles arising only from their relations to a Church, which, with all its excellences, retains far too much of kingcraft and priestcraft, far too much of that mis-called conservatism, which ever looks backward, and never forward, and which, as Arnold strongly says, is “always wrong,—not only foolish but suicidal.” There was needed, we think, a book which should take up the question of the Rule of Faith from the stand-point of pure Protestantism, which should view it in its relations, not merely to the Church of England, but to the Church of Christ ; and which should present the subject clearly and forcibly, in such a way as to serve the purpose both of a guide to the studies of those who wish to pursue their inquiries to the original sources, and of a *manual* for those who do not. Such a work, in our judgment, is the one named at the head of this article, to which we now invite the attention of our readers.

Dr. Peck remarks, in his Preface, that “in many instances the mere unmasking of an error is its refutation ;” and in accordance with this maxim, he proceeds, in his *first* chapter, to present all the essential features of the Traditional system, and to exhibit the process of its development in the history of Christianity. Not content, however, with the negative argument against the system which this exposition of its nakedness supplies, he enters, in the *second* chapter, upon a careful examination of the arguments, by which its claims are generally supported ; and, after a fair statement and pretty thorough refutation of these, he proceeds, in the *third* chapter, to bring up, in strong array, the crushing arguments of which the early reformers furnished so complete a supply, to invalidate the whole system. After thus disposing of the claims of Tradition, he finally adduces, in the *fourth* chapter, a series of positive arguments in proof of the Protestant doctrine that the Scriptures alone form a sufficient Rule of faith and practice. Thus the ground is admirably laid out. The

arrangement merits great praise for its neatness and precision; no small merits in a work of this sort, designed for general circulation, or, indeed, in a work of any sort. In the compass of one small volume, Dr. Peck has treated of the topics above mentioned to a sufficient extent for all ordinary purposes, and with a sprightliness and perspicuity that must recommend the subject even to ordinary minds; while, at the same time, the work will be a useful guide-book to the better informed, from its abundant and careful references to original authorities.

The ambitious curiosity of man seeks to know more of the invisible world than reason can develop. This thirst for hidden knowledge is united, in the mass of men, with a disposition to quench it at any stream, no matter whence it may take its rise. On the other hand, the *few* have made use of this thirst, in all ages, as a powerful means of lording it over the many; and it must be confessed that they have found willing vassals. Even among those who have, or profess to have, received an explicit revelation from God, the Jews and Mohammedans, as well as the Christians, this body of revealed doctrine has been overlaid by a vast stratum of allegorical or mystical interpretation, and still further, by doctrines extraneous to the written books, professedly derived from God no less than they, but resting on traditions preserved in the hands of the priesthood, and made available for the subjection of the minds of men by claims of authority equal to that of the written books themselves. What the Dervish is to the Moslim, and the Rabbi to the Jew, that the modern priest, whether Romanist or Puseyite, is to Christianity. Nor was it at a late period in the history of Christianity that the system of priestly domination, which Rome and Oxford now uphold, took its rise. "In the extension of the Christian Church," says Dr. Peck, "in numbers and political power, many became nominal Christians who were not wholly divested of notions of religion radically heathen, and consequently not in harmony with the Religion of Christ." "As early as the Council of Nice, the authority of the holy fathers

was plead both for and against the supreme divinity of Christ, and the trinity of persons in the Godhead. And in the fifth century, *Catholic consent* was set up as a test of the Orthodox faith."—p. 15.

The substance of the system is, that Scripture is defective, and that Tradition is its complement, while both, with like authority from God, claim the obedience of man. Dr. Peck proves, with great clearness, the practical identity of the views of High-Churchmen, Puseyites, and Romanists, in their views of the rule and its authority. He quotes Archdeacon Manning, (an unexceptionable "Churchman,") who makes the "rule of faith as recognized and contended for by the Reformed Church of England" to be "*Scripture and Antiquity*, or universal tradition attesting both Scripture and the sense:" and who believes that the "universal tradition of all ages is no less than the voice of God." Compare with this the doctrine of the Newmanites, as exhibited in *Traot No. 70* :—"Catholic tradition teaches revealed truth, Scripture proves it; Scripture is the document of faith, tradition the witness of it; Scripture by itself teaches mediately and proves decisively; tradition by itself proves negatively and teaches positively; Scripture and tradition, taken together, are the joint rule of faith." And, again, the Romish doctrine, as exhibited in the Tridentine Catechism, is, that "the whole of the doctrine to be delivered to the faithful is contained in the word of God, which is distributed into Scripture and Tradition." Do these differ more than three peas from the same pod? "They are brethren, why should they disagree?"

Yet the Puseyites in England and their servile followers in this country, object strongly to being called Romanists, not that they dislike Rome, but that they love the emoluments and the influence of their Church position, and know that all that is necessary to the destruction of that influence is a thorough unmasking of their genuine principles. But so long as Archdeacon Manning admits the supremacy of General Councils; so long as Mr. Newman asserts that "the Church Catholic is unerring in its declarations of faith for saving doctrine;"

so long as Dr. Pusey declares that "to the decisions of the Church universal we owe faith," and Mr. Keble that "consentient tradition is God's unwritten word; demanding the same reverence from us;" so long as the whole tribe unite in affirming that there are certain necessary doctrines not taught, or imperfectly taught, in the Bible; there can be no question of the substantial identity of the platform of Puseyism with that of Rome. The practical working of the Puseyite system has shown itself in the departure of the Capes, the Wards, *et id genus omne*, from the Church of England to the more congenial climate of Rome; may the time not be long until all that sympathize with them follow in their steps. But in the mean time, while so many of them remain to fill the minds of many young priests with aspiring views of spiritual dominion, and to poison the minds of simple people with their pestilential doctrines, it is well for Protestants to be continually reminded of their *real* character. This is well exhibited in Dr. Peck's second chapter, at the close of which he remarks :

"There can be no doubt but the Puseyites stand upon the *divine authority and infallibility* of the Church. This position is now boldly and unequivocally taken by their leading writers. When the new movement first commenced we heard much about *antiquity*—apostolical traditions—the Catholic rule of Vincentius, etc. But now they tell us plainly that *private judgment* upon *antiquity* is as fairly out of the question, as *private judgment* upon the Scriptures, and that we must take 'the *authority* of the Church' for every thing, without waiting to understand her 'dogmas.' 'The duty of *following the authority* of the Church of England' is a very different thing from 'going along with' her, 'because she proves her doctrines, to the satisfaction of *private judgment*.' *Implicit obedience to the voice of the Church* is the bounden duty of all. And as 'the Bible is in the hands of the Church to be dealt with in such a way as the Church shall consider best for the expression of her own mind,' when the English Church shall 'consider best' to deal with it as the Church of Rome does—that is, to withhold it from the people altogether—the Oxford movement will have reached the *ne plus ultra* of perfection, for which the Tractarians now so ardently labor. This will be the legitimate practical issue of the system of Church prerogative for which many Churchmen now contend, who shrink from such a result."—pp. 70, 71.

In fact, there can be no security for Protestants, except in a *total* rejection of the traditionary theory. There is the more need of saying this, because there are signs of a leaning to tradition in a branch of the Protestant Church, which has generally been considered as little likely to favor Popery as any other.* Our rebuke of any such leaning cannot be too decidedly given. Whether it be tradition *beyond* Scripture, or *subordinate* to Scripture, or *blended* with Scripture, or *explaining* Scripture, (that is, authoritatively,) it is still tradition *instead* of Scripture, and we will have none of it. "Let in but one little finger of tradition, and you will have in the whole monster, horns, tail and all." Tradition, we mean, as authority binding upon any man's conscience or judgment. We do not, must not refuse to listen to the voices of faithful men, whether of the first century or the nineteenth, but we must remember still that they are but the voices of men. We do not despise the testimony of any church, still less of the Universal Church, could it be delivered, but we must recollect, notwithstanding, that God has given no promise of *infallibility* to the Church. We hold in great value, as an aid to interpretation, the symbols of the early churches, and the creeds which have been held throughout Christendom for ages. But we cannot for a moment admit, without treachery to truth and God, that any testimony, any creed, any symbol, unless expressed in the *ipsissima verba* of Scripture, is binding upon any man's conscience as the Rule of his faith and practice.

This point is one of such vital importance, that no man ought to rest satisfied with any but the clearest views of it; yet there is much vagueness of conception in regard to it, even among Protestants. The Puseyites, and all who favor the Priestcraft theory, delight in this fog of opinion, and use the most strenuous efforts to make it as dense as that which covered Egypt of yore. It is an easy thing to prate of the authority of the Church, the primitive times, the Fathers, universal consent, and the like, without coming to any precise

* See Schaff on Principle of Protestantism.

explanation of the meaning of terms ; and the books of the Traditionists are full of this kind of mist. Putting good and bad things together, and offering the medley in the dark, they deceive many who would spurn them and their gifts in open daylight. Their system of Scripture *and* Tradition, or of Tradition interpreting Scripture, is far more insidious and dangerous than the open claim of Papal infallibility. But, as Dr. Whately has admirably shown, they come to the same result. If there can be *no appeal* from the interpretation of Tradition or of the Church, it is equally authoritative with Scripture at last.

We ask special attention from those who may read Dr. Peck's book, to his section on the "alleged necessity for Tradition." The principal ground assigned for this is the *obscurity of Scripture*, and in this point Puseyites, High-Churchmen and Romanists cordially agree. In meeting the whole argument two inquiries are naturally suggested : first, whether there is, in fact, any such obscurity in the Scriptures as is pretended ; and secondly, whether Tradition is the appropriate remedy. In regard to the first, Dr. Peck proceeds as follows :

"No one in his senses has ever asserted that 'the Scriptures are so clear that private Christians *could* not err in understanding' them, or that there may not be a variety of opinions in relation to many points of minor importance among Christians. But are the Scriptures consequently so *obscure* that they do not constitute a perfect rule of faith and practice ? Have they therefore no sense in themselves ? This consequence by no means follows from the premises. A written rule may certainly be so plain that common minds may, with suitable attention, so far understand its import and application that none of its practical objects will necessarily be thwarted, without being so clear that they 'could not err' under any circumstances. And we have never alleged that Divine revelation was so plain that there is no hazard through negligence or prejudice of misconceiving its true import. The Author of the Scriptures has so adjusted them that a clear apprehension of their import requires the exercise of our voluntary powers ; and has made us accountable to himself for a right under-

standing and a proper application of their great principles of faith and rules of duty. There is, indeed, a wide difference between the fact and the allegations of our opponents—between the necessity of careful examination of the Holy Scriptures, aided by all the means within our reach, and the necessity of a *traditional sense handed down from the apostles*.”—pp. 125, 6.

Of a piece with this doctrine of the obscurity of Scripture is that of its *defectiveness*, a point in regard to which “Churchmen” quarrel among themselves, although the difference between them is only that between tweedledum and tweedledee. The whole traditional system tends necessarily to weaken men’s confidence in the Scriptures. What could work more effectually into the hands of infidelity than this perpetual ringing of the changes upon the obscurity of the Bible? When we hear one of the ablest of the traditionists declaring that the “private student of the Scriptures would not ordinarily gain a knowledge of the Gospel from them,” we know not which should be greater, our indignation at the atrocious ingratitude of the man, or our pity for his blindness and our apprehension for his fate. God has given us a “light for our feet,” but these men tell us it burns so dimly that we shall not make our way with it: God has given us a “lamp unto our path,” but they declare it to be a dark jack-o’lantern that leads only to bewilder: God has given us a revelation of “his will,” but they assert that the Pythoness spoke less ambiguously: God has given us a “sure word of prophecy,” but they tell us that tradition is surer. The Scriptures declare themselves “able to furnish a man thoroughly unto every good work;” but we are told many good works are required on which Scripture is silent, and so it must be mended by tradition. “As Argo was patched until there was nothing of the old ship left, so these men have patched up the word of God until there is nothing of the word of God left in it.”*

Here, after all, is perhaps the most fearful danger to be apprehended from the insidious teachings of Puseyism and

* Lightfoot, Works VI. 56.

High-Churchism. Their doctrine cannot obtain the slightest hold upon any mind without diminishing its reverence for the Scriptures. The Word of God, like God himself, demands undivided homage; its throne in men's affections cannot be shared with popes, or creeds, or churches. Unless our confidence in it is supreme, its high purpose as God's revelation can never be accomplished. But it is impossible, in the nature of things, for the same mind to believe that the Scriptures are so obscure and imperfect as to need any supplement, and yet to offer them the entire allegiance which they demand. And the end must be a blind superstition or a heartless skepticism. If men can only be brought to believe what the traditionists say,—viz., that there is no more reason for receiving the Bible than for receiving their dogmas,—it will not be long before the drama of French infidelity will be played over again. It becomes us, then, if we would hold the Bible, to reject tradition utterly. We must have nothing to do with men who tell us to “seek unto wizards that peep and mutter. Should not a people seek unto their God? To the law and to the testimony: if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them.”

Dr. Peck devotes a short section, (a long one was not necessary,) to an examination of the few passages of Scripture which are claimed as supports to the traditionary scheme, and shows clearly, what indeed few of the advocates of the scheme will deny, that it must look elsewhere than to the Bible for its authority. Give them their theory of interpretation, and they are willing enough to adopt the Bible, because they can then make what they please of it; but apart from this, they have no love for scriptural arguments. Their chief stronghold is found now, as it always has been, in appeals to the *Fathers*. Dr. Peck avers his willingness to meet them even on this, their chosen ground, and in his *second* chapter rebuts the principal evidence claimed for Tradition from the Fathers, while in the *fourth*, he adduces positive testimony from the same source in favor of the Scriptures as the sole

rule of faith. We certainly hold their testimony in little value, one way or the other; nor does our author appear to have a much higher opinion of them. The ground on which he appeals to them at all may be gathered from the following passage :

"It must not be inferred from my readiness to inquire into the opinions of the Fathers upon the subject of tradition, that I recognize their competency to settle the Divine rule of faith and practice. I acknowledge no authority competent to this but God himself, or those whom he has inspired. So that, if those who are called *Fathers* should explicitly tell us that oral tradition coming down, as says the Council of Trent, 'from hand to hand,' is to be received to the end of time, as a part of this rule, we should not submit to their decision in the case, unless it could be sustained by God's word."—p. 152. But, after some examinations, having become perfectly satisfied that our opponents derive no support from the most ancient of the Fathers, whose writings have come down to our times, I shall devote a brief space to the consideration of the evidence which is adduced from this source." And again,—“Though we cannot admit the Fathers in matters of faith, yet they are available in a controversy with traditionists as an *argumentum ad hominem*. And I wish the reader to recollect that it is in this light only that I rely upon the patristic testimony which I adduce in this section. And if it is clearly shown that the chosen witnesses of our opponents bear testimony against them, the weakness of their cause will appear in a very clear and strong light.”—p. 321.

With such views of the Fathers, it would be the worst of logic to appeal to them in confirmation of any doctrine, in such a way as to leave the impression that the doctrine would fall to the ground, if not so supported. We do not understand Dr. Peck as denying that the traditionary system can be sustained by quotations from the Fathers, but as asserting that the opposite system can be supported by appeals to them as well: and in view of the famous maxim of Vincentius, that we are to receive that and that only as truth, "*quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus traditum est*," Dr. Peck's argument is a tremendous one. It is not for him to attempt the impossible task of making out that the Fathers were all wise, learned, or consistent; but to show that they

"cannot be made to prove the traditionary theory upon the principles which traditionists themselves have adopted ;" and this he has done most effectually. Viewed in this light, we consider that part of his work which shows the right use of the Fathers in this controversy, as perhaps the best and most useful of the whole ; and we thank him for the diligence with which he has collected, and the skill with which he has arranged, so great a mass of materials. It is quite possible for any one, without further study of the Fathers than these chapters afford, to overthrow the whole fabric of "Church Principles," even upon their own ground.

As for the rule of Vincentius itself, about which so much ado is made, Dr. Peck gives it, in the course of his volume, an effectual quietus. The utter absurdity and impracticability of this rule seems to be its chief recommendation to the Traditionists, who go upon the principle of believing, or rather of trying to make others believe, impossible things, simply because they are impossible. The inquirer after truth must first find out what has been believed *every where*; and when he has shouldered this burden of universal knowledge, he must see whether it has been believed *always* ; but even then he has not done, for he has yet to inquire whether *every body* has believed all that he has learned ! Nor will it do for the followers of Vincentius to say that the rule is not to be taken thus definitely and precisely. Its very definiteness is the chief ground on which they laud it ; its epigrammatic precision is what has preserved it from oblivion. If it lacks this merit, it has no other. We recommend those who find any trouble in disposing of Vincent's rule, to consult Dr. Peck's pages, in which its absurdity and inefficiency are shown more clearly and in shorter compass than we have known it to be done any where else, except, perhaps, in an admirable article on Puseyism in the Edinburgh Review, No. CLVI. Ecl. Mus., July, 1843, p. 354.

Dr. Peck's third chapter is one of the best in the book, and has this additional recommendation, that most of it is new

matter. The first section treats of the *improbabilities which oppose the system of tradition*, and shows with great force and brevity, that the common sense of mankind, the method of God's procedure in causing the Revelation of his will to be *written*, and the history of all churches, combine to prove tradition untrustworthy. The following passage contains a cogent *argumentum ad hominem* :

"But we need not go so far for illustrations of the truth and force of the consideration here urged. Why did not the Church of England leave her Thirty-nine Articles, and her hundred and forty-one Canons, to the *safe and certain* method of oral transmission 'from hand to hand,' instead of making them matter of record? If oral tradition is a safe and certain method of conveying the sense of Scripture—the doctrines and discipline of the church—why do not Churchmen and Romanists adopt it? Why have we, *in writing*, the decrees of the Council of Trent, and the creed of Pope Pius the Fourth, and the Articles and Homilies of the Church of England?" —p. 181.

The second section contains a novel and ingenious argument founded on the "Analogy between the doctrine of Tradition as held by Catholics and that held by Jews;" and proves, most convincingly, that the Puseyites are the legitimate successors of the Pharisees, who made the word of God of none effect through their traditions. The section on "Catholic Tradition wanting in Divine authority," is also presented in a manner equally original and striking; but we can do no more than merely direct our readers to it.

The fourth and last chapter brings up the positive proofs of the Protestant doctrine that "Scripture is a sufficient rule of faith and practice." Here the way is plain; the only difficulty is to select judiciously from the abounding multitude of arguments. In adducing his Scriptural evidence, Dr. Peck first brings up "passages which expressly declare the sufficiency of Scripture;" secondly, he shows that "portions of the sacred writings, as difficult to be understood as any of the Bible, are addressed expressly to the membership of the church, and not to any authorized expounders of God's word;" and thirdly, that such passages "are addressed to all classes

of persons, not excepting those in the meanest condition in life," a course which manifestly involves false dealing, if the traditionary theory is to be received. The subject is treated with an earnestness and manly confidence that is really refreshing.

"Now I will lay down a few propositions to which I beg special attention, and which, I am persuaded, are perfectly tenable: and should they be assailed, I should expect an easy triumph, no matter how Goliath-like the champion with whom I might be called to contend.

1. All things essential to salvation are contained in Holy Scripture.

2. All those matters of faith or practice, contained in Holy Scripture, which are essential to salvation, are clearly and simply stated, and easy to be understood.

3. Those things in the Scriptures not plainly and simply set forth, and not easily understood, are not essential to salvation.

4. There is no evidence that there is couched in these portions of Scripture of difficult interpretation, any new doctrine of faith or moral duty, not clearly set forth in other parts of the sacred volume.

5. The corruptions of the Christian doctrine and institutions have not generally originated from the principle, in practice, of private interpretation, but from the unhallowed union of philosophy, falsely so called, with the Christian system, or the admixture of heathen or Jewish errors with Christian truth; and these unholy associations and unauthorized admixtures have come in through the doctors and professed spiritual guides of the Church.—pp. 314–15.

We see not how these propositions can be denied by any man professing to believe the Bible, and yet, if they are admitted, the Pope and the Puseyites have not a leg left to stand on. Especially do they refute all the nonsense which the Traditionists are so fond of uttering in regard to the right of private judgment. And yet, private judgment,—its errors and its dangers,—forms the great bugbear which High-Churchmen continually hold up to frighten men into obedience. There is no medium between the Protestant ground and the utter abrogation of Reason at the feet of the Pope; and, indeed, the latter is a far more comfortable course than the *via media* proposed by High-Church doctors, who take

away private judgment, and yet supply no infallible living ruler and guide. The system of Rome has this great advantage,—if it does not answer our questions, it silences them; if it does not resolve our doubts, it crushes them. As the Romanist De Prat says, (without the least mixture of irony,) “the teaching of the Church contains many conveniences in relieving the human mind from the burthen of discussions.” To this complexion all must come at last, if there is the least swerving from the great Protestant principle of private judgment.

Dr. Peck’s section on “Romish evidence against Tradition,” contains the substance of a tract in the “Preservative against Popery,” now rarely to be met with, which shows from the proceedings of the Council of Trent, from the testimony of ante-Tridentine divines, and from the ancient officers of the Church of Rome, that the doctors of that Church were themselves far from being united in favor of the divine authority of Tradition. The work closes with an array of authorities from the Church of England, in which appear the names of her best and greatest sons, her Cranmer and Ridley, her Hooper and Jewel, her Usher and Jackson. The list might have been greatly extended,—but these, and a few more like them, constitute the glory of the English Church. It is not to be denied, however, that that Church was only half rescued from Romish practices at the Reformation; and that, as we have before hinted, the best and purest spirits in her communion have to struggle continually between her Protestant articles and her Romanizing ritual.

We have thus cursorily discussed a Treatise by a Protestant divine, whose object is to prove that the Bible is the sole rule of Christian faith and practice. This is Protestant *theory*; does Protestant *practice* correspond with it? Have we yet learned fully to trust the Bible? Has the experiment ever been fairly made in any branch of the Church, of giving the Protestant doctrine full scope? Or is it not rather the case that the lesson of Papal obedience has never been fully

unlearned, and that, practically, in every Protestant Church, the rule of faith is some Confession, Creed, or Symbol, which is made a Pope of, in the ordinary working of the church-machinery? These are grave questions, surely, yet it seems to us they have never been sufficiently considered. Perhaps the present agitation of the public mind will bring out clearly before the Protestant world the fact, that they have shrunk from the application of their own principle; and the result may be that the work left unfinished in the sixteenth century may be completed. It has been a problem with many, why the progress of the Reformation was so suddenly arrested, within half a century from its commencement; nay, why the tide, which rose so rapidly, and threatened to flow over all Europe, was so rudely turned back and so effectually dammed within certain narrow limits that it has never been able to surmount them. Perhaps this problem may find its solution—or one element, at least, of its solution,—in the fact, that, while the Reformation freed human thought in one direction, it bound it in another; that, while it dethroned the Pope, it crowned other high names; that, while it shivered the sceptre of the Pope's infallibility, it only substituted many tyrants for one. If Rome says "you must *not* think for yourselves, but take our creed," do others say any thing else than "you *must* think for yourselves, but take our creed?" It may be granted to the historian that this substitution of the authority of a symbol for the authority of the Pope was necessary in the sixteenth century, to afford a fixed centre toward which men's minds might gravitate, in that time of strife, when old bonds and attractions were so suddenly broken; but is such a substitution to be made a *permanent* element in the Christian Church for that reason? The principal argument for the use of authoritative creeds is, that they tend to insure uniformity of opinion within the limits of the same sect; an argument, we venture to affirm, utterly unsupported by the history of the Protestant Churches, and which, even if it were so supported, would only go to show that activity of thought had been suppressed, and words substituted for things. As for

absolute unity of opinion, even if it be desirable, (which is doubtful), it is unattainable. In no two ages has the faith of the Church been in all points alike ; nay, no two *men*, even of the same age, have held precisely the same shades of opinion on all points. It may be the case that men adopt the same symbols and utter the same words, but as for actual identity of opinion, it is impossible. It is with the eyes of the mind as with those of the body : no two men see objects precisely alike. In total darkness they may agree perfectly, but it is because neither sees at all. Yet, for the practical purposes of life, men's vision is sufficiently accurate ; and so, for all the real wants of the moral nature, men obtain the same view of the instructions of the Bible. There is a remarkable uniformity of religious faith among all sects in regard to those points which are essential to salvation.

Let our motto be here, as well as in our national politics, "Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable." We believe that true unity must be the offspring of Freedom. Severity necessarily produces a reaction of unbelief. And how noble, how worthy of Christianity, would be such a free unity of minds unconstrained, a union devoid of all shams, hypocrisies, and cant, in comparison with that unity so much vaunted now, of minds bound to swear in the words of a creed or a master—a unity apparent, not real ; in words only, not in heart ! When the day of *such* Union and Liberty shall come for the Protestant Church, then, and not sooner, will she present to the world the full power of her great principles of independence on man and faith in God ; then, and not till then, will she act out her fundamental theory, that "the Bible, and the Bible alone, is the religion of Protestants."

ARTICLE III.

AN INQUIRY CONCERNING "THE FIRST EMOTION OF ENMITY TO GOD."

By REV. PHARCELLUS CHURCH, Rochester, New-York.

In an article of the Biblical Repository for October, 1844, beginning on page 410, entitled "Divine agency and government, together with human agency and freedom," from Leonard Woods, D. D., of Andover, Mass., we find the following paragraph: "Conscience sees that the *first* emotion of love or enmity" to God, "is of the same nature with any subsequent emotion. It would never occur to plain common sense that, while love to God is the grand virtue of a Christian, his first act of love is no virtue at all; or that, while the first act of love to God is destitute of goodness, following acts of love to the same object are morally good. The repetition of an affection may increase its strength, but cannot change its nature. If there is no sin in the first emotion of enmity, what law of God or of conscience forbids us to indulge it? Does not our instinctive conviction and feeling, that we ought not to repeat and cherish enmity to God, imply that any emotion of enmity is sinful? Indeed, is not the fact that the emotion of love or hatred to God rises *spontaneously* in the heart of a man, as soon as the object is presented, a clearer evidence of the goodness or badness of a character, than the same emotion when elicited by his voluntary effort? If a rational being is completely holy, he has no occasion for any effort of will to excite his love to God. The affection is kindled as soon as he sees the object. And the same is true of *enmity*, in a moral agent, who is the subject of entire and unconstrained depravity. The emotion of enmity rises instantly, whether he wills it or not, as soon as the real character of God comes before his mind. That the goodness or badness of a man's character is specially manifested by the *spontaneous* exercise of his affections in view of their appro-

priate objects, is, I think, clear and certain to an unbiassed conscience."—Bib. Rep., Oct., 1844, pp. 423—424.

Dr. Woods here brings into comparison, if I understand him, the emotion of love or enmity to God *before* and *after* the will has acted with reference to it, or it has acquired a voluntary character. "A *spontaneous* emotion," and "an emotion repeated and cherished" by the will, "a *first* emotion of love or enmity to God," and "subsequent emotions," are forms of expression by which the Doctor designs to set before his readers the passion of love or enmity, while it yet exists as an involuntary or spontaneous sensation, as contrasted with the same passion after it comes to be determined or in any way affected by the action of the will. Precisely how much meaning the Doctor includes in the terms, "repeating and cherishing," he has not told us. Whether he confines them to those cases wherein the will *directly* exerts itself to call up an emotion, or to repeat a thought or an action, or whether he goes further, and includes in the terms the *whole* causality of the will, might perhaps be a question. A sensation may depend upon previous acts of the will as its cause, although its first appearance in the mind may not be connected with any direct endeavor toward its production on the part of that faculty. The first emotion or impulse to rob or murder may arise in the mind without any effort in the will to call it up; and yet it probably never comes into being, except as the result of a long course of previous indulgence in crime, and therefore as really depends upon the causality of the will, as any other exercise whatever.

And if the will is in *any* sense the cause of an emotion, I submit whether it can be "*spontaneous*," in the Doctor's sense of the term. He uses the term spontaneous with reference to the "*first*" emotion of enmity, or with reference to an emotion of enmity to God which existed in the mind apart from all causation in the will, direct or indirect. His object is to show that an emotion arising in this manner, without any agency in the will, is a stronger indication of the vicious character of the mind, if the emotion be vicious, than an

emotion which is caused by the will. This he does to disprove the "Pelagian Theory," that "an emotion or affection must be voluntarily repeated and cherished before it is morally good or bad." We do not call in question the correctness of the Doctor's conclusions on this point, though we must certainly demur at the soundness of his premises. For, if one of the things brought into comparison in these premises, is an entity, the other must be a nonentity. If it be true that enmity to God is ever a voluntary exercise; it is not true that it ever existed without being to some extent dependent on the previous action of the will. A first emotion of enmity, as existing independently of all previous action in the will tending toward its production, we will venture to say, is an impossibility in the psychology of man. If I mistake in this remark, or in any other I may make, no man is more competent to show it than Dr. Woods, and certainly no one could be more grateful to have it shown than myself. Having in my mind no theory to subserve, beyond that of feeling my way to nature and fact, I could not consider myself otherwise than benefited in having my errors in conducting this inquiry pointed out.

That the drift of my remarks may not be misjudged at the outset, I will here say, that I am not of that class who deny the depravity of our involuntary sensations. Whatever modification, or strength, or influence in any form, the emotions may receive from the previous action of the will, it is clear to my mind, that there are depraved tendencies in human nature that exist prior to all such action. The substantial facts in this case, it seems to me, must be alike clear to all, however they may differ in their terms or modes of speaking of them. One may affirm, and another deny, that those depraved tendencies which are born with us are sin, just as their favorite schemes of thinking bias their judgments. But systems or schemes apart, who can deny that an aptitude to vice, a liability to wrong-doing, descends from father to son in the ordinary way of generation? Who can deny that the habits of parents influence the tastes and inclinations of their

children, and that, in this way, many are made sinners by one man's disobedience.

I trust no one will impute to me, what I do not feel, a desire for controversy on these abstract subjects, which can only be evolved by a careful comparison of views, and by proceeding, step by step, and from thing to thing, in an uncontroversial and dispassionate manner. The reading of Dr. Woods's able article suggested to my mind some inquiries concerning the *actual circumstances* under which the first emotion of enmity to God, in a human being rising into life, comes into existence. Let each one catechize his memory, so far as it can give testimony in the case, as to the incipient growth of this wicked feeling in himself. Let him employ such other helps in determining the matter, as fall within the compass of his reason, experience, or consciousness. As Dr. W. observes, "No theory on this subject is of any value, except that which is founded in actual experience." What does nature, what does experience teach, as to the origin of our first emotion of enmity to God?

1. *This emotion is in all cases preceded by some degree of knowledge of God.* No object or character can elicit either our hatred or our love till it is known. This Dr. W. supposes in the qualifying phrases "as soon as the object is presented;" "as soon as the real character of God comes before his mind." Hence the emotion in question is in all cases predicated upon the previous exercises of the mind, in knowing, contemplating, or perceiving the real character of God.

2. *The first emotion of enmity to God must have been preceded by considerable exertion in the will, or voluntary agency.* The knowledge of God is not an intuitive truth, like our own existence. It seems to me that there are certain instincts of our nature which must lead a man to some idea of the Divine Being, under any circumstances that would admit of the development of his faculties. Whatever view may be taken of this point, it is manifest that this idea does not and cannot precede all exercise of his voluntary agency. His will must exert itself in various ways, through his bodily

organs, through his mental faculties, and thus his voluntary development must advance to a considerable extent, before the real character of God can come before his mind ; consequently, before his first emotion of enmity to God can exist. This position, I suppose, is as clear as the former.

3. *Many of the volitions thus preceding the first emotion of enmity to God, have a moral character.* That is to say, they are praise or blameworthy, and connected with merit or demerit. I say *many*, for that they *all* are moral, I think, will not be supposed. The crying of the infant, and the action of its muscles in taking food, are voluntary without being blame or praiseworthy. This seems to me, at least, a dictate of common sense. But then, when the development of his faculties advances a little further, and the child comes to have a distinct conception of parental authority, (which it has at a very early age,) and it persists in a thing against the known will of the parent, then its voluntary agency begins to acquire a moral character. And we have instances, wherein a simple command of the parent leads a very young child to struggle against and repress a strong tendency to cry, or to do a forbidden thing. Showing in it a degree of competency, at least, to act as a moral and accountable agent. And it is at this point, I think, the native tendencies to enmity against God begin to manifest themselves. The parental authority stands, in some sense, as the representative of the Divine, to elicit elementary feelings of resistance to law and authority, which are similar to those which the character and law of God awaken, when they come to be known. Hence, I suppose Dr. W. and all others would concur in regarding the child as capable of actual, voluntary transgression, before it is capable of knowing God, or feeling an emotion of enmity to him.

4. *These previous voluntary acts have their influence in forming the moral character.* The simplest acts of obedience or disobedience to parental authority, in a child too young to have "the real character of God come before its mind," probably have more influence in forming its future habits, than more important acts of a later period. The

most trifling thing may direct the growth of the twig, and thus give form to the future oak. But the oak once grown, can be diverted from its course only by a powerful force. It will be found, I think, that these incipient acts of the will do much toward giving specific form and direction to our permanent desires and affections, while these desires and affections constitute the basis of those later acts of our will, by which our characters among men are determined. We have an illustration of these facts, in the effect upon the appetites and cravings for particular kinds of food among different nations, which is produced by their early modes of gratification. Thus, as Lord Brougham has somewhere said, our moral characters are determined by the first two years of life.

Emotions, or voluntary movements scarcely distinguishable from emotions, appear to fill up the earliest stages of human development. An emotion Mr. Webster defines as "an internal motion or agitation of the mind which passes away without desire. When desire follows, the motion or agitation is called a *passion*." Whether an emotion can in any case rise to a passion, without some action of the will in sustaining or cherishing it, is a question that may be thought too subtle for argumentation. Appetite may spring up otherwise, it is true, but a passion is a widely different thing. Pride, vanity, envy, enmity, malice, and the like, always involve some extent of power in comparing one thing with another, such as our own appearance, accomplishments, talents, or whatever is our own, with those of another, or with what seems to conflict with our own. And how the mind should be able to make these comparisons, apart from some degree of exercise in the will, mediate or immediate, I am unable to see. Perhaps every mind may have the incipient emotions from which the passion of malice takes its rise. But we do not impute this passion to every one, because these emotions pass away before they reach the maturity necessary to constitute this passion. So the separate emotions in which the delicate passion of love has its inception, exist in many cases when the person could not be said to be in love. Indeed, I suppose it would

be difficult to show, that an emotion ever becomes a *passion* without some degree of action or influence from the will. Admitting, therefore, that those emotions which afterwards grow into enmity against God as a permanent passion, did take precedence of all voluntary action, it is questionable in my mind, whether, in strict propriety of speech, they can be called the emotions of a passion, or the emotions of enmity. And I confess I could not avoid the impression of solecism from the language of Dr. Woods, when he speaks of a *first* or *spontaneous* emotion of enmity to God, as existing apart from efforts in the will. I cannot conceive of any emotion, as the emotion of a *passion*, apart from some previous exercise of the will in giving it this character.

To illustrate this subject, let us take the passion or affection of filial love. Now, it is manifest that a great variety of emotions exist in the mind, some painful and others pleasurable, the joint operation of which produces, at length, the affection which the child feels for its mother. The nourishment, the kiss, the manipulations, and the ten thousand instances of agreeable contact, which the infant experiences from its mother, each affording the little one a specific emotion of pleasure, though neither can be said by itself to be an emotion of filial love, yet, through their union in the memory, the consciousness and active nature of the child, they at length resolve themselves into that passion. Even the painful emotions arising from the restraints of parental authority, which no one would think of calling emotions of filial love, still have their influence in giving existence and form to that affection. And in this process of development, who can fail to recognize the action of the will? Filial love as an aggregation of sympathies in a being so low in the scale of life as to have no voluntary power, or none to direct and modify these sympathies, can no more be conceived of, than ambition in a muscle, or poetry in a shell-fish.

It is true, as Dr. W. suggests, that if the mind never had any passions or affections till the will, beginning *de novo*, called them into being by a sovereign instantaneous act, it would

never have them at all. Passions are not created on this wise. It is equally true, on the other hand, that they never arise in the form of a first emotion, or of an involuntary spontaneous sensation. They are always a joint product of the sensations, and of the voluntary agency. Consequently, those voluntary acts, which precede the passions as such, have their influence, together with preceding emotions or sensations, in forming the moral habits and characters of men. And enmity to God no more began in "a first emotion," than it began in a first volition. It began in the united action of the emotions and volitions.

5. *The first emotion of enmity to God is never excited by viewing the character of God in the abstract, but always in its relations to our cherished habits and plans of action.* It is like the hatred which the barbarous backwoodsman feels toward the individual who shows a warrantee deed to the premises within which he has located himself. He does not hate the character of the man in the abstract, but he hates him for the claim which he sets up to his possessions, and this hatred is so intense that he waylays him and takes his life. So, if the testimony of experience is to be trusted, it is not a view of the benevolence, holiness, justice, power and majesty of God, *in themselves considered*, that kindles our first emotion of enmity. For there was a time, at least it seems to have been so in the writer's own case, when such a view of God filled him with reverential awe and veneration. But having formed an inveterate love of play, for instance, he could not brook the interruption which God's law of the Sabbath interposed to its gratification. Or, having conceived and cherished the desire of having his own way, he could not endure God's law of subordination to parents and superiors. And thus the restraints under which he found himself placed by God and his law, were felt to be disagreeable, and, as a consequence, were often violated. The consciousness of these violations produced guilt, and the sense of guilt made it hateful to think of God.

Great injustice is done to the cause of Christian orthodoxy,

by representing men as born with some element by which the attributes of God become hateful to him, on their own account and apart from his cherished passions and habits. Nothing is clearer than that we come into being with a susceptibility to the impressions of moral beauty, its fitness and excellence. To suppose otherwise would be as false as to suppose that men are born without the power of perceiving the superiority of happiness over misery. And where do we find higher exhibitions of moral beauty, than in the character of God as it is revealed in the person of his Son? What disinterestedness, benevolence, magnanimity, yea, what devotion to individual happiness, do we see in the life of Jesus! Even Pilate could find no fault in him, much as he desired it to justify his sentence of condemnation, and his very enemies confessed that never man spake like this man.

To say that man is incapable of feeling an emotion of approval on contemplating such a character, would be equal to affirming that sin had annihilated the essential features of his natural constitution. It is true, these emotions, in the unrenewed heart, do not amount to love, because they are too soon overborne and crushed by more active tendencies leading him in another direction. And it is from being sensible of the hostility of this object of moral beauty, this holiness, justice, truth, and love, to these cherished and predominant tendencies, that he is made at length to feel that God is hateful to him. He cannot endure to think of Him whose character and government are so diametrically opposed to what he feels he is and must be, to what he feels he must do. Hence, it is not the character of God in the abstract, that excites the first emotion of enmity, but the character of God as opposed to the passions which action and indulgence have generated, and to the habits which use has made second nature.

6. *The first emotion of enmity to God is consequent, not merely upon previous voluntary exercises, but upon the condition of our nature at our birth. As those emotions which are anterior to the modifying influence of volitions, are*

beyond the reach of experience and consciousness, we must judge of them on other grounds of evidence. The Bible is explicit in affirming the depravity of man at his birth. For vain man would be wise, though man be born like a wild ass's colt.—Job 11 : 12. Behold I was shapen in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me.—Ps. 51 : 5. We are by *nature* the children of wrath.—Eph. 2 : 3. By one man's disobedience many were made sinners.—Rom. 3 : 19. Whatever efforts may be made to abate the force of these passages on the score of Oriental hyperbole, still the fact of man's derangement by nature is conspicuous in the whole history of the species. If his nature, prior to any of its developments in action were not corrupt, how should its effects be so uniformly so? How can a fountain be pure, whose streams are always bitter?

As to the *nature* of this derangement, it might seem unnecessary to inquire. The most probable view, however, is that which makes it consist in the superior strength of the impulses and susceptibilities which are in themselves inferior. They may, perhaps, be likened to the propagated appetite of the drunkard, consisting in the greater susceptibility of the child at that point over other children. Though all our constitutional impulses are innocent, yet a certain proportion or balance between them is necessary to the continued practice of virtue. When this balance is lost, and the inferior acquire, from the conduct of parents and predecessors, greater strength and power to control us than the superior, we shall be sure to act wrong, as soon as we begin to act at all.

I include among the inferior impulses, the bodily appetites, the desire of present gratification, and the self-love; and among the superior, the reason, moral sense, and the tendencies to religion, to God, and to immortality. The end of the first seems to be gratification for its own sake; while to the others, duty, obligation, law, and the greatest ultimate good to accrue from actions, are in all cases paramount. Let the comparison be between those impulses which have respect to one's own interest and happiness, and those which regard the

happiness of others, the one being called self-love, and the other the social affections, and can there be a doubt that the first have in their inception a disproportionate strength? How tenacious are very young children of every thing pertaining to themselves, and how regardless of the claims of others! Four or five months of life are sufficient, in most cases, to develop these elementary tendencies to injustice and wrong, showing that they must have arisen from a deranged condition of the nature at its very birth.

Besides, both the self-love and the social tendencies are altogether more active from the first, than the moral and religious impulsions. In a holy or duly balanced nature the regard to right, to law, to God, is absolute in its control of the man. So long as the faculties of Adam in the garden remained holy, the divine interdict was of itself sufficient to restrain the most active and impulsive tendency of his appetites. Though he had every moment stood where he could have gratified those appetites, by simply stretching forth his hand, so long as his nature was duly balanced and holy, a knowledge that God had forbidden the gratification would have had such decided control over his feelings, that he would have been in no more danger of doing it, than if he had no hand to stretch forth, and no power to obtain the gratification. Simple law, or right, or God's will, is as good as a brazen wall to restrain one whose conscience has its relative pre-eminence. But when it sinks to a subordinate place, the nature is deranged, and the traces of sin become instantly visible.

Now, that we are born with a disproportionate relative activity of the appetites and inferior impulsions, is just as clear from the natural history of our race, as that a leopard comes from its dam with a tendency to blood and carnage. Call it what you please, sin, punishment, innocence, still the facts are as they are, and cannot be altered by a name. Thus, in the infant, the desire of having its own way is stronger than the tendency to filial submission. Its desire of personal gratification is greater than the desire of seeing its brothers and sisters gratified. And this disproportionate strength of its

lower and more selfish tendencies is the germ from which arise degrading vices, filial insubordination, injustice, first on the smaller scale of the nursery, and then in the wider field of general society, together with all the more spiritual and aggravated crimes of impiety, infidelity, contempt of God, rejection of the gospel, profanity, blasphemy. Consequently, the causes which were directly operative in producing the first emotion of enmity to God, had their origin, partly at least, in this disproportionate activity of the inferior over the superior impulses with which our existence commenced.

It is a well ascertained fact, both in the human and the animal economy, "that not only certain organic peculiarities, but certain habitudes, certain artificial instincts, may be acquired, and that, when once acquired, these, too, are transmissible from sire to son. A careless observer might easily be tempted to conclude that these acquired propensities were primitive and original, and a distinct peculiarity of the race." But a due and unprejudiced attention to all the facts in the case will dispel the illusion. Whatever plea infidelity may set up against the lapsed and fallen condition of our race, and however earnest its attempts to show that man has not acquired and cannot propagate habitudes, which were not originally natural to him, still there may be facts collated both in reference to ourselves and the inferior animals to establish the position, which can no more be overthrown than the doctrine of original sin can be invalidated. Are there no cases in which the drunkenness and debauchery of parents leave an influence on the appetites of children? Admitting they generate no impulses which are absolutely new, do they not impart undue and artificial degrees of strength to old ones?

What shall be the name of this propagated derangement is quite immaterial, provided the thing itself be understood. One class, starting with the principle that all sin is action in view of law, insist that nothing born with us shall be called sin. They tell us children would grow up holy, if they could, from the first, be placed under outward influences which are perfectly holy. But as we have no means

of testing such a question, I know not whether it is worth while to reason about it. If the experiment could be made, however, I reckon it would prove a failure. For, when an artificial impulsion, or an artificial condition of the impulsions, comes to be acquired and propagated, it is no more dependent on outward means of training for its development, than those which are natural, and no more likely to disappear in the absence of such means. Nothing is more adamant than the tablet of the soul, as the history of its habits and impressions clearly show. Hence, to say that a perfectly holy training would make any son or daughter of Adam perfectly holy, is affirming against evidence. Had such a plan of restoration to holiness been feasible, why had not God sent his angels to supervise the education of mankind, instead of sending his Son to die for their sins, and his Spirit to regenerate and sanctify their natures?

Others still insist that this inherited derangement, is sin in the same sense with any other use of that term. Paul, it is said, calls us sinners on account of what we inherit from Adam, and a sinner is the same thing whether young or old. But, as Dr. Wood justly observes, facts or "laws are immutable, while the meaning of words is variable, and always conforms to circumstances." Paul says also that Jesus was made *sin* and a *curse* for us. But was he sinful and accursed in the same sense that we are? There is no danger of making distinctions where there is a difference. And that there is a difference between the sin inherited from Adam, or from parents, and those acts of transgression which are designed and voluntary, I see not how any can doubt. Hence the terms *original* and *actual* are sometimes used to mark this difference.

While the facts in the case, it seems to me, are too plain to admit of controversy, very different results may be reached from the summing up of those facts. As for ourselves, we consider this inherited depravity strictly *judicial* in its character. And the use of the terms sin, sinner, and iniquity, with reference to our condition at birth, is one of those figures of speech by which the cause is put for the effect, the sin for

the punishment. Under God's government, the punishment is inseparable from the sin, consisting in the malignant infusion which instantly spreads itself among all the faculties of the agent, and so completely revolutionizing his nature, that no moral sentiment remains as it was before. Even in the commission of specific sins, it is wonderful to observe the change which the sinner undergoes. The mind of a murderer, a thief, a perjured person, occupies entirely different states *before* and *after* the guilt is contracted. *Then* he was bold and free, *now* he is skulking and constrained,—*then* he had some capacity for the virtue he has sacrificed; but *now* his sin is fixed upon him, perhaps in the form of a resistless tendency to repeat its commission; and thus in all points of view the nature of the agent, as well as his relations to God, to law, and to society, have undergone a complete change. And if such be the result from specific acts of crime in a nature already depraved, what might we expect from a first act of sin in a being hitherto spotless and holy? Indeed, the extraordinary result which the Bible describes as having followed from the first act of transgression in the race of man, has its miniature representations in the whole course of Providence, insomuch that, though we are indebted to revelation for our knowledge of the origin of evil, yet the idea being once supplied, arguments and illustrations to show its verity crowd in upon us from every side.

Another peculiarity of God's government is, that the consequences of the sin are not confined to the one active in its commission; but, if moral beings are propagated from him, as in this world, they are born in his own likeness, of guilt, pain, and death. Guilt in the progenitor of one of the races, entails ruin upon all its individuals; so rigorous are the penal provisions of God's government. This we know, not *a priori*, nor by specific enactment, but by precedent as it is presented in the history of our race. By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation. In Adam all die. The object of punishment is primarily to sustain the interests of law and government. And who does not see that these inter-

ests are more fully sustained by involving a whole race in the doom of its progenitor, than by confining punishments to the one active in the transgression? In the former case, how much more clearly does God set forth the fearful estimate which he puts upon the demerit of sin! And it seems to me manifest, both from Scripture and reason, that so much of our moral derangement as is propagated with us, is judicial and penal, being designed to illustrate and unfold the glory and majesty of law, and in this respect it is to be distinguished from those sins in which the will is directly active. But, if any one choose to take a different view of the subject, I have no controversy with him, so long as he keeps to the facts in the case, as they are spread out in Scripture and in real life.

Perhaps the advocates of Calvinism in certain quarters injure their own cause, by not adjusting their terms and modes of reasoning to the advancing analyses of subjects. They are so tenacious of the term "sinful nature," as applied to man, prior to voluntary action, as to revolt at the idea of resolving it into any thing more ultimate, such as a disproportionate relative strength of the constitutional impulsions; or, to use the language of an Apostle, the pre-eminence which *flesh* has acquired over *spirit*. They choose rather to confine themselves to the idea of a propagated sinful nature, without analysis, explanation, or qualification, in order to find a basis on which the regenerating influence, as an impulsion, acting without antecedent in the voluntary agency, may take effect. The one is an offset to the other. They begin by representing the passions as having their origin in purely involuntary emotions. And their natural heart is an aggregation of evil passions generated in this manner. Consequently, its counterpart, a spiritual heart, a new, regenerated nature, as an aggregation of gracious affections, they suppose to be alike independent of antecedence in the voluntary agency. It is produced by God's power, independently of any possible contributions from the human will. As they make all sinful volitions dependent on a sinful nature, so they make all holy or good resolutions dependent on a holy nature, the one re-

ceived in the ordinary way of generation, and the other in a manner equally independent of the choice of the mind in which it is implanted.

But however finished this view may appear as a system, I have never been able to adjust it to the matter of fact, as it exists either in my own experience, or in the word of God. In the first place, the passions of the natural heart are not generated in the manner supposed. Whatever disproportion may exist in the relative strength of the impulses at birth, they can never give being to an evil passion, till there is more or less development of the voluntary agency. Nor, indeed, were they entirely well balanced and holy at the birth, could they become the seat of a holy passion or affection, till the will had contributed its due share toward their production. Voluntary agency enters into the very nature of a passion or affection, the latter being no more able to exist without the former, than the sunbeams without light. This being, therefore, a universal law in the growth of the affections, it follows that the gracious affections must conform to it in the manner of their production. They have their antecedents in the previous exercises of the sinner's voluntary agency. And though these exercises may not, at the time, have seemed to promise any such result, yet a careful inspection of the subject will show, that they were causal influences tending toward the production of those very affections. This is the case with the throes and contortions of a convicted sinner's mind, though at the time he may have been more sensible of his enmity to God, than at any other period of his life. In the writer's own case, he is just as sensible to the presence of volitions, as the antecedent of what he has long humbly trusted to be a birth from above, as to the antecedence of volitions in any other part of his experience. And the gospel uniformly addresses sinners in a way to rouse them to action, and the grace of Christ upon the soul is always preceded by action of some sort, and to some extent; and action, too, that has an instrumental or causal tendency toward that result which we call regeneration. Perhaps there may be little or no differ-

ence on this point among experimental Christians, except what arises from a difference of terms, or in the association of ideas.

It may be true, as Dr. Woods suggests, that "there is nothing in moral philosophy which is more false, or more plainly pernicious, than the position, that no emotion or affection is morally good or evil, until it is voluntarily repeated and cherished,—a position which makes the character of the exercises of the mind depend, not on their *nature*, but on their circumstances." Admitting this to be "the *most* pernicious position," the one next to it, in my view is, that of representing the nature of man, prior to all emotions, affections, or volitions, as pervaded by a principle or element which makes goodness and benevolence hateful to it in the abstract, and then palming off this idea as the genuine Christian orthodoxy. Who does not know that the nature of man is still susceptible to the impressions of moral beauty, and of its inherent superiority and excellence? Who does not know, also, that moral deformity,—fraud, parricide, murder, ingratitude, and vice—are universally viewed with abhorrence? The images of such wickedness, in themselves considered, have no power to reduce the mind to their commission; but the seduction always takes place indirectly through the promptings of some specific passion, such as covetousness, or revenge, or lust, which imperceptibly controls the mind, when it is really unconscious of the abhorred result to which it is tending. To represent, therefore, that goodness, in itself considered, is an object of man's hatred; and wickedness, in itself considered, an object of his love, does by no means accord with the facts of human nature. If he loves darkness rather than light, it is because his deeds are evil, and he is borne away by some specific desire, to whose real nature and tendencies his mind is blinded.

What renders it so specially dangerous to represent man's nature as pervaded from his birth by some principle or element of evil that makes goodness, in itself, hateful to him, and wickedness agreeable, is, that it unnecessarily prejudices thinking men against important Christian truths, as if they were a contradiction of reason and fact. All our original sus-

ceptibilities remain with us in the fall ; only those which are by right supreme, are overborne and crushed by those which are in themselves subordinate, and this accounts for our first emotion of enmity to God. Our feelings rise up against laws and attributes which our consciences approve, because they interfere with our cherished passions and habits. And the object which God has in view in the gospel is, to raise these overborne susceptibilities to their due position, and to their healthful ascendancy. Somewhat may be done toward it in the education of children ; and hence we are commanded to train them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. Somewhat may be done, also, by holding up the truths and motives of the gospel to the reason and consciences of men. The example and association of pious men tend, in like manner, to strengthen the moral sense and the religious impulses. Whatever in fact serves, in any way, or to any extent, to restore man to the dominion of his reason, his conscience, and his higher impulses, is to be ranked among the instrumental causes of his restoration to God. And it is a dangerous idea, that those educated in gross wickedness, and to the dominion of every lawless passion, should have equal prospects of being born of the Spirit, and finally saved, with those who are brought up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. It should ever be borne in mind, however, that no instrumentalities can succeed, in a work like this, without the special agency of the Holy Spirit. The power of enthroning the superior impulses, is from above, and the law is fulfilled by those who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.

7. *No propagated derangement is necessary to produce a first emotion of enmity to God.* Having conceded that enmity to God in the offspring of a fallen race does not depend exclusively on previous acts of the will, but that it does arise in part from the condition of our nature at birth, I now say, that such condition is not necessary to its production, but it may be generated purely by the voluntary agency. This is manifest from the doctrine which is revealed to us in the Bible, that " God made man upright ; but they have sought

out many inventions." The race of man at the creation was perfectly holy; but this holiness did not preclude him from such an exercise of his voluntary agency, as has resulted in making him an enemy of God. This one fact, therefore, is as good as a thousand to prove that a first emotion of enmity to God may be generated in a purely voluntary way.

And not only may it be done in a purely voluntary way, but also, it may be done by causes operating *within* the nature of the agent himself, and independently of all extraneous malign agency. In the case of our first parents, extraneous malign agency was superadded to those impulses from within themselves, which lead to the first emotion of enmity and opposition to God. Lust, when it hath conceived, bringeth forth sin—and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death. It is not necessary to the conception of lust in a mind previously holy, that the will or any other power should call up a new constitutional impulse, but only that some old impulse should be suffered to acquire disproportionate strength. Selfishness, avarice, concupiscence, and every lust, have their foundation in affections which are lawful up to a certain extent. They are simply the excess of an affection in itself lawful. Now, in the case of Adam, the affections took the form of lust, and consequently of sin, not purely by the promptings of his own mind, but by the instigation of the serpent, which might lead it to be supposed, that some such extraneous malign agency is necessary, in all cases, to the production of a first emotion of enmity to God in a nature previously holy. But sin is not an eternal principle. It had a beginning, and consequently must have begun in some mind or minds, when all besides were perfectly holy. In that case, it is impossible that external malign agency should have been concerned in its production. Since, therefore, a first emotion of enmity to God may spring up without being in any degree dependent, either on hereditary depravity, or on extraneous malign agency, it follows that those faculties and adjuncts which are essential to the existence of a moral agent, and of moral obligation, contain in themselves causes which

may lead on to a first emotion of enmity to God. In saying these things, we simply state the facts as they are, without any attempt at explanation.

In order to give our positions the force of demonstration, we state them in the syllogistic form.

1. Whatever had a beginning is the effect of some cause. Sin had a beginning, therefore sin is the effect of some cause.

2. Sin in a being previously holy, cannot spring up without voluntary action in violation of known law. All voluntary actions in violation of known law are performed in view of some motive or motives. Therefore sin in a being previously holy, resulted from motives or temptations to act in violation of known law.

3. Sin had its beginning with a being or beings who were previously holy. Sin in that case was as much the result of motives or temptations to violate law, as in any other. Therefore holy beings are subject to the temptations of violating law.

4. Sin had its beginning in a universe that previously and up to the time of its commission was perfectly holy. Such a universe could have no being in it capable of the malignity which is involved in the act of placing before others enticements to sin. God himself cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man. And by parity of reasoning, other holy beings are equally incapable of tempting any to evil. Therefore, the temptation to the commission of the first sin in the universe, must have arisen apart from all extraneous malignant enticements, and consequently, it must have arisen from causes intrinsic to the nature or moral faculties of the first sinner or sinners. Here, then, we have a first emotion of enmity against God, which had no depravity of nature, and no extraneous enticements to evil for its cause, and which, therefore, must have depended upon some cause elementary to accountableness,—some cause involved in the power of performing deeds of merit or demerit, and which in its character was purely voluntary.

5. Temptation as a motive to wrong-doing was, in its inception, therefore, exclusively confined to the faculties of the being who first yielded to it. The mind which first yielded to it was perfectly holy up to the moment of its doing so. Therefore, temptation was existent and operative with that mind when it was holy, and existent and operative, too, not as the result of malign agency from extraneous sources, as in the temptations of Eve and of our Saviour, but as the result of principles inherent in its own nature as an accountable agent.

6. The essential elements of accountableness, by which I mean intelligence, affections, law, and whatever else the annihilation of which would destroy the power of being accountable, must be substantially the same in all moral agents. The first sinner was accountable; so were the progenitors of our race; so are the angels in heaven; so are the devils in hell; so are the human family at large; so am I myself. Therefore, truths necessarily involved by the essential elements of accountableness, in any of these various agents or classes of agents, are alike applicable to all. That is to say, if the moral faculties of the agent committing the first sin, were such as to admit of his feeling the influence of motives or temptations to sin, from sources wholly intrinsic to his own nature, or wholly independent of extraneous malign agency, such must be the moral faculties of other agents, and an universal law of moral agency.

Now, a train of connected propositions, like the foregoing, which it seems to me cannot be invalidated without resisting the authority both of reason and revelation, reduces to a matter of science the following proposition: *that the things, faculties, or qualities which are elementary to accountableness, contain in themselves, from the first and in their holiest state, principles which in their operation render the agent liable to the influence of motives or inducements to the violation of known law, or to the commission of moral evil; and that when these motives are yielded to, and the sin is committed, in intention or in deed, then the agent comes into instant conflict*

with the divine character and government, and this conflict generates his first emotion of enmity to God. I say, yielding to sin generates the first emotion of enmity to God ; for it is not true that sin in its earlier stages flowed from that principle. It flows from a specific lust, as that excited by the forbidden fruit in our first parents, for instance, and when the lust obtains the mastery over us, then we hate and oppose God, with whom we find ourselves in conflict.

The process through which we have reached the foregoing conclusion may be thought too abstract, and to savor of an attempt to account for the origin of evil. But this is a mistake. We pretend simply to believe what God has revealed, that evil had its origin in the voluntary transgression of a being whom God created holy, with the conclusions necessarily involved in this fact. This fact with its conclusions involves liability to temptation and to sin in the faculties and adjuncts of accountableness, at least through all the probationary stages of their existence and exercise. And this conclusion accords with all our observations upon the nature of man, the only accountable race subjected to our particular inspection. These observations go to show us that man is a constitution of various faculties and affections, and that each of these has some specific object or end, such as his own happiness; the good of others, or the glory of God ; some having respect to the body, some to the soul, some to time, and others to eternity. And the tendency of each of these constitutional affections or impulses is toward indefinite indulgence ; but being intercepted by counterbalancing impulses so as to make its indulgence beyond a certain limit wrong and sinful, it becomes to the agent, at this point of interception, an inherent motive or temptation to go further, and thus to run into the commission of moral evil. Adam's constitutional desires toward the fruit of the garden were in themselves as innocent as any of his other impulses. But when they reached the point of restraint imposed by the command of God, not to eat of a particular tree, his conscience, his reason, and his regard for God and his government, and all his higher impul-

sions imposed on him a feeling of obligation to restrain his desire of the fruit within the prescribed limit. But these higher impulses did by no means annihilate the tendency of that specific desire toward indulgence without limit or restraint. Without a serpent, therefore, and apart from all the infusions of moral evil in his own nature, that desire would have been a source of temptation to involve himself in enmity and conflict with God. Now, this case may be taken as an illustration of the general tendency of specific desires to claim for themselves too much of the mind's regards and undue degrees of indulgence, imposing on the agent the prerogative of determining whether they shall be duly restrained or unduly indulged. And it is according as this prerogative is exercised one way or the other, that merit or demerit arises. Nor does the holiness of the nature destroy the necessity of exercising such a prerogative. The force of habit and custom in right-doing long continued to insure the perpetuity of the agent in the same course, and thus to produce a confirmation in holiness, is a part of our subject that does not fall within the scope of the present essay.

These few concluding hints will serve as an index, to what might be said of the entire coincidence between the great facts which God has revealed concerning his moral government, and the elements of morals as we experience them in ourselves, or observe them in the race of mankind. In hope that these imperfect trains of thought may do somewhat toward opening to clearer and more satisfactory views as to the ultimate principles of morals, they are submitted to the consideration of those who embark in this class of investigations.

ARTICLE IV.

THE CHURCH QUESTION.

By Prof. TAYLER LEWIS, LL. D.

The Principle of Protestantism, as related to the Present State of the Church. By PHILIP SCHAFF, Ph. D.
With an Introduction by JOHN W. NEVIN, D. D.

IN attempting a review of the work which gives title to the present article, we feel that there is incurred no ordinary responsibility. The grounds assumed by it, whether true or false, are of no common importance. It professes to grapple with one of the great questions, perhaps the greatest question of the day. It conducts the discussion in a tone of solemn earnestness, which should alone command for it the most respectful attention of all thinking minds. The associated authors evidently write like persons who feel that they have a most serious message for the men of this generation—one long unheeded, but which it now becomes us to listen to, without delay, if we would avoid the greatest impending evils.

The work consists mainly of a discourse by Prof. Schaff on "The Principle of Protestantism as related to the present state of the Church." It is introduced by Dr. Nevin, and followed by a sermon, of the same gentleman, on the subject of Catholic Unity. This is pervaded throughout with the same spirit, and advocates substantially the same views; in connection, however, with another topic, which may be regarded as containing the central truth, or, as some would regard it, the central error, that gives coherence and consistency to all the other opinions advanced. This is the doctrine of the real and vital, instead of a mere moral or figurative, union of believers to Christ. In close alliance with this, is Dr. Nevin's peculiar view of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist;

in which ordinance, this union, although not created, is supposed to be strengthened and perfected in a special manner. We say Dr. Nevin's *peculiar* view, because so regarded by most Protestants of the present day, although, as he contends, it may be found in nearly all the articles drawn up at the Reformation, and now forming the avowed standards of almost all our Orthodox Protestant Churches.

Prof. Schaff's discourse is chiefly occupied, in its first part, with what he deems the true character of the Reformation as a necessary historical development of the Church, and with its positive principle, or the article of Justification by Faith; in the second, he considers the dangers of ultra Protestantism, in its rationalizing and sectarian tendencies. Both writers, although viewing it from somewhat different positions, agree in regarding the Church Question as the great question of the day, and as by no means finding its proper solution in the present state of the Protestant denominations. In respect to this, they use language which may, perhaps, be thought to resemble what has been employed by Puseyite and even Romanist writers. This, however, as we think, is more in appearance than reality. It is true, Dr. Nevin and Prof. Schaff, as well as Dr. Pusey and Dr. Wiseman, do talk much about the Church and its catholicity; they denounce sectarianism and rationalism; speak of the Church as having a distinct visible as well as invisible and spiritual character. They admit that Protestantism has some evil tendencies, and seem disposed to form a higher estimate of the religious worth of the middle ages, than would accord with the present notions on that subject. Here, however, the resemblance ceases, and even as far as it goes, it is, we think, more verbal than real. However extravagant may seem to some their doctrine in regard to the Church and the Sacraments, in one thing it differs essentially and fundamentally from that of Rome and Oxford. We refer to the dogma of a mediating priesthood, which essentially changes the nature of the Church, and under pretence of exalting, actually degrades the Eucharist. Of this we find no traces in the work before us; and this alone

creates an impassable gulf between the writers and those with whom they are, by some, confounded.

Is Protestantism perfect? If no man will dare to say this, why should we call in question the sincerity of those professed friends of the Reformation, who contend that, in setting forth its ultra tendencies, they are rendering the very best possible service to the cause they are charged with assailing? If it be said that, in the present critical strife, it is unsafe to speak, even in the most gentle terms, of any defects or false tendencies belonging to our own side of these most momentous questions, we demur to any such position, as either just in itself, or founded on any true notions of policy. If we are on the eve of a tremendous conflict, our first business should certainly be to examine if there are any weak points in our own position; not to proclaim them to the enemy, but that they may be remedied before the whole cause, with its immense over-balancing benefits, is thereby put in hopeless jeopardy.

This is the position assumed by Prof. S. and Dr. N. They claim to be true, zealous, and honest Protestants,—warm friends of the Reformation; and on a careful examination, we are disposed to concede to them the character in its fullest extent. We know that it is a common thing for those who are conscious of a contiguity to Rome, to assume, sometimes, the language of extreme opposition; just as a certain class of liberal Christians are ever engaged in writing books against infidels and on the evidences of Christianity. Mr. Palmer, and some others of the Oxford school, have been famous for this. In regard, however, to the writers of the book before us, we believe that no impartial reader can fail to be convinced of the reality, sincerity, warmth, and strength of their attachment to the Protestant cause. They may be mistaken in some, even in many points, and in the chief of their positions; but of this one thing we have no doubt, they are honest Protestants, as sincere as any of those who would charge them with such Puseyite tendencies, and perhaps, it may appear, more

consistent than some who assume to be the great champions of the cause of the Reformation.

Nothing can be more truly evangelical than the manner in which Prof. Schaff sets forth that great article of Justification by Faith, in the positive announcement of which, as he contends, consisted the historical development of the Reformation; constituting it a real step of progress in the historical consciousness of the Church; a step from which according to his peculiar theory, the Church can never recede. We think that there is some degree of error and inconsistency in this theory of progress and development, of which our author is so fond. It is sufficient, however, for our present purpose, to observe that the doctrine must for ever place an impassable barrier between him and both branches of the Anti-Protestant party—the one utterly disregarding the Reformation, as a mere historical negative in the history of the Church; the other viewing it as a step, perhaps necessary, but which having fulfilled its mission, must now be speedily retraced. If Prof. S. and Dr. N. are sincere in this,—and it seems to be not merely held, but to constitute their favorite and darling dogma,—then they must be among the last, if not the very last, in the Protestant ranks, to admit the thought of any return to Rome, or of any alliance with that heartless imitation of Rome, which has its seat at Oxford.

We think that our authors are right in regarding the Church Question as the great question of the day. Did Christ mean to leave behind him merely a system of truth, with only such association among his disciples as might *incidentally* bind together believers in the same philosophy, or the followers of the same teacher; or did he intend to establish, on earth, a community designed to be a visible, perpetual, one, and universal,—a community which, although most simple in its structure, should nevertheless have an efficient organization, and a true government, clothed not merely with moral, but official authority—in other words, did he design a visible communion of himself as of a *common life*, or the unions, and

of course the disunions, which might arise from the same or varying views of a *common professed philosophy*? Very few, even among the most ultra Protestants, would, as we conceive, hesitate in respect to this question. The New Testament uses language too plain to admit of doubt. Christianity is not merely a system of religious truth, however sublime and elevated. It is not a *school*, but a *life*; not a mere invisible influence, be it regarded as ever so refined, spiritual, or even supernatural, but an outward society, standing in the strongest visible contrast to the world, and realizing the full import of that most significant phrase—The Kingdom of Heaven.

If, then, there is such a Church—what and where is it? What constitutes the succession, or rather *continuity* of its life? In what consists its unity and catholicity? Whatever they may have been originally, these questions have now become exceedingly complicated. No one has even begun to think aright respecting them, who regards them as free from all difficulty. There are, however, two classes who may be charged with doing this. The one is the class of the ultra Protestants, the other, of those who claim to be the Churchmen par excellence, but who, in fact, may be shown to be the most unchurchly of all schismatical sectarians. The one avoids all perplexity by denying the reality of the idea altogether; the other by resolving it into a mere tactual succession of Popes and Bishops. The one utterly rejects the doctrine of such a common life; the other would confine the flow of its vitality to the narrowest possible channels. With the false Churchmen, the Church's catholicity or universality is just as universal as themselves, and, of course, they have no difficulty in its definition. No questions of doctrine, of historical life, of decayed and revived spirituality, of corruption or reformation, give them any trouble, so long as they can point to their real or fancied Apostolical succession. In this line is the Church, through whatever horrible pits of worse than even Pagan wickedness it may lead.

There are, however, others equally removed from both

these extremes, to whom the question, owing to the peculiar circumstances of our times, is one of great and trying difficulty. They cannot read their Bible and give up the idea of one *visible*, Catholic Church, or Kingdom of Heaven. They feel that the spiritual destiny of a dying, unregenerate world, is most intimately connected with its ultimate and perfect realization. They hope that they are true members of this Church, because they love its Lord, and all who manifest themselves to be their kindred, by partaking of his Spirit. They have no doubt, too, that every where, in other departments of this apparently disordered, though not utterly broken community, there are heirs of the same salvation, true members of the body of Christ, of the one Holy Catholic Church. Such men *will* talk of the Church, the visible Church, the Catholic Church, to whatever suspicions such language may subject them.

In ascertaining our true bearing in reference to important truths, it is sometimes of the greatest service, that we ascertain our parallax from two fixed and certain stations, which are relatively most remote from each other. In respect to the great question before us, one of these fixed positions may, we think, be found in the condition of the Church of Rome at and preceding the time of Luther, or under the Borgias and Leo Xth. By the Church of Rome here, and every where else, we intend the *Church of Rome* and nothing else, the Italian Hierarchy, the congregation of the city of the seven hills, that strange Power which we firmly believe to be the predicted Antichrist, in distinction from the Catholic Church with which it is so apt to be confounded, and which for ages has groaned under its tyranny. Now, in respect to this Roman or Italian hierarchy, especially at the period aforesaid, we can hold but one opinion. We cannot read the New Testament and believe, for a moment, that Rome, as we have above defined her, was in any sense this Church of Christ, this communion of the Lord Jesus, this Holy City of God. No argument can make us believe that that black line of Popes, and that most corrupt priesthood, were the necessary

and essential channels through which flowed the true vitality of Christ's mystical body, and apart from which there could be no true communion with his Spirit. Infidelity is a refuge from a conclusion so horrible. We would sooner trust our salvation to the religion of Numa Pompilius, than to that of Alexander Borgia. No form of Paganism ever combined such horrid elements of wickedness. An utterly corrupted form or appearance of Christianity was required to bring out those dark traits in human depravity, which heathenism and even Atheism had failed to manifest. This semi-Pagan, semi-atheistic monstrosity, it is true, was *in* the Church visible, and this was the very light which imparted so dark a hue to its abominations. Its predicted seat was the temple of God. But though *in*, it was never *of* the Church of Christ. The very thought is equivalent to blasphemy.

The Reformers always by Rome meant Rome, and not the great body of the Catholic Church, which they endeavored, and with partial success, to rescue from her tyranny. The most absurd mistakes are constantly arising from the want of this plain distinction, and among these, not the least, as we imagine, may be reckoned that most strange decision of the last Old School General Assembly in respect to Romish baptism. No doubt the Churches in Europe, under this influence, have suffered in consequence, both in faith and morals; yet still we have no right to charge them with total apostacy. They are rather deserving of commiseration, because so besotted under its poisonous influence, that that tyranny is voluntarily endured, from which other parts of the Church Catholic have been freed by the struggle at the Reformation. By maintaining this distinction, we may still exercise the most tender charity for our fellow Christians in France, and Austria, and other countries of Europe, whilst yet we shrink not from applying to the Romish Antichrist the clear and terrible predictions of Paul and John.

As long as the historical facts connected with the Papacy are remembered, no Protestant need fear the Romish arguments. We admit that the reasoning on their side is some-

times managed with the most consummate skill. The plea for the necessity of unity and of a visible central head for its preservation, the Jesuitical confounding of the Romish with the Catholic Church, the plausible argument from antiquity, the well-timed presentation of the distractions of Protestants, especially when urged with all the sophistry of a Bossuet, or a Milner, may, at times, make such an impression, as almost to persuade one that there may be something in the Romish claims. But to every sound and healthy Protestant mind, all this array of reasoning must inevitably be scattered to the winds, the moment he gets disentangled from this ingenious web of sophistry, by reverting to Borgia, to Leo X., to Tetzel and his scandalous sale of indulgences, to the exhumation of the bones of Wicliffe, to the *Te Deum* ordered to be sung for the diabolical massacre of St. Bartholomew, to the slaughter of millions of Albigenses, and to the abominable corruption, sensuality, and atheism, which distinguished the self-styled head of the Christian Church in the days of Luther. If, in addition to this, we think for a moment of that apostacy from an apostacy, that corruption of a corruption, that extension of the Italian Papal power which may be seen in modern Jesuitism, the moral sense, which God has given us, must, if we remain true to it, triumph over any amount of scholastic argument. Oh! this cannot be! is all the answer required. This could not have been the head of Christ's mystical body. This horrible stream of iniquity could not have been intended for the channel of its vitality. Such a conclusion, however logically deduced, irresistibly drives us back to examine and re-examine our premises. Christianity must be deemed a fable, if we are forced to conclude that its true and designed result is to be found in the state of the Romish Hierarchy in the sixteenth and for many centuries preceding.

If then we remain true to the moral sense, true to the unsophisticated feelings derived from the simple reading of the New Testament, we can come to but one conclusion: Luther was right; the Reformation was right; it was right

that that abominable power should be resisted ; and even now there can be no union with Rome, however much she may be hereafter improved, as long as she claims to be the sole head of the Church of Christ. Scripture gives no sanction to her claims ; history and experience condemn her ; she has been weighed in the balances and found wanting. If, as some contend, three centuries have proved Protestantism a failure, what must be thought of the verdict which more than thrice three centuries have rendered against the claims of the Papal and Episcopal hierarchy ?

This, then, is one of our fixed positions. We must look for the other in an opposite quarter, and in closer proximity to our own times. This second stand-point, as we humbly conceive, is furnished by the present condition of the Protestant Churches in Europe and America. Here, it is true, the eye is disgusted by no sale of indulgences, no traffic in the practices of a most degrading and blasphemous superstition, no murderous wars, and mutual poisonings, and horrible incests of popes and priests. We see a comparatively decent morality, mingled every where with a cold and worldly spirit, which is but a poor exchange for the false sanctity that had preceded it ; although no doubt in connection with this apparent worldliness, as previously was the case in the midst of that spurious sanctity, there are many thousands of the true disciples of the Lord Jesus. But can any reflecting mind bring itself seriously to believe, that in Protestantism, as it now is, we have the true model of Christ's intended visible Church on earth. Is the cold rationalism, or rather heartless infidelity, which pervades so large a portion, the consummation of that primitive faith which led the martyrs to the stake ? Did men in ancient, or comparatively modern times, give their bodies to the flames in attestation of no higher truths than are held by the rationalists of Germany and Geneva, the liberal Christians of our own country, or the Eighteenth Century Church of England men, bigoted and fanatical in regard to their single dogma of the Apostolical succession, whilst they were latitudinarian, even to the very

borders of infidelity, on every other article of faith? But aside from this, can we believe that the numerous sects, even of evangelical Protestantism, present a fair picture of what Christ and the Apostles designed by the visible Kingdom of Heaven, the communion of saints, and the undivided body of the Divine Redeemer? We have no wish to magnify differences, as is often done. We believe, and hope hereafter to show, that there is really more of true Church feeling among the various evangelical parties than is generally conceded; but we can no more blind our eyes to most serious defects in this quarter, than in the one to which we lately turned our attention. Here too is a call upon the reason and the simple moral sense. We must bring this condition of Protestantism to the plain and conclusive test of Scripture, as well as the anti-christian tendencies of the Papacy and of the heretical and schismatical dogma of a Church consisting solely of a Priesthood. There is danger here, too, of a subtle sophistry, which may utterly blind the mind to the real enormity of the evil. Let us oppose the simplicity of Scripture and of true Christian feeling, to the oft-repeated proposition, that the present division into sects is really calculated to advance pure Christianity, by exciting and maintaining a laudable spirit of emulation. If any one is in danger of being led away by this miserable argument, let him only open his New Testament. Its refutation is on every page. Separate families, we are told, live more harmoniously in separate houses; but what right have the followers of Christ to constitute separate families. Can we for a moment suppose, that this is the case with that part of the Church who

“Have crossed the flood;”

and can the thought be indulged in regard to those who

“Are crossing now?”

Again we are told, that if there be only an invisible unity, outward divisions are of no consequence; but what a wretched

petitio principii is this. If there be in truth but one Spirit, why this great diversity and complete separation? Must there not be some interior spiritual cause for the unchristian outward development? The truth is, we are not united in spirit; we do not love each other. Notwithstanding the most solemn and express charge of the Apostle, there are *schismata* among us; as far as we can effect it, Christ is divided. There is nothing in the Romish corruptions more strange than that we should allow any sophistry to close our eyes, and prevent our humbly and penitently acknowledging such a palpable and enormous evil of Protestantism.

But is not this, it may be asked, the natural result of that freedom of thought for the sake of which we threw off the bondage of Rome? Men cannot think alike. We are not, however, fully prepared to admit that, on subjects pertaining to salvation, men may innocently differ. There is some one or more truths which those who believe shall be saved, and those who believe not shall be damned. It is the language of the Saviour. Viewed even as a system of truth and nothing else, there must be some one or more doctrines, by which it stands out from every other religious system; some one term which gives meaning and value to all the rest. We believe Christianity to be something more than a system of truth, but it is sufficient for our present argument thus to regard it. Eighteen hundred years must have settled something, or the gospel is a delusion. When a man, at the present day, denies the old doctrine, or presents a new doctrine of the trinity, the atonement, or the resurrection, we will not argue with him; we will not listen to him. The establishment of his position is not simply productive of a mere change of opinion, but is subversive of our faith. We look back upon the long line of the pious, the learned, and the devout, which no honest student of ecclesiastical history can fail to trace, and in which have been ever maintained those doctrines that have constituted the power and life of the Church. Aside from these doctrines, Christianity has had, historically, no existence. Without them there is an immense hiatus from

the time of the Apostles down. If they are all wrong, we despair of ever finding the truth. If this immense accumulation of private judgments has only led to error, who can trust his own, single and unaided? We *must* judge, each for himself—that is a truism which no sane man will dispute; but as to the manner of this judgment, and the aids on which it should rely, this is the great inquiry. We intend here no mysticism or Germanism by the terms; but we hold it as a self-evident truth, that in determining what Christianity is, we cannot separate it from those doctrines that have ever had their seat in the consciousness of the Church, and formed the manifestation of its continuous life—doctrines no further depending on the decrees of councils, than as these truly represented that life. Of this we *must* judge, and when private judgment, or any other judgment, assures us of such a handing down of the universal Church, there is peril of heresy if we reject it. Otherwise the word has no meaning. We cannot at present go fully into the argument, but would only here express the opinion, that we are driven to infidelity, or to some sound and safe doctrine of tradition, equally removed from the extravagances of Rome and Oxford, and of the ultra-Protestant dogma of private judgment. If there is not acknowledged an historical Christianity, we have no reason ever to expect the unity of the Church on any other basis.

But there is no use of beating the air. The fact must be conceded. The great majority among our evangelical sects do admit, that there are certain fundamental doctrines which have always been in the Church, and that those who now deny them are not entitled to the Christian name. Notwithstanding the disposition, on the part of infidels and others, to exaggerate differences, there are vast numbers who do acknowledge one another to be Christians. This is enough for our present argument. Let us confine our attention to these, and ask why those who regard one another as members of the same invisible or spiritual organism, should belong to separate families in their visible constitution? We have no sympathy whatever with such as undervalue doctrines and

despise systematic theology ; yet still we must maintain, that although some agreement here is necessary, such agreement does not, of itself alone, constitute the unity of the Church. It is a community not of doctrine, but of life ; arising from the simple fact that we are Christians, and from the heart recognize each other as such. We may not *think* alike, but what should prevent our worshipping Christ together, if we believe that through him we are mutually the heirs of eternal life ? In the practical application of this simple principle, especially in the present state of the Church, there doubtless are great difficulties, which God only can remove ; yet still we contend that the principle cannot be denied without denying Christianity itself.

It is hard to be profound on this subject, or to avoid what may seem common-place. What we have expressed, is but the common language of those simple souls, who cannot understand why the Church of Christ should not now be visibly one, as well as in the days of the Apostles. It may be that we have taken a very superficial view, and are incapable of understanding those recondite arguments by which some Protestants would justify the present state of things ; but we will not be faithless to our moral sense, and to those first and fresh impressions of truth that rise up in the mind on the perusal of the words of Christ and his Apostles. We will be true to what we believe to be genuine Christian feelings. We cannot but conclude that the present state of the Protestant Churches is utterly wrong ; sinful in the sight of God, tending to put in extreme jeopardy the cause of the Reformation, and to promote the triumph of Rome. We may not be able at present to point out the best remedy, but in some respects it does seem to us that the path of duty is most clear. We should see to it, that all our personal and collective influence be exerted to prevent any further widening of existing breaches ; to maintain, in our respective departments, a position more favorable to an ultimate visible unity, whenever in the providence of God it may be accomplished ; to avoid, as the most deadly evil, the creation of any new sect, even un-

der the fair pretence of Christian unions; to discourage the spread of individual proselytism, whilst we seek rather to bring about the collective approach of organized bodies; to pray more earnestly that we may be kept from throwing any obstacles in the way of so blessed a result, and ever to feel that, along with Christian submission to the will of God, we are ever to be dissatisfied with the present state of our broken and fragmentary Zion, until "the Lord shall come to make Jerusalem a praise and a joy in the whole earth." As long, then, as the New Testament sheds upon the soul its pure and holy light; as long as we can trust at all our moral sense of Christian duty, this simple position must we regard as a truth which it would be sin to doubt—*All who recognize each other as Christians in the same convenient locality should worship Christ together, and should act together as one visible organization against the world.* We have no right to form Churches on the elective affinity principle, according to our own tastes and theological dogmas, unless they amount to such a difference as must, in our belief, exclude one or the other of the parties from the pale of Christianity. We have no right to organize exclusive Churches on temperance principles, or abolition principles. We have no right to secede from a body of Christians whom we regard as fundamentally and morally sound in the faith, because of defects, or the want of what we might conceive to be a perfect Christianity. This undoubtedly was the view of the Reformers, and of all those reformed national Churches which threw off the yoke of Rome, although by so doing they never wished or designed any separation from that great body of the Catholic Church, to which the false influence of Rome alone placed them in opposition. Who shall charge Calvin with a Romanizing tendency? yet that the above sentiments were earnestly taught by him is beyond all doubt.

The view of Prof. Schaff, as corresponding substantially with the above, is best set forth in the vivid picture drawn on page 117 of his discourse. That we may not crowd with unnecessary matter the limited space assigned to our review,

the reader is referred to the book itself. No candid man, we venture to affirm, can read that lively portrait of the evils of sectarianism, without recognizing his honest attachment to the Protestant cause, and the warm evangelical feeling, so utterly different from that evident exultation which characterizes the writers of the Oxford school, when indulging in animadversions on the same theme. "Faithful are the wounds of a friend." Give us such opponents of Protestantism as Prof. S. and Dr. Nevin, (if any will foolishly choose to regard them in that light,) rather than such friends of our cause, or such enemies of Popery, as Quinet, Michelet, and Eugene Sue. The truly evangelical Protestant can never rejoice in the alliance of those infidels, or semi-infidels, who attack Romanism in countries where it presents the nearest and most serious aspect of religious belief. The very same men would, doubtless, with still more zeal, take its part in other places, where it could be played off as the antagonist of a purer evangelical faith. Their philosophy is only hostility to religion in its nearest and most invading aspect.

Prof. Schaff's views have been characterized as vague, cloudy, mystical. In short, to sum up all in a word which is sometimes used as a synonyme for all that is obscure and unmeaning, it is said that they are most peculiarly German. We know ourselves so little of German theology, that we are unable to defend him successfully against this accusation. Judging however from the place of his birth and education, we deem it not at all unlikely or unnatural, that he should be somewhat tinctured with the philosophy and theology, and, as we should likewise conclude from some sections of his discourse, with the warm evangelical piety of Tholuck and Hengstenberg. It is also made matter of complaint against him, that he proposes no explicit remedy for the evils he points out. Dr. Nevin furnishes a satisfactory reply. "It was not," says he, "the design of Prof. S. to say what the form of the future Church is to be, or how it is to be reached. His aim is only to press the idea that a new order *must* come,

that we should expect it, and not stand in the way. God must bring it to pass in his own time and way as he did the Reformation." The first step towards a cure is to know our disorder ; and of the fact that we are suffering under a grievous moral disease, there cannot be a better proof, than the disposition to assail all who would kindly remind us of our deranged condition. The course of events, however, will soon furnish us with this knowledge. The life which yet remains will bring us to a position where we must meet the question with all its appalling difficulties. Our foreign missions, if successful, must hasten its speedy determination. No proposition seems to us more plain, than that the Church must be one, visibly one, before the world can be regenerated. Partial success may attend partial efforts ; but any general turning of the heathen mind to Christianity, must bring up this Church question, and present it in a light with which modern sects are not familiar. Dr. Adams, of New-York, in some of his late lectures, has clearly shown what immense power the missionary efforts of Rome derive from her false unity. We hope the lesson will not be lost on our Protestant Churches. Our various evangelical denominations may exhibit much of the spirit of Christian union on the exciting anniversary platform ; there may be much of mutual concession and mutual charity, as long as the various missionary stations are separate and remote. *One* missionary society (although several rival institutions are already forming) may, perhaps, for a while most imperfectly supply the place of *one* Church. But suppose that in the advance of the cause, the Presbyterian, the Baptist, the Methodist, and the Episcopalian, come to labor in the same or contiguous fields ; that Churches have to be organized, ministers ordained, and discipline exercised ; what a babel must there be presented to the eyes and ears of the astonished heathen, instead of a society having one Lord, one faith, one baptism. Does any one say, the Lord will provide a way ; that is the ground assumed by Prof. S. ; only he maintains that we should now be expecting it, praying for it,

preparing for it, confessing our diseased condition, instead of charging those who are faithful in exposing it, with being guilty of a Romanizing and Puseyite tendency.

Again, there can be no effective discipline without a high idea of Church authority, and this can never be, while the Church itself is regarded as little, if any thing more, than a voluntary society. Excommunication and Church censures are designed to mean something, and to produce that fear which can alone make them means of saving discipline; but what do they amount to when, in many cases, they result simply in a transfer from one voluntary society to another? Who will regard excommunication as a separation from the visible body of Christ, or for whom will it have any terrors, when any new opinion, not in theology simply, (a decision thence arising might have some plausible pretence,) but in morals and even in politics,—when any difference, for example, on temperance or slavery, and that too arising not so much from ultimate diversity of sentiment even on these points, as from varying standards of self-righteous zeal, shall ever and anon give rise to what is called *a new Church*! Will the discipline of such bodies, thus organized, be any more likely to be regarded than expulsion from a debating society, or the censures of a philosophical club? If the superstitious fears of an usurping priesthood, and the terrors of a purgatory were one extreme, surely this must be regarded as another equally pernicious. Opposition to Rome should not lead us to abate the force of some of the plainest passages in the Bible. The power of the keys so solemnly given, not to a priesthood, but to the Church, or to the Apostles as her representatives, must certainly be allowed to mean something. To bind and loose in Heaven what is bound and loosed on Earth, is certainly something more than what is implied in the transfer of a dissatisfied member from one voluntary social reform combination to another. Nothing can furnish stronger proof that there is something wrong about our Protestantism, than the fact that these, and kindred expressions of the Bible, have become almost obsolete among us. We are as shy of them, as Rome

is of 1 Timothy 3 : 2, or of the second commandment ; and with far more inconsistency in our own case, because we claim to be *par excellence*, *Bible Christians*. We feel the more confidence in this opinion, because it is sustained by the language of some of our most carefully formed Protestant standards of faith and discipline.


The idea of one Catholic Church, finally separate from the Italian Rome, was ever held by the Reformers. They contemplated, it is true, the necessary national and local partitions in the universal body, but they never thought of such a state of things as would permit the Christians, acknowledging each other to be Christians, (for this is the point on which we would ever insist,) in the same country, in the same city, aye in the same street, and even in the same house, to arrange themselves according to their elective affinities, and to maintain a separate worship of one common acknowledged Lord. It is true, they gave more prominence to the idea of the *spiritual* and *invisible* than their Romanist opponents, but they also speak with equal distinctness of a *visible* Catholic organization. To their minds the distinction between Rome and the Catholic Church was ever most clear, and hence they avoided that inconsistency into which, for the want of such distinction, we are so apt to run. They talked even harder of Antichrist than we do ; yet they would have been utterly astonished at such an act as that of the late General Assembly in respect to what is falsely called *Romish* baptism. They never gave up the hope that even the portions of the universal body, which yet remained under the tyranny of Rome, would in time be delivered and brought into the wide communion of the one visible, *reformed*, Catholic Church of Christ. Our desire for Christian union should not, then, be satisfied with the hope of a closer alliance at some remote day, among the various Protestant denominations, but we should also include in this fraternal feeling, those from whom we are so estranged, and whom we have almost consigned to perdition, mainly because we have unjustly confounded them with the odious name of Rome.

We want, then, no more mere party Protestant unions ; no creating of new sects, under pretence of uniting together fragments of older ones. We should have no confidence in any mere outward plans, as long as the true *Church feeling* remains in its present languishing state. "We need," as Dr. Nevin elsewhere observes, "the sense of unity, of Catholicity, reaching back to the age of the Apostles, and struggling, with God's help, to actualize itself in the new form of One Visible, Holy, Catholic Church." May not the extremes of error be found in the two remote, fixed positions on which we have been dwelling ? From them we may deduce our true parallax. Here are the marks to guide us to that future state of the Church, for whose development we are to look. Here is the true *via media*, in distinction from that pretended middle course of Oxford, which creeps along as close as possible to the very edge of Rome. Christ has promised to guide us into all truth, but he teaches by experience as well as by the Spirit. There are some things we can learn in no other way. Nearly a thousand years were necessary to fix an impression, never to be eradicated, of the enormous evils which have had their root in the early substitution of a priesthood in place of a ministry, and of a corrupt Popedom for the voice of the Universal Church. Three centuries, at least, have been required to teach us the equally necessary lesson, that there are also immense evils in the other extremes of rationalizing sectarianism, and—we must say it, whether it sounds unprotestant or not—the extravagances of the boasted natural right of private judgment.

Prof. S. regards the Reformation, not as a revolution, or a restoration even, but as a regular historical development of the Church doctrine and the Church organism. He traces the preparation for it in the previous history, both of the Church and of the world ; in politics, literature, the scholastic theology, and previous religious developments. In close connection with this, yet not identical with it, is his doctrine of progress. Although, in the main, agreeing with the author in this part of his work, there are, however, several things to

which we must demur. We cannot help regarding the Reformation as, in some respects, a restoration to a primitive standard, just as we must also believe that the future development, to which our author looks with so much solicitude, will be a still more complete return to that system of doctrine, that Church organization, and that *life*, which certainly has never since been realized and felt, as it was in the days of the Apostles and their immediate successors. We must believe that the Church, as left by Luther and Calvin and Crammer, would have been more easily recognized as the bride of Christ by the primitive Christians, had they been permitted to behold it, than the Church of Hildebrand and Thomas a Becket. They might have discovered some few familiar marks in the latter, which had been left out of the former, but we cannot doubt which they would have regarded as standing in the nearest relation to their ancient home, and which would seem at the point of greatest departure.

We should not object to the word progress, if simply used in relation to time and to development. A retrograde movement may be a necessary antecedent of a more glorious return to a primitive basis, and all this may be a necessary arrangement by which that primitive basis may be rendered more stable, more firmly apprehended, and, in this sense, more fully developed in the mind and the conscience. Thus, not only the restoration, but the intermediate retrogradation may both, with some propriety, be styled progress. If, however, Prof. S. means more than this, and would contend that, as the sixteenth century was a real advance upon the eighth, so the eighth had more of the mind of Christ than the fourth, and the fourth than the first,—the conclusion seems to us not only strange, but utterly at war with history, prophecy, and any comparison we may make of the spirit of the New Testament with that of any of the subsequent periods to which we have alluded. All these evidences concur in establishing, beyond doubt, that there was an apostacy, a falling away, a retrogradation, a grievous departure from that course into which Christ and the Apostles first directed the Church. An



unregenerate world, yet lying in wickedness after eighteen hundred years, is, we think, sufficient evidence, that the early, onward, triumphant movement by which she set out to subdue the world, and which, in the first century, gave such fair promise of speedy success, must have been checked by some backward current. We cannot, therefore, agree with that opinion of Guizot and other writers on the philosophy of history, and which is also advanced by our author, namely, that the Papacy was actually necessary for the preservation of Christianity, in the then rude condition of the world—an opinion which Prof. S. carries so far as to hold, that, for such countries as Spain, Italy, and Ireland, it is actually necessary now. This argument, however, is we think, repelled by the most authentic examples. No Papacy was necessary to convert and hold in Christian submission the ferocious Numidian, the savage Gaul, and the barbarous inhabitants of Britain, whether Celt or Saxon. The rude Caledonians were much better Christians under the Culdees than under the Romish priests. Christianity was in a far purer state among the rude tribes of England, Wales, and Ireland, than after they had been most unrighteously interfered with by the Papal hierarchy. The question then is not what influence the Papacy may have exerted, for some kind of good, over those wild hordes which overran the Roman Empire, but, whether they would, for so many centuries, have continued thus wild and barbarous, had they been first met with that pure and unadulterated Christianity, which found no barbarism capable of standing before it in the days of the Apostles.

To admit the apostacy, and then contend that it was included in the designs of Providence, for the accomplishment of some ultimate, unknown purpose, which could not so well have been brought about by the speedy triumph of Christianity, may be a correct view; but to call it progress, would be making every step in the world's history an advance in the same manner; just as is done by some of the transcendental rationalists, so that even Mahometanism and the French revolution may be defended on the same ground as

well as the Papacy. With just as much propriety, too, might we commend Peter's apostacy and David's grievous sin, because they were, doubtless, in the everlasting grace of God, the means of advance to a higher spiritual condition. In this sense, even Adam's fall may be regarded, as it has been regarded by some, an upward movement. Besides, the doctrine of continual progress, if carried out, would be inconsistent with another cherished position of our author. He holds, and so do we, that there has been in some respects a falling away from the primitive Protestantism. There have dropt out of our theology some doctrines that the reformers held most precious, and which Prof. S., and Dr. N. contend, and, as we think, most justly contend, must be restored before Protestantism can fully accomplish what they style its mission. The vital doctrine of the mystical union has faded away from our speculative theology, though still retained, it is to be hoped, in the life of our Christianity. Rationalistic views prevail in relation to the sacraments. They say, and we think justly, that there is a great lack of the true Church feeling. The future Church of the reformation, then, must be, in some respects, a restoration of a primitive Protestantism, as the reformation itself was of primitive Christianity. If they mean that rationalism and sectarianism are necessary steps to bring the Church to a deeper consciousness of certain doctrines, then the case is precisely similar to that before presented. It is, however, no less a retrogradation from the truth, for all that ; and we must come *back* to our point of departure with sorrow for our unchurchly sectarian spirit, and for the many evils and scandals that have followed in its train. Our view of the progress of the world and the Church, we must admit, is quite different from that presented in what is now commonly called the philosophy of history. We would recognize in it more of the absolute sovereignty of God, and less of what may be styled natural cause and effect ; we would regard it as marked by otherwise inexplicable retrogradations, abrupt and sudden inequalities. Like the signal fires in the Agamemnon, the light has glanced from one high peak to another, whilst the

intermediate valleys have been shrouded in comparative darkness. In other words, the outward progress of the Church has been marked by a series of revivals and declensions. There have been great periods and great men for those periods. They stand out between previous and subsequent extremes, though in the whole ever indicating progress; thus marking the true *via media*, and serving as beacon lights or way-marks to guide us back, or lead us on, which ever it may be styled, to primitive truth. We look with great confidence to such periods. We are not ashamed to confess, that we pin our faith upon them, as carrying with them clear evidence of that supernatural, spiritual intervention, which cannot be traced in the fanatical efforts of any spurious reformers. Such a period was the Reformation. It bore the impress of the Divine seal as no other period had done since the first century. The world bowed before it as it had never bowed since the days of the Apostles. It was attended by that same great and unmistakable sign, which ever attends the first promulgation or revival of vital, evangelical truth. The same old spirit of persecution that had been so violent in the Pagan city, now revived in Papal Rome, and aroused itself to a desperate conflict with the same antagonist. The struggle of the Reformers had this attestation of its primitive and apostolical character,—it was the second age of martyr witnesses. On this account, we rank the *fathers* of the Reformation as equal, to say the least, to any in the early Greek or Latin Church, and as possessing an authority, which does not belong to the directly preceding or subsequent ages of the Church.

In regard, however, to the life of the Church, as distinguished from its faith and purity, we cordially agree with Prof. S. in holding to its continuity; not merely as a fact, but as a most important and vital truth. Whatever may have been its retrogradations, the Church, we are satisfied, must be regarded as identical with the Church of history. It has had no abrupt chasms. It has never proceeded *per saltum*. It has never been invisible or run under ground. Had its continuity ceased but for a moment, there might have been a new

creation, but it would not have been the same Church that was once built on the foundation of the Apostles, any more than that could be said to be the same State, or the same individual man, the direct continuity of whose being had been, for ever so short a period, wholly interrupted. The very laws of language drive us to this, and we cannot use the expressions, "the Church," or "the visible Church," without indissolubly associating with them these ideas of unity, continuity, and identity. We may fancy as many cases as we please, of persons thrown upon a desert island, and there becoming converted by the reading of some casually found copy of the Scriptures. We may inquire, with ever so much seriousness, whether such persons, thus situated, could ever constitute a true Church. It is a sufficient reply, that the case never has happened. God has so far taken care, that the vitality and organization of the different parts of His Church, broken as it may be, have ever, as yet, been derived directly from the life of preceding organisms, and we firmly believe that this continuity will be maintained unto the very end of time.

Most Protestants would, perhaps, admit this, although there may be some whose Church feelings and Church ideas are so exceedingly low, as to attach no importance to such a continuity, and to find no difficulty in believing that the organic life, which commenced on the first establishment of the Church, might repeatedly go out, and be again rekindled, as easily as the spark is drawn from the flint and tinder. Such, however, are comparatively few, even among the most ultra-Protestants. There is something in the way which is stronger than our rationalism. Whatever may be our speculative dogmas, most of us have a Church feeling, of which we cannot wholly divest ourselves; a feeling which is pained at the thought of any interruption of this continuity, and which causes us to attach, perhaps without being fully aware of the reason, great importance to the historical facts by which it is established. If we strongly wish to avoid all contiguity to Rome, we seek for it among the Waldenses, the Albigenses,

or the Culdees; but whatever course we take, we do, nevertheless, seek for it, and we feel lost when we cannot find the track, as though our own vitality was concerned in the search. We cannot endure the thought, that there has been a year, a month, or even a day, since the time of the Apostles, when there was no organic society of real Christians upon earth; when either the life was totally extinct, or it existed, if such a supposition can be maintained, in scattered individuals unknown to each other and to the world—with no claim to be regarded in any sense as a *visible organized body*.

Christianity simply as a philosophy, or a system of truth, (the great error of ultra Protestantism,) might, in its abstract state, that is, abstracted from all individual or organic consciousness, have crossed many a dark chasm in history, and have been Christianity still, even during all the time of its speculative transmission. Such a Christianity may have existed in books and parchments, as the works of Aristotle, it is said, remained for several centuries, concealed from the world. It may have lived in creeds, and confessions of faith, and decrees of Councils. It may have existed, as some have said, in the Bible. Still there are few, even among Protestants, who would be satisfied with such a view, although they might be unable to say wherein it would be inconsistent with prevailing dogmas. The reason is evident. There is something more than truth and its influences in Christianity. There is a real, and not merely a figurative *life*, a life belonging to the Church as an organized body, in connection with a living head. As Christians, yea, as Protestant Christians, we partake of that life. Although, perhaps, it may not be present to the mind as an objective speculative dogma, yet we feel that there is something which unites us, not only to all the Christians now on earth, but also to all who are now with Christ—something that links us away back to the first Apostles and Martyrs of the Lord Jesus. We cannot bear to think, that this life has been interrupted, although we might be unable to give a reason for the feeling, and may be

therefore inclined to regard it as little more than an irrational, though pious prejudice.

Some who would admit the sentiment, might contend that it is satisfied by tracing the Church in some obscure lines of persecuted sects, connected by links on which history sheds its faintest rays. They might even feel a sort of antiquarian interest, in running up the spiritual genealogy through the Waldenses; and other such witnesses for the truth,—proceeding along the finest historical thread, which, where they cannot trace it by sight, they follow by faith; so strong is the feeling which impels to belief in its continuance. This, however, would resemble the life of those lowest animal substances which are propagated by sections, rather than that of an organized body ever in connection with a Divine and Everliving Head. The Waldenses are certainly worthy of being regarded as a light shining in dark places. Their history may present the brightest line amid surrounding shades. We may thank God for such a pure vein of vitality running for ages through Christ's mystical body, conveying the most precious influences from the Divine Redeemer; yet we cannot help feeling, with Dr. Nevin, (p. 33,) that there was something more than this in the full idea of the life of the Catholic Church. Our author takes delight—and we must confess that we share in the feeling—in finding a broader stream of life in the wide bosom of the universal, visible, Christian organization, tyrannized over as it was by the anti-Christian Papacy, and deeply marred in its spirituality by the pestilential corruptions flowing from it,—corruptions which, although they tended to stagnate and impede, did not wholly destroy the vitality that had come down from the Redeemer himself. Had this Catholic congregation contained no real Christians, through which it was thus united back to the fountain-head of life, we admit that its visible organization, or any outward visible succession, however accurately preserved, would not have entitled it to the name of the Church. But the most ultra contemner of the middle ages dares not

affirm this. The tares which the enemy had sown in the visible kingdom, may have been rank ; and yet, if in the midst of the worship of Baal, and Moloch, and calves, and demons, there were seven thousand undefiled spirits, may we not suppose that there were more than seven times seventy thousand true and spiritual worshippers, during the darkest period of Papal tyranny and apostacy.

Nothing can be more directly opposed to the absurd pretensions of the Oxford school, than this very view of Prof. Schaff, that the true life of the Church has been a *broad* stream flowing continually from the Apostles down to the present day. On this account our authors condemn the Puseyites, for “overleaping the time since the Reformation, in their efforts to connect the Church with the remote antiquity of the third century.” (See Dr. N’s Introduction, p. 23.)

“With all their historical feeling, (says Prof. S.) the Puseyites show themselves, in regard to the Reformation, absolutely unhistorical. They would shut out of view the last three centuries entirely, and, by one vast leap, carry back the Church to the point where it stood before the separation of the Oriental and Western Communions. Their doctrine of the Episcopal succession, with its denial of the *universal priesthood* of all believers, the Episcopal and Apostolical character of every inwardly and outwardly called minister of Christ, involving the papistical idea of a clerical mediatorship between God and man—this is the old leaven of the Pharisees, which has never been thoroughly purged out of the Anglican Church, and may now be said to offend Protestant feeling in the writings of the Oxford School, from beginning to end. If this succession was taken as one simply of doctrine and ministry—*successio spiritus Dei, doctrinae, et ministerii Divini*—it would be necessarily included in the idea of the Church, as the abiding and indissoluble communion of believers in Christ. But, instead of this, the idea is limited to an order of Bishops, unscripturally sundered from the laity and lower clergy, as though they were alone competent to transmit ministerial power. According to this theory, Paul was illegitimate fully, because he had his ordination neither from the Lord, nor from an Apostle, but from a simple Presbyter in Damascus. How monstrous, again, is the position, that the dead Armenian and the Greek denominations, because they have Bishops, belong regularly to the Holy Church Catholic, while the German Reformed, Lutheran, and Presbyterian bodies are denied any such character. Let it be allowed that the Tractarians

are right, and all unbishoped Churches are left without hope, till their clergy submit to have their character made valid by the hands of his Grace of Canterbury, or some Diocesan Onderdonk on this side of the water. Preposterous imagination! Can the Church be renovated by putting on a new coat?"—pp. 125–6.

If some ultra Protestants have falsely regarded the Church's historical life as proceeding *per saltum*, through sects obscure, or connected by almost invisible contiguities, whilst at times it has become almost invisible, or like the fabulous waters of Arethusa, found its way under ground, the High Church party have been guilty of a still greater absurdity, in tracing down this life through certain most attenuated lines, which even if whole and continuous furnish only a tactual and lineal succession—often, too, passing through points in which the true life of Christianity had no more existence than in the most profane orgies of paganism. That there have been many links, in such a series, which all must acknowledge to have been deeply affected with spiritual death, is a fact of tremendous significance, when such lineal succession is relied upon as the only channel through which the Church's life has flowed. Christ's promise, if thus limited, must be taken in the lowest official sense, or it has most certainly been broken. If they will confine it to the line of Popes and Bishops, then "he has *not* been with *them always*." In no spiritual sense whatever, was he with Alexander Borgia. In no sense whatever, can this monster be said to stand as a necessary conduit in the stream of life that has flowed down from the Saviour. In no sense whatever, has this poisoning, this horribly licentious and incestuous Pope imparted any true grace, or any spiritual gift that would have been impeded for want of such a succession as that in which he is said to have formed a necessary link. But what then, asks one, becomes of all Churches, Romish, Episcopal, or Protestant, if such consequences are to be attached to the cases of wicked and antichristian ministers of the gospel? The question may well be asked by those, and of those who make their ministry or priesthood the only channel of the Church's true life. It has

no difficulty for such as believe, with Prof. S., that this vitality has descended in the broad stream of the whole visible Church, flowing down through laity and clergy, although ever more or less in contact with a vast amount of spiritual death. It has no difficulty for those who hold that the clergy derive not only their spiritual, but also their official life, through a living Church, instead of imparting life to it. They bear not the Church, but the Church them. On our theory, they are but branches, of which the Church is the trunk, and Christ the root. They might be all dead, and yet the Church survive to give rise to other branches, and other organisms. But how different a feeling comes over the soul—we appeal to Papist, Puseyite, or Protestant—at the bare thought, that at any time the life of Christianity had been wholly extinct in every single member of the visible organism, whether clergy or laity. A most tremendous difficulty, surely, lies in the way of those who, with history before them, can assert that the Episcopacy has furnished the only vessels, or the Papacy the spinal marrow, through which this vitality has descended; or, in other words, that they have constituted the only channels through which Christ has ever lived in the hearts of believers. The absurdity of the ultra Protestant is as nothing when compared with this. The one may believe that a stream may occasionally run under ground, the folly of the other can only be equalled by him who would lay plumbers' pipes in the stream of the mighty Mississippi, and trace its course by them, instead of the broad channel which nature designed for the transmission of its fertilizing waters. In the face of the acknowledgment, which even Oxford makes, that there are in the Scriptures but exceedingly slender proofs, if any, of such a succession, how dare men appeal to history? Episcopacy and the Papacy are both unquestionably ancient, but this fact only shows how conclusive has been their trial. Do they appeal to History, to strengthen their feeble claim from Scripture? To History, then, let them go. It is full of the records of their condemnation. Protestantism has its great defects, but there has not yet been sufficient time to show

that those defects are incurable. If, however, history ever pronounced any verdict, then, certainly, the other system has been weighed in the balances and found wanting. Nowhere is that disguised rationalism which contends both with history and the Bible, so strikingly exhibited as in the defence of this scheme by the Oxford theologians.

If then the theory of our authors be true, the followers of Dr. Pusey are, in reality, the most unchurchly of all sects, and the most opposed to the true idea of historical life. With as much reason might we trace the vitality of the English nation through the genealogies of the Tudors and Plantagenets, and contend, that where this could not be found, the national life had ceased, as to attempt to find in this narrow, and oftentimes most unchristian succession, that broad kingdom to which Christ had promised his uninterrupted presence. And yet to these perverters of the true idea of the Church, have we yielded the precious word to such a degree, that whoever out of the limits of the Papacy or the Episcopacy, ventures to talk much about the Church, and a true Church feeling, or to lament the real defects of Protestantism, is very likely to be set down at once as manifesting anti-protestant tendencies.

We have suffered ourselves to be driven, by the high claims of the opposing school, into a false position, both in respect to the word and the idea. Still, we think, there is a good deal more of real Church feeling among the evangelical Protestant denominations, than Prof. S. and Dr. N. are willing to allow. The Church dogma, as a dogma, is doubtless more prominent among the Papists and Puseyites. Perhaps, too, there is among them more of a certain kind of artificial and sentimental feeling in relation to it. This is especially the case, just now, with certain young poets of the latter party, who, although just emerged from the straitest Puritan or Presbyterian sects, talk and sing about "Holy Mother," as though they could trace their spiritual genealogy through the line of all the Canterburies, or really fancied themselves in that mediæval period which they praise so highly, and of which they

know so little. It is, however, an easy matter to detect this miserable affectation of a spurious Church feeling. It may all be summed up in a pretended admiration of "the saintly George Herbert," of monkish rhymes, and Latin hymns. Should any one impose upon their ignorance, by translating and dressing up in this antique guise, one of Watts' Church lyrics, they would doubtless regard it with the same rapture, as indeed a most precious relic of the purest catholicity. But this sentimentality is as heartless as the system of which it is the offspring. There is more real Church feeling in the hymns of Wesley and Watts, than in all the cold cathedral strains of the school to which we refer. One sound from the true lyre of David, even although it may come to us through the old Scottish version, is worth it all. How indeed could there be any true emotion at the mention of Christ's kingdom, among such as would unchurch the most evangelical portions of Christendom? What Church feeling is that, which embraces Portugal, and Naples, and even Abyssinia, whilst it regards as heathen, Scotland, and Germany, and New England? Deficient as we may be in reverence for the true idea of a visible catholicity, and however much it may be marred by opposing sectarian sympathies, still, we do believe, the Evangelical Protestant denominations do really possess a Church feeling, more pure than any thing of the kind existing among those who denounce them as schismatics—and that, too, not in regard, merely, to the invisible or spiritual kingdom, but to the visible community of professing Christians. We believe that the bare mention or thought of this visible kingdom, as distinguished from a visible world in deadly opposition to it, calls forth among them a warmer emotion than is ever known at Rome or Oxford. What cathedral poet has ever set forth this attachment in strains so fervent and affectionate as those of the noble Puritan hymn:

I love thy kingdom, Lord,
The house of thine abode;
The church our blest Redeemer bought
With his own precious blood.

I love thy Church, O God !
Her walls before thee stand ;
Dear as the apple of thine eye,
And graven on thy hand.

The spirit with which these precious words have been often sung in the Methodist conference, or Presbyterian prayer meeting, or Puritan meeting-house, may well be compared, in respect to purity and truth, with any that was ever exhibited in the Gothic temple, though aided by the lyre of Herbert or of Keble. High Churchmen, in whose psalmody this hymn is a special favorite, as one peculiarly their own, have been known to express great surprise, when told of its Puritan origin. They might well imagine, however, that the third stanza, at least, came from warmer and more Catholic hearts than their own—

If e'er to bless thy sons,
My voice or hands deny—

With what feeling, or rather with what want of all feeling, must *they* sing this solemn imprecating strain, when they call to mind, how many precious members of the Redeemer's body their narrow schismatical spirit would consign to uncovenanted mercies. A *true* churchman would feel, that even to harbor the thought is enough to put his soul in peril. It is not simply in reference to the spiritual or invisible that these verses are such favorites with all truly evangelical souls. They love no less those parts that refer to the visible arrangement of Christ's kingdom, and the visible order of his house—

Beyond my highest joy,
I prize her heavenly ways,
Her sweet communion, solemn vows,
Her hymns of love and praise.

Every one is familiar with the ancient declaration—"Give me the making of a people's ballads, and let any one else make their laws." It is applicable, in its fullest sense, to the

songs and hymns of the Church. There is little danger of error when these are orthodox in sentiment and in feeling. Rigid as is our Calvinism, we have no fears that the Arminianism of our Methodist brethren will greatly mar their attachment to the "doctrines of grace," as long as they are fond of hymns, so full of the great truths of the Gospel, the bleeding sacrifice, the justifying righteousness, the incarnation, the intercession, the affiliation or adoption, and *the life*, as that favorite one, commencing—

Arise, my soul, arise,
Shake off thy guilty fears.

Neither can we believe, that the true Church feeling, however impeded in its flow, will ever become extinct among those who delight in Watts' plain yet beautiful version of the 87th Psalm—

God in his *earthly* temple lays
Foundations for his Heavenly praise.
He likes the tents of Jacob well,
But still in Zion loves to dwell.

That most precious word, Zion!—so long consecrated as a memorial of the visible congregation of the faithful—from what hearts does it come forth with the warmest gush of feeling? Who speak with the most affectionate tenderness of "the City of our God?"

Thou City of our God below;
Thy fame shall Tyre and Egypt know.

Where is such language most a favorite—we mean, among the laity, who are supposed to be under the influence of no professional dialect? Is it at St. Paul's, or St. John's, or Trinity, or in the meeting for prayer in the session or conference room? We ask not who are most fond of the phrase, "Holy Mother," but who do really speak with the most sincere and heartfelt interest, of the Church, as the true birth-place of souls.—

Egypt, and Tyre, and Greek, and Jew,
Shall there *begin their lives anew*.
Angels and men shall join to sing,
The hill where living waters spring.
When God makes up his last account,
Of *natives* in his Holy Mount,
'Twill be an honor to appear,
As one new-born and nourished there.

Amid all the false reasoning, and cant, and quackish declamation that have been charged upon our religious anniversary meetings—in these very hotbeds, as some would style them, of Ultra-Protestantism, and where, too, at times, some of the most unchurchly dogmas are said to be put forth—even here, we firmly believe, there is manifested more real love to the visible kingdom of Christ, in its purest and most enlarged sense, than in those assemblies where the first and last word is ever, the Church, but where its meaning is limited to the most narrow acceptance,—hardly embracing even the laity of such exclusively Church-like sects.

And so also in respect to what is styled the Church's visibility, the Evangelical Protestant bodies may well be compared with those who imagine themselves the almost exclusive maintainers of the dogma. The language of some would lead us to suppose, that this visibility depended upon the size of a Cathedral, the height of a spire, the extent of an organ, or the number of open visible baptisms, confirmations, &c. At least, we might draw this inference from the statistical reports of some ecclesiastical bodies. Now certainly we need not run to this most narrow extreme of what may be styled, *a visual visibility*, to avoid the error of the followers of Fox and Penn. There certainly is a visible Church, in distinction from the purely spiritual communion which comprises only the true elect of God, but this, we conceive, is to be measured by a standard far different from that above mentioned. It must, it is true, be visible in the sense of an outwardly organized body, with a visible authority, and a visible discipline; but the most important aspect of the Church's true visibility is in its relation to the world. Christ's kingdom is likened unto a city set

on a hill. This, then, is its most real and highest visibility; and, in this respect, the Evangelical Protestant bodies may, with great advantage, be compared with those by whom they are despised as mere *schools* of rationalizing lecturers.

The world never errs in this. It has an instinctive perception where Christ's kingdom is to be found. It seldom, if ever, fails to determine aright the position of its hated adversary. It never fails to see the really visible Church. Now what bodies can best abide this test? What Churches stand out in boldest relief, and in most visible contrast with the world, and which are most in favor with Christ's enemy? What side is instinctively taken, when the contest waxes warm against evangelical truth? In short, to make our meaning plain, if worldliness and infidelity were compelled to choose, would they take sides with Rome and Oxford, or with those Churches which honor Calvin, and Knox, and the Synod of Dort? Which has the most awe for the carnal mind—penance and asceticism, with all their alleged sanctity, or the soul-troubling doctrine of justification by faith alone, with all its alleged tendency to licentiousness? Which fills the sensualist, the worldling, or the infidel, with the most alarm? Which most wrings the conscience? Which most compels the sinner to think of the holiness of God, of his own depravity, and his own utterly lost condition?

Again, among what denominations do the phrases "admission into the Church," "members of the Church," etc., have the deepest significance? When it is said of a certain one, He has "joined the Church," what Churches are immediately suggested to the mind? Is it that sect which is ever loudest in the use of the word, as though it were its own peculiar property? Let experience judge and answer.

We think that Prof. S. has not done full justice, in this respect, to some of the principal evangelical bodies. The Puritans of New England, he regards as having possessed less Church feeling than some other denominations. Their peculiar relation to an oppressing hierarchy, may have led them into the opposite extreme, as far as the mere Church

dogma was concerned. In respect, however, to the *feeling*, where has it been in more vigorous exercise, than among the early congregations of New-England? In true love for Christ's visible kingdom, in warm attachment, not only to *their own Zion*, but to the Israel of God, whether in England, Scotland, Holland, Germany, or Switzerland, the rigid worshipper in the meeting-house, may fearlessly be compared with the disciples of Laud, the Church of Charles the Second, or the narrow Nonjurors. Nowhere was there a more scrupulous care for the visible order of God's house, and among no people was there a more decided opposition to that false spiritualism, which despises all external order, rites, and ordinances. No people ever made more of the Church, as the very soul of the commonwealth, the grand director of individual, domestic, social, and political life. Their love for their plain external order, and their most anxious solicitude for its pure transmission to posterity, were great in the inverse ratio of its extreme simplicity. Read their hymns, their devotional exercises, especially those pertaining to days of thanksgiving, or fasting and humiliation; enter into the soul of their worship, and then judge, whether from cathedral or meeting-house went up the holiest songs in praise of Zion, the most fervent prayers for the Redeemer's kingdom on earth, or the purest remembrances of the city of our God.

Again, if we turn our eyes to Scotland, how will the Church of John Knox compare with that which Queen Elizabeth established in opposition to the piety, the martyr-zeal, aye, as we are borne out by history, too, in saying, the learning of the Reformed Church of England? The latter has ever put forth the most high-sounding claims to Church authority. She has talked much of the keys, and of binding and loosing. She has been full of poetical sentiment respecting Holy Mother,—a term which, even in condemnation of its abuse, we would use in no spirit of irreverence. She has professed to be the very model of a true, and of course, a pure Church, driving from her all the profane, or else transforming them, through her inherent store of grace, into regen-

erate Christians. But with all these magnificent pretensions, what discipline has she ever exercised? What has she ever bound or loosed? Compare her in this respect with her plain and despised sister of Scotland. Which has really and truly been the most Church-like in this vital matter of discipline and authority? Can any one be at a loss as to the answer?

In respect to *teaching*, too, how stands the comparison? For centuries has the one been loud in the assertion of this claim. She has assumed to be "the ground and pillar of the truth." The people were to receive the law at her hands. They were to have no other faith but the faith of the Church. The priest's lips alone were to teach knowledge. And yet the greater part of her instruction has consisted in the constant and stale assertion of this single dogma. The exercise of her boasted Church authority has exhausted itself in the continual putting forth of a claim to such authority. What has she really taught in comparison with her despised and modest neighbor? We would not at all undervalue the labors of the great divines and scholars of the Church of England, but as regards the faithful and persevering instruction of the common people in evangelical truth, how will she compare with the Church of Scotland? The latter, although she has had but little to say about her authority, or exclusive right to control the faith, has been, most eminently, a *teaching Church*. Nowhere has catechetical instruction been ever so systematically, so thoroughly, and so universally carried on. Her bishops have indeed been pastors. For generations have they fed the sheep and guarded the lambs, in the fields, on the mountains, and in the lowly glens, demanding no reverence for the Episcopal stole, or submission to any symbolical Episcopal crook. In the English Cathedral, or in "the village Church," which forms so charming a picture in the strains of some of our shallow sentimentalists, there has doubtless been far more preaching *about* the Church and her traditional right to teach; but take the laity of the two denominations, (for this, after all, is the best test of true churchman-

ship,) and in which do we find the most real feeling of attachment to the Church as the body of Christ, the Zion of God, the kingdom of the Redeemer, as distinguished from a world lying in wickedness? We may be mistaken on this point, yet it does really seem, that far more of all this, in its best and purest state, has heretofore existed in Scotland and New-England, than among the inhabitants of Yorkshire or Cornwall. But what shall we say, then, of those who have been for ages under the tradition-dispensing hierarchy of Sicily, or Sardinia, or who have sat under the *teaching* priesthood of Ireland, or Lower Canada? Do they form Churches of Christ? With all their imperfections, corruptions, ignorance, and slavish superstition to the Romish Antichrist, we dare not deny them the title. What then, we ask, must be thought of that Church feeling which would embrace these in its catholicity, whilst it would regard as outcasts from the commonwealth of Israel such communions as those of Tholuck and Hengstenberg, of Chalmers, of Elliot and Brainard and Dwight? Is antichristian too harsh a term to apply to the spirit which gives birth to such a view of the Redeemer's kingdom? Surely, there are some conclusions which inevitably disprove the premises from which they are derived. If the doctrine of the Episcopal succession leads fairly to such a result, then is the doctrine false. To a sound mind, unshackled by invincible prejudice, no other argument would be necessary. At least, to sustain so monstrous a conclusion, the most express declarations of Scripture may certainly be required, and such declarations, it is conceded on all hands, are not to be found.

We would say thus much for the past, and, to some extent, the present state of our Evangelical Churches. It must be admitted, however, that in our own times there are, throughout Protestant christendom, some grounds for the alarm raised by Prof. Schaff. Whilst the false love of a hierarchy, taking the guise of love for the Church, may be waxing stronger in some bodies, the true Church feeling is decaying in others, where it once was cherished. Especially is this

the case in our own land. Here there is every appearance of an ecclesiastical crisis. The Church dogma, and the Church feeling, seem both destined to be most severely tested. Almost all our larger Christian bodies have been, and are yet, to some extent, representatives of national Churches in Europe. The Episcopal may certainly be so considered. The Presbyterian is a branch of the Church of Scotland. The Dutch Reformed bears the same, or even a closer relation to her mother in Holland. The German Reformed derives its origin and its life from the Church of the same name in Germany. The orthodox Puritans, also, in their varieties, may be regarded as the offspring of the Church of England. When they left their mother country they could hardly be said to occupy the position of dissenters. They were rather a party in the national congregation, who had been defeated in their efforts to give it a more thoroughly reformed character, and who therefore left their native land to avoid becoming dissenters, and that they might realize, on a foreign coast, their more perfect ecclesiastical polity. They parted in no friendly mood from the Church of England, and yet, it is matter of history, that they did for some time regard her as a mother, although, at the same time, they charged her with being a harsh parent. The origin of the Wesleyan Methodists is well known, and also, the fact that in England they never regarded themselves as wholly sundered from the parent stem. In this way may be traced the historical stream of life, in almost all its branches. There has been, till quite recently, no such thing known, among evangelical denominations, as a strictly voluntary society, starting up, automaton-like, from no acknowledged necessary connection with previous Churches. The most irregular and least justifiable secessions, came out as bodies deriving their ministry and their government from those from whom they separated. Thus almost all our ecclesiastical organisms have had a natural, although, in some respects, an irregular growth out of previously existing organisms, which in like manner sprang from others, and so on, back to the days of the first Churches planted by the Apostles. In this way the continuity of life, though in-

jured, and sometimes greatly interrupted, may yet be said to have been preserved.

In attaching value to such an Apostolical succession, we are only following a feeling, of which, as we have contended, it is very hard for any Christian wholly to divest himself. There have heretofore been very few who would have been wholly indifferent to the fact, whether the society to which they had belonged, possessed this continuity, or had suddenly at some period of its history, commenced an automaton course, under the direction of those who had had no Christian connection with any antecedent organism.

In the crisis, however, through which we are passing in this country, this is actually beginning to be the case. Not only are there new bodies continuing separate from the old, on altogether slight and inadequate grounds, but there are cases arising among us of associations in the strictest sense *voluntary—self-constituted*, claiming no continuous derivation from any others, and although calling themselves churches, acknowledging no higher obligation, and no higher life for their pretended organisms, than avowedly belong to a temperance or a moral reform society.

These things ought to show us whither we are tending. Even political society never could acknowledge so loose and disorganizing a principle! Surely, then, may we say, that the idea of the Church as developed in the New Testament—the organism of that society to which such sublime epithets are applied as “the pillar and ground of the truth,” “the body of Christ,” and through which, it is declared, that to Principalities and Powers in the heavens is made known the manifold wisdom of God, must undoubtedly be something more than what it is, not unfrequently, assumed to be, even among such as are in other respects comparatively orthodox. Most certainly it must be something more than a society which Mr. Gerrit Smith, or William Lloyd Garrison, may create and dissolve when they choose. If there is,—and who can read the New Testament and doubt it?—one universal visible Church, in distinction from a school, or schools of philosophy,—a Church most dear

to the Apostles and first disciples of our Lord, and to the unity of which they attached the utmost importance, then certainly we have gone too far in this country, to the unchurchly extreme. If there are such things as schism, and criminal sectarianism, we are in great danger of becoming guilty of them. In many parts, not only the Church dogma, but also the Church feeling, is almost wholly lost. We ought, therefore, to be thankful to those who sound the alarm, instead of charging them with Romish tendencies for so doing.

In the present discourse, Prof. S. does not pretend to assign, or even conjecture, the form of the future Church, or to point out the mode by which it may be reached. He has little confidence in artificial unions, or the making a new sect to destroy old ones. The first thing, and the great thing, is to attempt to revive a true Church feeling, and when this is warmly cherished in every department of our broken Zion, and each section begins to feel that it is incomplete and deprived of a portion of its true life, as long as it is not in true church relations, (in distinction from individual toleration and fellowship,) with other Christian bodies,—then one great step towards the blessed consummation has been already taken. When the heart has been prepared, God may provide a way. If, in a case so difficult, and yet so important to the highest interests of a dying world, we should even believe that He would interfere by some supernatural display of the power of his grace, surely it could not be charged with being any irrational superstition. If the soil be prepared, how easy would it be for him so to raise the spiritual temperature, by an outpouring of the Spirit of *life*, as well as of *truth*, that all sects, not even leaving out of the estimate the arrogant school of Oxford, or the subjects of Romish tyranny, should melt and flow into one !

We regret that our limits will not permit us to bestow as much attention as we could wish, upon Dr. Nevin's concluding discourse on the Catholic unity of the Church, as depending on the mystical union of all believers with Christ. A doctrine to which this name was applied, was certainly most

strenuously maintained by the Reformers; and although it has in a measure fallen out of our modern theology, still we have reason to believe, that, like the Church principle, it enters largely into the feelings of all true Christians; denoting in fact their very life, although as a speculative dogma but little apprehended, and in many cases even denied. It certainly is acknowledged, in most of our Protestant standards, and by our highest Protestant authorities. The great name of Calvin would alone be sufficient to defend any one from heresy who should maintain it. But we would not rest here. Beyond all question, to our mind, a doctrine of a more intimate union to Christ than is maintained by many, or even most Protestants, is taught in the New Testament; and in it, we agree with Dr. Nevins in believing, shall we find that great peculiarity of Christianity, which formed the true unity of the primitive Church, as it will also be the uniting life of the Church of the latter days. Forced and artificial Christian unions have only multiplied instead of destroying sects. Benevolent societies, although they spring out of a still existing churchly and catholic feeling, do yet tend to injure the Church, by superseding its proper organization. It seems impossible, also, to devise any system of truth, be it more or less stringent, or more or less liberal, in the reception of which, as the only bond, the different denominations may be united. As long as Christianity is thus regarded as a philosophy or system of truths, and nothing more (for we really cannot perceive the ground of distinction which Prof. Tappan makes between them,)* so long the differences and separations will remain among all those who have discovered the worthlessness of that unity, which depends solely on an external hierarchical succession. Here we have the two great extremes. The Papist and the Oxfordite, who are near enough in this respect to be classed together, rely upon this external or ritual unity. The rationalizing Protestant looks to what he is

* We refer to an article, written in an admirable spirit in the preceding No. of the Repository.

pleased to denominate, a spiritual unity arising from agreement in doctrine. If the fact that Christianity is a *life*—in distinction both from *truth* and external *order*—does indeed constitute the true uniting power, then both the other extremes, when held by themselves, are alike systems of rationalism—whether it is manifested in the Papacy, or in the Episcopal succession on the one hand; or, in the two forms of liberal, or speculatively orthodox Protestantism, on the other. It may be asked however,—What is the doctrine of *the life* but a dogma, and if so, what uniting power has it more than any other speculative truth? The objection is plausible, and yet, we think, there is something in this, even as addressed to the intellect alone, which tends more to produce the desired result, than any other. As an actual life, however, in the soul, not only felt but acknowledged, it must transcend any mere *influence* of truth, as truth, of however solemn and holy a nature it may be thought to be. It is admitted, of course, by all serious minds, that no other agent but the Divine Spirit can be ever expected to perform this work of healing the Church; but will it not be by a revival of that feeling, so prominent in the primitive age, that between Christ and every Christian there is a *real* union, and, of course, that all Christians hold to each other the relation of real and not merely figurative or moral brotherhood,—a brotherhood as intimate, if not more so, than any natural affinity, because they all *live* one common *life*, in distinction from maintaining common *truths*, or thinking common *thoughts*, or possessing common *feelings*?

Whoever examines carefully the writings of the earliest Christian Fathers, must be struck with their sudden departure on some points, from the letter and spirit of the Scriptures,—especially as regards the authority of the ministry, and an approach, to say the least, to the doctrine of a mediating priesthood. Between the liberal Paul and the rigid Ignatius, there would seem to be, in this respect, the lapse of ages. The difference is still greater, and grows continually greater, in subsequent writers. So also in respect to the cardinal doctrine of justification by faith, we cannot resist the belief, that

here also there was a departure which began to take place at a very early day. It seems to have suffered a sudden eclipse, and not to have emerged again in its original brightness, until the time of Augustine and Pelagius. We feel certain that the language and spirit of our Reformers on this subject is far more in accordance with that of Paul, than the style of those who lived but one or two centuries after him. The transition is certainly much easier from the Epistle to the Romans, or the Galatians, to Calvin's Institutes, and Luther's Sermons, than to Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian, and even Augustine himself.

In respect, however, to another topic, we are compelled to draw a conclusion directly the reverse. One great difference between them and our modern Protestant theology is found in this very doctrine of the mystical union. The earliest Fathers are full of it. It seems to be the pervading spirit of all their writings. We meet with it in every aspect of the primitive Church. Its martyrs proclaim it at the stake. The profane world around them stand amazed at a doctrine so wonderful and so new. Such godless scoffers as Lucian and Celsus represent it as one of their absurd and incomprehensible dogmas. The Christians, says one, believe that Christ lives in them, and that they literally carry their God within their hearts. We may regard this as figurative, but even on this supposition, it betokens an opinion with which the Church, to say the least, is not now familiar. Our present speculative mode of viewing the relation between Christ and his people, would certainly have given origin to no such expressions, and no such figurative language.

Here, however, when we turn to the Bible—it may be with the expectation, as in the cases just mentioned, of finding the language of the Scriptures more in accordance with modern ideas—the case is wholly reversed. On this point the early Fathers are the Bible Christians. The ancient position of the Church seems, *prima facie*, warranted by the language of the New Testament, from one end to the other. There is the same abundance of scriptural support that we find for

our favorite doctrine of justification by faith. Not more common is it for Paul to speak of our being saved by the blood of Christ, than of our being *in Christ*. He says that "*we are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones.*" Most wonderful language truly! *I knew a man in Christ*, he says, speaking of himself. Again, *If any man be in Christ.—There is, therefore, now no condemnation to those who are in Christ Jesus.—Our life is hid with Christ in God.—When Christ, who is our life, shall appear.—Ye are the body of Christ.—Those who sleep in Christ.—Know ye not that Jesus Christ is in you, unless ye be reprobate.—I live, not I, but Christ liveth in me.—For ye are all one in Christ Jesus.—In heavenly places in Christ.—Christ formed in the soul the hope of glory.* Most strange language this! Can we avoid the conclusion that it must contain some most wonderful truth, whatever that truth may be? How utterly absurd, exclaims an interpreter of the McKnight school, to think of finding any mystery here! How can any rational mind be misled by language so clearly figurative! *Ἐν Χριστῷ* most evidently means simply a Christian, a follower of Christ. How natural is it, we reply, when one has long been accustomed to a certain mode of interpretation, to regard any other sense, even although it should be really the most obvious, as fanciful. Is this language figurative? So also says the liberal Christian of all such expressions, as, *We are saved by his blood—He gave his life a ransom for us—He is the propitiation for our sins—He bore our sins in his own body on the tree—The Lamb of God who taketh away the sins of the world.* In the same category, also, he places these most important texts—*The Word was God—The Word was made flesh—I am in the Father, and the Father in me—As thou, Father, art in me and I in thee—I in them and thou in me.* All these, he contends, are most undoubtedly figurative, especially the first class, which are most evidently derived from the ritual of the Jewish religion. Thus the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement, are at once resolved into tropes and figures. Our great Protestant doctrine of Justification

by Faith, is explained away into one of the plainest elements of natural religion. In regard to the atonement, there is really more plausibility in this figurative theory, because there might be said to be a previous foundation for such metaphorical expressions, in the superseded Mosaic dispensation. In the other case, however, which we are now considering, the language is entirely new. No such *usus loquendi* had been ever before employed in the Old Testament. It was foreign to any previous system of religion. It was utterly unknown both to philosophy and theology. In short, there can be found no foundation or preparation for figures of so strange a kind, in any previous style or language the world had ever known. The relation between priest and people, between mediator and the objects of his mediation, between teacher and taught, between a master and his disciples, between the propounder of any inspired or uninspired system of truth and his followers, had never before been conveyed by these or any similar terms. The expression, *in Moses*, would have seemed as strange to the Jew, as *in Socrates* to the Greek. This mode of speech, then, is altogether new. It meets us, for the first time, in some of the declarations of our Lord, and then the Apostles, and especially Paul, are full of it. In fact, could we read the Bible, divested of those modern impressions through which these terms, in a great measure, lose their force, we would be astonished at their frequency and the strange significance of the relations in which they are found. How many passages, too, which are now regarded as having no peculiar emphasis, would mount up to a spirituality and a sublimity of meaning unconceived before! This style of speech forms a most striking peculiarity of Paul, in respect not only to his doctrinal language, but also to that of his own Christian experience. It seems to be all summed up in this—He is no longer Saul of Tarsus, but “*A man in Christ.*” In Christ Jesus old things had literally passed away, and all things had become new. He seems, in some sense, to have regarded himself as having lost his former humanity, and as having become identified with the Saviour. He had put off the old

Adam, and put on the new man created in Christ Jesus. He was crucified with Christ—dead with Christ—risen with Christ—justified, not simply *by*, but *in* Christ—δικαιωθείς ἐν Χριστῷ.

Almost all language is more or less metaphorical. There may have been figure in these expressions, and there undoubtedly was as far as they imply space or locality : yet there can be no doubt, that the early Christians and Christian writers did connect far more of literality with them (if there can be degrees in the word) than is thought of by most modern theologians. Here they adhere to the very words of the New Testament, to an extent which we condemn as extravagant. On this point, as far as language is concerned, they occupy that position on which we are so apt to pride ourselves as Protestants. They are the sober and literal interpreters ; we are the allegorizers. They are the Bible Christians ; we rationalize and rest on our Protestant traditions. This language made so deep an impression on the mind of the primitive Church, as to throw in the shade the other great doctrine of forensic justification, which is so intimately connected with it. The Reformation corrected that extreme, but we want now again revived the ancient doctrine, to bring the pendulum back to its true and impartial position. We may even suppose the language to be, and it doubtless is, in some respects metaphorical ; and yet it is hard to resist the impression, that so remarkable a phraseology must symbolize something deeper than is implied simply in a moral union, to whatever elevation we may carry the idea—or, in other words, a union merely of external relations, whether as mediator, redeemer, or teacher. We may adopt the highest or lowest view of such external relation ; yet Christianity still remains to us only a system of truth,—whether that system includes all that is generally embraced under what is styled the most rigid orthodoxy, or the most remote extreme of rationalizing liberalism.

The degrees, in this respect, seem not to affect the position. The term rationalism, may be applied to any view which thus regards Christianity as nothing more than a system

of truth, however high or however low those truths may be. This is perhaps an extreme use of the word, but we know not where else to stop short in its application. We are aware that it is commonly regarded as the antithesis of supernaturalism; but we may certainly rationalize about supernatural events. We may fancy or even construct, a science of miracles. According, however, to that use of the word which we have adopted, the lowest in the rationalizing scale might regard Christianity as the religion of nature, which Christ meant merely to confirm by his teaching. The Pelagian prefers a somewhat higher scheme, so as to include in it the incarnation, the trinity, and something bearing a faint resemblance to an atonement. It is, however, truth, which the human powers alone in their natural state may rightly appreciate—truth, which by its own native influence, may convert the soul and make a man a Christian. Another party rises a little higher. It is still truth, all truth; but then a Divine *influence* is necessary to present this truth and make it effective. It is the soul under the *influence* of truth; whether communicated by a human or a Divine agent, makes, in this respect, no difference. Another talks of the Spirit giving power to truth. All that we can say of this is, that we never could comprehend what was meant by it. It far surpasses in obscurity and mysticism any thing it was ever brought to explain. Power imparted to the truth, aside from the mind *on* which, or *in* which, it is to have power!—We can attach no meaning whatever to the terms. If there is any previous change in the soul to fit it for the reception of truth, it must be, on this system, by the presentation of previous *truths* or motives, and these again, to have effect, must have *their* antecedents, and so back ad infinitum. There is no escape from this, unless we adopt the old school tenet, which we hold to be true as far as it goes, namely, that the Divine Spirit works a change in the very being of the soul, or in other words acts directly as spirit upon spirit, to prepare us for the reception of truth, and not as an *influence* operating as a *medium* itself, or through *media*.

But, even here, in whatever way Christianity may have lodged in the soul, or the soul been prepared for its reception, it remains still but a system of truth. We are yet, as we humbly conceive, within the limits of rationalism, although it may have ascended far above what generally bears the name. As we rise in the scale, we may say Christ is our Teacher, our Prophet, our Redeemer, our Justifier, but it does not make him *our Life*. The mind may be changed by this influence, or it may be changed to prepare it for its reception; still, in whatever way introduced, salvation is to it only the possession, the enjoyment, or, if you please, the most spiritual contemplation of certain *truths*, with their *effects* upon the actions, the purposes, and the affections.

We contend against the avowed rationalist, that Christ is *the Way* as well *the Truth*, but is there not also a higher and deeper significance in the fact, that he is also the *Life*, in a sense equally real—a sense distinct and independent in itself, and not to be confounded with the others, as an effect or an influence proceeding from them? I am the *Way* and the *Truth*, says the Saviour. We find fault with the Socinian for confounding what appears to us so separate. I am also the *Life*, says Christ. If we make the third simply an *effect* or an *influence* from the others, without any independent reality of its own, on what principle can we condemn the exegesis of that interpreter, who regards the second as only another expression for the first. From the great prominence given to *the Life*, especially in the writings of John, may we not conclude, that if they are dependent as cause and effect, this is entitled to the first place, and that Jesus becomes our effectual teacher, and our real atoning sacrifice, because he previously becomes our life. The mystical union which we believe to be taught in such expressions, would not be the result, but the ground of the imputation of his righteousness.

In short, the doctrine of the language which has been so largely referred to, we believe to be this,—that there is between Christ and the believer, not merely a moral, or even a spirit-

ual union alone, as this latter term is now often used in distinction from real and actual, but a *real* union, in the highest sense of that term. We would say, a *physical* union, had not that word been so grossly abused. It is, in other words, an intercommunion of spirit with spirit, directly, and not through the media of truth, or in-flowings of something which is neither truth nor spirit. It may be regarded as a union of nature with nature; by which, however incomprehensible the process, Christ's humanity becomes our humanity, in as true, and real, and intimate a manner, as we are psychologically and anthropologically united to Adam, the natural head of our race, from whom all our natural humanity flows. To adopt another mode of expression, Christianity, in the soul, is a new Life, in the highest sense of that term, the meaning of which in modern theology is so apt to evaporate in figures. It is something below exercises, emotions, and thoughts, the very *life* of the Redeemer, *living* in all the redeemed as, *Ἐν ἐν πολλοῖς*—not as an effect or influence of truth, or of some external power, but as an absolute, independent, indwelling *life*, as real as that old life which was imparted to Adam, when he lay a passive and lifeless organism of clay in the garden of Eden.

There is a great difficulty in the expression of clear views on this subject, in consequence of the inveterate habit of taking certain terms in a metaphorical sense. Hence, many would seem to agree with the above statement, when, at the same time, they may be very remote from the meaning intended. There are those who would doubtless say amen to much that has been set forth. We hold, say they, to such a union, and that too of a most real and intimate kind. We hold that the believer has the mind of Christ, and that Christ dwells in him. He has the life of Christ. Very soon, however, those who use such language, as though they felt conscious that they may have gone too far into mysticism, will begin to qualify it. "By the glorified humanity of Christ," says one in reviewing Dr. Nevin, "is meant only the grace and spirit of

God." "Christ is in us by his spirit which he has given us," says the same writer.* "He is the second Adam, who came to restore us after the image and likeness lost in the fall." "It is the same spiritual condition, as that from which we fell, only it is *through Christ*, and by the operation of his spirit." "Thus we are his workmanship just as distinct as the vessel and the potter." The Scripture, however, says, we are created *in him*, and the figure of the clay and the potter is applied in a totally different manner. In reference to the above explanation, the same writer says, "Here is no confusion." He means that all is plain and intelligible: there is no mysticism. The remark, however, only shows the power of long and inveterate associations. It is just the objection that another mind would make, that these expressions convey no idea whatever, whereas the doctrine of a real indwelling *Life* which is the life of Christ, although incomprehensible as to the manner, is perfectly intelligible and simple as a fact for the apprehension. The others present to the mind nothing definite or easily conceived of even as facts. They are mere verbiage. Subject these statements to a strict analysis, and they will be found to indicate merely a communion of feeling—or rather of similar feeling—of thought, and, in a word, of *truth*. It is after all an *influence*, whatever may be the meaning attached to that term, instead of an abiding indwelling of a permanent hypostasis. Some talk of germs and principles, but what do they mean? We certainly have a right to ask this of those who cry out so much against Germanism and mysticism, and imagine that because they have long had their ears habituated to certain combinations of words, they must necessarily have a definite sense, whether they can explain it or not. We would just reverse the writer's declaration, and say—here *all* is confusion. These expressions, unsupported by something else, mean nothing, or they only serve to cover

* A popular commentator on John xiv. 17, says further, "that the Spirit dwells in Christians by his influences." Are these influences truth, or what is the nature of the intervening media?

up a more specious kind of rationalism, to which even the Socinian may be ready to declare his *ex animo* assent; for refine as we may, there is always that in his system, to which he can appropriately apply the terms, unless they are taken out of his grasp, not by being rejected, but by being connected with something to which his rationalism can make no approach.

The writer to whom we refer is alarmed at what he regards the pantheistic, or rather, as he probably meant, the *anthropotheistic* aspect of the doctrine. It will be time enough to make the charge, when any one teaches that the human soul is so united to Christ as to lose its own individual consciousness. Until this is done, we need not fear to use the language of some of our best old divines, such as Howe, Baxter, and Owen. They did not hesitate to speak of being one with Christ, or of the human will being absorbed in the Divine, and that too without fear of being justly charged with the Buddhist doctrine of spiritual annihilation. Such a philosopher as the author of the "Blessedness of the Righteous," would teach us that the soul's *consciousness* of being in Christ, and of having one life with him, might give a higher sense of a more glorious and blessed individuality, than could be derived from any other state of being. What would those who are so alarmed at pantheism have thought, if certain expressions had been for the first time used by Prof. Schaff and Dr. Nevin, instead of being found in our Bibles? Paul was not afraid of saying that "in God we live and move and are," or of speaking of the Church as "being the fulness of him that filleth all in all," or of declaring that "our life is hid with Christ in God." Neither, whilst there remained in him the individual consciousness of so blessed a state, was he afraid of the declaration, ζῶ δέ, οὐκ ἔτι ἘΓΩ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ,—*I live, not I, but Christ liveth in me.*

We wonder not that those who deny all psychological unity as existing between us and Adam—who regard our spiritual connection with him, as a mere *consequence* which they do not pretend farther to define—who deny that we inherit from him a depraved nature, or that the sin of the first

man is, in any sense, to be imputed to us, or regarded as ours—who, in other words, have almost discarded the doctrines of original sin, and federal headship from their theology—we wonder not, that such should see nothing but irrational mysticism in the tenet in question. It is, however, matter of very great surprise, that those who rigidly maintain the opposite view in all these points, who hold to a real union with the first man, a real imputation of his guilt and on real psychological grounds, in short, a real traduction from him of our whole natural life and our whole natural humanity by ordinary *generation*,—it is, we say, matter of great surprise that such should break the Apostle's analogy, should make a mere figure, or, at most, a moral influence of that *regeneration* by which the believer is really transferred to a new life, and engrafted into the humanity of the Second Adam—the Lord from Heaven. Both, in respect to the mode of explanation, may utterly transcend our highest understanding; but as matters of fact, we cannot see why the one should, in any sense, be regarded as more figurative, or less real than the other. If we have in theology one sure guide beyond all others, it is this favorite parallel which the Apostle is so fond of instituting between Christ and Adam. If original sin is something more than the following or the “*imitation of Adam as the Pelagians do vainly talk*,” then regeneration, union to Christ, being in Christ, and other similar expressions, must mean far more than being followers of Christ, or under the influence of truths revealed by his teaching, or being affected by his death *as a moral display of the Divine justice*,—or in short, any external relation, however high or supernatural it may be conceived to be.

We are reluctant to dwell on this, because we cannot help feeling that the doctrine, if true, is too holy for dialectical definition and dispute. It should be approached with something of that awe which Calvin manifests, in that sublime introduction to the chapter of his Institutes in which he begins to treat of Justification by Faith.* The reviewer dis-

* Calvin Instit., Let. III., ch. xii.

trusts himself and his own experimental knowledge of the truth. It is perilous, especially in relation to certain themes, to talk or write much beyond clear and distinct experience. We feel that we should put the shoes from off our feet, for we are on holy ground. No doctrine should so affect the soul as this. If, indeed, as Christians, we hope that we are really, and by no figure of speech, united to Christ;—if, in the awfully mysterious language of the Apostle, "*we are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones:*"—as such "*men in Christ,*" what manner of persons should we be in all conversation and godliness! If this indeed be so, and if it is only by such a union his death becomes our death, his sufferings our sufferings, and his righteousness our righteousness,—if thus alone we are *justified in him*—then indeed must this infinitely transcend all other truths of theology or philosophy. In reference to a theme so high and holy, we can only say, 'The good Lord pardon us if, in our ignorance, "we have darkened counsel by words without knowledge."' We cannot, however, help feeling that defective as may have been our experience—and we often fear that we may hold the tenet as a mere speculation—it is, even for the intellect, that most sublime and glorious truth which harmonizes all theology.

Great difficulties, on some doctrines, arise from severing Christ and the believer, and regarding them as in a mere outward relation. We may most firmly hold to the central truth of a vicarious atonement, or satisfaction offered to Divine Justice; but what an aspect does it assume when viewed in connection with the harmonizing doctrine, that Christ becomes one with the soul that believes on him? The confusion of ideas respecting that cardinal tenet, the imputation of the Redeemer's righteousness, and all the futile objections that some have made to it, as involving, in their absurd conceptions, a transfer of personal qualities, vanish at once. If this view be correct, then there is no arbitrary or unreal imputation of what is not. The Redeemer's righteousness is truly our righteousness, his condemnation our condemnation, his obedience our obedience; for all this is asserted in saying that

his life is our life, and that "this our life is hid with Christ in God." How strong too the assurance, herein derived, for the final safety of all who have once become united to Christ by faith! What shall ever break such a union as this? We fear not here the charge of antinomianism. As well might we suppose Christ himself to perish, as one who is a true and living member of his "body, yea, of his bones and of his flesh." This must be something more than that feeble principle of life, always communicated, as some say, in baptism, and which, in most cases, like the spark falling upon the water, goes out as soon as it is received. There is no longer any condemnation to those who are in Christ Jesus. What shall separate the believer from his life? As Christ's divine nature is united to that of the Father, so, in his human nature, is he united to his disciples. We say not, that the union is of the same kind, nor of the same strength, nor of the same extent; but this may be maintained, that, *as far as the language is concerned*, as is the one, so is the other—if the one is simply a figure, so is the other; if the one is only a moral union, so is the other.

We have dwelt on this, because we believe, with Dr. Nevin, that here is to be found the true ground of that churchly feeling, the resuscitation of which is to be the great cure for our broken and distracted Zion. There can be no hope that any system of truth, as mere truth, will ever effect this. This feeling of real union to Christ's humanity, and of real brotherhood in respect to each other, bound together the Christians of the primitive church. In time, however, it was suffered to become itself a dogma, instead of the life of all other truths; just as the great principle of the reformers, justification by faith, sunk down, in time, into *justification by belief in justification by faith*. As a mere dogma, it soon became allied to the false and pernicious doctrine of a priesthood, through which alone, it was believed, the life of Christ could be transmitted to the soul, and any true union with him effected. Along with this came the profanation of that sacrament, so vitally connected with the doctrine of the mystical

union. Instead of being regarded as a sign of a reality,* or symbolical of the union of Christ with all believers, or of the real presence of his humanity in their humanity, it was made subservient to ecclesiastical ambition, and its efficacy was held to depend on certain words and forms of consecration uttered by persons in a certain line of succession.

No doubt the administration of the holy Eucharist should be under the direction of those who exercise government in the visible church ; but of all acts of religion, there is none, we think, in which all Christians are so perfectly on a par, and where every thing of a priestly or mediatorial character is so utterly excluded as in this. It is not a sacrifice, but the feast upon the sacrifice, in which the Priest and the Levite are but the ministers or servants of the congregation. All partake alike of this food ; and although order requires that some should present the elements, and implore the blessing in the name of the congregation, yet nothing seems more remote from the real nature of this Holy Feast, than that any one or more should be regarded as the channels, or media, through which the life of the Head is conveyed to the members of the body. If there are any exclusively priestly acts in the church, baptism seems to partake far more of that character than the administration of the Eucharist. We have often been struck with the heavenly sublimity of the scene, on reading of the last participation in this holy rite, by the dying Schleiermacher. "Let us receive," says this precious saint, "the Lord's Supper. Let no one stumble at *the form*. We have the atoning death of Jesus, *his body and his blood*." Are they worthy of the name of Christian who can hold that Christ was not there in his most real presence, simply because there was wanting some form of priestly consecration, or some link in a fancied priestly succession ?

As a dogma, the mystical union has doubtless ever been more prominently presented in the theology of Rome and Oxford,

* To avoid the absurd Popish literality, which rests in the *very elements themselves*, rationalism has gone to the other extreme, and made it a figure of a figure, or representative only of a figurative union.

than in that of other churches, yet overlaid, as we have said, by that other false dogma of a priesthood, to which every thing else is sought to be made subservient. In consequence of this abuse, the reformers took the opposite direction, and labored to bring into a clearer light the long obscured doctrine of a forensic justification. Hence the former has in a measure faded away in our theology, although neither Prof. S. nor Dr. N. use language, on this subject, any stronger than may be found in the writings of Calvin and Zanchius, or even in the Catechism and Articles of the Reformed Dutch Church. Still, we believe it is a truth which is clearly set forth in the standards of the oldest Protestant Churches, and what is of more account, that it is, and ever must be, a living principle in the hearts of all evangelical Christians. Rome and Oxford may make more outward show of the tenet, as a dead relic of antiquity; but we would here again apply the same test that we have used before. What Churches exhibit more of the life of this truth? Who are more fond of those passages in the Scriptures, which speak of the union of Christ with believers? Let us compare books of devotion and experimental religion. Take, for example, that most precious treatise of the Scottish Church, "*Williston on the Sacraments*," and compare it with any of the "*Companions for the Altar*," that have issued from the other class of Christians. In the latter, there may be very clear allusions to the mystical union, expressed in certain set phrases that have come down from the Romish mother; but the former will be found full and warmly glowing with all that diversified Scripture language, by which Christ and his apostles delight to set forth the precious truth. How fond is this old Scottish divine of introducing these texts in every variety of method! How he loves to talk of *feeding on Christ*, *living on Christ*, *putting on Christ*, *abiding in Christ*, together with all those terms of intimate endearment which imply nothing else than the closest personal union! Again, enter a Wesleyan prayer meeting: how fond are the truly pious there of talking of the blessed union to the Redeemer—of Christ formed

within them the hope of glory. Listen to the experience of the newly regenerated, in some of those revivals of religion, which we must regard as genuine, notwithstanding all the spurious exhibitions with which they have been confounded. With what fondness do some new-born souls, when they first begin to speak the language of Heaven, turn to these expressions so thickly spread over the pages of the New Testament! Although the style of speech may be new, yet, when their eyes have been opened to read the Scriptures, their souls warm to it, as the most fitting medium for the expression of feelings and conceptions unknown before, and to which they have a consciousness that no other language is so well adapted. The most illiterate of men have been known thus to talk of being united to God and Christ, in a style that might remind us of Augustine and A Kempis. But what does all this prove, it may be said, as long as the expressions are regarded as figurative, and it is admitted that the corresponding dogma is not generally maintained? It shows, we reply, that the life may be stronger than the dogma. Even in the absence of definite conceptions, the extreme fondness of a certain class of minds for this language, manifests the current of the affections in distinction from the speculative views maintained, and a consciousness, that even if there be a figure, it is figurative of a reality more precious and glorious than was ever set forth in any form of rationalism.

We have no doubt that Christianity may exist as a *life in the soul*, when the related and usually accompanying, or rather following truths are most dimly discerned; and yet we would be far from that railing against systematic theology, of which some are so fond. Life must precede; but, if there is life, truth will soon follow. The grand doctrines of the Gospel will ever be embraced, when presented to the truly *living* soul. We have no fears that any one, to whom Christ is really precious, will fail to be substantially orthodox in regard to the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement. When, however, the doctrine wholly perishes, there is reason to fear that, as far as communities are concerned, the life also

may go out, although it will never be lost from those individual souls in which it has once been kindled.

If this then be a real truth of the Scriptures, and if it be that from which all other theological truths derive their meaning and importance, it certainly should be placed in the front rank of our theology. Especially is it of moment in regard to this great and vexed question of the Church. Can the body of Christ be otherwise than both spiritually and visibly one, when Christians universally believe and feel that they partake of one common life, instead of attempting to build their unity on a common system of truths; and will not a common system of truths, to any extent that may be necessary or desirable, come, as a matter of course, to follow such a conviction of a common life in a common Redeemer? Whilst such a view would draw the living to the living, and thus bring the external society to correspond more nearly with the internal and the spiritual, it would still tend to produce one visible Church with a visible organization, and that, too, after the highest species of visibility, namely, in broad and bright distinction from the dark world around it. Such a principle, when it sinks down to a mere dogma, may draw in the nominal Christian, and keep the tares among the wheat, but this, as the very words of Christ assure us, must continue to be the case to the end of the world.

We are sensible of having treated this subject most imperfectly and unsatisfactorily. We regret, however, that our limits do not permit us to dwell at greater length on Dr. Nevins's views of the Eucharist, as connected with that of which we have said so much. He has used some strong language, especially in relation to the human body of Christ, on which we hardly know whether we are fully prepared to go with him. In our own meditations, we have been more inclined to connect the idea of the mystical union with the *human soul* of the Redeemer; and yet the analogy would seem to be satisfied with nothing short of his whole and complete humanity. We should be inclined to demur to the statement (page 200) where he says—"We are not Christians, each one by himself,

but become such through the Church." Calvin holds similar language—*Non alius est in vitam ingressus nisi nos ipsa (ecclesia) concipiat in utero, nisi pariat, nisi nos alat suis uberibus, &c.* If by this is meant that the Church, by her ministry, her teaching, her ordinances, her manifestation of a divine life, is the ordinary channel or medium through which faith is produced, and the union is formed between Christ and the believer, there can be no objection to the statement. It doubtless, in this sense, contains an important truth, which, in these days of new and extra measures, is too much undervalued. If, however, it is intended, that the connection with the life of the visible Church is the necessary antecedent to a connection with the life of the Redeemer, it seems to us contrary to all the analogies employed. It would make the Church itself the vine, or else the branches to be the primary source of life. We do not think the latter is the meaning intended either by Dr. Nevin or by Calvin.

ARTICLE V.

MR. MARTIN'S EXAMINATION OF PROF. TAPPAN'S REVIEW OF EDWARDS ON THE WILL, REVIEWED.

By A. T. BLEDSOE, Esq., Philadelphia, Pa.

WE have often heard it alleged, that Professor Tappan, in ascribing the scheme of fatalism to Edwards, has entirely misconceived his philosophy of the will; but, in our opinion, it will be found much easier to make such an assertion than to prove it. This charge has been repeated by an able writer in the *Repository*,* who seems to have exerted his utmost ingenuity to make it good. Yet, after all, if it should turn out that it is the disciple, and not the opponent, of President Edwards, who has "capitally and essentially" misconceived his doctrine, it would be no new thing under

* Jan. No. 1843.

the sun. Indeed, we can more easily conceive, that the amiable desire to bring the system of so justly venerated a master into harmony with the truth, should have blinded the eyes of a loving disciple to its true features, than that "an anxiety to fasten on it the scheme of a physical necessity," should have deceived and misled a candid and truth-loving opponent. Whether the former disposition has misled Mr. Martin, the writer in question, or the latter has betrayed Prof. T. into a misstatement of Edwards's system, it is the principal object of the present article to inquire.

In this discussion, we do not intend to enter into all the minute criticisms which have been made upon Prof. Tappan's masterly review of Edwards. This would lead us into a variety of particular details which would become exceedingly tedious to the reader, without a sufficient return for such a tax upon his patience; and besides, it would give our article the appearance of an attempt to adjust the respective merits of Prof. T. and his reviewer, rather than the air of a sober and serious inquiry after truth.

The first point, then, in regard to which there is any *important* diversity of sentiment, is that which refers to the relation between the sensibility and the will. The review of Prof. T. possesses the very great merit, that it has exhibited and set forth the great accession of strength which the cause of necessity derives from identifying the "sensitvity and the will." Mr. Martin does not deny the correctness of the statement, that Edwards has confounded these two faculties of the soul; but he thinks that Prof. T. has "scarcely paid sufficient attention to the cautious hesitancy with which Edwards *always* expresses himself" on this subject. P. 37.

Now, is it true that Edwards has *always* expressed himself with such cautious hesitancy? If we have read his works aright, he is very far from having done so. For, he expressly declares, that there are two faculties of the soul, the understanding and the will. And again, he explicitly asserts, "that the affections of the soul are not properly distinguished from the will; as though they were two facul-

ties in the soul." "The affections are no other than the more vigorous and sensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul." From the first of these sentences, one would suppose that Edwards intended to identify the affections with the will; but, in the second, he expressly identifies them, not with the will itself, but with the *exercises* of the will. This identification is here as pointed and positive in the statement of Edwards himself as it could possibly be in Prof. T.'s representation of his doctrine. His "cautious hesitancy" does not *always* adhere to him; in the above passages, as well as in many others which might be produced, it entirely vanishes.

It matters but very little, however, whether President Edwards held to this identification with a cautious hesitancy, or with a dogmatical confidence. The main question is, whether he has wrought this "manifest error," as Mr. Martin calls it, into his scheme of necessity, and made it an integral part and parcel of his logic. If he has done this, it is a poor apology, to allege that he has built with materials of whose soundness he himself entertained very serious doubts. Whether he has done so or not, we shall see in its proper place.

Mr. Martin attaches importance to the cautious hesitancy with which Edwards *always* speaks on this point, because he has, in many instances, taken the diametrically opposite ground, and maintained, not that desire is the same with volition, but that it is the cause thereof. P. 37. He confesses that Edwards has affirmed the identity alleged; but he also contends that he is equally explicit in denying it. He complains that Prof. T. has not expressly noticed this inconsistency. And why? Was Prof. T. bound to point out and dwell upon every defect and flaw in the work of President Edwards? Certainly not: and it is well, perhaps, that he has left some of them to be exposed by the disciples of the great New England metaphysician.

But why should Prof. T., in justice to Edwards, have noticed this inconsistency? This question we shall permit the writer under consideration to answer in his own words.

“What is the value of all this oft-repeated argument, which alleges that Edwards identifies them, and imputes fatalism to his system, in consequence of the identification, the reviewer’s own inconsistent denial of his allegation will serve sufficiently to show. If Edwards did identify them, he had too much acuteness to persist in an error so manifest, and he relieved his system of its embarrassments by a happy inconsistency for which his critic has not given him credit.” P. 45.

This is the burden of the complaint, then, that Prof. T. has not given Edwards credit for his “happy inconsistency.” Let him, then, have the full benefit of it. Will it deliver him, even during the happy moments of his inconsistency, from the scheme of fatalism, which is involved in the identification of will and desire? By no means. It does not follow, that because the identification of will and desire leads directly to the scheme of fatalism, the separation of them necessarily leads away from it. It is true that, when Edwards identifies the two faculties in question, he makes the road to fatalism direct, short, and palpable; for, if a volition is a state of the sensibility, and this is necessitated, as it is conceded to be, the work of the necessitarian is done. The scheme of fatalism is established. It rests upon the very foundation on which Hobbes placed it, and on which it has too securely stood from his time down to the present day. But it does not follow, as we have said, that the distinction in question is a rejection of that scheme; for when Edwards distinguishes between them, he is careful to make the necessitated state of the sensibility, the necessitating cause of volition. By his inconsistency, therefore, he does not break the chain of necessity; he merely introduces another link into it. He contradicts himself, it is true, as Mr. Martin alleges; but instead of delivering himself, by a “happy inconsistency,” from the scheme of fatalism, he does, by a most unhappy consistency, cling to it. This is the true state of the case; and if Prof. T. has not given his author credit for a *happy inconsistency*, it is because he did not deserve it.

Those who have felt constrained to take sides against President Edwards, must content themselves, in the best way they can, to labor under a very great disadvantage. His disciples, even the most candid and philosophic among them, find it very convenient, at times, to manufacture his great name and reputation into an element of logic. The writer under review is not altogether free from this very common fault. "Edwards had too much acuteness," says he, "to persist in an error so manifest." But did he not persist in it? Did his acuteness enable him to see through it, and expel it from his works? No such thing is pretended. It is admitted by Mr. Martin, that he fell into this manifest error, and that it is to be found in the present editions of his work. What is meant, then, by his having had too much acuteness to persist in it? The meaning of the writer evidently is, not that Edwards has seen through his error and rejected it, but that he has, "in many instances," taken up with contradictory positions. Now, if it is any evidence of acuteness for an author to occupy contradictory positions, we know of nothing which is so well entitled to the character of acuteness as dullness itself.

We are very far from intending to intimate, that Edwards had not sufficient acuteness to see through the "manifest error" in question; but that it was possible for him to persist in it, we think is sufficiently proved by the fact, that he has actually done so. He not only persisted in it, but he was enabled to do so by means of his acuteness. Locke had pointed out the distinction between will and desire; and the acuteness of Edwards was aroused, not to illustrate and vindicate this distinction, but to overthrow it, in order that he might establish an identification which is so great a prop and support to the particular scheme he had undertaken to advocate. His departure from the manifest error in question was not the work of his acuteness; if it had been, the error itself would have been abandoned. All his acuteness was enlisted—calmly and deliberately enlisted—on the side of this error; and if he has departed from it at all, in other parts of

his work, it is in those moments of *happy forgetfulness* in which he permitted the thoughts and workings of his great mind to have fair play. It is our decided opinion, that the acuteness of President Edwards was sufficient for any thing, except for that which is so far above and beyond the reach of all human genius, a severe and rigid consistency in the defence of error.

Other strictures in abundance might be offered on the above passage ; but we shall pass them over in silence, because we deem them of scarcely sufficient importance to engage the attention of the reader. Before we leave this branch of the subject, however, we must notice the prominent part which the identification of will and desire has been made to perform in the scheme of necessity. We have already seen how it helps that scheme by confounding the phenomena of the will, which we contend are free, with the phenomena of the sensibility, which are admitted to be necessitated. In addition to this, we may safely say, that the error of confounding will and desire has been the source of no little mystification and delusion.

For example, to the mind of President Edwards it seems to have been "utterly unintelligible" to speak of an action or volition, in which there "is no passion or passiveness." P. 198. Now, whence arose this great difficulty ? Its source is obvious. Having confounded a state of the sensibility, which is purely passive, with an act of the will, he was sadly perplexed to conceive of this compound nature as "something wherein is no passion or passiveness." If he had clearly distinguished between will and feeling, he might have conceived of a pure act of the mind, which is not even partly passive. By confounding the sensibility with the will, the phenomena of the latter appeared to him to present two phases, the one active, the other passive ; and hence the absurd conception of an act which is only in part an act. If he had clearly and constantly distinguished these two things, as Mr. Martin now admits he should have done, he would have seen that there are two distinct phenomena instead of one : the state of the

sensibility, which is merely a passive impression, and an act of the will, which is all an act. We do not intend, however, to dwell upon this distinction, nor to advert to the false analogies and illustrations by which it has been obliterated, and the mass of cloudy sophisms reared upon its ruins.

But the "manifest error" in question, is made to perform one function in the scheme of necessity, which is by far too important to be overlooked. It is truly wonderful to watch it in its workings and to behold its mysteries. The will, says Edwards, is determined by the strongest motive, by the strongest appetite, by the strongest inclination, etc. Nowhere, as Mr. Martin truly says, does Edwards recognize the distinction between the sensibility and the will. He considers the strongest desire, or affection, or passion, not as volition, but as the cause of volition. But yet, when he comes to fix his eye upon this distinction, it seems to fade away under his steadfast gaze. Just mark his words;—"I have chosen," says he, "rather to express myself thus, that the will always is as the greatest apparent good, or as what appears most agreeable, than to say the will is determined by the greatest apparent good, or by what seems most agreeable; *because an appearing most agreeable to the mind, and the mind's preferring, SEEM SCARCELY DISTINCT.* Here, it is perfectly evident, that although Edwards did sometimes distinguish between volition and "the mind's sense of pleasure," as Mr. Martin contends he did; yet when he came to consider this matter more closely, he did not exactly like to do so. He did not like to say, that "the mind's sense of pleasure" is the cause of volition; because it *seems scarcely distinct* therefrom. He expresses himself "with cautious hesitancy," it is true, as becomes every honest man to do, who feels that he is in a mist; but yet he expresses himself against the distinction which is claimed in his favor.

It is very true, if these two things are not distinct, it is absurd to call one the cause of the other; and Edwards has run into this absurdity, just as often as he has represented the will as being determined by a sense of the most agreeable.

This he has often done ; and yet, as we have seen, he was at times not altogether unaware of the absurdity involved in this manner of speaking. Now, how does he seek to escape this absurdity ? By ceasing to call one the cause of the other, and choosing to say, that one is as the other ! Incredible as it may seem, this is the precise course which he has taken. Is it not wonderful, that it did not occur to so acute a mind, that if they are not distinct, then to say that one is as the other, is only to say, *that a thing is as itself* ? According to his own psychology, by which the emotive part of our nature and the will are identified, his great fundamental doctrine is either an absurdity, making a thing the cause of itself, or an insignificant truism, declaring that a thing is as itself ; and if this did not so appear to himself, it was because a better psychology was partly presented to his mind, so as to obscure the absurdity of his doctrine in its one form, and to hide its insignificance in the other. It is evident that his great mind was under a cloud, into which the light of nature had but a partial entrance ; and hence, "the cautious hesitancy," the wavering and the vacillation, which marked his course, as well as the darkness and the dissatisfaction which hang around his system.

We do not suppose, that Edwards was at all aware of the process by which he slid down into the truism, that a thing is always as itself ; but when he had once reached it, he felt quite sure that his foot was planted on a rock. His cautious hesitancy all vanishes, and he feels that he may dogmatize without the least fear of contradiction. There is scarcely a plainer or more universal dictate of the reason and experience of mankind, than that when men do what they please, then they do what they please. This is the firm and impregnable position, in which he finds himself intrenched. To deny this position, he repeatedly and truly affirms, is a contradiction in terms. It is to put "the soul in a state of choice," and yet affirm, that it "has no choice." P. 74. It is to contend, that "the mind may choose without choosing ;" which is just as absurd as to assert, that "a body may move while it is in a state of rest." P. 64.

With whatever caution, then, the "manifest error" in question may have been broached, it has become, in its results, as unbounded, as it is unassailable in its dogmatism.

In the perception of truth, and in the feeling of pleasure or pain, "the intelligence and the sensitivity" are both passive. The will is the power by which we act. It has been, as we have seen, by confounding the phenomena of this active power of the mind with those of one of its passive susceptibilities, that the scheme of necessity has been made to appear so adamant in its strength. This confusion of things, which are so different in their natures, has been, we are firmly persuaded, one of the chief sources of the influence of this scheme over the human mind.

A striking light is thrown upon this subject, by a curious and interesting passage of literary history. There was a gentleman of the University of Cambridge, who had become deeply entangled in the scheme of necessity; so that he could not help believing, as he said, that our volitions are necessitated. In writing to the celebrated Dr. Samuel Clarke, in relation to his difficulties, he said, "I cannot but suspect, that I am got into a very odd train of thoughts: and yet, when I take a survey of my ideas on all sides, I am at a loss *how or where* the delusion could creep in." In the course of this interesting correspondence, which extended to three letters on the one side and to four on the other, the source of his delusion became manifest to himself. It arose from the identification, not of will and desire, according to the practice of more modern necessitarians, but of the will and the understanding. "'Tis allowed," says he, "*that the will is no other but the last judgment of the understanding*;" and having set out with this assumption he could not escape the conclusion, that the will, i. e. the last dictate of the understanding, is necessitated. He concludes the correspondence, however, with this ingenuous confession: "I have now, to my great satisfaction, a clearer insight than I ever expected, into so intricate a question as we have been upon. The consideration, that the last judgment of the understanding can have no influence on self-

motion, *because there is no resemblance between an action and a perception of the mind*, and that therefore there must be some distinct principle of self-motion entirely independent on the perceptive faculty, weighs very much with me ; and I think it is very probable, (as you observe,) that *our want of clearly distinguishing between the perceptive and the active faculty, is the chief origin of all perplexity on this subject.*" In like manner, when the distinction between the emotive part of our nature and the will, shall be clearly and constantly made, and the relation between them properly understood, will many a sincere inquirer after truth be delivered from the entanglements and the snares, by which his path has been so long beset.

There are other questions, with respect to the relation between the sensibility and the will, which have been greatly agitated ; but if we should enter upon them here, it would lead us far beyond the limits we must assign to ourselves. We shall add, however, that we would not pretend to determine the precise nature of the relation which subsists between the will and the sensibility, between volition and desire. We can more clearly see what this relation is not, than what it is. We feel quite sure, that a destitution of feeling is not at all essential to the most absolute and perfect liberty ; and we are equally well assured, that feeling is not the producing cause of volition. But this is only an approximation to the truth, by an escape from the error, which lies both on the right hand and on the left.

We are fully aware of the danger of attempting to throw light upon questions of this kind, by analogies drawn from the world of matter : all such illustrations must necessarily carry many imperfections along with them. They are better adapted to expose error, than they are to illustrate truth. But, since reasoners on this subject seem determined to avail themselves of such analogies, we think we can furnish one which comes nearer the truth, by getting further from error, than any of those which the necessitarian is accustomed to employ. It is this :—The bird in its flight through the air, whose re-

sistance it feels, may suppose that it could get along much better in a perfectly void space. This was the error of those libertarians, who have imagined that we are then perfectly free, only when the mind, in sending forth volitions, is perfectly destitute of all feeling or emotion. On the other hand, if any should suppose that, because the bird could not fly at all in void space, it is the element of air by which it is impelled in its flight, he would commit the error of the necessitarian, who imagines, that because reason and feeling are indispensable *conditions*, without which there can be no moral agency, they are therefore the causes by which we are impelled in our career as rational and accountable beings. The cause of free-agency can lose nothing, then, by the admission that all our volitions are performed with reference to reason and feeling, provided we contend, as in truth we may, that the will is no more impelled, by either reason or emotion, in putting forth volitions, than the free bird is driven in its course by the buoyant air in which it flies.

But, to return from this digression. The next point of difference between Prof. T. and Mr. Martin is one of great importance. According to the statement of the former, Edwards held motive to be the efficient cause of volition; while the latter is quite sure, that he regarded motive merely as the occasion on which the mind acts, and the mind itself as the efficient cause of its own acts. If this position be correct, it cannot be denied that Prof. T. has entirely misconceived the scheme of Edwards; *but what evidence has Mr. Martin produced of its correctness?*

The first branch of the proposition is, that Edwards regarded motive merely as the occasion of volition, and not as its producing cause. "There is one passage in the Inquiry," says Mr. Martin, "which we cannot but consider absolutely decisive of all controversy on this point." P. 43. This passage is thus quoted by the writer in question: "I would explain how I would be understood when I use the word cause in this discourse, since for the want of a better word I shall have occasion to use it, *in a sense which is more extended,*

than that in which it is sometimes used. The word is often used so as to signify only that which has a positive efficiency, or *influence to produce a thing*. But there are many things which have *no such productive* influence, which yet are causes. Therefore, I sometimes use the word cause, to signify any antecedent with which a consequent event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the *reason* why the proposition which affirms that event is true, *whether it has any positive PRODUCTIVE influence*, or not ; and the word event, for the consequence of that which is rather *an occasion*, than *a cause*, most properly speaking." This is the passage, just as it is given by Mr. Martin, (the italics and capitals are all his own,) and he thinks it justifies him in the conclusion, "that Edwards used the word cause in its application to the antecedent of volition *in particular*, to signify that which has "no productive *influence*, but is a mere occasion." P. 44. This is the "controlling passage" which, according to the writer in question, absolutely establishes the position, that Edwards regarded motive as merely the occasion of volition, and not as its producing cause. It shows most conclusively, in his opinion, that Edwards did not lean to the scheme of fatalism. But, in our humble apprehension, his view of the whole passage may be most easily and most triumphantly refuted.

In the first place, Edwards expressly declares in the passage itself that he uses the term cause "*for the want of a better word*." And yet his learned disciple thinks there is a better word ; inasmuch as Edwards did not mean that motive is the cause, properly speaking, but merely the occasion or antecedent, of volition. With all these words before him, and used by him in the very passage in question, the master selects the term *cause* as the best he can find to express his own meaning, and yet the disciple is quite sure, that he did not really mean cause, but occasion ! Is it not a little remarkable that the disciple should know how to express the meaning of the master, so much better than the master himself knew how to express it ? This is merely the beginning of difficulties.

In the next place, we venture to assert, that Mr. Martin has entirely misconceived the passage upon which he relies as so "absolutely decisive of all controversy" on the point in dispute; and that so far from being "a controlling passage," it does not afford the least support to his view of the leading doctrine of the Inquiry. Edwards tells us, it is true, that the word *cause* "is often used in so restrained a sense as to signify *only* that which has a positive efficiency, or influence to produce a thing, or bring it to pass;" but he does not tell us, that he abstains from this use of the word. He uses it "in a more extended sense," as he says, so as to signify, not *only* that which has a positive efficiency, but "any antecedent." That such is his meaning may be clearly shown, without travelling beyond the passage itself.

"I *sometimes* use the word cause," says he, "in this Inquiry, to signify *any* antecedent, *either natural or moral, positive or negative*," etc. These last very significant words, which we have taken the liberty to italicize, are entirely omitted in the extract as made by Mr. Martin. They very clearly show, that in Edwards's definition of cause, he included not only those antecedents which exert no positive influence, but those antecedents also which have such an influence or efficiency. Under the head of "any antecedent," he included the producing cause, the most important and conspicuous antecedent of all. This is the reason why he used the term cause, "for the want of a better word:" he meant something more than the mere antecedents or occasions, which exert no positive influence.

And again, if we may believe him rather than Mr. Martin, he meant to include in his sense of the term cause any antecedent, which "*is either in whole or in part the ground and reason*" of the corresponding effect. Now, is the producing cause of a thing, neither in whole nor in part, the ground or reason of its existence? Can we account for the creation of the world, without supposing an exertion of power on the part of the Creator?

In President Edwards's definition of motive, he expressly

includes every thing which "operates to induce a particular act of volition." In the face of such a definition, is it not wonderful, that any one should attempt to persuade us, that Edwards held motive to be merely the occasion on which the mind acts, and that it does not *operate* at all? The younger Edwards made the same attempt; and, in support of his position, he relied upon the very "controlling passage" in question. But let it be remembered, that this was only while engaged in defending his father's system against the attacks of Dr. West, as Mr. Martin now defends it against those of Dr. Tappan; for, on other occasions, he expressly admits, that President Edwards, in his definition of motive, "*includes every cause of volition.*" Mr. Martin is not so inconsistent; he is more uniform in his interpretation of Edwards, because he seems to have an eye only for those portions of the Inquiry which appear to be agreeable to his preconceived *interpretation* of it.

Nothing can be more wonderful to us, than that any reader of the Inquiry should have come to the conclusion, that Edwards used the term motive "to signify that which has no *productive* influence, but is the mere occasion" of volition. P. 44. If it were necessary, we might adduce many passages from the Inquiry, in which Edwards speaks of motive as "the cause of volition *in the most proper sense of the word,*" and not as "the mere negative occasion" thereof; as that which "*causes* volition to arise and come forth into existence;" and that too, by a "positive influence," by an "influence that is prevalent and effectual;" but surely it cannot be necessary to enlighten any attentive and impartial reader of the Inquiry on such a subject.

Mr. Martin lays stress upon the fact, that Edwards "never once calls motive the producing cause of choice." P. 43. If it should appear, then, that Edwards does call motive the producing cause of volition, it will follow that he is rather more of a fatalist than Mr. Martin has supposed him to be; and that there are at least some passages in the Inquiry, which Mr. M. has not very seriously pondered. Let us see, then, if

Edwards has been as silent on this point, as his learned disciple would have had him to be. "I find myself possessed of my volitions," says Edwards, "before I see *the effectual power of any cause to PRODUCE them*, for the power and efficacy of the cause is not seen but by the effect." P. 277. Now, what is here meant by the cause which produces volition? Is it the mind? Edwards every where declares, that the mind is not, and cannot be the cause of volition. Every body knows, that in the scheme of Edwards volition is the effect, and motive is the cause. Hence, unless he here means to establish the doctrine of his adversaries, and not his own, he calls motive "the cause which *produces*" volition. If Mr. Martin is right in his view of the Inquiry, we apprehend it will be found, that Edwards has been misrepresented by himself fully as often and as glaringly as he has been by Prof. Tappan.

But the master-piece of interpretation is yet to come. Mr. Martin is quite sure, that Edwards held the mind to be "the efficient cause" of volition. P. 54. In relation to this point, the first thing which strikes us is, the wonderful diversity of sentiment among intelligent men, in regard to the leading idea of a work, which it is confessed was the offspring of one of the greatest minds the world has ever produced, and which has certainly not designed to be obscure. Why do not the best minds agree as to what the Inquiry means? The difficulty certainly does not arise from the dark and abstruse nature of the subject; for, in one short sentence, Mr. Martin has stated the doctrine which he ascribes to Edwards in language so clear and so precise, that there can be no controversy as to its real import. He declares that, in his own opinion, as well as in that of Edwards, *the mind is the efficient cause of volition*, and motive is merely the occasion on which it acts. Now, if Edwards held this doctrine, why has he failed to let us know it in his great work, at least as explicitly as Mr. Martin has set it down before us in a single sentence? Shall we be told, in the language of the latter, that Edwards clearly represents the mind as the efficient cause of volition, and if we do not see it, it is because of "an extreme anxiety

to fasten on his scheme" the stigma of fatalism? If so, we may content ourselves with the reply, that surely the younger Edwards had no desire to fasten the charge of fatalism upon the scheme of his father; and he is just as confident that President Edwards did *not* regard the mind as the efficient cause of volition, as Mr. Martin is of the contrary. His disciples disagree among themselves, with respect to the import of his system, as much as they do with his adversaries. If he held the doctrine of the younger Edwards, or that of Mr. Martin, how has it happened that so great a master in Israel has left *his own disciples* in such amazing uncertainty as to what he means? We have no difficulty in grasping the doctrine of his two disciples; but, if either has stated his scheme correctly, it is impossible for us to gather it from his works. They have failed to satisfy us that they are right, and they have failed to satisfy each other. Is it not possible, that this diversity of interpretation has arisen from the fact, that they have both departed from the system of President Edwards in different directions, and that each has struggled to make the great oracle give utterance to his own sentiments?

That such has been the course of Mr. Martin, we think may be easily shown. He *infers*, from several passages in the inquiry, that the author of it held the mind to be the efficient cause of its own volitions; but, in drawing such an inference for President Edwards, he has placed him in a sad dilemma. All his opponents, it is universally known, held the mind to be the efficient cause of volition. This doctrine was clearly and unequivocally advocated by them; and Edwards knew this to be their doctrine. Did he agree with them? No! Did he ever throw out the slightest intimation that he agreed with them? No! He labored without ceasing to demolish the doctrine thus clearly expressed and advocated by his opponents. He contended that the mind could not be the cause of volition; for, said he, if the mind causes volition, it must cause it by a preceding act of volition; and so on without end. Every reader of Edwards must be familiar with this oft-repeated argument of the inquiry. Now,

is it possible, that Edwards has exerted so much power to demolish a doctrine which he himself maintained? Has he written a great work, a world-famous book, to refute the scheme of such men as Clarke, and Chubb, and Whitby, whilst his own scheme was precisely the same as theirs? Has he raised such a mighty war of words with men about a question in regard to which he most perfectly agreed with them? Has he labored in so many ways, and with so much energy, to prove that the mind is not, and cannot be, the cause of volition; and yet, all the while, really believing that the mind is the cause of volition; and not only so, but that it is the efficient cause of volition? We cannot believe so monstrous a thing of the logic of President Edwards. It does seem to us that he needs to be defended against the defence of his friends, quite as much as against the attacks of his adversaries.

We have now sufficiently considered, we think, what Mr. Martin has advanced in favor of his positions, that Edwards held motive to be merely the occasion or antecedent of volition, and the mind to be the efficient cause thereof. Before we leave his defence of Edwards, however, we would notice the manner in which he attempts to prove that the author of the Inquiry really believed in a liberty to the contrary choice. He finds that Edwards opposes three kinds of liberty; he asserts that he does not oppose that "view of liberty which makes it consist in power to the contrary volition," and then concludes, from his silence, that he really believed in this kind of freedom of the will. P. 49. Is it not truly wonderful, if Mr. Martin be right, that President Edwards should have written a great work in defence of the freedom of the will; and yet not have said one word explicitly in favor of it, but have left his disciples to *guess* at what he would really have them to believe? It is very evident, and it is every day becoming more and more evident, that the disciples of Edwards are not altogether satisfied with the account which the Inquiry gives of the freedom of the will. President Day plainly confesses, that what Edwards has said in the Inquiry, with respect to

the freedom of the will, "has rather the appearance of evading such a definition of it as might be considered his own." It is obvious, we think, that if these learned disciples of President Edwards had been his advisers, they would have urged him to take a very different course from that which they have ascribed to him: the one would have urged him to speak out plainly, and not even seem to evade his own definition of the freedom of the will; and the other would have implored him to say at least one little word in favor of his fondly cherished doctrine of liberty to the contrary choice.

But has Edwards really said nothing *against* this doctrine? We will venture to affirm, that neither Hobbes, nor Collins, nor Kaimes, nor Crombie, nor any other man, has written with greater plainness or force against the great doctrine of liberty to the contrary choice, than has Edwards himself. His whole argument, from cause to effect, as well as from the foreknowledge of God, is designed to prove the utter absurdity, the inherent impossibility, of such a thing. Motive, he contends, is the cause of volition; and "*it is absurd*" to suppose that an "effect may be loose from the influence of its cause;" that "it may attend it, or may not;" and to assert that it may depart from the influence of its cause, is a contradiction in terms; for it is to assert, that its cause "is not its cause." Pp. 77, 78. Edwards has repeatedly and explicitly repudiated the doctrine, that a volition may be loose from the influence of the strongest motive, as self-contradictory and absurd; and yet Mr. Martin would persuade us, that he really entertained that "view of liberty which makes it consist in power to the contrary choice."

We do not deny, that the true doctrine of liberty may be deduced from various detached portions of the Inquiry, nor that Mr. Martin has fairly inferred it, in some cases, from such portions. But these are so far from being the inferences of Edwards himself, that they are expressly repudiated by him, and are at war with his whole system. It cannot but be true, that the light of nature did shine into the mind of Edwards, as well as into that of other men; but yet, was he

not so wedded to a particular system, *that he comprehended it not?* We should be very sorry to believe that every inference which may be fairly drawn from his work is really a part and parcel of the doctrine to be imputed to him.

Mr. Martin confesses that Edwards has made one unfortunate concession in favor of the doctrine of fatalism, and he wonders that Prof. Tappan has not turned it to greater account. This "admission" of Edwards is, that the difference between natural and moral necessity "lies not so much in the nature of the connection as in the terms connected." P. 41. It is too evident to be denied that, if the connection between motive and volition is the same, in nature and in kind, as that which obtains between natural cause and effect, there is no room left for freedom, and the scheme of fate is established. But what the writer cannot deny he seeks to evade, by setting this down as "a hasty and ill-considered expression," which is not to be taken as the deliberate opinion of President Edwards. It will be found, we think, that this is a very "hasty and ill-considered" apology for the author of the Inquiry.

Let it be borne in mind, that this unfortunate expression, as Mr. Martin deems it, occurs in the most elaborate attempt Edwards has ever made to point out the distinction between natural and moral necessity. His scheme is charged with fatalism; he knows it full well; and he also knows, that nothing can absolve it from this charge, unless he can show such a difference between natural and moral necessity, as to free the latter from the fatalism which is universally admitted to attach to the former. In drawing this distinction, then, it became him, above all things, to be on his guard against the doctrine of fate: it is in this part of his work, above all others, that we should naturally expect the greatest possible care and precision, in order to keep clear of so odious a doctrine. And it seems to us, that in laboring this famous distinction, the author of the Inquiry proceeds with all that care and deliberation which is due to the paramount importance of the subject. We discern not the slightest trace of

haste or precipitancy. Yet it is in this part of his work, if we may believe Mr. Martin, that he has *accidentally* run into the scheme of fatalism! Now, if President Edwards is so hasty and careless here, where can we expect him to be otherwise? May not the most important statements of the Inquiry be only "hasty and ill-considered expressions?" Is it not strange that the author of the Inquiry should be defended upon such grounds?

This is not all. There is a greater wonder yet to come. If Mr. Martin has not wholly misconceived Edwards, he held motive to be merely the occasion of volition, which has "no productive influence;" and if such were his doctrine, he had only to state it, in order to show an inconceivably greater difference between natural and moral necessity, than any which he has noticed. If he recognized this great difference, one word might have shown that his scheme had not the slightest affinity with fatalism; and yet this one word is not uttered, nor any thing approaching to it! We should be glad if Mr. Martin would inform us how it happened, that while engaged in this all-important attempt to define the difference between natural and moral necessity, Edwards has not even alluded to the circumstance by which they are the most widely distinguished from each other? If he really believed, that the relation between cause and effect is different in the two cases, and that this is the grand distinction by which his scheme is to be separated from that of fatalism, why did he not declare that they are different? Why did he declare that they are the same?

We have too much respect for President Edwards to subscribe to the apology of Mr. Martin. For if, on such an occasion, his carelessness could lead him to set forth the doctrine of fatalism, which he did not hold, and, at the same time, prevent him from dropping a single syllable in favor of the great and vital doctrine, which he did hold, we will venture to affirm, that so careless and bungling a teacher the world has never seen. His case is absolutely without parallel. It transcends the bounds of the imagination, and sets dulness

itself at defiance. Who can possibly conceive that any man should entertain the views which have been ascribed to Edwards, and that he should have written a great work in defence of them ; and yet that he should so often and in so many ways, have inculcated, by accident, diametrically opposite sentiments, without once exhibiting in express words, either by accident or design, those which he really entertained ?

By the mode of interpretation which Mr. Martin has applied to the Inquiry, *any book may be made to teach any doctrine*. The very scheme which it was the scope and design of the whole Inquiry to demolish, the scheme of Dr. Samuel Clarke himself, has been seriously ascribed to the author of the Inquiry ! Who knows but that we may next be informed that Dr. Clarke or that Dr. Tappan was an avowed fatalist ; and that, if it does not so appear to us, it is because of our "extreme anxiety" to deliver him from so odious a charge ? Of the acuteness and ability of Mr. Martin, we do not entertain a doubt ; and we should rejoice to see them enlisted in a cause in which they might appear to greater advantage. If Edwards himself were to rise from the dead, he would fail most signally and most ingloriously, if he were to attempt to persuade the world, that he and Mr. Martin entertained the same views with respect to the philosophy of the will.

One word more, and we shall take leave of Mr. Martin. He ventures to predict, that the "main pillars" of the system of Edwards "will stand even the severe ordeal of the Reviewer's searching examination." Now, if Mr. Martin had not failed to see so many things which must have passed directly before his eyes in reading the Inquiry, we should feel more safe in trusting him as a guide, when he undertakes to conduct us into the future. As it is, we fear that his mental vision is not so entirely purged from every film of prejudice, that he can foresee, with unerring certainty, the final verdict of the world as between Edwards and Tappan. For our part, (if we also may be allowed to deliver oracles,) we are firmly persuaded, that Prof. Tappan's statement of the system of Ed-

wards is perfectly fair and just, and that he has demolished it by a *reductio ad absurdum* as complete and unanswerable as it is possible for the human mind to construct.

In conclusion, we would propound a serious problem to the friends and followers of President Edwards. If he does not teach the doctrine of fatalism, will any of his disciples undertake to show wherein his system, or his position, or his arguments, differ from those of universally acknowledged fatalists? We do not fear to assert, that the scheme of Hobbes and Collins is, in all material respects, precisely the same with that of President Edwards. If any man will show a real difference between them, we will either confess our error, or else stand before the world convicted and condemned for our obstinacy. Let it not be supposed that we have thrown out a mere idle challenge. If any man will accept it, and undertake to point out a difference between the system of Edwards and that of Hobbes, we will pledge ourselves to show, that they are identically the same. So far as we can see, the only difference between them is, that the one has been baptized into the name of religion, and thereby had those many sins washed away, which all Christian men have concurred in imputing to the other. Let some other and greater difference be made to appear, or where, we demand, is the justice of branding the name and memory of Hobbes with the odious stigma of atheism, for holding the very doctrine which, in Edwards, is made the test and the standard of orthodoxy?

We have spoken plainly, because we have spoken in what we conceive to be the cause of truth. If we know ourselves, we have not the least desire to fasten upon Edwards, or upon any other man, the odious charge of fatalism; but we do feel a deep and earnest desire, inconceivably stronger than the love of life itself, that the holy religion of Jesus Christ should be left to stand upon its own eternal and immutable foundation, and not be made to turn for support to the weak and tottering philosophy of Atheism. What concern hath Christ with Belial, or what communion hath light with darkness? Let the

friends of truth, of the pure and undefiled truth, as it is in Jesus, see to it, that they do not hug the philosophy of Atheism to their bosoms, from the weak fear that the interests of orthodoxy may be made to suffer by the rejection and the repudiation of it.

ARTICLE VI.

SKETCH OF CHANGES IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

By Rev. GEORGE C. BECKWITH, Boston.

THE history of language is a history of mankind. It develops their original affinities ; it marks their early migrations, and the subsequent intermixture of different tribes ; it embodies the prominent peculiarities of national character ; it shows their transition from barbarism to civilization, and traces their progress in the arts and sciences, in morality and religion, in literature, philosophy, and all kinds of knowledge. Language is a mirror of the human mind, and reflects a pretty just image of its peculiar features in all ages and countries. As the instrument of mind in its various operations, as the principal medium through which it acts on other minds, as the great storehouse of inventions, discoveries and improvements, treasured up for posterity, it forms an index to the character of nations, and serves not only to transmit the acquisitions of one age and country to another, but to throw light on the early and doubtful periods of history. “The similitude and derivation of languages afford,” says Dr. Johnson, “the most indubitable proof of the traduction of nations, and the genealogy of mankind. They add physical certainty to historical evidence, and often apply the only evidence of ancient migrations, and of the revolutions of ages which left no written monuments behind them.”* “The real character of a nation,” says a critic less known, but equally acute,

* Letter to William Drummond.

“will not be thoroughly understood by one who is a perfect stranger to their tongue; for, whatever regards the religion, the laws, the constitution, and the manners of a people, operates powerfully on their sentiments, and these have a principal effect, first, on the associations of ideas formed in their minds, in relation to *character and to whatever* is an object of abstract reflection; secondly, on the formation of words, and combination of phrases, by which these associations are expressed.”¹ Addison considers our language as showing “the genius and natural temper of the English,” and thinks it possible “to carry the same thought into other languages, and deduce a great part of what is peculiar to them from the genius of the people who speak them. It is certain the light talkative humor of the French has not a little infected their tongue, which might be shown by many instances; as the genius of the Italians, which is so much addicted to music and ceremony, has moulded all their words and phrases to those particular uses. The stateliness and gravity of the Spaniards shows itself to perfection in the solemnity of their language; and the blunt honest humor of the Germans sounds better in the roughness of the High-Dutch, than it would in a politer tongue.”²

A history of our own language, in whatever light considered, would be highly curious and instructive; but we shall give only a few specimens taken from different and distant periods, just to exemplify some of the changes through which it has actually passed, and show to what fluctuations it may still be liable.

As Britain was probably first peopled by adventurers from France, its original language was doubtless essentially the same with the Gallic; but the Britons were so nearly exterminated by their successive conquerors, that only few and very faint traces of the native tongue remain in either the

¹ Dr. Campbell's Dissertations prefixed to his Translation of the Gospels. Dissert. II., Part I.

² Spectator, No. 135.

words or the idiom of the present English.* Our language is a dialect of the Teutonic, and akin to the tongues spoken throughout the northern countries of Europe. Its principal elements were brought from the continent by the Saxons, who obtained possession of the British island in the fifth century; it received a slight tincture from the Danes, who invaded England in the ninth century; but it was greatly and permanently modified by the Norman conquest, (1067,) and the subsequent introduction of Norman French as the language of the court, and of all legal transactions and records.

As a specimen of the ancient Anglo-Saxon, we copy an early translation of the Lord's prayer. "Faeder ure thu the eart on heofenum, si thin nama ge halgod. To-become thin rice. Gewurthe thin willa on eorthan, swa swa on heofenum. Urne daeghwamlican hlaf syle us to daeg. And forgyf us ure gyltas, swa swa we forgyfath urum gyltendum. And ne ge laedde thu us on costnunge, ac a lys us of yfele."

Near the close of the seventh century, the same prayer ran thus in Saxon; "Uron Fader thic arth in heofnas, sic gehalgud thin noma, so cymeth thin ric. Sic thin willa sue is heofnas, and in cortho," etc.

About two centuries after this, and more than one hundred and fifty years before the Norman conquest, we find the Lord's prayer thus translated, with only a slight difference in orthography from the preceding version: "Thue ur Fader the

* On this point, however, there is, as might be expected on such a subject, no small diversity of opinions. Horne Tooke (*Diversions of Purley*, Vol. II. 311,) says that "our language has absolutely nothing from the Welsh," or original British; but Ellis, (in his *Metrical Romances*, quoted by Todd,) asserts, that "near one-third of our language is of Welsh origin;" while Dr. Johnson (*Hist. of the Eng. Lang.*) thinks "we have so few words which can, with any probability, be referred to British roots, that we justly regard the Saxons and Welsh as nations totally distinct;" and Dr. Drake, (*Orig. of the Eng. Lang.*) modifying all these statements, declares, that the "British has little or no resemblance to the English. Many of their terms have gained admission among us; but their idioms and genius are as radically and essentially different as any two languages can possibly be." The opinion of Dr. Noah Webster, is not materially different from that of Drake.

eart on heofenum, si thin nama gehalgod ; cume thin rice si thin willa on eorþan swa, swo on heofenum," etc.

The same prayer, about one hundred years after the Norman conquest, or near the middle of the twelfth century, was thus paraphrased in rhyme :

"Ure Fader in heaven rich ;
Thy name be halyed ever lich ;
Thou bring us thy mechle blisse :
Als hit in heaven y doe,
Evar in yearth been it also."

The foregoing specimens are all pretty pure Anglo-Saxon, and contain few, if any, foreign words or idioms. It is difficult to ascertain and fix the precise period of transition from Saxon to English ; but when the Saxons and Normans began, near the close of the twelfth century, to lay aside their mutual antipathies, and to use in amity a common language and literature, then the English, with nearly nine-tenths of its words from the Saxon, and the rest principally from the Danish, Norman and Latin, commenced the nucleus of its present character.

The following song in praise of the cuckoo, said to be the oldest one extant in the English Language, is supposed to have been written before the year 1250 :

"Sumer is i-cumen in,
Lhude sing cuckoo :
Groweth sed, and bloweth med,
And springeth the wde nu.
Sing cucu.

Awe bleteth after lomb ;
Lhouth after calve cu ;
Bulluc sterteth,
Bucke verteth ;
Murie sing cucu,
Cucu, cucu.
Wel singes thu cucu,
Ne swik thou nauer nu.

Summer is come in,
Loud sings cuckoo :
Groweth seed, and bloweth mead,*
And springeth the wood now.
Sings cuckoo.

Ewe bleateth after lamb ;
Loweth cow after calf ;
Bullock starteth,
Buck verteth ;†
Merry sings cuckoo,
Cuckoo, cuckoo,
Well singest thou, cuckoo ;
Nor cease thou never now.

* Mead is in flower.

† Goes to harbor among the fern.

The following lines of a lover in compliment of his Mistress Alisoun, were probably written in the same century :

Bytuene Marsh. and Averil, When spray beginneth to springe,	Between March and April, When the branches begin to spring,
The lutel foul hath hire wyl On hyre lud to synge, Ich libbe in louelonginge For semlokest of alle thynges. He ¹ may me blysse bringe Icham in hire bandoun, An hendy hap ichabbe yhent Ichot from hevene it is me sent From alle wymmen mi love is lent, And lyht on Alisoun.	And the litte birds are inclined On their lay to sing, I live in the longing of love For the seemliest of all things. She may bring me bliss; I am at her command. I have obtained a lucky lot; I believe it is sent me from heaven, My love has left all other women, And alighted on Alisoun.

Robert de Brunne lived in the early part of the fourteenth century, and did much to polish his native tongue. From his "Handlyng of Sinne," we copy his praise of good women :

"Nothyng is to man so dere
As womany's love yn godemanere.
A gode woman ys mannys blyss,
Wher her love ryght and stedfast ys.
Ther ys no solace undyr hevene,
Of al that a man may nevene,²
That shuld a man so moche glew,³
As a gode woman that loveth trew."

Richard Rolle, who flourished near the middle of this century, says of himself, "I seke no straunge Ynglys, bot lightest and communest." From his translation of the Psalms, and his Twelve Profits of Affliction, we transcribe the following brief extracts :

Ps. 23 : 1. "Our Lord governeth me, and nothing to me shal wante. 2. Stede of pasture thar he me sette; in the water of the hetyng forth he me brougte. 3. My soule he turnyde: he ladde me on the stretis of rygtwisnesse for his name. 4. For win gif I hadde goo in myddil of the shadewe

¹ *Heo*, in old Saxon, is *she*.

² Name.

³ Delight.

of deeth, I shal not dreede yveles ; for thou art with me ; thi geerde and thi stef, thei haue coumfortid me."

"The sevynth profet of tribulacion is, that it spredith abred or opynyth thyne hert to receyve the grace of God. For God, with many strokys of the hammyr, spredith abroad a pese of golde or of silver, to make a vessell for to put in wyne or precyouse liquore.—And considre, as the more precieuse metalle is more ductible and obeynge to the strokes of the goldsmyth ; so the more precieuse and meke herte is more paciente in tribulacion. And allethogh the sharp stroke of tribulacion turmenteth the, yet comforte the ; for the goldsmyth, Alle-myghty God, holdeth the hammyr of tribulacion in his hond, and knoweth ful welle what thou maiste suffir, and mesurith hys smytynge after thi frele nature."

From Wyckliffe's translation of the Bible, written about the year 1380, we give, for the gratification of our readers, a few verses in the first chapter of Luke : " 5. In the dayes of Eroude kyng of Judee ther was a prest Zacarye by name : of the sort of Abia, and his wyf was of the doughtris of Aaron : and hir name was Elisabeth. 6. And bothe weren juste before God : goynge in alle the maundementis and justifyingis of the Lord withouten playnt. 7. And thei hadden no child, for Elisabeth was bareyn and bothe weren of greet age in her dayes.—17. And he schal go before in the spiryte and vertue of Helye : and he schal turne the hertis of the fadris to the sonis, and men out of beleewe, to the prudence of just men, to make redy a perfyt puple to the Lord. 18. And Zacarye seyde to the aungel: wherof schal Y wyte this ? for Y am old : and my wyf hath gon fer in hir dayes. 59. And it was doon in the eightithe day thei camen to circumside the child, and thei clepiden him Zacarye by the name of his fadir. 60. And his modir answeride and seide, nay ; but he schal be clepid Ion."

From a translation of Higden's Polychronicon, by John de Trevisa, near the close of the fourteenth century, we copy some curious extracts respecting the English language :

‘ As it is know how many maner peple beth in this Ilonde, ther beth also of so meny peple langages and tonges. Englischmen, though they had from the beginnyng thre maner speche, southren, northren, and myddell speche in the myddell of the lond, as thei come of the thre maner peple of Germania: notheles by commixtion, and medlynge, first with Danes, and afterward with Normans, in many the contray langage is appaised. This apaisynge of the birthe tonge is because of twey thinges: oon is, for children in scole agens the usage and maner of alle other nationns beth compellid for to leve her owne langage, and for to constrewe her lessons and her thinges a Frensche, and haveth siththe that the Normans came first in to Englund. Also gentil mens children beth ytaught for to speke Frensche from the time that thei beth rokked in her cradel, and kunneth speke and play with a childe brooch. And uplondische men woll likne hem selfe to gentilmen, and fondith with grete bysinesse for to speke Frensche for to be the more ytold of. Hit semeth a grete wonder, how Englisch that is the birthe tonge of Englischmen, and her owne langage and tonges, is so dyverse of soun in this oon Ilonde.”

Chaucer, the father of English poetry, wrote near the close of the fourteenth century. Of his poetry, we give a brief specimen, and another of his prose taken from his translations of Boethius:

“ Whanne that April with his shoures sote
 The droughte of March hath perced to the rote,
 And bathed every veine in swiche licour
 Of whiche vertue engendred is the flour;
 Whan Zephirus eke with his sote brethe
 Enspired hath in every holte and hethe
 The tendre croppes; and the yonge sonne
 Hath in the Ram his halfe eours yronne,—
 And smale foules maken melodie,
 That slepen alle night with open eye,
 So priketh hem nature in hir corages;
 That longen folk to gon on pilgrimages,
 And palmeres for to seken strange strondes,
 To serve halves couthe in sondry londes;

And specially, from every shires ende
Of Englelond to Canterbury they wende,
The holy blissful martyr for to seke
That helm hath holpen, whan that they were seke."

"Alas! I wepyng am constrained to begin verse of sorrowfull matter that whilom in florishyng studie made delitable ditees. For lo! rendyng muses of Poetes enditen to me thinges to be writen, and drierie teses.—In the mene while, that I still record these thynges with my self, and marked my wepelie complainte with office of pointtell: I saugh stondyng aboven the hight of myn hed a woman of full grete reverence, by semblaunt. Her eyen bronnyng and clere, seyng over the common might of menne, with a lively colour, and withe soche vigour and strength, that it ne might be nempned, all were it so, that she were full of so grete age, that menne woulde not trowen in no manere, that she were of our elde."

As a specimen of the style and orthography prevalent in the middle of the fifteenth century, we give a brief extract from Pecock, Bishop of Chichester, a man of learning, and a stanch opponent of the Wyckliffites. Alluding to "braunchis of trees fro Bischopis-wode, and flouris fro the feeld," which "men of the cuntree uplond bringen into Londoun in mydsomer eve," he says, "Tho braunchis grewen out of the bowis, upon which thei in Bischopis-wode stoden; and tho bowis grewen out of stokis or tronchons; and the tronchons or shaftis grewen out of the roote; and the roote out of the next erthe thereto, etc. So that neither the cart, neither the hondis of the bringers, neither tho bringers ben the groundis or fundamentis of the braunchis.—The hool office and work, into which God ordeyned holy scripture, is for to grounde articlis of feithe, and for to reherce and witnesse moral trouthis of lawe of kind grounded in moral philosophie, that is to seie, in doom¹ of resoun; that the reders be remembrid, stirrid, and exortid, bi so miche the better, and the more, and the sooner for to fulfille hem."

¹ Nature.

The following pithy sentences are extracted from works published about the year 1480: "Ther be thre estates of men that be known in thre maners, that is to witt, the pacient is not knowen but in his adversite, and in his ire; the valiaunt man is not knowen but in warre; and the frende is not knowen but in necessite. Of all other maners and condicions the warste is, a man to be suspicious of his frende, etc. To be joyous, and to salew every manne gladly, to be liberale in yevyng and receyvyng, and to foryive gladly his evyl will, maken a man to be beloved of yche body."¹

"Be not glad of the falle or evyl fare of thy neyghbour, lest God turne his wreth fro hym to the; and so thou sholdest falle in the same or worse. Fle chydyng; be waar, and doo awaye the occasion of stryf, and lyve allewey in peace. Lete no thyng passe thy lippys that may defoule the eeris of the herers. Take hede what thou spekyst, and what thou spekyst not; and both in spekyng and not spekyng be right well waar; for thou mayest not call ayene that thou hast seyde. Shut fro thy tunge the synne of backbytyng. When thou blamest another, thynke on thyn ounne sinne, and loke not on other mennys. For thou shalt never backbite, yf thou wylt beholde thyself."²

Sir Thomas More wrote in the early part of the sixteenth century, when our language was in a great degree settled. As his writings were regarded, at the time, as models of pure and elegant style, we cannot forbear to make a brief extract from his "*Merry iest how a sergeant would learne to playe the frere, written by Maister Thomas More in hys youth.*"

"Wyse men alway,
Affyrme and say,
That best is for a man;
Diligently,
For to apply,
The busines that he can,
And in no wyse,

¹ Lord Rivers.

² Caxton.

To enterpryse,
Another faculte,
For he that wyll,
And can no skyll,
Is neuer lyke to the.
He that hath lafte
The hosiers crafte,
And falleth to making shone,
The smythe that shall,
To payntyng fall,
His thrift is well nigh done.
A man of lawe,
That neuer sawe
The wayes to bye and sell,
Wenyng to ryse,
By marchaundise,
I wish to spede hym well.
A marchaunt eke,
That wyll goo seke,
By all the meanes he may,
To fall in sute,
Tyll he dyspute
His money cleane away,
Pletyng the lawe,
For every strawe,
Shall proue a thrifty man,
With bate and strife,
But by my life,
I cannot tell you whan.
This thing was tryed
And verefyed,
Here by a. sergeaunt late,
That thriftly was,
Or he coulde pas,
Rapped about the pate,
Whyle that he would
See how he could
A little play the frere:
Now yf you wyll
Knowe how it fyll,
Take heed and ye shall here." etc.

Of the same age was Skelton, whom Erasmus called
"the light and ornament of English scholars." From his
writings we copy a short extract:

"In Autumpne whan the sonne in vyrgyne
 By radyante hete enryped hath our corne ;
 Whan Luna, full of mutabylyte,
 As emperes the dyademe hath worne
 Of our pole as tyke, smylynge half in ſcorne
 At our ſoly and our vnſtedfaſtneſſe,
 The time when Mars to warre hym did dres ;
 I callynge to mynde the greate auctoryte
 Of poetes olde, whiche full craftely
 Vnder as couerte termes as coulde be
 Can touche a trouth, and cloke ſubtylly
 With freſſhe vtteraunce full ſentencyouſly
 Dyuerſe in ſtyle ; ſome ſpared not vyce to wryte,
 Some of mortalitie nobly dyd endyte."

From the writings of learned men in the reign of Henry VIII., we give a ſingle brief extract from a report made by Leland, the King's librarian, who had been commissioned to examine the ancient records of the whole kingdom. "That profyt hath ryſen by the aſorſayd journeye, in bryngynge full manye thynges to light, as concernynge the uſurped autoryte of the byſhopp of Rome and his complyces, to the manyfeſt and vyolent derogacyon of kyngely dygnyte, I referre my ſelfe moſte humbly to your moſte prudent, lerned, and hygh judgement, to deſcerne my dylygence in the longe volume, wherin I have made answer for the defence of your ſupreme dygnyte ; alonly lenynge to the ſtronger pyllour of holye ſcripture agaynſte the whole college of the Romanyſtes, clokyng their crafty aſſercyons and argumentes undre the name of one poorei Pighus of Ultrajecte in Germany, and ſtandyng to them as to their only anker—holde agaynſte tempeſtes that they knowe wyll aryſe, yf truthe maye be by lycens lette in to have a voyce in the generall counſell."

Archbishop Cranmer, who ſuffered martyrdom in 1555, was diſtinguiſhed not only for the extent of his learning, but for the purity and elegance of his ſtyle. From the preface to one of his works, we extract a ſpecimen of our language in the middle of the ſixteenth century : "The Lorde graunt, that this my travayle and labour in his vinegard be not in vayne, but that it may prosper, and bring forthe good fruites to

his honoure and glory. For when I see his vynegard overgrown with thornes, brambles, and weedes, I knowe that everlasting wo appertayneth unto me, if I holde my peace, and put not to my handes and tongue, to labour in pourgyng his vinegard. It pitieth me to see the simple and hungry flocke of Christe ledde into corrupt pastures, to be caryed blindfelde they knowe not whither, and to be fedde with poyson in the steede of holosome meates. Lysten not to the false incantations, sweet whisperinges, and crafty jugglynges of the subtyll Papystes, wherewith they have this many years deluded and bewytched the worlde. But hearken to Christe ; gyve care unto his wordes, which shall leade you the ryght waye unto everlastynge lyfe, there with hym to lyve ever as heyres of hys kyngdome."

We cannot forbear to quote, as a further specimen of the language at this period, a part of the apology, which Roger Ascham, the celebrated tutor of Queen Elizabeth, makes for composing his work on Archery in English : " If any man would blame me, eyther for takinge such a matter in hand, or els for wrytinge it in the English tongue, this aunswere I may make him, that when the best of the realme thincke it honest for them to use, I, one of the meanest sorte, ought not to suppose it vile for me to wryte.—Manye Englishe writers have not done so, but usinge straunge words, as Latine, Frenche, and Italian, do make all thinges darke and harde. Ones I communed with a man which reasoned the Englishe tongue to be enriched and encreased thereby, sayinge, ' Who will not prayse that feast where a man shall drincke at a dinner, both wyne, ale, and beere ? ' Truly, quoth I, they be all good, every one taken by himself alone ; but if you put malvayse and sacke, redde wyne and white, ale and beere, and al in one pot, you shall make a drincke not easye to be knownen, nor yet holosome for the bodye."

We now approach a period when our language reached a high degree of richness and vigor in Spenser and Shakspeare, in Hooker, Hall and Bacon. Our readers are too well acquainted with the great writers who flourished in the reign of

Elizabeth, to need any extracts from their works; but we quote from Owen Feltham, a powerful, though well nigh forgotten writer, a single specimen of our language in the early part of the seventeenth century, which very much resembles the rich and gorgeous style of Jeremy Taylor:—
“Love those pleasures well that are on all sides legitimated by the bounty of Heaven; after which no private gripe, no fancied goblin, comes to upbraid my sense for using them; but such as may with equal pleasure be again dreamed over, and not disturb my sleep. This is to take off the parchings of the summer sun, by bathing in a pure and chrystal fountain.—Desire of glory is the last garment that even wise men lay aside. Not that it betters himself, being gone, but that it stirs up those that follow him to an earnest endeavour after noble actions: which is the only means to coin the fame we wish for. Themistocles, that streamed out his youth in wine and venery, and was suddenly changed to a virtuous and valiant man, told one that asked what did so strangely change him, that the trophy of Miltiades would not let him sleep. Surely, nothing awakes our sleeping virtues, like the noble acts of our predecessors. They are flaming beacons, that fame and time have set on hills, to call us to a defence of virtue, whensoever vice invades the commonwealth of man. Roman virtue made Roman virtues lasting. Brave men never die; but, like the phenix, from whose preserved ashes one or other still springs up like them.”

The seventeenth century was a period of strong and all-pervading excitement that produced a constellation of authors distinguished for the vigor of their talents, the extent of their learning, and the power of their writings; but our readers are familiar with the names, and should be with the works of such writers as Chillingworth and Clarendon, Burnet and Baxter, Bates and Howe, Tillotson, Barrow, and Jeremy Taylor. Before this time, however, “our language,” as Dr. Johnson remarks, “began to lose the stability which it had obtained in the reign of Elizabeth; and was considered by every writer as a subject on which he might try his plastick

skill, by moulding it according to his own fancy. Milton, in consequence of this encroaching license, began to introduce the Latin idiom: and Brown, though he gave less disturbance to our structure and phraseology, yet poured in a multitude of exotick words." Bacon did very much the same, and Dryden charges Ben Jonson with "Romanizing our language too much." Heylin said in 1658, "Many think, that they can never speak elegantly, nor write significantly, except they do it in a language of their own devising; as if they were ashamed of their mother-tongue, and thought it not sufficiently curious to express their fancies. By means whereof more French and Latin words have gained ground upon us since the middle of Queen Elizabeth's reign, than were admitted by our ancestors, whether we look upon them as the British or Saxon race, not only since the Norman, but the Roman conquest."

We need not continue our extracts. The few specimens we have selected from different periods, may suffice to give some idea of the changes which have taken place in our language, since the conquest of England by the Saxons, and to show through what mutations every tongue must pass in its progress from original rudeness to that degree of regularity, refinement and copiousness which the English has at length attained. Of the Saxon, as spoken before the Norman conquest, we know too little to trace its changes with accuracy; but from its few remaining monuments, we should suppose that, while the orthography was fluctuating, the words and the idiom continued essentially the same till the Saxons and the Normans began, near the close of the twelfth century, to form a common language and literature. From that time to the reign of Henry VIII, (1509-47,) there was, as the specimens we have given will show, a series of fluctuations; and ever since this last period, our language has undergone many changes, both in orthography and idioms, by the introduction of new words, and the disuse, or altered meaning of old ones.

The orthography of our language was, till the time of Dr.

Johnson, unsettled and fortuitous ; nor has even his authority, or the industry of his painstaking successors, been sufficient to banish its irregularities. The few specimens we have given of English in "olden times," will show how capricious and fluctuating was the orthography of its earliest writers. We find *yf*, *gyf*, for *if* ; *yt*, *hit*, *hyt*, *hight*, *hyght*, for *it* ; *geve*, *gyve*, *yeve*, for *give* ; *Englonde*, *Inglonde*, *Ynglonde*, *Englonde*, for *England* ; *anes*, *anis*, *anys*, *ones*, *onys*, for *once* ; *ley*, *lage*, *lagh*, *laugh*, for *law*. These diversities of orthography Dr. Johnson thus explains : "As language was at its beginning merely oral, all words of necessary or common use were spoken before they were written, and, while they were unfixed by any visible signs, must have been spoken with great diversity, as we now observe those who cannot read, catch sounds imperfectly, and utter them negligently. When this wild and barbarous jargon was first reduced to an alphabet, every penman endeavoured to express, as he could, the sounds which he was accustomed to pronounce or to receive, and vitiated in writing such words as were already vitiated in speech."

The *idiom* of our language has undergone fewer changes than its orthography. The Saxon has always formed the groundwork of English ; and the introduction of words from other sources has never entirely frittered away this foundation, nor materially affected the peculiar structure of our language. Still our idiom, formed out of so many heterogeneous materials, remains on many points unsettled and clashing. We speak of conformity *to*, or *with* a principle ; of being *in*, or *under* certain circumstances ; of one thing corresponding *to*, or *with* another ; of an argument founded *in*, or *upon* a premise. Such diversities of structure and phraseology are comparatively unimportant ; but we need some standard on this subject to guide inexperienced writers ; and we know not a greater or more urgent desideratum in the literature of the present day than a full, accurate and decisive work on the idiom of our language.

But the most important change that has taken place in

our tongue respects *the use and signification of words*. No one acquainted with any of the writers previous to the seventeenth century, need be told how many words then in familiar use have now become obsolete, and how many more have so far changed their signification as, in some instances, to lose their original meaning. We cannot open a volume of Hooker, nor read a single page in Chaucer, Spenser, or Shakspeare, without finding words and phrases that would now seem strange, and perhaps unintelligible to most readers. A few such occur even in the common version of the Bible. The Psalmist speaks of *leasing* for lying; and Peter exhorts the Christian to *eschew* (avoid) evil. We meet with *trow*, for think, and *wot* for know. “Doth ^{he} thank that servant? I *trow* not.—I *wot* that through ignorance ye did it.” We find also *let* for hinder, and *prevent* for go before. “Only he who now *letteth*, will *let*, until he be taken out of the way.—I *prevented* the dawning of the morning; and cried.” On nearly every page of Todd’s edition of Johnson’s Dictionary, we find words not now in use; and of those from Saxon roots which once formed nine-tenths of our language, more than one fifth have become obsolete, and their place been supplied by words from ancient and foreign tongues.

But a topic far more important than either of the preceding,—the origin of past and still continued changes in our language,—must be reserved for a future number.

ARTICLE VII.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

- 1.—*Biographical and Critical Miscellanies*. By WILLIAM H. PARSONS, Author of the “*History of Ferdinand and Isabella*,” etc. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1845. pp. 638, 8vo.

THIS volume is got up in a style correspondent with that of the author’s historical works, and contains his contributions to the North

American Review. Among them are Reviews of Irving's Conquest of Granada—Cervantes—Sir Walter Scott—Chateaubriand's English Literature—Bancroft's History of the United States—Madame Calderons' Life in Mexico—Molière, etc.

They are written in Mr. Prescott's usually lucid and chaste style, and, although by no means so valuable as the works on which his fame rests, yet are they worthy of a place on the same shelf, and will, doubtless, be wanted by all who possess the others.

2.—*Observations in the East, chiefly in Egypt, Palestine, Syria and Asia Minor.* By JOHN P. DURBIN, D. D., late President of Dickinson College. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1845. 2 vols., 12mo.

Dr. Durbin is an observant traveller, and an independent thinker. His Observations in Europe met with a favorable reception, and those on the East will, no doubt, be read with equal interest.

Dr. Durbin disagrees with Dr. Robinson in respect to the approach to the Red Sea, and the passage over it, and gives some striking reasons for his view of the case. He agrees with him, and of course disagrees with Dr. Olin, as to the site of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem; i. e. on the question, whether the present sepulchre covers the ground of our Lord's tomb.

Much valuable and interesting information is conveyed in these volumes, in regard to the ancient churches of Asia Minor; and the Doctor's reflections on the Missions to the Eastern Churches of the present day, are discriminating and candid.

His observations on the ground lead him to the conclusion, that the missions of the A. B. C. F. M. are spiritual in their object, while those of the Episcopal Church and the Papacy are ecclesiastical and political. The two latter seek fellowship and communion with those churches, as they are; the former seek first their conversion to a true, spiritual Christianity, in order to fellowship; without, however, disturbing their organizations.

3.—*The Sufferings of Christ.* By A LAYMAN. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1845. pp. 328, 12mo.

This is a novel book, on a startling subject; not startling in its title—"The Sufferings of Christ;" but in its real doctrine—the passibility of God, and the actual suffering of the Divine Word incarnate. The impassibility of the divine nature has been so long a settled doctrine of the church, that when a layman broaches and defends the opposite doctrine, at this day, we are naturally startled.

The book is evidently the result of no little reflection, and has been penned by one who is not unused to expressing his thoughts in

clear and forcible diction. Few books of the present day are written in so forcible style. It is a pleasure to read the volume, independently of the interest of the subject.

We are not ready to pronounce positively on the argument. We are not yet convinced by it. Some parts of it, we think, not just criticism; as, for instance, in the chapter on the meaning of the term "flesh;" yet is it worthy of serious consideration, and is, at least, a good specimen of an argument.

The author only contends, that God is capable of *voluntary* suffering, not *involuntary*, that he can choose to suffer, if thereby his own glory and the good of his creatures shall be promoted. Then he contends, that God did *actually choose* to suffer in connection with human nature, and did suffer for the redemption of sinners.

It might be asked, whether a being capable of suffering, can be denominated a perfect being? whether experience of suffering is not evidence of imperfection? and whether, for any purpose whatever, God can voluntarily inflict pain on himself, without, at the same time, detracting from our view of him as the Perfect One?

4.—*The Philosophy of Mystery.* By WALTER COOPER DENDY, *Fellow and Honorary Librarian of the Medical Society of London, etc.* New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1845. pp. 442, 12mo.

This is the third volume of Harpers' New Miscellany, and truly an interesting volume it is. The form of dialogue is adopted, and thus the author presents different views, and answers objections philosophically, clothing the whole in a very pleasant diction.

The object is to give a history and an explanation of all manner of spectres, phantasies, and illusions. Hence we have interesting chapters on the nature and motives of ghosts, phantasy from mental association, mysterious forms and signs, demonology, nature of soul and mind, of sleep, of dreams, somnambulism, trance, mesmerism, etc., etc. The analysis and classification of spectral illusions evinces genius and analytic power.

5.—*The Life of Mozart, including his Correspondence.* By EDWARD HOLMES, *Author of "A Ramble among the Musicians of Germany."* New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1845. pp. 380, 12mo.

Another volume of the New Miscellany, and one well worthy of a place in it. For the first time is the English public put in possession of any thing like a Life of Mozart; and surely it cannot but be acceptable, to be introduced to a more familiar acquaintance with one who has done so much for the musical harmony of the world. Much of Mozart's correspondence is embodied in the volume; and he is

made, as much as possible, to tell his own tale of himself. A full account is also given of his compositions, from an inspection of the original MSS.

It will be perceived that Mozart was born to music, and that at the age of four he already composed pieces, which his father wrote down in a book. This book was preserved by his only sister to the end of her life, and a specimen from it, composed at the age of four, is found in this volume. Connoisseurs and amateurs will, of course, be greatly gratified with this record of the development of the great musical genius.

6.—*Aids to English Composition, prepared for Students of all Grades; embracing Specimens and Examples of School and College Exercises, and most of the higher departments of English Composition, both in Prose and Poetry.* By RICHARD GREEN PARKER. A new edition, with additions and improvements. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1845. pp. 429, 12mo.

We wish there were more attention paid to composition in our schools than there is; and we, therefore, rejoice in any well-constructed aids prepared for teachers and scholars. Mr. Parker's work has been before the public for some time, and has been pronounced useful by those who are practically acquainted with its details. We find in it many admirable rules and appropriate examples, and doubt not that much benefit may be derived from the study and practice of its inculcations.

7.—*The Pilgrim's Progress; with a Life of John Bunyan.* By ROBERT SOUTHEY, Esq., LL.D. Illustrated with fifty cuts, by Adams, after designs by Chapman, Harvey, and others. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1845. pp. 348, 12mo.

This edition of the Pilgrim's Progress will meet a want of the community. Whilst the wealthy can afford to buy more elegantly illustrated editions, here is one adorned with beautiful wood-cuts, which will come within the means of the humbler classes of society; and to such is it an interesting and useful book.

8.—*The Vigil of Faith, and other Poems.* By CHARLES FENNO HOFFMAN. Fourth edition. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1845. pp. 164, 18mo.

A neat little volume, too well known to require any special notice from us. Mr. Hoffman possesses a poetic vein, not of the purest order, yet yielding occasionally some golden threads.

9.—*Conquest and Self-Conquest—Woman an Enigma.* New-York Harper & Brothers.

We notice these small volumes rather out of time ; but we do it chiefly to remind our readers that they emanated from the same source from which came "Praise and Principle," noticed in our last number. Whoever has read the latter will be glad, we are sure, to obtain the former. To the young, the doctrine of *self-mastery*, so beautifully inculcated in *Conquest and Self-Conquest*, is of the last importance.

10.—*The History of Silk, Cotton, Linen, Wool, and other Fibrous Substances ; including Observations on Spinning, Dyeing, and Weaving. Also an Account of the Pastoral Life of the Ancients, their Social State, and Attainments in the Domestic Arts. With Appendices on Pliny's Natural History ; on the Origin and Manufacture of Linen and Cotton Paper ; on Felting, Netting, etc. Deduced from copious and authentic sources.* Illustrated by steel engravings. New-York : Harper and Brothers. 1845. pp. 464, 8vo.

We are much pleased with the style in which this volume is "got up." The subject-matter is of great interest and value ; and the work is manifestly one of great research, and evincing scholarship. It is a book which would be read with pleasure by all ; they would meet in its pages very much in respect to the social life and manufactures of the ancients, which is probably new to most. To the classical scholar also, it is a useful illustration of many passages of his favorite authors of antiquity ; and it throws not a little light on portions of the word of God.

The first part treats of the Ancient History of Silk—the second of the Sheep—the third of the Cotton Manufacture—the fourth of the Linen Manufacture. Under the second chapter is introduced the history of the Goat, Beaver's Wool, Camel's Wool, and Camel's Hair.

11.—*Ollendorf's New Method of learning to Read, Write and Speak the German Language ; to which is added a systematic outline of the Different Parts of Speech, their inflection and use, with full Paradigms, and a complete Table of the Irregular Verbs.* By G. J. ADLER, A. B. New-York : D. Appleton & Co. Phila. : Geo. S. Appleton. 1845. pp. 510, 12mo.

The German language is becoming so much an object of attention in this country, that every facility afforded for its acquisition ought to be hailed as a valuable contribution toward the cultivation of the intellect. We have had several new Grammars of the German language, within a few years, and among the best, that of Noehden, by

Prof. Sears, of Newton Seminary. Ollendorf's is on a different plan, much the same as that of Manesca, in French. The pupil is led on, through a series of exercises, inducting him gradually into a knowledge of the words, inflections, and idioms of the language. Such a method of acquisition requires to be used with caution, and is better for those somewhat advanced in acquaintance with the principles of language in general, than for young persons.

There is, however, an "Outline," in other words, a condensed Grammar, occupying 136 pages of this work, which will be of great utility, if properly used in connection with the lessons for practice.

This Grammar of Ollendorf's has gained great reputation in Europe, and is pronounced by many who have used it, the most effective aid yet afforded to the public, for attaining a knowledge of the German tongue.

There is accompanying the Grammar a Key to the Lessons, which may be of service judiciously used, but almost necessarily of disservice in the hands of a youthful learner.

12.—APPLETON'S LITERARY MISCELLANY.—*I Promessi Sposi. The Betrothed.* By ALESSANDRO MANZONI. A new translation, reprinted entire from the last English Edition. In two volumes.—*Memoirs of an American Lady, with Sketches of Manners and Living prior to the Revolution.* By MRS. GRANT.—*The Life of Frederick Schiller, comprehending an Examination of his Works.* By THOMAS CARLYLE.—*Sketches of Modern Literature and Eminent Literary men.* By GEORGE GILFILLAN.

We must thus combine our notices of these volumes, for want of room. The design of the Miscellany, we have heretofore announced, and also noticed the first volume, Gertrude. The Betrothed is the second, from the pen of Manzoni, the Walter Scott of Italy. Its date is over two centuries, and its plot the protracted separation of the betrothed on the very eve of marriage. Its tone is high, yet is there much in it which cannot meet a hearty response from us.—Mrs. Grant's Memoirs is an authentic detail of facts, and a legacy to those who would see a vivid portraiture of our fathers and mothers previous to the days of our Revolution.—The Life of Schiller, by Carlyle, will, of course, be read, and needs no commendation. The last two volumes—the Gallery of Literary Portraits, are just fresh from the English Press, and we are truly glad to see them in the Miscellany. Most of the prominent men of the present day, in Great Britain, and a few in these United States, find a place in this Gallery. The author, of course, contemplates men from his own stand-point, and that gives coloring to his portraits. Under the head of Ralph Waldo Emerson, after portraying Edwards, Channing, Webster, and others of less note, he concludes that Emerson is the greatest of all, and so

represents him. Few, in this land, will agree with him. The portraits are, however, generally fine, and the book exceedingly interesting.

- 13.—*The Vision; or Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise, of Dante Alighieri.* Translated by the Rev. HENRY FRANCIS CAREY, A. M. with the Life of Dante, Chronological View of his age, additional Notes and Index. Illustrated with twelve Engravings, from Designs by JOHN FLAXMAN, R. A. From the last corrected London Edition. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Phila.: Geo. S. Appleton. 1845. pp. 587, 12mo.

The publishers merit commendation for the style of the book; and certainly for placing within our reach this excellent translation by Mr. Carey. True, no translation can transfer the beauties and fine touches of the original, yet those who know not the Italian, will be glad to inspire some of the poetic breathings of one, whose genius awakened enthusiasm in both Michael Angelo and Milton.

Whether the Vision be denominated an epic or a satire, is of comparatively little importance. It is sufficient to know that it is magnificent in its conception, and gave color to the poetry of Europe,—that it wrought with such power on the heart in awakening pity and terror, as justly to claim for its author the possession of a superior creative faculty, and to entitle him to one of the first niches in the Temple of Fame.

We must not forget to say that the frontispiece is a copy of the portrait of Dante, discovered in 1840, in the pantry of a prison at Florence, all covered with whitewash.

- 14.—*A Practical Treatise on Healthy Skin; with Rules for the Medical and Domestic Treatment of Cutaneous Diseases.* By ERASMUS WILSON, F. R. S., Consulting Surgeon to the St. Pancras Infirmary, etc., etc. Illustrated with six Engravings. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Phila.: Geo. S. Appleton. 1845. pp. 246, 12mo.

Although rather a medical work, it is one of value to every person. The knowledge it imparts of the skin, its health, and its diseases, is such as all ought to possess. And every one is so necessarily bound up in his skin, that it seems desirable he should know somewhat of its properties, maladies, remedies, etc. Well, this book is all freighted with just such knowledge of the subject, as will be of great utility to those who acquire it. If you wish to learn how the skin grows, how it is connected with the nails and the hair, how it is colored and discolored, how it becomes diseased, and how it may be cured, above all, how it may be preserved from the maladies to which it is liable, then read this book. You will find in it, observations on

soap, its proper and improper application, on ablutions, on diet, etc. of interest and value.

It is really a *practical* Treatise, and any one who takes it up will be likely to read it through.

- 15.—*Sermons preached in the Chapel of the Rugby School, with an Address before Confirmation.* By THOMAS ARNOLD, D. D. First American Edition. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Phila.: Geo. S. Appleton. 1845. pp. 284, 12mo.

Dr. Arnold has become so much of a favorite in this country, that any thing from his pen is acceptable.

This volume contains discourses to his pupils as a minister of the gospel; and it is really delightful to mark the simplicity, appropriateness, and faithfulness of these sermons. It were well for our youth in schools and colleges to ponder them diligently. They may be marrow to their bones.

- 16.—*The Book of the Colonies: comprising a History of the Colonies composing the United States, from the Discovery in the Tenth Century, until the commencement of the Revolutionary War. Compiled from the best authorities, by JOHN FROST, LL. D.* New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Phila.: Geo. S. Appleton. 1846. pp. 280, 12mo.

This volume, by Dr. Frost, is intended to make our youth familiar with the settlement of the several original colonies of this new world. It begins with the Northmen, passes on to the Spaniards, French, and then to the history of the several colonies; and, like the other books of the same author, conveys much interesting knowledge to the youthful reader.

- 17.—*The Book of Good Examples; drawn from authentic History and Biography; designed to illustrate the beneficial effects of virtuous conduct.* By JOHN FROST, LL. D. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Phila.: Geo. S. Appleton. 1846. pp. 288, 12mo.

An excellent book in its design, and well executed. To teach virtue by example is the most impressive mode: and to bring before the minds of youth the virtuous conduct and habits of those who have obtained notoriety, is doing much toward inducing them to walk in their steps. We want more books of the same description—not mere toys of books.

- 18.—*Chances and Changes; or Life as it is. Illustrated in the History of a Straw Hat.* By CHARLES BURDETT, A. M., Author of *Emma, or the Lost Found*, etc., etc. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Phila.: Geo. S. Appleton. 1847. pp. 158, 18mo.

The author has made much of a Straw Hat, and to a good pur-

pose. The Hat tells a good and useful tale, and the whole is intended, in a history of the changes of life, to inculcate confidence in God, and submission to His will, under the varied adversities of our earthly pilgrimage.

19.—WILEY & PUTNAM'S LIBRARY OF CHOICE READING.

We have already spoken favorably of this enterprise; and as a whole the selections are good. We have made an occasional exception to what we considered not very wholesome in its tendency. Yet even the most exceptionable portions of the Library are far better than the cheap trash which has been so long floating on the surface of society, and, alas! too often sinking, we fear, into the depths of the inner man, there to repress all good principles, and quicken into life the evil passions of human nature.

The last number we noticed was the twenty-fourth, and the Library has now reached the fortieth. The intervening numbers are all worthy of a place in this selection. They are wheat, not chaff, as the bare mention of the titles will sufficiently evince:—Hazlitt's *Table Talk*, second series—Basil Montagu's *Selections from Taylor, Barrow, South, Fuller, etc.*—Tupper's *Twins and Heart*—Hazlitt's *English Comic Writers*—Lamb's *English Dramatic Poets*—Tupper's *Proverbial Philosophy*—Vicar of Wakefield—Lord Mahon's *Life of Condé*—Hazlitt's *Lectures on the English Poets*—Hervey's *Book of Christmas*—Carlyle's *Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell*.

We said all these were good and useful books. We like even "*The Book of Christmas*," although we could wish the author or the editor had modified the enchantment which, on page 148, is thrown around the *theatre*, as a Christmas amusement. The entire representation of it there is adapted to awaken in youth a passion for visiting it.

20.—*Notes from Over Sea*. Consisting of Observations made in Europe, in the years 1843 and 1844: Addressed to a Brother. By Rev. JOHN MITCHELL. In two volumes. New York: Gates & Stedman. 1845.

These are the notes of a New England minister of the gospel, obliged to travel for his health. They are the record of what he saw and heard, told in a manly, easy style, without affectation and without fear.

Although we have abundance of *Travels and Observations*, *Notes*, etc., yet almost every one having his own stand-point, his idiosyncrasy, presents us, at least, with some new reflections, if not with novel objects.

Mr. Mitchell's stand-point is Mount Zion, his inner man the Christian. Hence his observations are characterized by pious feeling, regard for God and his glory.

He seems, in some quarters, to have met with rudeness, where it was not to be expected, because of his moderation on the subject of slavery.

21.—*The Jesuits.* Translated from the French of MM. Michelet and Quinet, Professors in the College of France. Edited by C. EDWARDS LESTER. New York: Gates & Stedman. 1845. pp. 225, 12mo.

Of the Jesuits we need to know much now, and shall yet have occasion to know more. Revived, they begin to live with all their artfulness, knowledge of human nature and undying perseverance. They are in the midst of us, and too often we know it not. Let us be on the alert. They require watching.

The controversy which called forth this volume is well known. The Professors wrote in self-defence, and in defence of right. What they have written is exceedingly valuable, at the present time. Let us use the weapons they furnish us, but not forget, at the same time, that while they fight the Jesuits, they have no affection for evangelical religion. The book, consequently, is to be received and read with caution.

22.—*The Roman Church and Modern Society.* Translated from the French of Professor E. Quinet. Edited by C. EDWARDS LESTER. New York: Gates & Stedman. 1846. pp. 198, 12mo.

We cannot but ponder the sayings and reflections of such a man as Quinet with interest. They are influential, whether for good or for ill. His sketch of the Roman Church and its relation to modern society is graphic, and must tell, at home at least, if not here and elsewhere. It is well to enlist such a mind in such a cause; and let us pray that it be converted from all forms of infidelity, and imbued with the spirit of evangelical religion.

To Mr. Lester we are becoming more and more indebted for his translations. May they, too, be well selected, and only good in their tendency.

23.—*The Complete Works of N. P. Willis.* New York: J. S. Redfield. 1846. pp. 895, royal 8vo.

Whatever may be thought of some of Mr. Willis's foibles, and however much we may regret that he has departed from the simple faith and manners of his earlier years, yet are we glad to see a vol-

ume of his complete works: and we doubt not it will be a very acceptable present to many of his friends.

Whatever faults he may have been guilty of in his "Pencilings," he certainly has written in it many beautiful things, and furnished some graphic delineations of scenery and society. His offence against the proprieties of social intercourse he has himself regretted: and although we feel bound to express unqualified censure of some of his doings, yet do we believe, at the same time, that some of his English censors have been guilty of much worse things in the same line. We have no sympathy with those who run after British critics in their unqualified and matter-of-course denunciation of every thing American.

Some of Mr. Willis's earlier poetry is beautiful and impressive, especially his Scriptural pieces. For instance, his Abraham—David's Grief for his Child—Absalom—Baptism of Christ—Contemplation, etc., etc.

24.—*The Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley. First American Edition (complete): with some Remarks on the Poetical Faculty, and its Influence on Human Destiny, embracing a biographical and critical notice.* By G. G. FOSTER. New York: J. S. Redfield. 1845. pp. 750, 12mo.

This is quite a pretty edition of Shelley's Poetical Works, and as the first which has appeared among us, will probably find admirers enough to secure a ready sale.

We should prefer the Poetry without Mr. Foster's Remarks. The former is, in some parts, objectionable, and the author of it a man, whose character is far from being one to be imitated. The latter is full of dreamy sensibility, Fourierism, and foolish pantheism: e. g., "Man shall discover that he himself is heaven—that every wild hope and aspiration was but a sparkling forth of that universal light-fluid in which *God* and all his creation swims"—"if poetry and imagination be not a part of *God*, then is it nothing"—"every word and syllable of it is as precious as the breath of *God*."

25.—*The Lord our Shepherd: An Exposition of the Twenty-third Psalm.* By Rev. JOHN STEVENSON. New York: Robert Carter. 1845. pp. 239.

The author is already favorably known as the author of a delightful work entitled "Christ on the Cross. This on the 23d Psalm is equally interesting and profitable. It is of a practical character, and unfolds, in succession, the themes—The Shepherd—No Want—Green Pastures—Still Waters, etc. etc.

26.—*Penny Magazine.*

It is enough to say that No. 16 has been issued by the publisher, J. S. Redfield.

- 27.—*The Greece of the Greeks.* By G. H. PERDICARIS, A. M., late Consul of the United States at Athens. In two volumes. New York: Paine & Burgess. 1845.

The author is a Greek, who, after having spent some years among us, returned to his native land, as Consul from the United States at Athens. This gave him an opportunity of intercourse with the King and Queen, and of acquiring a true knowledge of the country. In this volume he gives us the results of his observations, and a better insight into the present state of that country than can be derived from any other source easily accessible.

The grammar and style need improvement, but we can overlook that, when we remember who has written the work.

- 28.—*Rambles by Land and Water; or Notes of Travel in Cuba and Mexico, including a Canoe Voyage up the river Panuco, and Researches among the Ruins of Tamaulipas, etc.* By B. M. NORMAN. New York: Paine & Burgess. 1845. pp. 216, 12mo.

Mr. Norman is already known to us by his *Rambles in Yucatan, etc.*, which were read with eagerness and interest by many. This second volume of travel and of discovery will be of no less interest. Indeed it will well repay a perusal, abounding as it does in novel developments and vivid sketches.

- 29.—*The Fruit of the Spirit.* By GEO. W. BETHUNE, D. D., Minister of the Third Reformed Dutch Church, Philadelphia. Third Edition. Phil.: Mentz & Rovoudt. New York: Saxton & Miles. 1845. pp. 304, 18mo.

Dr. Bethune has evidently thought deeply and written elaborately on the topics presented in this volume. The theme is one of exceeding importance, and it has certainly lost none of its importance in the author's hands. The several chapters are based on the topics presented by the Spirit himself, whose fruits are here delineated—to wit, love, joy, peace, etc.

We have read the volume with great interest, and heartily commend it to the perusal of Christians, with the hope that its spirit may be more generally diffused through the Church.

The chaste, polished style in which the book is written, were compensation enough in itself for the reading of it.

- 30.—*Lectures on the Pilgrim's Progress, and on the Life and Times of John Bunyan.* By REV. GEORGE B. CHEEVER. Fourth edition. 1845. pp. 514, 8vo.

At so late a day, we can, of course, say nothing to recommend this work. Suffice it to say that Dr. Cheever has infused into it all

the charms of his peculiar style, and made a book which every Christian will love to read, and from which every poet and scholar may derive both pleasure and profit. It is the best commentary on the Pilgrim's Progress ever written.

The author knew well that old Bunyan is a favorite with the aged Christian; and that he may read it readily, a large clear type has been selected, and printed on a good fair paper. The edition by Mr. Walker is handsomely illustrated, and makes a beautiful book for a present, at any time.

31.—*The History of Romanism: from the earliest corruptions of Christianity to the present time.* By Rev. JOHN DOWLING, A. M. Eighth edition. New-York: 1845. pp. 671, 8vo.

This is an exceedingly popular book, having in a very short time reached its eighth edition. The author has evidently investigated extensively and thoroughly, and has furnished a succinct, and for all practical purposes, sufficient history of the origin, advance, cruel persecutions, and present state of the Papacy. The story is forcibly, fearlessly, truthfully told, and makes a correct impression of Popery as it is and as it was.

Then the beautiful wood-cut illustrations tend greatly to add to the interest and usefulness of the book. Mr. Walker deserves much credit for his painstaking in this respect, and Mr. Lossing has shown what can be done in xylography.

We wish the volume a place in every family.

32.—*The Attraction of the Cross; designed to illustrate the Leading Truths, Obligations and Hopes of Christianity.* By GARDINER SPRING, D. D. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1846. pp. 413, 8vo.

We always expect something good from Dr. Spring, and seldom, if ever, are we disappointed. This we think one of his best books. The subject is one of deep interest to man, and one that can be made attractive. The Cross, indeed, is a point of attraction to the Universe. The death of God's only Son for a rebel race must be known to all intelligences; and in all must awaken new emotions of wonder and praise. The reading of the first chapter of the "Attraction of the Cross" is sufficient to excite a desire to read more. It is a graphic, impressive narrative of the Cross. We must not omit to say that the book is got up in a very neat style.

33.—*Play-Room Poetry.* By S. S. A. New York: M. W. Dodd, 1846. pp. 128, 18mo.

A very pretty little book, suitable for very young children. The poetry is of a simple character, such as to meet the wants of infancy.

- 34.—*The Pilgrim's Note-Book ; or Choice Sayings, illustrative of Christian Character and Duty.* Selected by Mrs. F. L. SMITH. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1846. pp. 124, 32mo.

A pretty little volume of well selected incidents in the lives of different devoted servants of God, together with many beautiful and striking observations.

- 35.—*The Example of Washington commended to the Young.* By Rev. JOSEPH ALDEN, D. D. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1846. pp. 108, 18mo.

Prof. Alden has become quite a popular author with the young: and, that being the case, it is matter of gratulation that the tendency of his little volumes is so good.

And what a great matter is it, too, that George Washington, whose name is every thing to an American child, was a good man—that the example of such an one, honored throughout the world, can be safely recommended to our children.

This is not a narrative of Washington's life, but a selection of striking incidents for the purpose of commending to the attention and imitation of youth, some of his prominent qualities.

- 36.—*The Siege of Derry.* By CHARLOTTE ELIZABETH. Third American Edition. New York: John S. Taylor & Co. 1846. pp. 322, 18mo.

Already known to most of our readers as a thrilling book—let it be disseminated widely.

- 37.—*Influence of Physical Causes on Religious Experience.* By JOSEPH H. JONES. Phil.: W. S. Martien. 1846. pp. 132, 18mo.

An excellent little book, adapted to do much good. It meets the case of many of God's dear children, who make great mistakes in estimating their Christian character, for want of just such knowledge as is here furnished. May many bruised reeds be healed through its instrumentality. This, we know, is the highest wish of the author, in respect to it.

- 38.—*The Land of Sinim, or an Exposition of Isaiah xlix. 12, together with a Brief Account of the Jews and Christians in China.* By A MISSIONARY IN CHINA. Phil.: Wm. S. Martien. 1845. pp. 147, 18mo.

An interesting little book, detailing the history of the Jews in China—Early Christians in China—Nestorians in China—Roman Catholics—Protestant Missionaries, etc.

- 39.—*An Examination of President Edwards's Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will.* By ALBERT TAYLOR BLEDSOE. Phil.: H. Hooker. 1845. pp. 234, 12mo.

We received this work at too late a season to allow of a very particular examination. It is written with candor and clearness, and with an apparent desire to arrive at the truth. The author's view of Edwards's philosophy will be discovered from his Review of Mr. Martin's article, in the present number of the Repository.

- 40.—*Theobald, or the Fanatic: A True History.* From the German of Heinrich Stilling. Translated by REV. SAMUEL SCHAEFFER. Phil.: H. Hooker. 1846. pp. 286, 12mo.

Stilling is already favorably known to us. His *Theobald* is a work of great popularity at home, and the translation will, no doubt, be acceptable here. Its design is to show that the via media between unbelief and religious delusion is the way to temporal and eternal happiness.

The hero is a fictitious character, but the incidents are matters of fact, derived from his own observation of men and manners. It is an exceedingly interesting and valuable book, written with much discrimination, and well adapted to meet some of the delusions of the present day. "The itch," he says, "of founding separate religious sects is founded itself in pride—in pride concealed under the mask of piety—and is nothing less than insurrection against that peace and order of society guaranteed to us under the most sacred sanctions."

- 41.—*A Pictorial History of England.* By S. C. GOODRICH, author of *Peter Parley's Tales.* Phil.: Sorin & Ball. 1846. pp. 444, 12mo.

This is the third of the series of Pictorial Histories prepared by Mr. Goodrich, and published by Sorin & Ball; and we certainly think this, on England, falls not a whit behind the others, but rather surpasses them. It is very comprehensive for a school book, embracing all the principal events; and the style of the author, with the fine wood-cut illustrations, renders it especially interesting to children.

- 42.—*The Extent of the Atonement, in its Relation to God and the Universe.* By THOMAS W. JENKYN, D. D., President of Coward College, London. Second American Edition, from the third London. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. 1846. pp. 266, 12mo.

This book will not meet with universal acceptance, because it opposes views of the atonement held by some branches of the Church: but we think it one of the most masterly works on the subject with which we have met. The whole doctrine, in all its relations, is presented in a striking and forcible manner, and with an array of argument on the different points, which antagonists will not easily over-

throw. We have chapters on—The Nature and Design of the Atonement—Its Relation to the Person of the Son of God—Relation to the Perfections of God—Relation to His Purposes—To His Works—To Divine Moral Government—To Providence—To the Whole System of Divine Truth—To Sin—To Salvation—To the Work of the Spirit—To the Church—To the Various Dispensations of Revealed Religion—To the Eternal State of the Universe—Its Moral Grandeur.

43.—*British Quarterly Review.*

This valuable Quarterly, representing the Dissenting interest in Great Britain, has completed its first volume. The Rev. Dr. Vaughan, the editor, is known among us as a writer of great force of intellect and strength of style. His articles are always read with interest and profit, as are those of Dr. Hamilton, and others.

On the whole, we think the Review evinces quite as much talent as the very best of the English Quarterlies.

ARTICLE VIII.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Germany.

The recent controversy about Ronge has called forth many works on all points related to the new Reformation. Among others Kempf Luther's gegen Heiligenanrufung, Bilderdienst, und Reliquienverehrung; John Tetzl, der Ablasskrämer, Ein seitenstück zu der Reliquienverehrung und zu dem heiligen Roch zu Trier.—Dr. Aug. Ludw. Geo. Krehl has published his work on Der Brief an die Römer. He takes for his starting point the present critical and philological conclusions of those who have commented on this epistle; and, regarding it as the basis of dogmatic theology, he aims at a more comprehensive view of its great idea.—Das Evangelium Johannis und die neueste Hypothese über seine Entstehung, von Dr. A. Ebrard.—Chrysostomes Postille. Auswahl seiner schönsten Predigten und übersetzt von Prof. Dr. Hefeler.—Geschichte der Römischen Literatur, von J. C. F. Bähr, greatly enlarged and much improved.—An excellent and highly useful work, entitled: Bibliographisches Lexikon der gesammten Literatur der Griechen: von S. F. W. Hoffman.—Cl. Ptolemæi Geographia, Edid. C. F. A. Nolbe.—Rossius: Inscriptiones Græcæ Ineditæ, Fasc. III.

France.

Chateaubriand: Etudes ou Discours Historiques sur la Chute de l'Empire Romain, la Naissance et les Progrès du Christianisme, et l'Invasion des Barbares.—Duhamel: Histoire Constitutionnelle de la Monarchie Espagnole, depuis l'Invasion des hommes du Nord jusqu' à la Mort de Ferdinand VIII. A. D. 411—1833.—Mignet: Notice historique sur la Vie et les Travaux de M. de Simondi.

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THE
BIBLICAL REPOSITORY
AND
CLASSICAL REVIEW.

THIRD SERIES, NO. VI.—WHOLE NUMBER LXII.

APRIL, 1846.

ARTICLE I.

WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER.

By C. E. STOWA, D. D., Professor of Biblical Literature, Lane Seminary, Cincinnati.

Luther as a Writer of Hymns and Composer of Church Music.

1. Ueber Dr. Martin Luther's Verdienst um den Kirchengesang, oder Darstellung derjenigen was er als Liturg, als Liederdichter und Tonsetzer zur Verbesserung des oeffentlichen Gottesdienstes geleistet hat. Nebst einem aus der Originalen genommenen Abdrucke sämmtliche Lieder und Melodien Luthers, wie auch die Vorreden zu seinem Gesangbuche, von August Jakob Rambach, Prediger bei W. Jakob in Hamburg. Hamburg, 1813.

(Dr. Martin Luther's Merits in respect to Church Psalmody, or an exhibition of what he has done for the Reformation of Public Worship as a Liturgist, a Hymnologist, and a Composer of Tunes; together with all the Hymns and Tunes of Luther, reprinted from the Original, and the Prefaces to his Hymn Book. By A. J. Rambach.) 12mo. pp. xvi. 348.

2. Das Deutsche Kirchenlied von Dr. Martin Luther, bis auf Nic. Herman und Ambr. Blaurer; von Dr. K. E. Ph. Wachernagel. Stuttgart, 1841.

(The German Church Psalmody, from Dr. M. Luther to N. Herman and A. Blaurer, by Dr. C. E. P. Wachernagel.) 4to. pp. xxxix. 894.

3. Dr. Martin Luther's Deutsche geistliche Lieder nebst den während seinen Leben dazu gebräuchlichen Singweisen und einigen mehrstimmigen Tonsätzen ueber dieselben von Meisten des sechszehnten Jahrhunderts. Herausgegeben als Textschrift zur Erfindung der Buchdruckerkunst, von O. V. Winterfeld. Mit eingedruchten Holzschnitten und zeichnungen, von A. Sträberber. Leipzig, 1840.

(Dr. M. Luther's German Spiritual Songs, with the tunes to which they were sung during his life, etc., etc.,) folio.

4. Schatz des Evangelisches Kirchengesangs, der Melodie und Harmonie nach aus den Quellen des 16 und 17 Jahrhunderts geschöpft, und zum heutigen Gebrauch gerichtet, zugleich als Versuch eines Normal- oder Allgemein- Choralbuch bezüglich der älteren Periode des Kirchengesangs. Unter Mitwirkung Mehrerer herausgegeben von G. Freihern von Tucker. Stuttgart, 1840.

(Treasury of Evangelical Church Psalmody in Melody and Harmony, drawn from the sources of the 16th and 17th century, and adapted to present use, etc., etc., 4to.)

5. Thesaurus hymnologicus, sive hymnorum canticorum frequentiorum circa ann. 1500 usitatorum Collectio Amplissima. Carmina collegit, apparatu crit. ornavit, veter. interpretum notas selectas suasque adjecit Hm. Adlb. Daniel. Halle, 1841. 8vo.

For several years past, the readers of the religious and theological journals of Germany have frequently seen articles in them under the somewhat odd-looking title of *Die Gesangbuchsnoth—The Hymn Book Difficulty*. When the German churches began to awake from the death-like slumbers of rationalism, they found their old hymns so corrupted and changed, and their new ones so tame and cold, that the church psalmody then in use no longer met the wants of the reanimated congregations, and various efforts were made to

supply the newly-felt deficiency. This led to a long and vigorous discussion of all the principles of sacred song. Volume after volume was written, hymn book after hymn book, and singing book after singing book, was published ; some contended for the unconditional restoration of the old orthodox hymns entire, which sang the creeds and catechisms almost straight through from title-page to finis ; others affirmed that such sins against all the laws of harmony and poetic taste are quite as bad in church music as a little technical heterodoxy ; while others, with equal zeal, insisted that religious hymns should be simply expressions of devotional feeling, without reference to doctrinal speculations.

On music, too, opinions were equally divided ; nor is the controversy yet at an end. *The hymn-book difficulty* is still a source of great agitation among the churches of Germany. We seem to be getting into very much the same kind of difficulty here in the United States.

The result of the controversy in Germany has been a careful and critical examination of the religious poetry and music of the reformation period, and particularly a thorough investigation of the services and merits of Luther in this very important department of the religious life. At the head of this article I have written the titles of a few of the most useful and instructive works on the topic which I propose to discuss, that the reader, who wishes to pursue the subject further, may know where to look for the best sources of information. Subjoined is a brief account of these works.

No. 1 was for a long time the best, and indeed the only readable book on Luther's merits as a hymnologist and composer of church music. The author, Rev. A. J. Rambach, has been for many years senior pastor of the Great St. Michael's Church in Hamburg, and is highly respected among his associates for his learning and virtues. My first introduction to him was so odd, and gave me so vivid an idea of the difference of customs in different nations, that I will here recount it for the amusement of the reader. The first Sunday after my arrival in Hamburg, which was the first German town I had ever visited, I bent my steps in the morning toward the

Great St. Michael's church, to attend public worship. Scarcely had I passed the Little St. Michael's, a Roman Catholic church from which I heard the tones of a most beautiful organ, when two or three withered old women approached from the Great St. Michael's with little pamphlets in their hands for sale. "Buy the sermon, sir?" said they all in a breath. "What sermon?" said I. "Why, the sermon Dr. Rambach preaches this morning," was the reply. The matter seemed to me so singular, that I paid a Hamburg shilling and took a pamphlet, which proved to be a printed sermon of eight pages, for the thirteenth Sunday after Trinity—text, Luke 10: 23–37—subject, *der Freund in der noth*, (*the Friend in need*)—three hymns to be sung with it designated at the close, and paged 289 to 296; as if it were the fragment of a large volume. I wondered within myself whether Dr. Rambach was in the habit of printing his sermons from week to week, till he got enough to make a volume, and then having them bound for the benefit of posterity. I had no time to make inquiry, but entered the immense church, which was crowded to overflowing, and the whole congregation were singing at the top of their voices. In the pulpit, near a corner, there sat Dr. Rambach, a venerable old man, robed in the Lutheran black gown, with an enormous muslin ruff or vandyke around his neck, somewhat the size and form of the forward wheel of a railroad car, but white as the driven snow, and most beautifully plaited and crimped. At first I could scarcely persuade myself that it was not a nice old picture on the wall, instead of a living man in the pulpit. The singing over, the old gentleman arose and began to preach, and I found that most of the congregation had furnished themselves with the printed sermon as well as myself; and while the good Dr. was preaching, we all looked over to see if he preached it right. He had no notes himself, but he hit it pretty nearly word for word, though now and then he deviated a little from the printed form. I still have the sermon in my possession, and I carefully preserve it as a memento of a most curious custom which I never witnessed any where else.

Dr. Rambach's work on Luther's merits in respect to

church psalmody, has four principal divisions. First, he gives a detail of the various reforms which Luther introduced into the method of conducting public worship ; second, he gives an account of all the hymns which Luther wrote, or translated, or adapted to public worship, with the historical circumstances attending the publication of each ; third, he gives a like account of all the tunes which Luther composed or adapted ; and fourth, he gives the prefaces which Luther wrote to the various editions of his hymn books, and publishes in full his hymns with the music originally set to them, and concludes the work with various extracts from the writings of Luther on the general subject of music and psalmody.

No. 2. The work of Wachernagel is a splendid one in its mechanical execution, and indicates great labour and research on the part of its author. It has been received with general approbation by the writers of Germany, and is probably the most complete work that has ever been published on the topic of which it treats. It consists of five parts. First, the old Latin hymns in use before the Reformation, sixty-five in number ; second, the old German hymns preceding the Reformation ; third, the hymns of Luther and his associates ; fourth, the hymns of the oldest Roman Catholic hymn books ; and fifth, an appendix of miscellaneous matter, the most important of which are, descriptions of the old psalm books and singing sheets, the prefaces of the old hymn books, and the old secular songs which were remodelled into religious hymns by the sacred poets.

The work of Wachernagel does not by any means supercede that of Rambach ; in fact, the two are mutually supplementary to each other, and from both can be obtained a tolerably complete view of the whole subject.

Dr. Wachernagel is still a young man. He was formerly a teacher in Berlin, and is now in Stettin.

Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 5. The object of these works is sufficiently indicated by their titles. Taking them together, the reader will find all the Latin hymns in use in the Papal churches, which had any influence on the psalmody of the

Reformation, with all the historical illustrations that are needed for their full elucidation ; all the hymns and tunes of Luther in their original form ; and the most successful efforts which have been made to adapt these ancient songs and music to the use of the churches at the present day.

We now proceed to a historical development of the services which Luther rendered as a hymnologist and composer of church music, following principally the lead of Rambach and Wachernagel, with the aid of Luther's Letters, edited by De Wette, the Memoirs of Luther by Mathesius, by Audin, and by Pfitzer, Lomler's edition of Luther's German Writings, Tholuck's Anzeiger, and Hengstenberg's Kirchenzeitung.

We shall not scrupulously follow any particular arrangement, but give the facts in rather a miscellaneous manner, as they have occurred to us in our reading.

Church psalmody before the time of Luther was exceedingly meagre. The whole of it that is worth noticing is given in the first 128 pages of the splendid work of Wachernagel. Except the chanting of the Vulgate Latin translation of the Psalms, and other Scriptural hymns, there were scarcely a dozen decent pieces for public worship. Some few are most admirable, both as it respects the words and the music, and will be admired as long as psalmody exists on earth. Among these are the *Te Deum Laudamus*, the *Aeterne rerum Conditor*, the *Veni Redemptor Gentium*, and some other pieces by St. Ambrose ; the *Rex Christe, Factor omnium*, by Gregory I. ; the *Jesu dulcis memoria*, by St. Bernard ; the *Veni Creator Spiritus*, said to be by Charlemagne ; the *Veni Sancte Spiritus*, by Robert, King of France ; the *Jam mæsta quiesce querela*, by A. P. Clemens ; the *Dies Iræ*, of Thomas de Celano ; the *Stabat Mater*, of Jaroponus ; and some few others. Some hymns of various degrees of merit had also been published by Thomas Aquinas, Peter Abaelard, Coelius Sedulius, and John Huss and his followers, the latter mostly of a very evangelical character.

The qualifications of Luther for improving, and to no inconsiderable extent, for creating, the church psalmody of the

Reformation, and of all subsequent time, were by no means the least among the gifts of that most extraordinary man. He had by nature a most exquisite sensibility to the power of music. A manuscript biography of him by Matthew Ratzberger, surgeon to John Frederic, Elector of Saxony, which is preserved in the ducal library at Gotha, has a section entitled, *On Dr. Luther's weakness, and his being quickened and exhilarated by means of Music*; in which the following anecdote is related: "Once came Master Lucas Edenberger, preceptor of John Ernst, Duke of Saxony, with certain of his associates, all good musicians, and George Rhau, (a famous composer of music,) to visit him. It was told them that Luther had shut himself up in his cell, and had kept himself there for some time, and had eaten and drunk nothing to speak of, and would let no one in to him. Then Master Lucas thought it could not be well with him, and knocked at the door, but got no answer; whereupon, he looked in at the keyhole through the door, and seeth that Luther is lying upon the ground on his face, with outstretched arms, in a swoon. He then forced open the door, and shook him, and lifted him up, and prepared for him some refreshment; and then he and his companions began to sing, and to play upon their instruments. Hereupon, Luther began gradually to come to himself, and his melancholy and distress began to leave him, and he soon began to sing, and became right joyous thereby, and entertained Master Lucas and his companions most pleasantly. So they would often visit him when they had a desire for music, and would not be turned away, whatever work he had to do. So soon as he heard good music, his temptations and his gloom flew away. So he said, the devil specially hates music, because thereby men are made joyful; for he loveth nothing better than to make men unbelieving and cowardly, by means of melancholy and gloominess."

Luther's natural capabilities for music were of the highest order. He had given great attention to the theory of music, and much time to the practice; and his taste was formed on the very best models, those of the ancient Greeks. This

fact is sufficiently attested by the words which are found in his books to designate the character and expression of his different tunes. According to their character they are marked, *Ionian, Lydian, Phrygian, Æolic, Doric, Hyperdoric*, etc. Besides, his deep religious experience had made him familiar with all the phases of religious emotion; his veneration for antiquity caused him to love and preserve whatever was really valuable in the old psalmody; while his sharp sagacity, his tact in dealing with the popular mind, his entire moral independence, and his knowledge of the whole subject, fitted him to contrive and introduce all needed improvements, without acting the part, or exposing himself to the rebuffs, of a rash innovator.

Such a man could not fail to perceive and appreciate the importance of good church music; and knowing the deficiencies of his age in this respect, he set himself to work with characteristic energy to supply them. In 1523, he published in a single sheet his first hymn, with the music, under the title, *A Christian Hymn, by Dr. Martin Luther, comprehending the unspeakable Grace of God, and of the right Faith*. This is the hymn beginning—*Nun freut euch lieber Christen g'mein*,

(“*Now rejoice, dear Christians all.*”)

It is a full and exceedingly graphic development of his own religious experience in passing from death to life.

For this truly Christian hymn, he composed the majestic tune so often republished in our singing-books under the name of Monmouth. The following is a copy of the original melody as published by Rambach.



Monmouth and Old Hundred are striking specimens of the general character of Luther's music, solemn, awe-inspiring,

and joyous ; and in all his own publications, the music is carefully and beautifully adapted to the sentiment of the hymn.

The next year, 1524, he wrote seventeen hymns, and set them to music ; in 1525, six ; in 1526, 30, and 33, one in each year ; in 1535, two ; in 1537 and 41 one in each year, and in 1543, four. Of the tunes which he published with the hymns, five were arranged from the old Latin chants, seven were taken from the popular songs of the day, and forty-two were composed by himself and his associates. Of the tunes still in use in the German churches, twenty are known to be Luther's. The first edition of his hymn-book was published in 1524, and Wachernagel notices ninety different editions of it which had been issued within forty years after that time ; and how many more there might have been, he is not able to say.

Luther was very sensitive to all the decencies and proprieties of public worship, and nothing grated more harshly on his nerves than inattention and whispering during the devotional services, especially the singing. In the earlier period of his ministry at Wittenberg, some of the leading men in the congregation indulged an evil habit which is not yet entirely obsolete, even among the clergymen of the present day, namely—that of taking the time of singing to do up their whispering and moving about. This vexed him to the soul, and he often reproved them for it. One Sabbath the nuisance was so intolerable during singing, that he could bear it no longer, and said to them,—“ Christians with God-fearing hearts come to church to thank God and pray to him, and not to whisper and mutter. If any wish to whisper, and mutter, and fluster, and grunt, it is better that they go out into the fields with the cattle and swine, where they will find fitting answer, and leave the church of God undisturbed.”—Notwithstanding this reproof, such is the force of evil habit, the next Sunday the offence was repeated ; whereupon Luther walked out of the church with great indignation on his face. Dr. Pommer, (Bugenhagen,) then gave the people a strong exhortation on the impropriety of their conduct, which had a good effect.

Luther was an admirer of severe simplicity in public worship, and spoke with enthusiasm of the meetings of the Apostles, and of the Lord's Supper as instituted by Christ himself, where there were neither altars, nor vestments, nor costly furniture, nor pompous ceremonies ; but simply mutual exhortations, prayers, singing, and giving thanks to God. Especially when these things had been abused to purposes of superstition, it might be necessary that they should be wholly done away, as king Hezekiah destroyed the brazen serpent which had been made by command of God himself ; for, in such cases, he remarked, order becomes disorder. Yet in practice, in innovating on old usages, he was the most moderate and forbearing of men. Whatever could be retained without positive injury, he advised should be retained ; and he resisted with gigantic power and complete success, the attempts of Carlstadt and other rash reformers, to strip the churches at once of all pictures and ornaments, and bring the public worship to a nakedness for which the people were by no means prepared. All these matters, he insisted, belonged to the non-essentials ; and we ought to have an eye to the weakness of our neighbours, that their weak consciences be not wounded, that they be gradually enlightened, and led to sound and discriminating views. The great business of religious assemblies, according to him, ought to be, the faithful and instructive preaching of the word ; and if the word were not preached, both singing and reading the liturgy were better omitted, lest it all degenerate to mere sound and vain repetition, like the heathen worship. Yet, recognizing, as he said, the power of appropriate ceremonies, and especially of devotional music, to interest and move the minds of the people, when accompanied with a due proportion of faithful and instructive preaching, no one was ever more assiduous than he in giving all proper attention to the devotional parts of the religious service, especially the providing of a sufficient number of good hymns, and an improved and appropriate psalmody.

Some of the old hymns and psalm tunes he admired,

and all such he introduced and adapted to the reformed worship; while others of them he could not endure, and these he sternly rejected, whatever plea prejudice or authority might make in their favour. "Since God's word has been silent, (said he,) such a multitude of superstitious fables and lies have been brought in by means of legends, hymns, and sermons, that it is horrible to think of. Mary, the dear mother, has more and better hymns sung to her, than her son Jesus."

All hymns which ascribed divine honours to Mary, or made her the Intercessor and Saviour instead of Christ,—all which referred to the wood of the cross as an object of veneration, or countenanced the doctrine of Purgatory, were his abhorrence. On this account he rejected many of the most popular pieces of his time,—such as the *Salve Regina*, the *Lauda Sion Salvatorem*, by Thomas Aquinas, in honour of the body of Christ, which he called a fool's song; the *Crux Fidelis*, in honour of the wood of the Cross, by Venantius Fortunatus, and most of the funeral hymns of the time. None of these would he have used, however popular they might be, unless it were after a thorough purgation.

On the other hand, for some of the old Latin hymns he had an almost filial love and veneration. These he retained, translated them into German, and composed new tunes for them; sometimes, though rarely, retaining the old music, somewhat modified. He thought the old Latin chants were not adapted to the German language, and though he liked them very much with the Latin words, he had an almost ludicrous aversion to hearing them sung with German words. In 1524, he writes,—“I would gladly have a church service entirely in German, and I am labouring for that purpose; but then it must be thoroughly and consistently German. The literal translation of the Latin text into German, and the singing of the old Latin tunes, is not in good taste, nor is it right. The words, the notes, the accent, the mode, the movement, must all come out of the right mother speech and voice, otherwise it is a mere imitation, such as monkeys make.” An old biographer says of him,—“One time he

came into the church at Eisenberg on Easter-Day, and they were singing the *Introitum* in German, with the old Latin tune; whereupon, he turned up his nose and looked very sour. When he returned to the inn to dine, the landlord asked him what had been the matter with him in church? "I thought, (said he,) I could have spit upon their ridiculous singing. If they wish to sing in German, then let them sing good German hymns and tunes; and if they wish to sing the old Latin chants, then let them retain the Latin text for which they were made, as scholars ought to do. I hate people who are making these little puny innovations. In the Latin schools, let them sing the Latin, text and tunes; and in the German churches, let them sing German, words and music, then all goes right."

He thanked God that by a miracle of divine mercy, good hymns and tunes still existed amid all the corruptions of the church. "Most of the singing in the mass (he said) is very fine and glorious, breathing nothing but thankfulness and praise, such as the *Gloria in excelsis*, the *Alleluia*, the *Sanctus*, the *Benedictus*, the *Agnus Dei*. In those pieces you will find nothing of the superstition of the sacrifice, but only praise and thanksgiving. Especially the *Agnus Dei*, above all hymns, is appropriate to the sacrament of the Lord's supper; for it clearly sings and praises Christ, that he hath borne our sins, and it lovingly and powerfully brings up the memory of Christ in few and beautiful words." Many of the hymns of Ambrose, such as the *Te deum laudamus*, he admired, though he found fault that Ambrose generally sings God the Creator rather than God the Redeemer. Of A. C. Prudentius, the contemporary of Ambrose and author of the beautiful funeral hymn *Jam moesta quiesce querela*, he said, "he is the best of the Christian poets, and if he had lived in the time of Virgil, he would have been more praised than Horace, whom yet Virgil praised. I should be very glad if the hymns and poems of Prudentius could be read in all our schools."

The *Patris sapientia*, and the *Herodes hostis impie* by Cælius Sedulius he translated into German; and the *Rex*

Christe, Factor omnium by Gregory I. he pronounced to be among the best of all the hymns. Of the *Victimæ paschali laudes* he remarked, "Let the author be who he may, he must have had a sublime and truly Christian intellect, especially in the stanza *Mors et Vita duello*, where the image of death and the devil was painted with most exquisite art." An old Christmas hymn, *Eia zecolamus laudibus piis*, was a special favorite with him, and it is said that while he was once singing the stanza *O beata culpa quae talem meruisti redemptorem*, it was then that the comfort of the gospel first dawned on his mind. This hymn he sung at Christmas-time to his latest days.

Before Luther's time, the Germans had occasionally indulged themselves in singing in the churches in the vernacular tongue, and German hymns had been written by Peter of Dresden, Adam of Fulda, and others. But the aggressions of the papacy had gradually taken away this liberty, and congregational singing in the vernacular tongue was at length entirely crowded out by the Latin chants of the choir. Of these old German hymns Luther affirmed that most of them were as offensive to good taste as to true devotion; yet some of them he greatly admired, as the one beginning *Christ ist erstanden*, (*Christ is arisen*), which Goethe introduces with such fine effect in his *Faust*, and another, *Komm heiliger Geist*, (*Come, Holy Spirit*), which Luther affirmed was worthy to have the Holy Ghost himself for its author, both the words and the music. Some half-dozen hymns and melodies of this character he inserted in his own hymn book, with the remark: "These old hymns which follow, we have gathered up as the testimony of certain pious Christians who have lived before us, amid the great darkness of the ancient doctrine; in order that we may see that there have been people at all times, who have truly known Christ, and who by God's grace have wonderfully persevered in the knowledge of him."

As it had been an old custom in the church, he would not object to continuing to sing the Nicene creed, the Lord's prayer, and the decalogue, for the edification of the people;

and indeed he himself made German versions of all those pieces and set them to music. As to long, pious hymns generally, he said, "Let those who like them sing them at home, if they will, but let not the spirit of devotion in the church be wearied out with them." The long, daily chantings of the cathedrals and cloisters he declared to be a burden for an ass; and while he strongly recommended a daily service, (a morning and evening prayer meeting,) he would have it short and simple, accompanied with the distinct reading of appropriate passages of Scripture, and the singing of such hymns as the *Te Deum*, and the *Magnificat*, (Luke 1 : 46-55.) The shortening of the church service was by no means an insignificant benefit; for a contemporary asserts that even in the cold winter nights, the poor boys were sometimes kept standing in the churches at their singing three long hours, so that not unfrequently they were crippled or diseased for life. To those who found fault with his church-service as lean and meagre, he replied that so seemed the worship of Christ and the apostles when compared with the elaborate ritual of the temple; but the true glory of a church-service is the preaching of Christ and him crucified. He gave brevity, freedom, and variety to the public worship, instead of the wearisome, slavish, literal monotony of the old ritual, and he had it conducted in the language of the people instead of an unknown tongue.

Luther was anxious, at a very early period, to reintroduce and extend much further the ancient practice of singing German hymns in public worship, but the extravagances of Carlstadt hindered him for some time. "I should like much (said he) to have the singing all in German; but Carlstadt would impose it upon us as a matter of duty. This I will not submit to. I will not suffer the Latin to be prohibited as sin, when it is no sin. I will take time to introduce the German, and hurry less than I have done, if for no other reason than to defy the fanatic and soul-murderer, who would force us to this work as if it were positively commanded, when it is not commanded. We lack good German poets and com-

posers ; at least I know very few, if any, who are able to make good Christian hymns and tunes, such as St. Paul speaks of, fit to use in the daily service of the church. For the present, let the people make use of the few old ones that are good, for there are not many which show either good taste or the right spirit. I say these things in the hope that, if there are any good German poets, they may be moved to write some good German spiritual songs. I myself desire, rather than hope, to accomplish something in this work ; for it requires musical power and a peculiar poetic talent, which I fear are not among the gifts which God has given me." He would not have a slavish imitation of the old psalmody, but something (to use his own expression) which is "right genial German."

In 1524 he wrote the following letter to Spalatin, soliciting his aid in the undertaking :

"Grace and peace. It is my purpose, after the example of the prophets and ancient church-fathers to compose some vernacular psalms for the common folks, that is, some spiritual songs, by means of which the word of God may dwell among the people even during the singing. We are looking around every where for poets. Since you have great copiousness and eloquence in the German language, and have by practice highly cultivated it, I entreat you lend us a helping hand in this labour, and try to turn some of the psalms into German hymns, as here you have a specimen from me. I would that new and courtly words might be avoided, and that the language be all suited to the capacity of the people, as simple as possible, yet pure and plain, that the meaning may stand out with the utmost clearness, and that it be the true view of the psalm. The translation should not be servile, but the true meaning should be given in the most suitable language. I fear that I have not the grace for this, sufficient to be able to do what I could wish. And now I will try you, whether you may not be a Heman, or Asaph, or Jeduthun. I would ask the same of John Dolziko, if there be leisure to him and

- you, of which I suspect you have not much. You have my seven penitential psalms with the commentary, from which you can get the sense of the psalm, if you choose to take the first in order, to wit, *Domine ne in furore*, or the seventh, *Domine, exaudio rationem*. I assign to John Dolziko the second, *Beati, quorum*; the *De profundis* I have already versified myself, and the *Miserere me* is assigned to another. If those are thought too difficult, then just take these two, *Benedicam Dominum in omni tempore*, and *Exultate justi in domino*, that is the 33d and 32d; or the 103d, *Benedic, anima mea, Dominum*. Write and tell me how much hope I may have of help from you. Farewell in the Lord.

“ MARTIN LUTHER.

“ Wittenberg, 1524.”

From this letter it is easy to see how much in advance Luther was, in respect to right principles and correct taste on this subject, of the editions of the psalms still in use in the national churches of Scotland and England, the rough barbarisms of Rome, and the servile versions of Tate and Brady. In subsequent letters to Spalatin, Luther repeats his request, but we have no evidence that he received any assistance from that quarter. Indeed, through life, like other busy men, he generally found it less laborious to take hold and do a thing himself, than to solicit others to help him.

His most effective assistant in respect to music was John Walther, the chapel-chorister of the Elector of Saxony. As early as 1525 Walther published a psalm book with tunes set to four and five parts, to which Luther, besides furnishing a large portion of the original matter, wrote a preface. The book went through a great number of editions, and continued in use a long time. The preface to the first edition is as follows:

“ That it is good and acceptable to God to sing spiritual songs I presume every Christian knows, since we have not only the example of prophets and kings in the Old Testament, who, with song and sound, with poetry and all sorts of

stringed instruments, praised God ; but the custom, especially with the psalms, has been common to all Christendom from the beginning. Yea, also St. Paul enjoins it, (1 Cor. 14,) and directs the Colossians to sing from the heart psalms and hymns to the Lord, in order that thereby the word of God and the Christian doctrine may in every manner be forwarded and exercised.

“ Accordingly I, also, with some few others, have now collected certain spiritual songs, for a good beginning, and to give occasion to others, who can do it better, in order that the holy gospel, which now by God’s grace again begins to arise, may be forwarded and brought in vogue ; and that we also may boast, as Moses does in his song, (Exod. 16,) that Christ is our praise and song, and that we should know nothing to sing or to preach, save Jesus Christ our Saviour, as Paul says, (1 Cor. 2.) The tunes are set in four parts, for no other reason than this, that I desire the youth, who ought and must be educated in music and the other fine arts, may have something to draw them off from the carnal and amatory songs, and in their place learn somewhat that is wholesome, and may enter on the good with pleasure, as is proper for the young. Indeed, I am not of the opinion that all the fine arts should be cast to the ground and destroyed by the gospel, as some superstitious ones do talk ; but I would gladly see all the arts, and especially music, employed in the service of Him who hath created them and given them to man. I entreat, therefore, every pious Christian to accept in good part what is here offered ; and to whomsoever God has given the power to do better, or as well, let him lend a helping hand. Alas ! all the world is too negligent and forgetful to educate and teach the poor youth, and there is no occasion at all for cautioning them against doing too much in this way. God grant us his grace. Amen.”

In 1533 Luther published a revised edition of his hymn book, containing seventy pieces ; thirty-one of which were his own, fifteen he obtained from others, seventeen were simply prose translations of Scriptural pieces, and the remainder were

translations of the old Latin hymns. Ten years after, an edition of the hymn book was published, with the following lines in the title-page :

WARNUNG DR. MART. LUTHER'S.

Viel falscher meister itzt lieder tickten,
Sihe dich für, und lern sie recht richten ;
Wo Gott hin bauet sein Kirch und sein Wort,
Da wil der Teufel sein mit Trug und Mord.

which may be thus translated :

DR. MART. LUTHER'S WARNING.

*Many false masters now hymns make,
Learn to judge right and good care take :
Where God builds with his Word and his Church,
There comes the devil to cheat and to lurch.*

In his preface to the Scriptural pieces, in this edition, Luther says : " Above all, I would have these pieces sung with seriousness and devotion ; not as men at this day blast and howl them in the cathedrals and cloisters, without any understanding of them, or even the will or disposition to understand them ; to say nothing of singing with devotion, or for the edification of others. With such singing God is angry rather than pleased."

Yet he did not indiscriminately reject all the ceremonies and peculiarities of the old Catholic chanting, but expressed himself very much pleased with certain portions of it. He liked the old practice, when chanting the creed, of pronouncing the words *ex Maria virgine et homo factus est*, more clearly than the other portions, and with a peculiar intonation, at the same time uncovering the head and bending the knee. He said, " It is reasonable and right that men should bow the knee at the words *et homo factus est*, and sing with prolonged notes as they formerly did ." " It pleases me to have the 79th psalm sung in responsive choirs as formerly. Let one boy, with a good voice, sing alone the verse *Domine non secundum*, another one the *Domine, ne memineras* ; and the

whole choir kneeling, chant *Adjuva nos, Deus*, just as it was sung in the festivals of the papacy, for it both appears and sounds very devotional." The lot of the singing boys in those days in the papal church was any thing but enviable. Says a contemporary, "After they have been tortured in the schools, and frozen in the churches, they must take the bag and go begging through the city. If with great difficulty through rain, wind, and snow, they gain any thing by singing, they must bring it to the old gluttons who lie at home on their bearskins, and they take it down their throats like so many dragons, while the poor boys must starve with their mouths shut."

Luther was very active to introduce music into the childrens' schools; and he would have not only simple melodies taught, but also the theory and practice of harmony. In 1544, Luther aided George Rhau, a celebrated composer of music, in the publication of a hymn book, entitled, "New German Spiritual Songs for the Common Schools," undoubtedly the first book of the kind that was ever published. In this collection much, both of the poetry and music, was of Luther's composition. Carlstadt objected to harmonies, and said that as there was one Lord, one faith, and one baptism, so there ought to be but one part in singing. A contemporary replied, that "by parity of reasoning, then Carlstadt ought to have but one eye, one ear, one hand, one boot, one knife, one coat, and one penny." Carlstadt also objected strongly to organs and instrumental music, which Luther and his friends as strongly defended.

The hymns were originally published on single sheets; sometimes one, sometimes two on a sheet, with the music, and scattered among the people as we now distribute newspapers and tracts. This we have already remarked in respect to the first hymn and tune which Luther published.

The celebrated hymn, *Ein veste burg ist unser Gott*, (*A strong tower is our God*), was not written, as many suppose, at the Diet of Worms, in 1521. Luther wrote it and set it to music while he was in the castle at Coburg, during the Diet at Augsburg in 1530. This was the time when the Augs-

burg Confession was published, and it was a crisis of most imminent danger and hazard to the Protestant cause, as we have fully shown in a former article. (Biblical Repository for July, 1844.) That the hymn was composed at this time, we have the direct testimony of Luther's contemporaries, Cœlestin, Clytræus, Seluacher, and Sleidan, (Book xvi. at the close), and the additional evidence that it is found in no collection of Luther's hymns that was published previous to 1530. As this is the great liberty hymn of the Germans, and has recently been so often sung in the Ronge movements, we will here insert the music entire, and copy a translation of the words, by Henry Mills, of Auburn, N. Y., and taken from his *Horæ Germanicæ*.




1. A tower of safety is our God,
His sword and shield defend us ;
His mercy too relieves the load
Of evils that attend us.
But the ancient foe
Strives to work our wo
Fearful power and art
In him their force exert,—
On earth he has no rival.
2. By strength of ours naught could be done,—
The strife full soon were ended ;
But fights for us that righteous One
By God himself commended.
Needs his name be told ?
Jesus—from of old
LORD of Sabbath,—
Our God and Saviour both,
He shall our souls deliver.

3. Though devils all the earth should fill,
 Each gaping to devour us,
 This Saviour would our terrors quell,
 And vict'ry guide before us.
 Prince of this vain world,
 Be thy fury hurl'd
 On our heads!—'t were vain!
 He will thy rage restrain,
 His smallest word subdues thee.

4. His truth our foes shall help to show,—
 For this no thanks they merit ;—
 Believing him we onward go,
 He cheers us by his Spirit :—
 Should they, in the strife,
 Quench our joys—and life ;—
 When their worst is done,
 For us the vict'ry's won—
 He'll crown us then with glory !

M. Luther.

While Luther was in the castle at Coburg, he suffered severely from ill health and depression of spirits, and often alleviated his melancholy by musical composition. He thus set to music the Latin words of Psalms 118: 17, and wrote the notes on the wall of the apartment he occupied, whence they were copied by Retzeberger, twenty years after, in 1550. They are as follows :



Non mori-ar sed vi - vam, et nar - ra - bo
 op - - - - e - - - - ra - - - - Do - - - - mi - - - - ni.

Another hymn of Luther's, *Christ unser Herr zum Jordan kam*, (*Christ our Lord to Jordan came*), was first published with the title *A Spiritual Song respecting our holy Baptism, wherein is finely and briefly contained, what it is, who hath appointed it, and what it is good for*. It is quite a full exposition of the doctrine of baptism, and the music is as follows :



Another hymn, *Gehalt uns Herr bey deinem Wort*, (*Preserve us Lord by thine own word*,) was first published with the title *A child's song to be sung against the two arch foes of Christ and his holy Church, the Pope and the Turk*. It consists of three stanzas, an invocation to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, to give the saints courage and victory over their terrible foes. The tune runs thus :



His music was all composed in scraps of time saved by his ever active industry ; and the estimate which he put upon his own talents in this department was a very modest one. Both points appear in the following extract of a letter written to Melanchthon from the Wartburg, on Trinity Sunday, 1521. "I send you here a psalm to be sung at this festival, which, if you please and the printers are at leisure, you may have printed, and dedicate it to whomsoever you can and will. I have composed it here in my idle time, for I have no books. If you do not think best to print it, pass it over to my friends Christian Aurifaber or Amsdorf."

Of the hymns ascribed to Luther, nine are revised versions of old German hymns which existed before his time, nine are trans-

lations of old Latin hymns, eleven are versions of passages from the Bible, and the remainder are strictly original.

The nature of the changes which he made in the old German hymns may be illustrated by the following example. In a sacramental hymn there was a stanza to this effect: *Grant, Lord, that when we die we may receive the sacrament from the hands of a consecrated priest.* This stanza Luther omitted, and instead of it inserted two others of a highly spiritual character. Luther remarked on this stanza, that it did not at all correspond with the generally evangelical spirit of the hymn. He thought it must have been interpolated by some disciple of St. Bernard, who supposed he might spend all his life without regard to religion, and then on his death-bed, by this one good work, enter into life. The alterations which he made in the old hymns were generally of this kind; not the changing of single words, but the omission of entire stanzas which contained any thing objectionable, and the supplying their place with others.

A translation of the *Te Deum* he published by itself as a tract, at Wittenberg, in 1543, with the following remark: "This third symbolum is said to be written by Ambrose and Augustin, and to have been sung at Augustin's baptism. This may be so or it may not be so—whether we believe it or not, it is no matter. It is nevertheless a fine symbolum or confession, whoever may have been the author; and it is set to music, not only that we may therein profess the true faith, but may also thereby thank and praise God."

Several of the poetical pieces of the Bible he set to music in simple prose translations, others he transferred to German verses. The song of Simeon, for example, (Luke 2: 29–32,) the celebrated *Nunc Dimittis*, he set to music once in prose and made besides three different metrical versions of it.

The music of his translation of the 130th psalm, *Aus tiefer Noth sehrei ich zu dir*, (*From deep distress I call to thee*,) which was sung with such thrilling effect at his funeral, (Bib. Repos., April, 1845,) is this:



A translation of it is here given from Mr. Mills's *Hore Germanicæ*.

- 1 From deep distress to Thee I pray,
O God, hear my intreaty !
Turn not thy face from me away,
But show thy tender pity :
As Judge, shouldst thou my deeds regard,
In justice weighing due award,
How could I stand the trial ?
- 2 Should mercy with thee not prevail
To show to man thy favour,
His ev'ry act his guilt would swell,
Vain were his best endeavour.
His goodness in its utmost length,
Reveals his utter want of strength,—
He must rely on *mercy*.
- 3 On God alone, and on his grace,
Can I securely rest me ;
He sees my heart, He heals distress,—
To Him, then, why not trust me ?
He owns a Father's name, and knows
The full amount of human woes—
On Him be my reliance !
- 4 Should comfort seem afar to keep,
I'll not sink down despairing ;
They who in godly sorrow weep
Shall find a gracious hearing :
Thus Christians do, and they are blest
In God, their confidence and rest,
Their comfort and Redeemer.
- 5 Many and great my sins, I own,
But greater God's free mercies :
From wrath I flee to his dear Son,
Who bore for me its curses :
And He will be my Shepherd, too,
Will all my troubles guide me through,
To rest with him in glory.

M. Luther.

The hymns of Luther are mainly expressions of Christian emotion and Christian experience; and some of them are designed to impress particular doctrines and particular Bible facts deeply upon the minds of the common people and of children.

The writing of hymn- and psalm-tunes was not a business, as we have already seen, to which Luther devoted much time; and he put a very modest estimate on his labours in this department. In the second edition of his hymn-book he expresses himself happy that many had been excited by his example to write hymns much better than his own, and greatly to increase the number of good sacred songs. The number of hymns which Luther published was somewhat less than fifty, which seems to us very small; but to his contemporaries it seemed large. Hymns were then very few, and Wachernagel, with all his researches, cannot collect two hundred from all quarters for the whole fifteen centuries which preceded Luther; though he says in his preface that it has been a principle with him "to omit no poet whose hymns have ever been in use in a congregation; to give in full all the hymns of a poet which have been received in the hymn books, and always from the original sources." Of the quality of Luther's hymns his contemporaries judged very differently from himself; and of all the uninspired sacred songs the world had ever seen, in their opinion there were none to be compared with Luther's. In 1581 Cyriack Spangenberg published at Muehlhausen a work entitled, *Cithara Lutheri; or the beautiful, Christian, consoling Psalms and Spiritual Songs of Dr. Martin Luther, expounded in Sermons, in four volumes*, of which a second edition was published at Wittenberg in 1601. In this work the author says: "We must confess that this is true and will remain true, that of all the master-singers since the apostles' times, Luther is the best and the richest, and will so remain. In his songs you will scarcely find a careless or an inappropriate word. It all flows and falls from him in the most lovely and most delightful manner; full of spirit and doctrine, so that every word is almost a whole

sermon, and at the least gives a special admonition. There is nothing forced, nothing unnatural or far-fetched, nothing of failure. The rhymes are easy and good, the words are neat and well chosen, the meaning clear and striking, the melody and tone agreeable and hearty; and in fine, every thing is glorious and precious, so that it has both unction and power; it gives both heart and comfort. Indeed its equal is not to be found, much less its superior, as all pious hearts to whom Luther's hymn book is known, must acknowledge with me, that God by him has given us something in that hymn book which is peculiar and high and wonderful, for which we cannot thank him enough in all eternity. It is not possible that we can sufficiently praise that beautiful, lovely and sacred German hymn book, in which, according to occasions of times and persons, are found instructive psalms and comforting hymns, beyond all measure beautiful. O, it is indeed a book spiritually rich to all who use it aright."

Nicholas Selnecker is no less enthusiastic. He says: "Among other things which have come from that Helicon, (Wittenberg,) are the beautiful, spiritual, Christian songs of comfort and instruction by that dear man Dr. Luther, in which the music, the words, and the meaning have and give both unction and power; and every thing therein is composed and expressed in a manner so peculiar, so admirable, so consoling, that one must say and confess, that certainly the Holy Ghost himself made both the hymns and the tunes; and also that if the God-blessed Dr. Luther had performed no other labour, and left nothing else to the Church of Christ, but only his psalms and spiritual songs, that would have been enough, so that he would never be sufficiently thanked and recompensed. Dr. Luther's manner excels all others in our German tongue. One sees it at once in the words and the spirit which are in his songs. Indeed, it is fitting out of gratitude, that this honour should be given to these hymns, that they are published in a book by themselves, and these noble jewels are not mingled with stones less precious."

But the highest honour that could be paid to Luther's hymns

and tunes was, that they were almost immediately adopted by his enemies. The Papists finding that the people would sing Luther's hymns, and were almost running wild with delight in so doing, published hymn-books of their own, in which, with slight alterations, they incorporated almost all of the Reformer's pieces. That sturdy enemy of the Reformation, duke Henry of Brunswick, could not resist the temptation to introduce into his own chapel-worship five or six of Luther's best pieces. An officiating priest once ventured to remonstrate with the duke on the subject, and complained that there were heretical hymns in the chapel-service. "Indeed," (said the duke with some indignation in his look and tone,) "which are they?" The priest referred to the hymn of Luther: *Es wollt uns Gott genädig seyen*—(*May God be gracious to us*). "Well (said the duke) how would you have it? would you rather pray, *may the devil be gracious to us*?" The priest held his peace, and Luther's hymns and music thus kept their place in the Roman Catholic chapel. As this is one of the most admired of Luther's tunes, we will here give the melody as published by Rambach.



In 1524, an old weaver brought two of Luther's hymns to Magdeburg, namely, the one just referred to, and the 130th Psalm before mentioned, which he sang through the streets, and then offered them for sale in the market place. An immense multitude gathered around him; but the Burgomaster Rubin, returning from church and seeing the crowd, ordered the "old rogue to be sent to jail for distributing heretical

songs among the people." Immediately two hundred of the most respectable citizens repaired to the council house and obtained his release. In 1529 a papal priest at Lubeck, after sermon, began to offer a prayer for the dead in purgatory, when two children struck up the hymn, *Ach Gott von Himmel sieh darcin* (*O God from heaven now look down,*) in which the whole congregation joined, and thus put an end to the superstitious ceremony. Afterward, in the same church, the people often took a similar liberty when Papal mummeries were about to be imposed upon them.

A Carmelite friar, Thomas à Jesu, declared that Luther's hymns "helped his cause astonishingly ; they spread among all classes of people, and were sung not only in the churches and schools, but also in the houses and in the workshops, in the streets and in the market-places, in the barns and in the fields." A Protestant contemporary, Tileman Heshusius, bears similar testimony : "I doubt not, (said he,) that that one little hymn, *Nu freut euch lieber Christen g'mein*, (the first one Luther published,) has brought many hundred Christians to the faith. - - - The noble, sweet language of that one little song, has won their hearts so that they could not resist the truth ; and, in my opinion, the spiritual songs have contributed not a little to the spread of the Gospel."

Sufficient specimens of Luther's music have already been given. Should it be asked, what evidence have we that the music which bears his name was actually composed by him, we answer, precisely the same evidence which we have that he was the author of the famous theses against Indulgences ; or the noble sermon on the Freedom of a Christian Man ; or the eloquent Address to the German Nobility ; or the powerful treatise on the Babylonian Captivity of the Church ; or any other of his acknowledged writings. They were many times published during his life by his own publishers, under his own name ; they were acknowledged by himself as his ; hundreds of contemporary witnesses testify that they were his ; and of some, the autographs in his own hand-writing exist to this day. It is true that his great popularity induced selfish

men to publish spurious hymns and tunes under his name ;— but this only impelled him to make a collection of his own, and publish them himself, to distinguish them from all counterfeits. In a preface to his hymn and tune-book, he says : “ Many have lately published hymns and tunes, in which they show themselves far superior to me, and may well be my masters ; and others have published very inferior and useless things in my name. - - - Men will never be done mixing mouse-dung among the pepper. To prevent this as much as possible, I have now revised this book anew, brought all my songs together with my name, which out of modesty I did not do before, but now must do, lest the unfitting songs of others should continue to be published as mine. Now I beg and exhort all who love the pure word, not to be improving and enlarging my book without my knowledge or consent.— But if they will persist in their improvements, let every one know that it is not my book which is published here in Wittenberg.” Again, in a collection of funeral hymns which was published in 1557, he writes : “ The piece to be sung at the grave,—*Nu lasst uns den Leib begraben*,—(*Now let us the corpse inter*,) has borne my name, but it is not mine, and my name must henceforth be separated from it ; not that I reject the piece, for I like it much ; - - - but I will have no other man’s labour attributed to me.” Luther’s sensitiveness in this respect, and the numerous editions of his pieces which were published under his own eye at Wittenberg, are sufficient guaranty against interpolation. The testimony of John Walther, the organist of the Elector of Saxony, and the great musical composer of the age, is so full and so directly to the point, that I will here insert it somewhat at length. Says Walther,—“ I know and truthfully testify, that Luther, the holy man of God, who was the prophet and apostle of the German nation, had great delight in music, and the various styles of singing ; and many a glad some hour have I spent in singing with him, and have often seen how gleeful and joyous the dear man has been made by singing, so that he never would be wearied or satiated with music ; and such glorious

things as he would say about it ! It is now more than forty years ago that he was remodelling the church service at Wittenberg, and he sent to the Elector of Saxony, and to Duke John of blessed memory, and requested that the old chorister, Conrad Rupff, and myself, might be permitted to go to Wittenberg and help him. He there consulted us about all the music, and he himself composed the chants, setting the Epistles to the *tonum octavum*, and the Gospels to the *tonum sextum*. As the reason for this, he said, ' Christ is an affectionate master, and his discourse is so full of love, that we will have the *tonum sextum* for the Gospels ; but Paul is an earnest and strenuous spirit, and therefore we will give to the Epistles the *tonum octavum*.' He composed the chants for the Gospels, the Epistles, and the Eucharist, and then sang them over to me, and asked my opinion of them. He detained me three weeks at Wittenberg, employing me to write out and arrange this music, till the first German mass was celebrated in the parish church. This I must stay and hear, and then take a copy of it all with me to Torgau, and lay it before the Elector for his inspection. Luther took care also that vespers, which in many places had fallen into disuse, should be restored, with short and pure psalm-tunes, for the students and young people ; and that the poor scholars who sung for bread from door to door, should make use of the old Latin hymns also, and not confine themselves to the German."

" Now you may see, hear, and clearly comprehend, that the Holy Ghost was with Mr. Luther, who, for the most part, was the author of the German psalmody, both the poetry and the music. What a noble piece of music has he given us in the German,—*Sanctus*,—(Isa. vi. 3,)—in how masterly a manner has he adapted the notes to the words ! how brilliant is the musical effect ! In my surprise, I could not but ask him how he had learned such wonderful adaptation ; whereupon the dear man smiled at my simplicity, and said : ' The poet Virgil hath taught me this, who also adapts his verse so beautifully to the sentiment he wishes to express. Thus should music always be adapted to the sentiment of the song.' "

Other contemporaries, especially Paul Eberus, pastor of the church at Wittenberg, and David Chytraeus, professor at Rostock, assert that the hymns which Luther wrote he also composed tunes for; and Sleidan adduces as a striking proof of the Reformer's musical talent, the wonderful adaptation of the tune to the words of the celebrated hymn,—*Ein veste Burg ist unser Gott*.

Says Alberus,—“Luther was a fine musician, and he loved the noble arts of the painter and the organist.” His student Mathesius informs us, that he was a beautiful singer, and even in his old age sang the alto to the delight of all who heard him. It was his beautiful singing in his boyhood which first attracted the notice of the accomplished lady of Conrad Cotta, at Eisenach, who received the poor, half-famished student to her house and her table. He was a skilful performer on the lute and the German flute; and while on his way to the Diet at Worms, in 1521, his occasional performances on these instruments excited great admiration. He was enthusiastically fond of music. He said,—“I have always loved music. I would not for any prize, lose the little musical power I possess. - - - It drives away the spirit of melancholy, as we see in the case of king Saul. - - - By its aid, a man forgets his anger, his lust, his pride, and other vices, and expels many temptations and evil thoughts. The devil cannot abide good music—he hates it. It is the best soother of a troubled man, whereby the heart is again quickened, refreshed, and made contented,—as it is said in Virgil,—*Tu calamos inflare leves, ego dicere versus*,—that is, ‘Do you play the flute, and I will sing the words.’ Music is a great disciplinarian; she makes people tractable, kindly-disposed, modest, reasonable. Singing is the best art and exercise. He who knoweth this art is well off, and fit for any good work. Singers are not melancholy, but cheerful; they drive away care and sorrow by singing. Music is a beauteous, lovely gift of God; it awakens and moves me so that I preach with pleasure.”—Once of a musical festival he said,—“Since our Lord God pours out upon us in this life such noble gifts, what will it be

in that eternal life, where every thing is to be most perfect and joyous."

To a friend, who was in a depressed state of mind, he writes: "If you are melancholy and will conquer, then say to yourself, Up! I must strike up a song on the organ to my Lord Christ; it may be the *Te Deum*, or the *Benedictus*, or what not; for the Scripture teaches us that he loves to hear a joyous song with musical accompaniments. Then strike on to the keys, and sing away as David and Elisha did. And if the devil comes again and puts gloomy thoughts and cares in your head, say,—Out, devil! I must now sing and play to my Lord Christ; then run to your organ, or call in your good friends and sing a tune or two, till you learn to defy the devil!" In the castle of Coburg, when in great danger, he said to his desponding friends: "Come, let us defy the devil, and sing in four parts the 130th Psalm,—*Aus tiefer Noth schrei ich zu dir.*" When he had company at his house, or when he visited others, sacred music always made up the greater part of the evening's entertainment. Riding once through a wood, he alighted from the carriage and walked among the trees, and began to sing with great animation, and then said,—“Our singing distresses the devil, and hurts his feelings amazingly; but our impotence, and complaining, and groaning pleases him mightily, and makes him laugh in his sleeve. A good, joyous hymn is the remedy for gloomy and evil thoughts.” He and Melancthon often sung together passages from Virgil. In writing to the father of a student who had died at the University, he said: “He was indeed a youth much endeared to us all, and especially to myself; for many an evening has he spent at my home singing with me.” When he sent his son John to school at Torgau, he commended him to the care of John Walther, the musician already mentioned, and begged him to give the boy thorough instruction in music. “I am a father of theologians; (added he,) but I would gladly be also a father of grammarians and musicians.” He once heard a new anthem by Louis Seufel, the organist of the Elector of Bavaria, and was so delighted with it that he sprang from

his chair, and exclaimed, "If I were to tear myself to pieces I could not make such an anthem as that; but then Seufel cannot *preach a psalm* as I can." To this Seufel, though a Catholic, and in the service of a bigoted Catholic prince, he wrote a very friendly and characteristic letter on music, which we give entire:—

"To Louis Seufel, Court Musician to the Duke of Bavaria, at Munich:

"Grace and peace in Christ. Although my name, my dear Louis, may be hateful to you, so that I am compelled to fear that the letters which I send you can scarcely with safety be received and read; yet this fear is overcome by my love of music, in which art I perceive that you are adorned and gifted by my God. The same love also induces the hope that my letters will be the occasion of no injury to you; for who would find fault even among the Turks, when one loves the art, and praises the artist? I indeed respect and vehemently praise even your Dukes of Bavaria, though most hostile to me, because they more than others favour and honour music. Doubtless the seeds of many excellent virtues are to be found in the minds of those who are fond of music; but as for those who cannot be moved by it, I regard them as most like to stocks and stones. We know that music is odious and intolerable to the devil. I believe entirely, and am not ashamed to profess, that, next to theology, there is no art or science to be compared with music; since this alone besides theology, does that which otherwise theology alone can do; namely—it gives a quiet and joyful mind; a clear proof that the devil, who every where stirs up gloomy cares and disquieting alarms, flees before musical sounds, as he does from the word of God. Therefore the prophets used no art so much as music; and they illustrated their theology, not by geography, or arithmetic, or astronomy, but by music; so that they held music and theology in most intimate connection, teaching the truth in psalms and songs. But how can I praise music on this little bit of paper, and thus attempt to paint, or rather daub, so

great a matter ? But my affection overflows and gushes out toward it, so often has it refreshed me, and relieved me from great sorrows.

“ I return to you, and intreat, if you have a copy of that chant, *In pace in idipsum*,* that you would have it transcribed and sent to me ; for that tune has delighted me from my youth, and now much more since my condition makes me feel the meaning of the words. I have never seen the piece arranged for several parts. I would not impose on you the labour of composing and arranging it ; but I perceive you have it already composed by some one else. I really hope that the end of my life draws near, for the world hates me, and cannot endure me, and I also am weary of and detest the world ; then let the good and faithful Shepherd take my soul. I have therefore already begun to sing this chant, and I desire to see it composed and arranged. If you have not a copy, or know not where to obtain one, I here send you one with the notes, which, if you please, you may compose and arrange after my death. May the Lord Jesus be with you forever, Amen.

“ Pardon my temerity and wordiness. Salute for me reverently the whole choir of your musicians.

“ From Coburg, Oct. 4th, 1530.

“ MARTIN LUTHER.”

The above letter, written from the castle of Coburg, in that crisis of extreme excitement and hazard, breathes somewhat of a pensive spirit ; but while there, Luther was sometimes in a merrier mood, as is seen in the following letter to John Agricola (otherwise called Eisleben), in which he contrives a plot to play a joke on Master George, a conceited musical clergyman of his acquaintance. Agricola had written a jocose letter to Luther's wife, to which allusion is made in the first instance.

“ Grace and peace. I have sent your letter to my lady,

* The last verse of the Fourth Psalm, according to the Vulgate.

my Agricola ; and I can divine to you beforehand what her answer will be. Reading the letter she will smile and say, " Ah, Master Eisleben, what a rogue he always is ! " I hope Casper Aquila has returned to you released from his feline metamorphosis. You are sad rogues thus to vex the good man.

" I send to you a little tune for you to exercise yourself upon. When for four days I could neither read nor write, I by chance found in an outhouse a bit of paper on which this old tune was written, set to three parts. This I took, expurgated, corrected and amended it, added to it a fourth part, and wrote impromptu some words for it ; principally with this object, that I may put a joke upon your chaplain Master George. Let him receive it as a new song lately composed by the choir at Augsburg, on the solemn entrance of the emperor and his brother Ferdinand, and sent by you to me. He will more easily be hoaxed, if you will praise it a little to me, and say you have heard it praised by many, especially for its simplicity, and that you will soon send me the remainder of the words. When you perceive that it pleases me, then I will send it all to him, and if the joke succeeds so that I can impose upon that fine critic and most malapropos Momus of music, I will forever take away from him that authority of judging in musical matters, on which he values himself so much. Perhaps too we may in this way get rid of the Sirenes. Do your duty in this, and manage the matter cunningly. More another time. Meanwhile, farewell in the Lord, all of you together.

" Yours,

" June 15th, 1530.

" MARTIN LUTHER."

The hymns and tunes of Luther were immediately translated and adopted in the reformed churches of other countries ; in France very early by Theodore Beza and Claude Marot. Hence it has happened that some of Luther's own music was afterwards supposed to be original with Marot. The mistake, however, is easily corrected, for Marot's tune book was

not published till several years after the first edition of Luther's. As we now read Luther's hymns, after the lapse of three centuries from their first publication, we find them full of strength and fervour, abounding in a deep and rich Christian experience, and with every quality adapted to make them popular favourites ; while his tunes all breathe the utmost sweetness and majesty of devotion, and are always admirable for their peculiar adaptedness to the sentiment of the hymns for which they were originally composed. The eminent composer Handel possessed several of Luther's tunes in the very autographs of the great reformer ; he studied them faithfully, and gratefully acknowledged the very essential benefit he derived from them, publicly declaring that he was indebted to them for some of his very best ideas. The contemporaries of Luther, as we have already seen, studied and criticised his hymns and tunes very diligently ; but for several generations past they have attracted little special notice out of Germany, till of late they have been again vehemently eulogized by the papal ecclesiastic Audin.

ARTICLE II.

PURITANISM.*.

THERE can be no possible reason why the faults of good men should be concealed, when the public good requires their exposure ; and if candour directs the disemboweling of historic truth for such a purpose, it may be productive of no little good. To unveil the faults of *bad* men, is a work so odious and repulsive, that nothing but necessity will justify it.

* "PURITANISM: or a Churchman's Defence against its Aspersions, by an Appeal to its own History." By Thomas W. Coit, D. D., member of the New-York Historical Society."

But to calumniate the memory of departed worthies, or needlessly to blazon their faults, is as wanton and wicked as it is mischievous.

Whether either of these characteristics is applicable to the work before us, requires our demonstration.

Its author "expects no quarter," and apprehends a "rhetorical crucifixion." p. 8. He deals in "vinegar" and "*unwelcome* truths," p. 14, and expects the *most* copious measure of censure; and to be regarded as *bitter*, p. 404, and as "having said all which one of the 'Malignant Party' *can* say to disparage the Puritans." p. 427. It is not possible that the man could have set down to his work with such shivering apprehensions, had he not been conscious of meriting something of what he feared. He *ought* not to expect that those who revere the memories of those worthy men, and who admire the principles which they discovered and the institutions which they planted, will sit down in silence, under such assaults as these, without investigating their truth and exposing their error.

We believe that this book will accomplish much good by causing the whole subject to be laid before an intelligent public, (and herein we differ from Dr. C., who thinks that "the good sense of the community" "cannot be relied on,") and also by defining the true position of at least one party, if it does not draw out the true position of the other.

There is one fact which gives prominent importance to this effusion. It speaks not the sentiments of the writer merely, it is *endorsed* by "SEVERAL OF THE BISHOPS and *by a LARGE NUMBER OF THE CLERGY.*" "*By giving him their SIGNATURES they SHARE WITH HIM THE RESPONSIBILITY of publishing these disagreeable facts,*" p. 7, and "TO THE BISHOPS AND CLERGY WHO HAVE URGED ME TO MY PRESENT UNDERTAKING," p. 13. "*Such a list of names* is at last sent as to induce him to put his articles into a permanent form," though with "*less vinegar in his ink.*" p. 24.

The book then represents, as we have reason to believe, the *Protestant Episcopal Church*; and if it indulges in any

bitterness, a large number of the bishops and clergy not only feel but are willing to endorse, even more than this. If the writer shall appear to be a Tory or a Royalist, a Puseyite or a *Roman Catholic*, he still speaks *by authority*, and represents, in fact, his *church*.

We agree with the author, not only in regard to the practical importance of the book, but also that it will call forth a searching examination of its merits, of himself, of Puritans, and of Episcopacy. To the fulfilment of his prediction we now propose to offer our contribution.

It is worthy of notice that a large part of the book is occupied with making statements, building arguments and pouring eloquent invectives, which he himself abundantly and directly refutes. The author says, "In Maryland, the rights of conscience were *first* fully recognized in this country. This is a fact I never knew disputed by good authority." p. 21. "How transcendently superior are Papists to Puritans!" p. 437. "Papists could tolerate, Puritans could not." p. 469. "Here is Rome herself, putting you [Puritans] to the blush." p. 470. And then on the other hand he says: "They [Papists] placed in the background the natural exclusiveness of their system, and opened their doors, as David did when overawed by *necessity*, to whomsoever would enter." "The celebrated act of toleration of 1649 was passed by a legislature in which the Papists formed but *one* part out of *several*. Mr. Knowles, therefore, is justified in disputing the alledged priority of the Papists in the cause of religious freedom." "It is difficult for me to believe that there is any more elective affinity between Popery and republicanism, than between an acid and an alkali," pp. 355-8; and even Puritans were excusable for dreading them, p. 341—compare pp. 22, 434, 359. Here are about eight pages occupied in lauding Romanists, to prepare the way for his bitterest vituperation of the Puritans, and then in destroying his own fabric upon which that abuse is founded. If he was at first in error, why did he not expunge that error and all that it supported? Ah, that would have effaced some of the gall and the wormwood with which

he had bespattered the hated Puritans. Better to *contradict* the *facts*, and *leave* the *calumnious inferences*.

He also devotes some *fifteen pages* to the work of showing, mainly from the Plymouth and Massachusetts charters, (as he does many pages to the demonstration of the same fact from other sources,) that the Pilgrims came over from no "*religious cause*," but simply for "*power or consequence*," "*exclusive trade*," "*the entire property of the soil*," "*fishing*," "*furs and skins*," "*notoriety*," "*more money*," "*more power*," pp. 16-18, "*adventurers to convert the Indians*," "*fishing*," "*beaver skins*," pp. 430, 1; "*compacting with an avowed band of money-getters, and fortified by this all-embracing charter*." "*They look after the profits of trade with eagle eyes*," "*exclusive establishment*," pp. 75-8. "*The Pilgrims did not sail for New England because they were persecuted*," p. 128-130. The Puritans had leagued themselves with the Plymouth council, p. 132-142, 144, 153, 154. While he answers conclusively all this abuse of the Puritans respecting their avarice and ambition, (so far as he pretends to show it by references to the charters,) by showing in a few paragraphs on pp. 137, 8, 9, and 144, that they had no connexion at that time with either the one or the other charter, (neither of them having an existence when the Pilgrims sailed from England,*) that they made their contract with the Virginia Company, intending to go to its domains, that they were set down in New England, by the ignorance of their shipmaster. In short, he concedes what Bancroft asserts, that "*the first permanent colony on the soil of New England was established without the knowledge of the corporation, and without the aid of King James*." Here is evidence, aside from his manifest bitterness, which forestalls the charitable conclusion that he has *ignorantly* published these unfounded calumnies of the Puritans. He admits that he knows better, and yet he does not erase a single line. His "*vinegar*" is too precious to be wasted.

* Bancroft, United States I. 308.

So he reviles the Puritans for covetousness and hypocrisy because they sent Missionaries to Virginia, p. 21. But when the Episcopalian historian to whom he refers puts "a different face upon" the mission to Virginia, p. 435, declaring that it was *requested* by the people there, he replies that he would abandon the paragraph, as *one* blot effaced from the Puritan escutcheon, but the probability of Laud's death favoured the attempt, and then "their excessive testiness about Episcopal Missions and the Quakers," etc. etc.; so he will not abandon the paragraph, though convinced by his own authority that it is a misrepresentation, pp. 436, 435. He *loves* "*vinegar*," or he would have erased those self-counteracting pages.

He gives "the palm in peerless charity" to Roger Williams, p. 437, 22, 428, 293, and yet *he* sells Indians into slavery, and his colony refuse toleration to Roman Catholics, p. 437, 356. The same purpose to vilify the Puritans, prompts him here to censure and to criminate. (Compare also p. 470, with 354-360.)

From this single point of observation we may judge of the spirit, accuracy and value of a book that contains, within itself, an ample corrective for so many of its worst maledictions.

On page 39, he quotes the charge of Robinson to his congregation to "shake off the NAME of Brownist. 'Tis a mere nickname;" and from this alone he says, "They are implored not *to* BE Brownists." "Brownists they were, therefore, to that ultimate hour of their European existence."

To bear a NICKNAME, then, is to BE the very thing it represents. Surely he believes in *transubstantiation*.

The reviewer asserts that "the cavils and clamours" of the Puritans "were political rather than religious, because they refused, what the queen *insisted* on," to take "the oaths of SUPREMACY and allegiance," p. 142. He says "they might go scot free with their religion, if they would swear to be loyal to their lawful sovereign." But the oath of allegiance they never objected to, except as it was inseparable from the oath of *supremacy*. She extorted the oath of supremacy, by which

they swore allegiance to her *as head of the Church of England*, including not Episcopalians only, but *all* the people—they vowed submission to the hierarchy, and acknowledged the sovereign as lord of the conscience and arbiter of the faith of all the subjects. See Act of Supremacy, Neal, 1, 32, 72–74. Only first *swear* to be an Episcopalian, and you may “go scot free with your religion.” But that was the very thing they fled from ; yet she would enforce that oath, or keep them in England and punish them for non-conformity.

To go, after taking the oath, would be of no use. The soul was trammelled with the very yoke they would escape from, and well she knew the efficacy of thus fettering a Puritan’s conscience. For “though to his own hurt he swears, he still performs his word.”

But Episcopacy then was like Episcopacy now. You may be a Calvinist or an Arminian, a High-churchman or a Low-churchman, a Puseyite or an Evangelical ; you may reverence the cross like Bishop Doane, or abhor such fooleries with Bishop M’Ilvaine ; you may go scot free with your religion, if you will but be an Episcopalian.

“Mr. Hallam gives the palm” of toleration “to the Arminians.” “*Ap. Laud* was considered a strong Arminian,” p. 437. Here are the premises of a conclusion which he evidently wishes his readers to draw, but which is too monstrous even for him to state, viz., that *Laud was tolerant*.

The worst possible misrepresentations frequently occur, as on pp. 304, 305 : “The last victims of the act *De hæretico comburendo* suffered in 1611.” But it was about half a century after this that “the *last* victims of Puritanism suffered death.” Here is a comparison of the parties, and if there is any meaning in the passage, he meant to have it understood that the English church was fifty years in advance of the Puritans, in respect to toleration. The comparison is in reference to *burning* heretics merely. He would have us understand, either that the Puritan act “*De heretico comburendo*” was continued about fifty years after the English act was repealed, or that none suffered death in England after the year

1611. But there never was such an act in New England, as this for burning heretics, nor ever a heretic or any other criminal burned ; and on the other hand, there were many executions on a religious account down to seventy-five years afterward. Has Dr. C. never heard of Learmont, and Cargill, and James Guthrie, and James Stewart, and Isabel Alison, and Marion Harvey ? Has he never heard of the barbarities of Claverhouse—all sanctioned by that very Charles II., whose liberality and clemency Dr. C. can commend ? Has he never read the history of the Covenanters ? Has he never heard that “ De Laune* was one of near eight thousand Protestant dissenters, who had *perished* in prison, in the reign of King Charles II.—*stifled in jails* ? ”

Yet he would have us suppose that the Puritans were fifty years behind the Episcopalian Church of England, in this matter of bloody persecution. How, then, can such a writer expect his readers to place the least confidence in his conclusions, when his statements of fact are so grossly incorrect, not to say maliciously false ? There is but one explanation of this rash misrepresentation of historic facts. He plays upon the word “ *comburendo*.” While none were BURNED for heresy, as such, after 1611, numbers were *executed* for their religion. THOUSANDS suffered the greatest cruelties for near a score of years after the execution of the *only* four persons (Quakers) who ever suffered death in New England, and they suffered, as we shall see, for something besides mere opinions.

One witch was BURNED in *Great Britain* more than ONE HUNDRED AND TEN years after the persons whom he calls the “ last of English sufferers at the stake.”

But he well knew that “ unlearned ” readers would not distinguish between suffering at the stake and suffering death, and that most of his Episcopalian readers would infallibly imbibe a gross error from his language ; but he also asserts that egregious error, for he thus glosses the statements quoted

* Page 5, Preface to De Laune's Plea, as quoted by Neal's Hist. Puritans, II., 322.

above : “ Tyre and Sidon [England and her monarch] had a great while ago repented, sitting in sackcloth and ashes, but the children of the covenant still held to the doctrine of coercive power as the matter shall require,” p. 305. The assertion is as false as it is calumnious.

“ *But PURITANISM SENT POPERY HERE, IN 1632 ; let the DISASTROUS INSTRUMENTALITY be ‘ graven with an IRON pen and lead in the rock forever’ !*” p. 89. But HOW ? “ Why—it was the UNNECESSARY AND UNCALLED-FOR SEVERITY of that GOVERNMENT, GOADED on by PURITAN CLAMOURS, which COMPELLED ROMANISTS TO FLY from England FOR THE SAME SHELTER which Puritans declare they sought in this Western Hemisphere,” p. 88. *Cruel Puritans, miserable Episcopalians ! Puritans clamour for religious LIBERTY. Episcopalians, “ GOADED ON” thereby, raise such a terrible persecution, not only of Puritans but of Romanists also, as COMPELLED THE ROMANISTS TO FLY from England for the same shelter which Puritans sought*” here. Therefore, “ Puritanism sent popery here in 1632.” He must be blinder than a beetle, who does not see the force of this.

From the use of the term “ Brownistical Independents”* by Mather, he extorts the admission of “ the connexion between Brownism and Congregationalism.” But if the reader will turn to the passage, he will see that it is used to *distinguish* Brownism from Congregationalism. This perversion is so palpable, that we are forbidden to attribute it to ignorance.

The assertion on p. 189, that “ nothing but the right of petition” was involved in the controversy with Vassal and his colleagues, we declare, on the authority of Bancroft,† and Hutchinson,‡ to be an outrageous falsehood, as calumnious as the “ wanton insults of Vassal and his brother factionists.”

One of his great errors is, that we claim perfection for the Puritans. This false issue is *the thread* that runs through

* Mather's Magn. II. 426. † U. S. I. 438, 439. ‡ Coll. 154, 189, 212, 213.

the book, and, more than all his authorities, gives plausibility to his conclusions, with those who have the misfortune to believe him. But if they never *professed* perfection, then no mere imperfections can contradict their professions. If their descendants never asserted their perfection, mere imperfections do not vitiate their claims.

If he discovers any wrong in a Presbyterian or a Congregationalist, he at once infers that they are as bad as churchmen. He ought, however, to remember, that there are ten thousand wrongs which do not equal in enormity the persecutions of the Episcopalian Church, which he delights to honour. It is the glory of *neither* of those parties that they were perfect, and it constitutes the first part of the grievous wrong which he perpetrates upon us, to misrepresent New Englanders as exalting their fathers to this standard of excellence; and then, with the appetite of a buzzard, picking out every fault of individuals, and every mistake of an infant government; following, with the scent of a hungry wolf, the history of men, of colonies, of states, and charging every fault of either upon the whole body of *Puritans*. No one ever pretended that such a man may not find faults enough to chronicle.

The glory of the Puritans is, not that they were faultless, but that they made great progress, in their efforts to secure civil and religious emancipation. The *Presbyterians* made great advance; and as a step towards the glorious consummation which we enjoy, it was as important as any other. With all their faults and imperfections, they ought to be honoured as the noble defenders of truth which they saw but in part, yet maintained with sincerity and boldness, so far as it was perceived.

Cannot Dr. Coit and the bishops see the absurdity of censuring them for not at once attaining to the standard of complete toleration and perfect republicanism, while he belabours them, with equal severity, for the "*radicalism*" that prompted every attempt at reformation either in the church or state? Every effort of this party secured a step of pro-

gress, which the bishops and the clergy and the Episcopalian Church, strenuously opposed. These insisted on the supremacy of their church and on conformity to all the ceremony under penalty of suffering even to death ; and after that was abolished *in form*, thousands, by other severities, were murdered. But under the Presbyterian directory for worship, the Episcopalian might use his own forms of prayer, as near to his prayer book as he liked, and enjoy the ordinances of religion according to his wishes in almost every respect, except the heresies of baptismal regeneration, godfathers, etc., transubstantiation, the sign of the cross, and " Apostolical succession."

It was a very great relaxing of the stringent requirements of Episcopacy ; and are the men who have broken down so much of the barriers of religious and civil despotism, to receive no honour for this service ? We think that they deserve great honour for having broken away from any of the chains of antiquity and custom, and for having discovered and vindicated so much of truth. Just as John Fitch, for his first bungling attempt at steam navigation, is worthy of immortal honour for his glorious conception.

But the Independents demolished the directory, and gave still larger liberty to Episcopalians and all other sects. Men may think what they please of the *political complexion* of the Commonwealth, but they cannot deny that it was the most glorious period of English history, and that the Independents were then the ascendant party. No more can it be denied that toleration was then conceded to all, whose political relations did not interfere with the peace of society and the stability of the government. The questions of forms and ordination, and subscription for religion's sake, was left to every man's own conscience. We do not say that the doctrine of toleration was then understood as perfectly as now, or as consistently practised : a thousand embarrassing circumstances would hinder such a result. But they made a nearer approximation to that result then, than England has ever seen before or since. Thomas Goodwin was the high priest of the Puritan Israel, not in virtue of succession, or royal appointment,

but in virtue of character, of talents, and of principles. But the Reviewer, if he can find a single blot on the Puritan escutcheon, will claim it as proof that the *inquisition* alone equals Puritan barbarity.

We may safely assert that, without the important steps of progress which they made, complete toleration would not have been enjoyed to this day. The vigour with which Episcopacy holds on to oppressive and unrighteous enactments, is seen in the fact that she still, in 1846, holds on to the tithes when she has the power. The progress made by Presbyterians and Congregationalists, whether it was little or much, was made in the face of violent and sturdy opposition from the Episcopalians. The Toleration act itself was opposed by the clergy, and carried over them by the king and commons ; and we may clearly see the views and tendencies of the Reviewer, and of the bishops and clergy of the Episcopalian Church here, by their preference of the days and conduct of Laud over those of the Puritans, with all their superior and glorious results in this land. He is continually looking back to the superstition, bigotry, and cruelty of those dark ages, and censuring, at every step, the struggles of the Puritans to break down the tyranny of the prerogative and the supremacy.

But he himself answers all his tirade about the Puritan *inconsistency*, by showing, *as he claims*, that they never pretended to tolerate. He pretends to show it by their laws, and books, and principles, and actions ; but if they never pretended to tolerate, then there is no inconsistency in persecuting. Again, he quotes the sentiments of the Independents in the Westminster Assembly, 1643 and afterwards ; infers the same sentiments and professions in 1620 or 1630 ; then alledges some actions not consistent with those views, and thence *infers* their “ *canting hypocrisy* ” !!!

Without admitting his inferences or allegations, it is a sufficient defence of the Puritans, not that they were completely free from intolerance, but that they made great progress toward it, and ultimately secured it.

Their day was the dawn, the glorious sunrise of this day

of freedom, not its meridian light. The Reviewer, however, cannot see any light until noon. Nay, the very light of liberty and toleration blinds his eyes, if he has any, and he mourns and pines for the days of Laud and Charles I., "*the martyred prelate,*" "*murdered king,*"—the fogs of divine right and apostolical succession, and prerogative, are like a veil of sackcloth. However, he is not the only creature whose delicacy of vision prevents his seeing in the daytime.

It is important to take up briefly, though in detail, the heavy charges which he brings against Puritanism.

The charge of persecuting Philip Ratcliff, (p. 66,) is based upon a *false quotation*. He was punished not for his "*tenets,*" but for "*invectives.*"*

Does not Dr. C. know that there is a vast difference between punishing a man for his *opinions*, and for "*most foul and scandalous*" *abuse*, uttered in public, hurled at the *government*, as well as the churches? Has Dr. C. never heard of contempt of court, and slander, now punishable with imprisonment and fines? If so, what will he say to that?—Does he mean, also, to affirm that Laud never used worse severities, and only for such reasons?

We come now to more particular details of "*Puritan intolerance;*" and in the first place, we are called to weep over Episcopalian martyrs. The first *victim* is Rev. William Blackstone, whom he claims as an Episcopalian. He came over before 1629, without a charter, and "*squatted*" at Boston.† Had he any of Dr. Coit's "*love of soil,*" "*trading*" propensities, sordid, mercenary motives, etc.? "*The charter of 1629 superseded his title.*" What title had he? But however this may be, it was the *Episcopalian martyr Charles* who superseded his title by a charter; and Episcopalians may settle that as they please; it is a controversy among themselves. The Puritans then gave him fifty acres of land, to which he had no legal claim, and full permission to remain. It is not

* Winthrop's Journal, Ed. 1790, p. 27.

† Mather's Magn., I., 221.

true that he said, as Dr. C. affirms, "he *must* now remove again to avoid my lord brethren," pp. 176, 185, 20. His "*cutting remark*" was, "I came from England because I did not like the lord bishops ; but I can't join you, because I would not be under the lord brethren."* This looks more like exclusiveness in him, than like tyranny in them. He confesses that "the lord bishops" MADE *him flee* from England, p. 185. But suppose Dr. Coit's story to be correct, and "Blackstone's case is important to show" not that Episcopacy was not tolerated by Puritanism, but "that Puritanism was intolerable" to Episcopalians ; so bitter were their feelings toward it, that no Episcopalian would live near it. Does not the same case show, far more clearly, that prelacy was *intolerable* in England? But how was he hurried out of the land? Dr. C. shows—and this is *all* he shows—that Blackstone remained there *six years*, having been presented with fifty acres of land, and invited to remain and cultivate it ; invited to join any of their churches, and not censured for refusing ; he sold his estate when he chose, and left for no more formidable reason than that he was "*afraid*" of what the Puritans *might* do, pp. 174, 185, (and Mather's Magn. I. 221.)

In 1629 the Browns were sent back to England. There is no plausibility in the charge that this was persecution, except as the Reviewer falsely insinuates, what he dare not affirm, that they were sent back for *mere separation*. But they not only insisted on the right to use the Liturgy ; they would impose it on others. "They *insisted* on the use of the English Liturgy"† and though they had insisted on it only for themselves, that, in the estimation of the Puritans, involved "the intrusion of the hierarchy, before which they had fled. They deemed the coexistence of their liberty and of prelacy impossible."† Hence that "form of religion" was opposed "not as a *sect*, but as a *tyranny*."† Under the wing of the charter, and *positive* "*instructions* from the still Episcopalian *company*" in England, therefore Endicott sent them back. They raised

* Mather's Mag. I. 221.

† Bancroft's United States, I. 349.

“a deal of trouble,” forming a party, accusing the ministers, etc.* The one party intended the establishment of prelacy in New England; the other resisted it, because their own liberties were involved in that movement of the Browns. The scheme of the Browns would have brought the whole colony under the ecclesiastical supremacy of Laud. There were political reasons, therefore, sufficient to dictate the treatment of those disturbers, without attributing it to persecution. Nay, it was persecution in *them* to insist on that which would infallibly abridge the liberties of all the rest. Such were the political bearings and relations of Episcopacy, that, to insist upon it, was to make that contest inevitable.

It is not easy for *us* to see *all* the dangers to which the Puritans were exposed; and it is easy to overlook the many good reasons which they may have had for some apparent severities. Though they were not as thoroughly reformed from Episcopacy as the other colonies, yet the great reason of their coming to this wilderness, was to escape from royal and prelatical oppression. Should they now suffer these men to establish the claim of the king and prelate to a *lawful jurisdiction over them*? It was *right* to maintain their own title to this land, and their jurisdiction over it, though it led to the expulsion of those who set up a counter claim.

Next we have the Rev. Francis Bright, and Rev. Mr. Smith, “long a Puritan preacher,” p. 184. We cannot see why we should weep over *their* sufferings as persecution of Episcopalians. Both were pastors of congregational churches by his own showing, pp. 183, 184. But let us weep! Mr. Bright’s “attachment to Episcopacy” “was enough to ruin him, etc.” “Where were the heads and hearts turned into fountains of tears for the afflictions of one” like him? “Tears”? alas! they are thus “recklessly blasted!” How? “Buried beneath the rubbish,” etc. “This is their rhetorical destiny,” p. 184. But how is it? “Why Hubbard and Mather both make them the subject of their jeers and scorn!”

* Mather’s Magn. I., 67, 68.

How? They say, "The one betook himself to the seas again, and the other to till the ground." They "DEGRADE one into a *sailor*, and the other into a *farmer*"!! p. 184. "Verily, this is a plain case, *and the whole of it*," p. 18.

The one removed from Salem because he "disagreed" with the ministers there; was minister to the church at Salem for a year, but because he could not convince the *people* of the beauties of Episcopacy, he went to England of his own accord, p. 183. The other staid while he pleased, and did what he pleased, p. 184.

The next martyr is "Morell," of whose persecution we are told nothing, except by Dr. Coit's awkward assent to Mr. Bancroft's account of his expedition, pp. 143, 144. "They came to plant a hierarchy and a general government, and they produced only a fruitless quarrel and a dull poem."* Besides, Morell *never went into a Puritan colony*. He came over to *George's* territory, *with the proprietor*, and as *his minister*. We hardly know whether to think this an intentional misrepresentation, or ignorance so gross that he cannot distinguish one settlement from another. But it is like the rest of his "FACTS." If his errors were mere blunders, he would *sometimes* blunder *right*. He also says, that Bright and Morell were "*compelled*" to leave, p. 185, in the face of his own showing that they went freely, pp. 183, 143. That was a very *foolish* falsehood!

These are all the cases of individual persecution he has to boast of, and with these he will match the persecutions of Laud and Jeffries!! These are *all*.† He would not have laboured thus to bring forth a *mouse*, if he could have brought forth a *lion*. His disposition to make out a case of persecution is apparent enough. The material only is wanting. Yet this is *all*—except that Governor Leet did not obey a *king* as *quick as Dr. Coit thinks he ought*, and Governor Andross was received with great coldness, his authority was evaded as far as

* Bancroft, I., 326.

† Gibson's case, p. 230, was, by his own showing, merely *political*.

possible, and the people did not care to conceal their abhorrence of his tyranny. Let Dr. Coit justify it, and he will see that the sons of the Puritans love freedom as much as their fathers did; let him say that the Puritans did wrong,—or if they did not, “*why doth he yet find fault?*”

But what if some severity had been used toward Episcopalian dissenters of that day; that is not proof that it was not both *necessary* and *right*. He who knows any thing of Episcopalian arrogance at this day, can *guess* at its spirit then, when supported by the power of the throne and the hierarchy—allied as it then was with the *throne*, it was not the harmless thing it now is in this land, shorn of its locks of power. “The apparent purpose of advancing religious freedom was made to disguise measures of the deadliest hostility to the frame of *civil* government.”* Thus did they *use* their dreaded power. He himself shows that in their manner “their proceedings indicate a spirit sufficiently lofty and determined,” p. 206. It is easy to see that severity might have been *necessary*; yet it is not proved.

One great grievance which Episcopalians suffered at the hands of the Puritans was “their prevention of an American Episcopate.” This “was, to an American Churchman, a most inconvenient and harassing thing. He must send 3000 miles for his priest,” pp. 261, 262.

Did Puritans prevent “an American Episcopate” in Virginia? or is Virginia 3000 miles distant, or “across the ocean?”

But let it not be forgotten in this controversy that “an American Episcopate” means nothing more nor less than a *British Episcopate in America*. Why, even after the Revolutionary war, it was with the greatest difficulty they obtained the Episcopate at all, without *swearing allegiance to the king as head of the church* as a condition; and it was with great difficulty that that condition was stricken out, and that not without an act of Parliament. Before the

* Bancroft, I., 437.

Revolution, there was no thought of making that change. The Episcopate was the creature of the crown. The bishops were civil officers. They held their courts, not merely to pronounce church censures, but also to sentence as state criminals the violators of ecclesiastical law. The administration of Laud is the commentary upon this intended Episcopate, and after the Revolution of 1689, the Episcopate continued to be the same political thing that it was before, except that the penalties for non-conformity might be evaded by the toleration process. The bishop had jurisdiction over *territory*, not merely over those who *chose* to submit but over *all* within their bounds, whether willing or not. They still have jurisdiction by common law in all causes matrimonial and testamentary, and before the Revolution the Archbishop of Canterbury actually commissioned the governor of New Jersey to act for HIM in all such cases, and he appointed notaries public in Puritan New England.

Now for Dr. Coit to condemn the vigorous opposition of the Puritans to such a system as this, is to justify these grasping claims of Episcopacy. Had this Episcopacy been a merely religious and not a political affair, the case would have been entirely different and the result might have been different. But Dr. C. will gain but little sympathy for his sect, by censuring as persecution the opposition of the Puritans to such monstrous Episcopacy as this.

That strenuous efforts were made to introduce such Episcopacy is evident, alike from his concessions, from the facts of history, and from the opposition and fears which the project excited.

See the case of Morell, of the Browns, and he alludes to another in 1635, p. 267. That of Vassal and others, of King's Chapel. "Some almost successful efforts to establish it, in the reign of Charles II.;" "the proceedings relating to American bishoprics" in the reign of Queen Anne. "The plan was presented and urged in succeeding reigns," p. 267. The "plan" for "the appointment of colonial bishops" wanted but the ready co-operation of the queen to become a reali-

ty," but "death frustrated the intentions of her majesty, and blighted the hopes of many hearty advocates for Episcopacy." "But the plan was not forgotten." "Efforts were accordingly repeated in the reign of George I.," and its friends were "considerably cheered," p. 303. The plan was publicly argued by its friends, and opposed by those who feared the power of bishops, with equal boldness and energy. Bishop White, in his *Memoirs*, concedes that many *Episcopalians*, who desired the spiritual functions of a bishop, so dreaded his civil power as to oppose the Episcopate. "The minutes of conventions of Presbyterian and Congregational delegates" show what reasons the colonies had to fear Episcopacy. John Adams asserted, and no man better knew, that the fear of this was one prominent cause of the American Revolution, and how childish is Dr. C.'s effort to parry the force of this by showing what no one ever thought of denying, that there were other causes of this event. There was reason why the Puritans should fear this *Episcopalian* conspiracy against the liberties of this land.

But, before leaving this subject he must vindicate his church from the charge of being, in part at least, the cause of the Revolution, and in doing so he can be satisfied with nothing short of the assertion that Episcopacy was as patriotic in that war as the Puritans themselves. "The blood of *Episcopalians* flowed as freely for their country's rights as that of Puritans;" "our liberties are more indebted to an *Episcopalian* than to any body;" "the first general of our armies, and the first chaplain of our Congress were Churchmen, both of them;" "this may suffice, I hope, to vindicate episcopacy from the miserable aspersion now cast upon it, of being a disturber of American peace, and of compelling Americans to resist its tyrannical encroachments, at the point of the bayonet." But it will not suffice, it only vindicates some *individuals*. They were by no means such *Episcopalians* as Dr. C. They would not have apologized for Laud and Strafford, for James and Charles. Far better would it be to apologize for George III. and defend the *stamp act* and the *tea tax*,

than to do what Dr. Coit has done. Washington could ask the privilege of communion at the Lord's supper with a Presbyterian church. Would Dr. C. or his endorsing bishops and clergy do this? And Bishop White tells us, in his Memoirs, that the very name of bishop had become so odious after the Revolution, even to Episcopalians, that it was very difficult to organize an Episcopalian church, on any terms; but this fact is so notorious that comment is unnecessary. The patriotism of such men as he refers to, who left their ecclesiastical associations for the defence of their country, is no more to be accounted for by their *Episcopacy*, than was that of Greene by his Quakerism. Such men "rebelled in spite of ancestral opinions," while in New England the progress of free principles "is all one steady current to the sea."

The relative position of the parties is enough to show that Episcopacy was not favourable to independence; the one hoping for Episcopacy from the continued submission of the colonies to the English Crown, the other hoping to escape from Episcopacy by the experiment of revolution. That this issue was to be decided by the war, is evident from his own statement of the case in Letter XIII. Their interests as a denomination were identified with the defeat of the American armies. How often do Episcopalians now lament that the Revolution was nearly *fatal* to Episcopacy!

Ask the old men, who fought the battles of their country, who were their worst enemies, and they will tell of some, whom they more feared than British soldiery. Who were the guides of the British in their movements and marauding expeditions? When the war came, what Puritan minister did not advocate the claims of freedom and pray for the success of his country's arms? And where were the Episcopalian ministers then? With the champions of Episcopacy, such as Jeremiah Learning, pp. 43, 268, the rector of St. Paul's church, Norwalk, Conn., going over to the British, leaving his church and town, laid in ashes not *by American soldiers, perhaps not by the British*. So did Samuel Peters, Episcopalian Missionary at Hebron, the lying historian of

Connecticut, the author of "the Blue Laws," which were never dreamed of till he invented them in London, to revenge himself upon the rebels, and the mention of which should sear every Episcopalian tongue that utters the calumny. So also did Rev. Mr. Sayre, of Fairfield, whose "earnest intercessions for their property," and whose fearless intrepidity in bearing a flag when 'the flames were raging and the bullets flying' Dr. C. delights to honour. Also he notices "the burning down of" the Church of England building "*not by the British.*" Villainous insinuation! Will he say that it was not done by *Episcopalian Tories*, as in Norwalk? when he does, he will deserve an answer. The very letter from which he makes these misrepresentations, and endeavours to make the impression that Mr. Sayre, the Church of England Missionary, was favourable to American interests, and that Americans destroyed the Episcopalian church, shows conclusively that Mr. S. was a Tory, and a bearer of a proclamation from Gov. Tryon so insulting,—and brought while hostilities were continued,—that the people would not suffer him to remain, and he left with the British fleet. One party of the British troops consisted of American Tories, and Tories headed the burning parties. All this is contained in the letter which he produces to show the patriotism of Mr. Sayre, p. 476. If such are the materials from which he concludes that "Connecticut is a rich field for the annalists of 'the Episcopal church,' let them traverse it faithfully." We believe that the political bearings of such annals would be such as we have just noticed. We have not given the names of all the Episcopalian ministers we know of who went over to the British during that war, nor need we go farther to show that the Episcopal church was then a Tory faction. The facts multiply on our hands, and our space forbids enlargement.

"Roger Williams was not tolerated." But his was not a case of *toleration*; for it did not concern the rights of conscience. He was not ordered away because he was a Baptist, as is often alleged, for he was not a Baptist then, but a congregational minister. The difficulties which led to his ban-

ishment were entirely among Congregationalists themselves, and related to nothing peculiar to other denominations.

Nor was he sent away for merely believing or for saying that magistrates ought not to interfere in religious matters. That he held such sentiments, and that they were alleged against him on his trial, is true; but to say that this was *the* ground of his condemnation is *not the truth*, and we submit whether it is not bearing false witness against the Puritans, to allege as the ground of his condemnation that which does not embrace the most material part of it.

He insisted that the government should tolerate sins against the first table of the law, including *blasphemy* of course;* a crime which is not tolerated in these days, by these sufficiently tolerant states. He also endeavoured to sow dissensions among the churches, to alienate and divide the colonies, when, being in their infancy, they were scarcely able to stand together.† He stirred up the minds of the church and people of Salem to opposition to the magistrates. He did the same things elsewhere. He was convicted of defaming the magistrates,‡ and of opposing their authority. He held it to be criminal “to tender an oath to an unregenerate person, or to pray with such, though *wife* or children,”§ and he acted out his errors. He renounced and denounced all the churches of New England, because they would not unite with him in denouncing the civil government which they themselves had chosen, and so bitter was he in this excommunication of all Christendom, that he refused to commune even with his own *wife*, unless she first renounced the communion of all others.|| Such was the *charity*, the “equivocal beginning, and stray conclusion,” p. 296, of the man, who, as some pretend, was “the father of Toleration!”

His conduct respecting *religious* matters is characterized

* Gov. Winthrop's Journal, p. 84.

† Ibid p. 86, 88, and Hutchinson's Hist. Mass. I. 41.

‡ Mass. Records, 1635.

§ Mather's Magn. II. 437, 2, and Winthrop, 84.

|| Mather's Magn. II. 431.

by Cotton Mather as simply "disturbant and offensive." But there were two things relating to the *civil* government, for which it concerned the magistrates to arraign him. One was his violent attack upon the patent which the magistrates and people regarded as "the life of the colony." His violence was aimed at the constitution of the state, which is to this day regarded as necessary to the well being of the state, both as a test of the fidelity of the citizens and an essential security in the administration of justice. These were simply offences against the state. The rights of conscience and religious toleration had nothing to do with them. The question then was, Shall this man, with impunity, be suffered to assail the constitution, and prosecute a systematic attempt to overturn the whole fabric of government, to defame the magistrates and hinder the administration of justice by denying the right to administer an oath, to sow discord and stir up strife? These were the crimes for which he was banished.* They judged that his conduct endangered the colony, and what then did they do? Imprison, burn, fine, hang him?—None of these things. But after the delay of a *year*, that the ministers and churches might labour with him and reduce him to reason, they sent him out of the colony, out of the way of doing mischief to them.

And after his sentence, he was at his own request suffered to remain for about six months without molestation. How different was this treatment from that which the English Puritans received from the English government and hierarchy, who would neither suffer them to leave the country, nor to remain without conformity in all the non-essentials of religion.

But, whatever may be thought of the banishment of Roger Williams, he has himself endorsed its justice by procuring a similar sentence upon Gorton and others for similar reasons, and seven years later, when from his own experience he should have been wiser, and if wrongly treated, more tolerant. *We* do not compare Williams and Gorton as to *character*, though

* Mather's Magn. II. 431.

Dr. C. says that their "*opinions*" were alike, p. 79, but their treatment was similar, and the grounds of it alike. They assailed the government, abused and contemned the magistracy, sowed discords among the people, and awakened just apprehensions of danger from the Indians.

Gorton, being brought before the court "on some *civil controversy*," behaved himself so mutinously, seditiously, and outrageously, that he was fined "and banished." "From thence he went into Rhode Island, where he affronted what little government they had, with such intolerable insolencies that *he was then WHIPPED and SENT OUT OF THAT COLONY*"!! At Providence, he requited the kindness of Mr. Williams with such abuses, that he, with others, implored aid from the Massachusetts Bay, to protect them against the outrages of these outlaws. The result of his appeal was, they were again *banished*.*

Now, if it was right for him to instigate the banishment and other punishment of the "Gortonians," it was right for Massachusetts to banish him on similar grounds. If it was right for him to *appeal to the very same laws by which he had suffered*, it was right for the people of Massachusetts to make the same appeal, to the same tribunal, in respect to himself.

Let it be remembered, also, that this Gorton is the same man, whose manifesto and complaint to the English government has done more, perhaps, than any thing else to fasten upon the Puritans the stigma of persecuting the Quakers; and that one of the leading acts which led to that famous appeal *was caused by Roger Williams himself*.

It is equally worthy of commemoration, that Roger Williams, while denouncing the court for interference in religious matters, was himself on trial for seditious attempts to induce the CHURCHES, *by their censures*, to control if possible the action of the magistrates in things both civil and sacred.

One Baptist, T. Painter, was whipped in 1644, p. 232,

* Mather's Magn. II. 437.

not for his opinions on Baptism, but for his shameful contempt of court and scandalous conduct, and wrong to his family.* There was at that time no law for this whipping, if his religious opinions were the subject of judicial investigation. But it was a lawful punishment for contempt of court, a crime which in this enlightened age and republican government is often *punished* with fine and imprisonment, as it always ought to be, and no one but a non-resistant would venture to advocate the abolition of that righteous law.

The case of Holmes was similar.

The people called Baptists, were *disorderly*; they were disturbers of the peace, sympathizing with the Quakers in their views of government, and to some extent imitating their turbulent and mischievous conduct.

They were such as would be disowned by those who now bear their name. The historians of that age record minutely these facts, and we have this perfect demonstration of the truth of what we have asserted, in the fact that numbers had embraced those erroneous views, and yet *were never disturbed for their religious opinions, while they continued peaceable and quiet citizens.*† Gov. Winslow affirms, that though they knew the *opinions* of the man who was whipped, they would not have punished him thus for these, “but had he not carried himself so contemptuously toward the authority God hath betruſted us, we had *never so censured him*, and therefore he may thank *himself*, who suffered *as an evil-doer, in that respect.*‡

“If *ANY differing from us be answerable to this rule in their lives and conversation, WE DO NOT exercise THE CIVIL SWORD AGAINST THEM.*”

The Quakers were more severely dealt with, but not without reason. We hope the time will never come in New England, when *such* Quakers will not receive the punishment which they certainly deserve.

* Winthrop's Journal, 339, Ed. 1790.

† Mather's Magn. II. 459-62.

‡ Chronicles of the Pilgrims, p. 404-7, and Winthrop's Journal, 339.

They possessed scarcely any of the characteristics of that now grave and peaceful sect. They were non-resistants, which implied obstinate and turbulent resistance to *all* government. But who and what were the Quakers, and for what were they punished?

Nearly all of them when examined were guilty of the most gross and intolerable contempt of court, and the sentiments which they uttered there, they gave vent to every where. Mary Prince reviled the Governor on the Lord's day as he was going to public worship; she also wrote to him and the magistrates "a letter filled with opprobrious stuff," and when they and the ministers kindly endeavoured to convince and reform her and others, they redoubled their abuse. Robinson was whipped for abusing the court. Stephenson had disturbed a congregation. Mary Dyer denied the law, came to bear witness against it, and promised to violate it again. Some were banished, but finding that they would return to renew their disturbances, they were banished on pain of death, if they returned. Some of these returned and some of them were executed. Nicholson was found much inclining to Quakerism, but refusing to answer directly was dismissed with an admonition. John Smith of Salem was imprisoned for making disturbance at an ordination, crying out with abusive language during the services. Others were whipped in "other places for disorderly behaviour, putting people in terror, coming into the congregations and calling to the minister, in the time of public worship, declaring their preaching etc. to be an abomination to the Lord.

They were guilty also of other breaches of the peace.* George Wilson and Elizabeth Horton went crying through the streets, that the Lord was coming with fire and sword to plead for them. Gorton was a "blasphemous Atheist."† Thomas Newhouse went into the meeting-house at Boston with a couple of glass bottles, and broke them before the congregation, and threatened, "Thus will the Lord break you in pieces!"

* Hutchinson's Hist. of Mass., I. 187, 204. † Holmes' Annals, 244.

Another time M. Brewster came in with her face all besmeared as black as a coal. Deborah Wilson went through the streets of Salem naked as she came into the world, for which she was well whipped;* and in other instances they came in the same plight into the public religious assemblies;† others, men and women, danced together *naked*,‡ and others still apologized for such hideous indecencies.§

Long may it be before such abuses are tolerated in New England! To endure them is not toleration, but anarchy. *Shame* on the *intolerance* that insists on our suffering such outrages, as if every thing must be endured but Puritanism; that denies to *us* the rights of conscience, in favour of the fanaticism or the malignity of these *pretenders* to the praise of liberality.

But how were *peaceable* Quakers (for there were some such two hundred years ago) treated by the Puritans? Were they hung for the heretical and anti-government opinions which it was well known they held? During this very period of excitement, turmoil, and of real alarm on the part of the Puritans for the stability of their civil and religious institutions, under the persevering attacks of these declared revolutionizers, there were those in all these colonies who were quiet, though heretical, and consequently unharmed; a fact which shows conclusively, that those who *were* arraigned, were supposed to be guilty of something more than mere heretical *opinions*; that in public estimation their errors were political heresies tending to revolution, and producing disorder and crime.

But let us consider the actual treatment which the Quakers received from the Puritan magistrates. Four Quakers were hung, a number more were banished, and many were whipped. Not one of the Quakers was hung for holding heretical opinions. They were all first punished for conduct, which is now pronounced worthy of severe inflictions by our

* Hutchinson's Hist. of Mass., I. 187, 204.

† Mather's Magn., II., 455 and 458.

‡ Ibid.

§ Ibid.

penal code in this enlightened and liberal age. As this did not prevent a repetition and aggravation of their outrageous conduct, their punishment was increased,—they were *banished*.

This was not *mere* punishment, as we shall see, but an effort of the state to extirpate these political cancers.

In defiance of law and the lash they returned ; and the government, perceiving that nothing else would keep the coast clear of such disturbers of the peace, enacted a law for their banishment on pain of death.

They were thus banished again, and yet though admonished of the inflexibility of the government, they madly rushed upon the sword presented to them, and were arrested, tried, condemned, and executed.

So far were they from suffering for their *opinions*, that with all their opinions, and with all their superadded outrageous *conduct*, they were offered life after conviction, and at the gallows, upon this sole condition, that they should enjoy it out of the colony's jurisdiction. But they *would not consent* to this, and suffered. It is the testimony of the records, the magistrates, and of the leading men in the colony, that they desired not their deaths, but their absence ; that they were banished to protect the people of the colony, rather than to punish them.*

As to the *severity* of these inflictions, something of which they *unquestionably deserved*, that is a different matter from the question of punishing them at all. It is easy, however, to justify it, if the law under which they suffered is justifiable ; and whether such banishment for a crime so near to actual rebellion, and involving so much of injury and peril to the colony, is not justifiable, let the world judge ; especially considering the weakness of the infant colony, not yet compacted, the government scarcely established, exposed to intestine difficulties, and surrounded by hostile tribes of Indians, rendering unity still more essential to existence ; remembering also the

* Mass. Records, Dec. 19, 1660. Declaration of Court, Oct. 18, 1659. Mather's Magn., II. 454, 453, 462.

forbearance that offered them life after conviction, and even on the very gallows ; yet even clemency they would not have, unless they might enjoy it their own way.

Treatment of criminals which would be wrong in the present age and state of the country, their weakness and danger might then have justified entirely.

This severity was not shown peculiarly to Quakers and witches ; the criminal code of that day numbered many more capital offences than ours does now. Yet it was no more sanguinary or severe than that of the mildest and most benevolent government then existing in the world ; and it will lose all its pre-eminent terrors, if we compare it with the criminal code of England, which numbers, *to this day, as many* capital offences, and for more trivial crimes, and yet is sanctioned by the whole weight, and character, and influence of the Mother Church ; and still more if we remember, that *within a year past* a man was HUNG, in North Carolina, for *stealing a pair of suspenders* !! a place where the baleful light of Puritanism, surely, has not too much abounded.

If these things are so, who are the men that would cheat the world into the belief, that the Puritans were “sinners above all the Galileans” ?

The Quakers were men whom that *most* tolerant colony of Rhode Island regarded as dangerous, their principles and conduct “*tending to very absolute cutting down, and overturning relations and CIVIL GOVERNMENT among men* if generally received.”* And the government judged it requisite to commend their *extravagant outgoings* to the consideration of the next general assembly, hoping that such order may be taken as will prevent the bad effects of their doctrines and endeavours !!

This was in Rhode Island ! Tolerant Rhode Island !!

In 1665, “The government of Rhode Island *passed an order to outlaw Quakers*, and to seize their estates,” and the Quakers of Pennsylvania themselves, many years afterwards,

* Hutchinson's Hist. Mass. I., 454.

persecuted their brethren the Quakers, by fines, imprisonment and confiscation of goods, even without trial, and simply for religious dissent.* So that the Quakers were persecuted by the *Quakers*, as well as by Roger Williams and the Puritans of Massachusetts!! What then must have been the character of this people, with whom Massachusetts dealt not as errorists but as insurrectionists? For it must be remembered that she alone must bear the burden of this reproach, if any is deserved.

But what was the wrong done to the worst of these people, in the cases of greatest severity which are recorded? Was it wrong to prevent women from *going through the streets, naked as they were born*? Wrong to prevent women from going stark naked into the congregations of the faithful, among men and women, young men and maidens, children and all, to expose their shamelessness, and to debauch the minds of the people, under the false plea of toleration? Is it wrong to banish those who will not otherwise be hindered from sacrificing a *dog*, as the prelude to a promiscuous dance of men and women together *naked*!! If it is, what shall be said of the legislators of Connecticut, who, in 1845, enacted a law abridging the liberty of brothel keepers? And if they raise the plea of religious toleration, ought *that* to exempt them from the operation of this law? *There are those who complain of the intolerance of this law.* Is it wrong to convict of scandalous contempt of court, and to punish accordingly? Wrong to convict of slander in 1840 or 1660? Wrong to punish bold and malignant defamation of magistrates and ministers, and to hinder systematic and persevering attempts to break down the laws and the government, to effect a revolution not only in society, but in the civil institutions of the land? Is it wrong to prevent men, whether fanatics or malignants, from breaking bottles amidst the congregations of peaceful worshippers, and other similar abuses? and is it wrong to *end* such mischiefs, though it be by banishment on pain of death, and by executing such severe enactments when nothing else will

* Mather's Magn., II. 456, 560.

keep the coast clear of such men and their intolerable abuses ? and if we have found a better *way* of doing this, it may be owing quite as much to their wisdom and virtues as to our own.

Their general principles tended to universal liberty. Their institutions tended to the same result, and these facts are evidence, of no small moment, of the nature and tendency of their views of religious liberty. When has not religious liberty been the forerunner of civil freedom ? Making allowance, also, for the circumstances in which they were placed, the age in which they lived, and their want of knowledge on these subjects, we must accord to them the honour of surpassing the *world* in their enlarged views of human rights, and their devotion to the cause of liberty ; and to overlook these facts and principles is to give a partial and unjust and false view of the subject. It is to misrepresent, if not to slander, the Puritans.

Isaac Newton discovered the law of attraction, which has given a new face to the philosophy of the physical universe ever since his day, but he did not understand many of the plainest applications of that profound doctrine with which every school-boy is now familiar. Shall pretenders to philosophy now revile him for this ignorance ? With the same justice are the Puritans reviled for their ignorance of some applications of their glorious doctrine of toleration, by those who coolly pronounce all Christendom, excepting themselves, destitute of a valid ministry, and valid ordinances, or even church estate, merely because they are not suspended by a certain old rusty broken chain—like Bishop Onderdonk,—or because they do not believe in the animal magnetism of a chain of hands and arms and heads.

Thus have we disposed of Dr. C.'s specific charges. But the Reviewer aims nearly all his strictures at the colony of Massachusetts Bay. Suppose we grant that he has proved their character to be as mercenary, and sordid, and tyrannical, and persecuting, as he would have us believe they were :—

MASSACHUSETTS CAME FROM THE BOSOM OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND, WITHOUT THAT THOROUGH REFORMATION WHICH CHARACTERIZED THE OTHER COLONIES. The Pilgrims at

Plymouth were *separatists*. They believed that the corruptions of the Church of England *required* an entire separation ; they had thoroughly investigated the subject of church government, and had deliberately settled down upon the Congregational form. They followed the teachings of the Bible, as they supposed, in making their ecclesiastical organization a complete democracy.

It was from this that they learned the grand idea of applying the democratic principle in civil government. In 1620 they had a government established according to those simple and democratic forms, and this was, in respect to government, *the model* colony.

As to New Haven, Cotton Mather, who reveres sufficiently Cotton and the magnates at the Bay, acknowledges that Davenport went to New Haven from Massachusetts to attempt "a yet stricter conformity to the word of God, in settling of all matters, both civil and sacred ;" and the result confirms the statement of the historian. (Mather's Magn., I. 296.)

By the same infallible test, we determine that Connecticut had a similar origin. They enacted the first constitution the world had ever seen, and one which for liberality and wisdom has hardly been excelled to this day. They established toleration among their fundamental laws, and whatever may have been their theories, they maintained the principle thus established as consistently as ever it has been in the world.

But Massachusetts was settled by Church of England men, deserving indeed the name of Puritan, yet very far from having made the progress which Plymouth and the other colonies had made.

The proof of the semi-Episcopalian character of the Massachusetts colony, is found in the farewell of the Rev. Francis Higginson to England. "He called his children and the other passengers to the stern of the ship, to take their last sight of their native country," and said, "Farewell, dear England ! Farewell the Church of God in England," etc. "We do not go to New England, as separatists from the Church of England." These are the words of the founder

of the ecclesiastical institutions of Massachusetts. So the letter from the Arabella, which brought over the Governor and Deputy, and Assistants, and the charter, the constitution and the government of the colony, declares that they are "those who esteem* it an honour to call THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND OUR DEAR MOTHER, and acknowledging, that such hope and part as we have obtained in the common salvation, we have received in her bosom and sucked from her breast. We leave it not, therefore, as loathing that milk wherewith we were nourished there, but blessing God for the parentage and education, as MEMBERS OF THE SAME BODY, shall always rejoice in her good, and unfeignedly grieve for any sorrow that shall ever betide her, etc."

They desire, also, an interest in the "prayers and affections" of their brethren in and of the Church of England. Hubbard represents them as "quite afloat at first, respecting the subject of an ecclesiastical platform for *themselves*." They were "*not*" (like those of New Plymouth) "aforehand moulded into any order or form of church government."† And the Reviewer concedes that they were not so far Puritanized as to wish to leave the Episcopalian Church of England. "They knew enough to dislike 'some things in the discipline and ceremonies of the church of England,' and also, 'that pattern of separation set up before them at Plymouth.'"[‡]

He also claims that this darkness continued "for years," "until Mr. Cotton and Mr. Hooker came over,"† (and they did not arrive till 1633,) though they were *partially* enlightened in the mean time.‡

"Even Higginson, and Hooker, and Cotton, were still ministers of the Church of England."§ Winthrop, the first governor of Massachusetts who resided in the colony, was "in England a conformist," though "loving 'Gospel purity' even to Independency."||

* Pp. 157, 158.

† P. 159.

‡ P. 180.

§ Bancroft, I. 343.

|| P. 354.

They were Puritans of the primitive caste, wishing only for a *reformation* of the Church of England, but not regarding it as so corrupt as to require of them a separation from it.

So when the Browns accused the first settlers at Salem of separation from the Church of England, the ministers replied that "they were neither Separatists nor Anabaptists; that *they did not separate from the Church of England, nor from the ordinances of God there*, but only from the *corruptions* and disorders of that church."* The principles of Mr. Skelton were like those of Mr. Higginson.†

There can be no doubt from these confessions, and historical facts and concessions, that the first settlers of Massachusetts were, at the first, of the Church of England, and, in this respect, different from any of the other colonies.

Their charter was given to them as "Church of England" men, and they had then no thought of being any thing else; and every quotation from that charter which the Reviewer makes to prove the mercenary character of the colony, (though he quotes it against the Plymouth colony, who had no more concern in it than Dr. C. himself,) recoils upon Episcopacy with far greater force than it falls upon Puritanism.

But there is another feature of this history that bears yet more decisively upon the fact, that Massachusetts was indebted to Episcopacy for her "persecuting" spirit.

In every other colony the state followed the church, and grew out of it; in this the state anticipated the church. In Plymouth, the political organization was about eighteen years after the organization of their church;‡ and both were "a strict democracy."

In Connecticut and New Haven, also, the church preceded the state, and the practice of Congregationalism prepared the way for, and led to, a similar democratic constitution of the body politic. In each of these three colonies the church is older than the town, and the town older than the confederacy of towns which constitutes the commonwealth.

* Mather's Magn., I. 68. † p. 328. ‡ Bancroft, I. 300, 309, 320, 322.

They learned from the *Bible* how to govern themselves in the church, and from the church how to govern themselves in the state.

But in Massachusetts the process was reversed. Their charter from the king was their only constitution. This placed the legislative and executive powers of the plantation in the hands of a close corporation beyond the ocean. And, although it fell into the hands of men more liberal and enlightened than most men of their church or nation in that age, yet they were Episcopalians, some of them yet conformists, and some even royalists; and their governor himself "averse to pure democracy." Their body politic, and their legislation was begun in England, by a few men whose power, amounting to little less than that of royalty itself, was extended over all the rest of the colony; and it was not until after they had transferred themselves and their charter to America, and tasted of the influence of Congregationalism, that they conferred any new franchises or power to the emigrants.

The charter was obtained in 1628. Mr. Higginson went over in the next year, but as yet the settlers at the Bay were without one valuable franchise;* and as to their "form of church government," they were "agreed little further than" to conform to the Bible.†

But, convinced that some improvement should be made in the discipline of the church, they consulted with their brethren at Plymouth what steps to take; and instructed by them out of the word, and thus convinced of their duty, they adopted Congregationalism as their form of church government.

Thus their church estate was formed with the concurrence of "Endicott, an Episcopalian yesterday, but converted to-day to Plymouth separation, by a Plymouth Doctor."‡ Had they like their "Plymothean" neighbours, studied faithfully the word of God, and settled their minds on this subject

* Bancroft's U. S. I. 345. † Mather's Magn., I. 66. ‡ Review, p. 180.

before they commenced their political establishment, they would, doubtless, like the other colonies, have been more democratic and more tolerant. It was not till 1630 that the government and charter,—the corporation—came over; and although in the autumn following they extended the franchises of the corporation, yet they did not relinquish the right to determine by election who should, and who should not, be admitted to the privileges of the corporation. The next year they limited that privilege to church members, and *two years* afterward Mr. Cotton and Mr. Hooker came over. So that unwise and offensive limitation was to be traced to their Episcopalian tendencies, rather than to Mr. Cotton's influence.

They had not yet unlearned the doctrine of church and state union under which they were brought up in England, in the bosom of that "Dear Mother," *from whose "breasts" they had "sucked" this "milk."* "Endicott, an Episcopalian," had tasted of the sweets of power before he was "converted by the Plymouth Doctor;" and it is not easy for imperfect human nature to relinquish *power*.

We need add no more at present to show that their "Church of England" affinities furnish the reason why Massachusetts was not as free from stain as her sister colonies.

It will be remembered that we do not at all allow Dr. C.'s assertions of severity and intolerance, as levelled against Massachusetts. They are almost entirely based upon garbled quotations or misquotations, or upon worthless authorities, or gross exaggerations, or consist of false inferences, or base insinuations.

But if it had all been true, he himself provides the answer, that this was but the working of the leaven of Episcopalian exclusiveness; while, the other colonies being first rooted and grounded in Congregationalism, exhibited conduct worthy of the noblest memorial.

Some of her leading men may have been too stern and unyielding in the administration of justice; rigid in the exercise of their own virtues, they may not have been sufficiently indulgent toward the loose principles of others. But the

stories of Gulliver are not more incredible, than that their conduct sustained the comparison he makes of such men with Tiberias and the Inquisition.

It is more likely that Dr. Coit should *falsify* than that the glorious commonwealth of Massachusetts should have come of such a "bloodthirsty," "cruel," and "oppressive" colony as it is represented by him to have been. It is *incredible* that Boston, the mirror that reflects the feelings and the principles of the commonwealth at the bay, whose heart is in Faneuil Hall, "the cradle of liberty," should have been trained up from infancy to maturity in such a school of oppression and tyranny. It is as true of states as of men, "Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it;" and the converse of this is equally true,— "Thorns and snares are in the way of the froward." The rod of tyranny is never relinquished. The theatre of oppression is purified only with *blood*. The exercise of despotic power is restrained only by revolution.

We say again, it is **INCREDIBLE** that the Massachusetts which Dr. C. describes, produced the Massachusetts which so early sounded the tocsin of liberty and thundered in the Revolution, and without whose efforts to break the British yoke, we might now be paying taxes without representation, and sitting under the ægis of English Episcopacy, and paying tithes of all we possess, even to the mint, and anise, and cummin, to such men as Dr. Coit, beside our own ecclesiastical burdens, as our brethren do in England. The absurdity of his arguments proves the falsity of his facts, and the falsity of his alledged facts shows, as we have seen, the worthlessness of his conclusions. It is a pitiful spectacle to see a man in his station, with the bishops and clergy who have endorsed his perversion of history, occupying a position in which we see not how they can be screened from the charge of wilful falsehood and deliberate calumny, with "malice aforethought."

Another still more important topic is the *Toryism* of this book, and consequently of not a few of the bishops and clergy of "the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States."

This book is "a confession of judgment" to that charge, and as the facts exist we are glad to know it.

They go with Charles for the prerogative, and with Laud for the royal and Episcopal supremacy, with the Tories before the Revolution of 1689, and with the Tories here, before and during the Revolution of 1776.

They show it by their sympathy with Laud and with Charles, by their apologies both for their conduct and their principles, by their opposition to free principles, to democracy, to republican government, to the progress which the Puritans actually made, and to the advance of free principles under their auspices.

Hear Dr. C.'s sympathy for the "old tormented archbishop" and "Laud's *harmless* superstition," p. 331. "Let Laud and High Commission Judges pass as samples of comparative *innocence*," p. 332. "I feel as if it were any thing but sin to defend him." "Venerable, but alas, Episcopal Lambeth! the blood of two of your archbishops, MARTYRED by Romanists and by Puritans, proclaims who were your worst enemies, and how earnestly you have contended for *the faith once delivered to the Saints*, by "the armour of **RIGHTEOUSNESS ON THE RIGHT HAND AND ON THE LEFT.**" p. 78.

His sympathy for such a bitter persecutor as Laud, shows his own intolerance. It shows his opposition to the great principles of liberty which the Puritans maintained against all the power of the church and the state, whatever may have been their imperfections, for the hierarchy was as earnestly devoted to the prerogatives of the crown as to the supremacy of the king in the church, the pre-eminence of the bishops and the uniformity of the ceremonies. This is a matter that Dr. Coit keeps out of sight, and yet it is the great fact to be remembered in studying that whole period of history.

To frown upon the Puritans' resistance to civil and ecclesiastical tyranny, and upon their earnest advocacy of freedom, is a full confession of his readiness to submit to both; and to defend the *men* as he does, is to *endorse* their *princi-*

ples. He shows also in various other ways the affinities of himself and his party for the principles which in the reign of Charles II. were denominated "Tory."

Laud, with whom they so heartily sympathize as a *martyr* "contending for the faith," "by the armour of RIGHTEOUSNESS" (p. 78), was a man who, from his elevation to the primacy, was a "zealous supporter of the hated administration of Buckingham," and "was also the most active member of the high commission court, the arbitrary and severe proceedings of which were so justly odious to the nation."*

Such was the feeling of the nation in reference to the archbishop that the long parliament at once impeached him, afterward tried him for high treason, papistry and cruelty, and finally by a bill of attainder condemned him to death for high treason, and he was beheaded by a parliament not Puritan in the sense of Dr. Coit; but by one, *every* one of whose members was a conformist to the archbishop's own church.†

Besides all this, Dr. Coit and our Episcopalian hierarchy show their Toryism by their approbation of the profligate tyrant Charles II.

They honour him as the author of "the abolition of death by fire, and of the passage of the habeas corpus act," which were *extorted* from him by the spirit of liberty in the commons,‡ which had originated with the Puritans, and been fostered by them, and for which Dr. C. seems almost ready to commit them to the flames. "Such was the state of the country, that Charles was OBLIGED TO GIVE WAY to some popular measures, and the great palladium of civil liberty, the habeas corpus bill, passed."§

"Like his father, he *determined to govern* without" a parliament. No sovereign in Europe was more absolute than he. "Had he been an active prince, the fetters of tyranny might have been *completely riveted*." "He was a most dishonourable and heartless monarch and man."|| "Scotland,

* Am. Encyc. 7. 442. † Neal's Hist. Pur'ns, I. 350. ‡ II. 286.

§ Am. Encyc. 3. 90.

|| Am. Encyc. 3. 91.

driven into insurrection by his arbitrary attempt to restore *Episcopacy*, was at length completely dragooned into submission, and the relics of the Covenanters were suppressed with circumstances of *great barbarity*.* This is the man whom Dr. Coit and the bishops and clergy who admire the meekness of Laud, revere as a generous and tolerant and liberal-minded prince. But besides his despotism in civil matters, and his profligacy in domestic and social life, and besides many cases of individual suffering for non-conformity and of varied severities inflicted on Dissenters, “near EIGHT THOUSAND Protestant Dissenters PERISHED in prison in the reign of King Charles II.” “They suffered in their trades and estates, within the compass of *three years*, at least *two millions*.”† How many of those *fifteen hundred* Quakers did this same king persecute and imprison? and how many of those *three hundred and fifty* Quakers who died of their sufferings in prison, must this same king answer for?‡ Their *blood* cries out against him.

And the want of a cap or a tippet was *just* as fatal to the standing of the Puritan ministers as *Popery* or *Atheism*. But “the Act of Uniformity was a triumphal overthrow of papal machinations,” p. 55. By this he says that he means to insinuate or assert that Puritans were leagued with papists and *similar* to them. But how ridiculous to pretend that they who *suffered* from the Act of Uniformity were more like papists than they who made it!! Does the man expect to be believed, even by the most foolish dupe of Episcopalianism, when asserting, as he largely does, the similarity of papistry and Puritanism? pp. 49, 55, 80, 81; and that Congregationalists and Presbyterians are more like Roman Catholics than Episcopalians are, including Bishop Doane with his crucifix and altar, Bishop Whittingham editing Palmer on the Church, Bishop Onderdonk not yet deposed, and Pusey and Newman and Laud; or than Episcopacy itself, with its hierarchy, its

* Amer. Encyc. 3. 91.

† Neal's Hist. 2. 322.

‡ P. 321, 322.

baptismal regeneration, its denials of the right of private judgment? etc.*

But these are only "the self-defensive severities of England." So it is only *self-defence* to eject *two thousand* faithful ministers for nothing but that they cannot in conscience wear every tittle of your prescribed dress and use every absurd or wicked ceremony in worship; it is but self-defence to imprison some *sixty thousand* or more of godly persons for such reasons, until about *ten thousand* of them perish under those severities!

We notice these things to show how ready he is to apologize for, and defend the Tory clergy and court; while all this time the conforming clergy are preaching up the doctrines of passive obedience and the Divine right of kings and bishops, and inculcating the duty of submitting to this tyranny and persecution without a murmur.

Nor are we much disturbed by what he intended for denunciation, when he says, "The blood of Strafford and Laud and Charles I. will stain their annals forever," p. 35. "Puritan ministers preached down Strafford and Laud and Charles, and Puritan emissaries of state dragged them to the block," p. 36. "They were the radicals and destructives of their day," p. 35. So they were in 1776, and Episcopacy then was "conservative," as we have seen, just as Dr. C. is now. They were then as hearty denouncers of "rebellion to tyrants," as Dr. C. or any of the conservatives of 1648. We do not fear the responsibility of endorsing the efforts of

* "There is a curious coincidence between Popery and Puritanism, i. e. their multiplying the notes of the church, beyond those given in the ancient creeds. The creeds say that the church is one, holy, catholic, apostolic, i. e. has four notes or marks. But Popery, by Bellarmine, says she has *fifteen*, and Congregationalism, by Bartlett, that she has seven. Both indulge private judgment on such a subject." p. 452. Very well. Episcopacy has this *same curious coincidence* with Popery, or it has not. If it has, will Dr. Coit answer his argument; if not, then Episcopalians have no private judgment upon the marks of a true church—WHICH?

This attempt at argument proves, to our satisfaction, that the Reviewer has very little judgment of *any* sort.

the Puritans to burst the fetters of that bondage. If there was one reason why the patriot should by *force* resist the sovereign in 1776, there were an *hundred* why he should do it in 1648. If ever oppression justified a resort to arms, and the effusion of blood, it was when Charles II. attempted with his soldiery the seizure of the men in parliament who dared to speak for freedom, and, by every illegal exaction, extorted the money which the law and the parliament refused; and he who, with the light of this day, defends such tyranny against the patriotic resistance of the Hampdens and Eliots of that day, is a baser *tory* than he who burned the homes of his "*dissenting*" countrymen in 1776.

See how this republican doctor, and these bishops and clergy despise the Puritans' struggles for freedom.

Hear him censuring the resistance of New England to the tyranny of Edmund Andross—"an Episcopal governor" who came to deprive the people of every vestige of liberty—as persecution of Episcopalians, p. 231–234; and how did they persecute even him? They would not give up to him **THEIR** houses of worship, and ring for him **THEIR** bells, p. 205. Nay, so terrible and bloody was this persecution, that not a "Puritan truckman among them all would have travelled from his path one hair's breadth, to allow the Liturgy to be joined in with less distraction;" at least he guesses it was so, for he confesses he does not know, p. 205. And this is a specimen of his ability to "match *every grievance* in England with its parallel here," p. 67. It is even so.

"The 'sovereign people' are dragging" us to "the precipice;" "affright at the consequence of *too much liberty*" "does not surprise" him!! p. 234. "Such are some of the results of intelligent apprehension," p. 235. "Multitudes think that" "the right which they [our fathers] assumed to think for themselves in religion, and to act for themselves in politics," is fraught with every peril. He dreads the levelling and revolving system of politics, p. 235. "Who, by and by, there may be to rejoice in the doctrine, that "rebellion to tyrants is

obedience to God," "taught by the Puritans of the *last* and the preceding century, is concealed beneath a *dark* horizon."

"But I will not dwell upon a strain *which* MAY LAY MYSELF OPEN TO A SUSPICION OF POLITICAL PREFERENCES AND PARTISANSHIP, which I neither feel nor entertain," p. 237. The foolish tory is *conscious* that he has proved his disgust for our popular institutions, though for the sake of the ecclesiastical bearing of the argument, he will not blot a single line. If the pages just referred to have any meaning, they demonstrate his full conviction that the popular element in our institutions will bring ruin to the country, that it is always dangerous in its tendency, and, in connexion with his sympathy for Laud, his defence of the Charleses, his praises of the stability and benefits of monarchy, show infallibly his political preferences. They are just the same that controlled Episcopacy in the war of the Revolution.

We, on the other hand, regard the popular element in our civil institutions as their glory and their salvation. We believe that the *people* both *can* and *will* govern themselves, unless Episcopacy should prevail in the land; and Dr. Coit confesses that to Puritanism the country is indebted for this popular element. This is the difference between us; let the country and the world judge.

Our limits forbid the notice, in the present number, of innumerable errors, which render this book worthy of a place beside the immortal Sam Peters's History of Connecticut and Baron Munchausen. No man is competent to appreciate the history of Puritanism, unless he can free his mind from the twin heresies of legitimacy in government and succession in the church.

He who cannot perceive how the magistrate, who exercises "the powers that be" in virtue of his election by the people, is as truly "*ordained of God*," and is as truly "the minister of God,"* as if he assumed those powers in virtue of his hereditary descent from a monarch, has no capacity to

* Rom. 13.

perceive the excellency of Puritanism in the state. So he, who cannot see how the persons who shall bear the commission of Christ, as ministers of his gospel, may, by divine authority, be designated to that office by that "*church of the living God, which is the PILLAR and ground of the TRUTH,*"* as well as by a succession of *bishops*, some of whom are only *PILLARS of salt†* to warn the world to avoid their abominations, is not capable of judging of the merits of Puritanism in the church.

We have in this book new and substantial evidence that these errors are as inseparable as the Siamese twins. Cut off either of them, and both will die. We thus find additional encouragement to hope, that the reaction of our admirable free civil institutions upon the erroneous ecclesiastical systems of the land will become one of the most powerful means of their recovery from error.

ARTICLE III.

JOHNSON'S REVIEW OF HOPKINS'S EXAMINATION OF JOSH. 10:12-15, REVIEWED.

By Rev. T. M. Hopkins, Pastor Pres. Ch. Racine, W. T.

A Review of the Rev. T. M. Hopkins's Examination of Josh. 10:12-15. By Professor H. M. Johnson, Methodist Quarterly Review, October 1845.

THE Reviewer introduces himself to the reader in the following strain of purest fustian. "The Biblical Repository for Jan. 1845, presents us with a full grown, and perhaps timely delivery, of a German embryo idea, in the shape of a profound doubt of the genuineness of the passage in Joshua, giving account, *that the sun and moon stood still;*

* 1 Tim. 3, 15.

† Gen. 19, 26.

which doubt grows in the mind of the writer into a certainty of disbelief, duly compacted with ligamentous evidence, authority and criticism; and arrayed withal in the necessary argumental investments. We wish to unfold the wrappings of this new-born, before its strength shall have become consolidated; to dissect its members and prove whether there be in it a life which may not die."

By the time we had concluded this, we entertained sound fears, that it was all over with us; we had even settled in our own mind upon an epitaph: "*Alas, poor Yorick!*" Because, having seen that our "embryo idea" was threatened with "dissection," we thought it possible, that a like fate awaited ourselves: on more mature reflection, however, we have been led to regard what is past, on the part of the Reviewer, only a "timely," and as we would fondly hope, "*safe delivery*" of a vast amount of wind.

Finding ourselves, therefore, still in the land of the living, we shall endeavour to show to the satisfaction of every reasonable man, that "this new-born" does, in fact, "contain in it a life which may not die."

At the very outset of his enterprise, the Reviewer seeks to secure a verdict in his favour, and to make all necessary provision against prospective defeat, by representing, that all such speculations as this, which he is about to "dissect," are the legitimate offspring of German Rationalism. How easy thus to overthrow an antagonist! Who can entertain a doubt after this, that the sun and moon stood still, according to "The book of Jasher?"

Homer has somewhere related that a snail, on looking out of his shell, saw a frog leaping by; and being seized with a desire to leap in like manner, forthwith crept out for that purpose; but upon making trial of his leaping powers, soon found that he must first build himself a stool. Here we have, if we are not utterly deceived, the veritable and main object of all such manœuvres. In order to enable the reader to see clearly and judge correctly in this matter, he must look through glasses smoked with slanderous suspicion!

There is not a candid man on earth, one, over whose intellect the smell of thought ever passed, who would discover, on reading the Examination, *the faintest traces of that form of Infidelity.*

"Success," says Johnson, (the *Dr.*, not the Professor,) "inspires courage:" and having met with no insurmountable obstacles in getting through with an introduction, the Reviewer girds up the energies of his pen to the task of meeting the arguments brought forward in support of the doctrine of the Examination. We shall endeavour to accompany him, at an humble distance, if possible,—to learn the fate of our unhappy idea; and if it is slain, "be in at the death." He condescends to shed a ray of hope upon our prospects, by admitting the first argument in all its force: the argument (see Biblical Repository for January, 1845, p. 107) is, "Joshua 10: 12–15, is evidently an interruption of the narrative; an interruption, which, when considered with reference to its own statement at the close, destroys the credibility of the passage." It is there added in explanation, "the reader has only to leave it out, and he will find a well connected account of a series of events, in all parts perfectly consistent with itself." "True," says the Reviewer,—“and the same may be said of any paragraph in any narrative of events, occurring successively, and not necessarily dependent on one another.” But we ask if these statements are *not* so dependent one on the other, that the credibility of v. 15, "And Joshua returned and all Israel with him unto the camp at Gilgal," is hopelessly lost, if the *rest* of the narrative (v. 16 et. seq.) be true? How can Joshua and all Israel with him, return from Makkedah to Gilgal, a distance of some thirty-three or thirty-four miles, the evening of the day on which they had achieved so signal a victory, and yet *be* at Makkedah (see v. 16) to bring out the five kings to slay them? If Joshua and all Israel with him, have returned to Gilgal, they are not at Makkedah as is stated in the subjoined text: which now of these two conflicting statements must we give up?

In order to escape, if possible, from this difficulty, the Reviewer endeavors to separate verse 15 from the rest of the suspicious passage. He admits that all commentators have found a difficulty in it, which they knew not what to do with; and that the statement therein made is not reconcilable with the surrounding text. (See *Methodist Quarterly Review*, pp. 507, 508.) But his labours to save the remainder, when he has given up verse 15, amount to but little, as we shall soon see. With what a grace, the complaint of cutting knots instead of untying them, comes from a man that finds it necessary so soon to introduce the knife! Especially is this the case, when, in the course of his efforts to defend the rest of the passage, he becomes so thoroughly convinced of the hopelessness of his cause as to express a willingness to give up all after the appeal in verse 13, "Is not this written?" etc. (*Review*, p. 508.);

The controversy then would seem to be narrowed down to a very small compass; but no, we go for the whole, and nothing less. There is such a marked family likeness in all the parts as to force us to the belief, that they belong together; and since we are favoured with a sight at the Book from which the whole appears to have been taken, we shall prefer to present "an extract," a larger one than the disputed passage, yet one that embraces it, to satisfy the reader we have judged correctly in deciding, that inasmuch as in life they have been most firmly united, in death they should not be parted.

The reader will of course allow himself to smile at the idea just advanced; yet it is most true, "The Book of Jasher" is now lying before me; the veritable סֵפֶר הַיָּשָׁר, "Sepher Hajasher," (literally "correct record,") with its chapters and verses and with the passage in dispute, is at hand! We shall quote it in its English dress, presuming the Reviewer will be satisfied with the assurance, that it claims to have been originally written in Rabbinical Hebrew, to have been discovered in Jerusalem, when the city was taken by Titus, and to have been first printed at Venice, A. D. 1613. So much

for its authentic antiquity ! What could be more satisfactory ?

If there is any thing of the ridiculous and absurd in this representation, it belongs neither to us nor our cause. Our Professor must share it, for aught we see, with no one,—since it is exclusively his. He maintains, as we shall soon see, that it was altogether “reasonable to suppose, that a poetic account of this great miracle was actually in circulation, *before* history, with a graver pen, enacted the imperishable record” ! (Review, p. 509.) A book containing the famous extract, a volume as large as the entire Pentateuch, written and put in circulation, *after* the miracle of stopping the sun had been performed and *before* that miracle had been recorded by the sacred historian, a flying scroll which has been sailing through the heavens, lo, these thirty-five hundred years, has finally alighted upon our table, here before us ! *credat qui potest ; non ego*. He who can receive this, ought surely never to be accused of not believing enough.

The reader, it is presumed, and possibly the Reviewer, will be glad to see the entire passage from which the verses in dispute are thought to have been taken. He can then determine for himself, whether there be any good reason for stopping at the appeal in the midst of verse 13,—as suggested by the Professor,—regarding that which precedes it as a true record of an event which actually took place, and that which follows, to the end of verse 13, the original extract.

BOOK OF JASHER, CHAPTER 88 : 63.

“ And when they were smiting, the day was declining towards evening, and Joshua said in the sight of all the people,

Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon,
And thou moon in the valley of Ajalon,
Until the nation shall have avenged itself upon its enemies.
And the Lord hearkened to the voice of Joshua,
And the sun stood still in the midst of the heavens,
And it stood still six and thirty (צו"ו) times, or moments,
And the moon also stood still,
And hasted not to go down a whole day.

And there was no day like that before it or after it,
That the Lord hearkened to the voice of a man,
For the Lord fought for Israel."

CHAPTER 89.

- (1) "Then spake Joshua this song, on the day that the Lord had given the Amorites into the hand of Joshua, and the children of Israel; and he said, in the sight of all Israel,
- (2) Thou hast done mighty things, O Lord,
Thou hast performed great deeds,
Who is like unto thee?
My lips shall sing to thy name.
- (3) My goodness, my fortress, my high tower,
I will sing a new song unto thee,
Thou art the strength of my salvation.
- (4) All the kings of the earth shall praise thee,
The princes of the world shall sing to thee,
The children of Israel shall rejoice in thy salvation,
They shall sing and praise thy power.
- (5) To thee, O Lord, did we confide;
We said, thou art our God,
For thou wast our shelter
And strong tower against our enemies.
- (6) To thee we cried and were not ashamed,
In thee we trusted and were delivered;
When we cried unto thee thou didst hear our voice,
Thou didst deliver our souls from the sword,
Thou didst show unto us thy grace,
Thou didst give unto us thy salvation,
Thou didst rejoice our hearts with thy strength.
- (7) Thou didst go forth for our salvation,
With thine arm thou didst redeem thy people,
Thou didst answer us from the heavens of thy holiness,
Thou didst save us from ten thousands of people.
- (8) The sun and moon stood still in heaven, (see Hab. 3: 11)
And thou didst stand in thy wrath against our oppressors,
And didst command thy judgments over them.
- (9) All the princes of the earth stood up,
The kings of the nations had gathered themselves together,
They were not moved at thy presence.
They desired thy battles.
- (10) Thou didst rise against them in thine anger,
And didst bring down thy wrath upon them;
Thou didst destroy them in thine anger,
And cut them off in thine heart.

- (11) Nations have been consumed with thy fury,
Kingdoms have declined because of thy wrath,
Thou didst wound kings in the day of thine anger.
- (12) Thou didst pour out thy fury upon them,
Thy wrathful anger took hold of them,
Thou didst turn their iniquity upon them,
And didst cut them off in their wickedness.
- (13) They did spread a trap, they fell therein, (Ps. 7 : 15. 57 : 6)
In the net they hid their foot was caught.
- (14) Thine hand was ready for all thine enemies,
Who said, through their sword they possessed the land,
Through their arm they dwelt in the city;
Thou didst fill their faces with shame,
Thou didst bring their horns down to the ground,
Thou didst terrify them in thy wrath,
And didst destroy them in thine anger.
- (15) The earth trembled and shook,
At the sound of thy storm over them,
Thou didst not withhold their souls from death,
And didst bring down their life to the grave.
- (16) Thou didst pursue them in thy storm,
Thou didst consume them in thy whirlwind,
Thou didst turn their rain into hail,
They fell in deep pits so that they could not rise.
- (17) Their carcasses were like rubbish
Cast out in the middle of the streets.
- (18) They were consumed and destroyed in thine anger,
Thou didst save thy people with thy might.
- (19) Therefore our hearts rejoice in thee,
Our souls exult in thy salvation.
- (20) Our tongues shall relate thy might,
We will sing and praise thy wondrous works.
- (21) For thou didst save us from our enemies,
Thou didst deliver us from those who rose up against us,
Thou didst destroy them from before us,
And depress them beneath our feet.
- (22) Thus shall all thine enemies perish, O Lord,
And the wicked shall be like chaff driven by the wind,
And thy beloved shall be like trees planted by the waters.

(23) So Joshua returned and all Israel with him unto the camp at Gilgal, after having smitten all the kings, so that not a remnant was left of them.

(24) And the five kings fled alone on foot from battle, and hid themselves in a cave,"—[all this, kind reader, after they had all

been smitten so that not a remnant was left,] "And Joshua sought for them in the field of battle, and did not find them.

(25) And it was afterwards told to Joshua, saying, the kings are found and behold they are hidden in a cave," etc. etc. (See Josh. 10: 16, et seq. Almost word for word !)

Here are the facts in the case ; and here "the song," which Joshua sung, if we may credit the book of Jasher, when the Lord had given up the Amorites into the hand of Israel ! But this song, which claims to have been written immediately upon the occurrence of the events which it recounts, is made up, as any one may see, of detached sentences from the Psalms of David, the writings of Solomon and of the Prophets. In the midst of it, (verse 8,) we have the passage which undoubtedly originated the story of the sun and moon standing still ;—a passage either quoted from Hab. 3: 11, or Hab. 3: 11 is a quotation from that. The reader may have his choice here between the two suppositions: the Reviewer it seems has already made his election. It is, in his estimation, far more reasonable to suppose that the poetic effusion (the song by Jasher) should be antecedent to the prose record ; and as no one believes that Habakkuk was written before the book of Joshua, it follows, that Habakkuk is a literal quotation from the book of Jasher ! At the close of the whole, we have the famous passage which terminates the extract as we find it in Joshua : "And Joshua returned and all Israel with him unto the camp at Gilgal."

We submit now, whether the theory, which, in the opinion of our Reviewer, smells so rank of German Rationalism, and which he seems to think would look very foolish even to its author, if he would bestow ten years more of study upon it, is not a plausible one ? Nay, more ; is it not the *only* one which an intelligent, careful reader will regard as worthy of any confidence ?*

* We think the supposition a most reasonable one, that he who had the temerity to introduce the passage where we find it in Joshua, tenth chapter, saw

Devoutly were it to be wished, that this so-called "poetic effusion" had never seen the light: or, that no one had ever thought to illuminate the sacred record by introducing extracts from it. We feel bound to say of it as a whole, something as a clear-minded, sound-hearted old man once said of a sermon from a Universalist: "The scripture that he quoted, and quoted *right*, was good." So of the self-styled "Sepher Ha-jasher," or "correct record;" that which it contains, which is scripture, is well enough; unless so combined with the fancy and conceit of him who has gathered it up, as to pervert utterly its meaning; which is the case before us.

The reader, we think, will sympathize with us in our disgust for this book, when we assure him, that among all the Apocryphal writings now extant, there are few, if any, more replete with absurdities, vain and inconsistent surmises, or more deeply imbued throughout with the smut and moonshine of monkish superstition and folly. It commences with the history of the creation of man; it claims (as indeed it must) to have been extant when Joshua was written, in order to be quoted. And yet, (O consistency, thou art a jewel!) near the close, and immediately after the record of Joshua's exploits, it speaks of the conquest of Britain by the Latins! Chapters three and four are occupied with an account of Enoch; he is represented by the writer as having been a king, a *great* king, a *king of kings*! Query, where could he have obtained subjects at this age of the world? Next, that we might be thoroughly penetrated with the exaltation and renown of Enoch, the historian represents him as passing most of his time in retirement; thus modestly intimating or sug-

the evident inconsistency of quoting the book of Jasher as a book that was extant when that of Joshua was written. Hence the appeal, verse 13, "Is not this written?" etc. These words we regard as his *own*: while *all* the rest is from the book of Jasher. The *song*, too, which had been gathered up, as we have proved, from all parts of the Old Testament, was too long to be inserted entire; therefore, we have only the beginning and the end of it. Hence the astounding absurdity involved in it: "And Joshua returned and all Israel with him unto the camp at Gilgal;" since verse 16 of Joshua x., and verse 24 of the *song* before us, are a plain contradiction of it.

gesting that Enoch was *a monk*! A circumstance which indicates the age of the document itself. But the writer, in order to lend a finishing touch to the exalted character of Enoch, after having spoken of him in the language of the Bible, as walking with God here below, sends him to heaven on a pacing horse! Was not this the original of our Reviewer's "winged Pegasus?" Jasher's account of Nimrod's hatred of Abraham, is but a garbled reiteration of Matthew's record of Herod attempting to destroy Christ. The star which he represents as making its appearance at the birth of Abraham, needs no explanation. He describes Babel with great particularity. It was a tower ten miles in diameter, and thirty miles round; was carried up to such a height, that when a brick started at the bottom early in the morning, being tossed from man to man, one directly over the other, it would arrive at the top late in the evening! Moreover, as those on the top amused themselves with shooting arrows directly up, they perceived, on the descent of these arrows, they were covered with blood: by which they inferred, says the writer, that they had mortally wounded many in heaven! And at the dispersion, he is careful to name all the countries colonized and settled by the various tribes which were scattered abroad. Among them we have an account of the settlement of France and of Italia! The only shadow of a misgiving in the mind of the writer as to the consistency of these things, manifests itself in an awkward attempt to furnish the name "Roman," and that of the river "Tiber," with Hebrew terminations!

Still, we maintain that this book, in order to have been referred to in Joshua, must have been extant when Joshua was written. Our heroic Reviewer felt this, and manfully girded up himself to the task of making all appear smooth and credible. He says, (Review, p. 509,) "We claim it as the more reasonable to suppose, that the poetic effusion," (the poem by Jasher,) "should have been *antecedent* to the prose record;" (the record made by Joshua.) He even claims "that it is more reasonable to suppose, that the flight of the winged Pegasus should have outstripped the

tardier movements of the pedestrian muse"! We profess to know a little of almost every thing; but we have no knowledge of his meaning here. He has evidently had the good fortune to dive so deep into the merits of his own cause, as to bring back proofs with him that he has been to the bottom. Well, perhaps the sentence which immediately succeeds is epexigetical, and will throw some light on its predecessor. He adds, "the shout of victory and the telegraphic announcement frequently find utterance in poetic numbers, while history, with a graver dignity, enacts the imperishable record, when the tide of excitement shall have given place to the calmer flow of unexaggerated truth." This is somewhat more lucid and intelligible; a plain English translation of which is, "The book of Joshua was evidently not written till abundant time had been given for the flight of the winged Pegasus." The man whose credulity can overcome such obstacles as these, will never find any in the way of a position which he wishes to establish. Our Reviewer may rest easy, too, we think, as to another point: admitting his position as absurd as we regard it, he has reached his ultimatum in absurdity. He cannot be more so, for the same reason assigned by a recent writer, that the weather could not be any colder—the thermometer was not long enough. The mercury was in the bulb; how could it go lower? So with him, who in the face of such time-defying proofs of the utter hopelessness of his cause, still persists in endeavouring to defend it; he has sunk himself in the scale of a generous and accurate estimation of these things so low, there is no room to go lower.

We say, then, in his own language, "when no other object in the universe is proposed, but to support a favourite theory, we do, in the name of Christianity, in the name of candid criticism, and in the name of the sacred regard we have for the integrity of that book which contains the principles of our cherished religion, most earnestly and most solemnly protest against such trifling with the word of God as this."

But when was the book of Joshua written? The Reviewer thinks that many things therein found did not occur till after

Joshua's death; so that they could not have been recorded by his pen. To this position he is driven, that he may find time for his "winged Pegasus" and his "pedestrian muse" to go forth proclaiming the victories of Joshua, and the miracles he wrought by a "poetic effusion,"—ere "history, with a graver dignity, shall enact the imperishable record." When, therefore, was this record made? And by whom? Was he a man whose testimony we are to receive, as one of those "holy men of old who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost?" Most certainly, if the book be any part of the Bible. And this man, whether Joshua or somebody else, inspired of God to record that and only that which is truth, finds it necessary, in order to command belief, to appeal to a piece of fugitive poetry which had been dropped in the flight of a "winged Pegasus!"

But the Professor, somewhere along here, sees so many and serious difficulties gather thick and dark around his cause, that he expresses a willingness to give up *all after the appeal in verse 13*. (Review, p. 508, bottom.) But we cannot concur: there is such a marked family likeness in all its parts, that we are disposed still to maintain for them a common parentage. Our extract from the book of Jasher shows, with great plainness, that this strong resemblance is caused by a common origin, and a common character. We shall endeavour to see that all, both before and after the appeal, share one common fate.

Let the supposition, then, be made, that Jos. 10: 12-15 is to be retained, because the thing it states is true. Wherefore this citation then of another writer? Is it to command belief? Where in all the word of God do we find another case like it? Inspired men, in every part of the Bible, are remarkable for moving directly along in their narrative, as if the thought not once occurs to them that their testimony will not be received. Why this trembling, this apparent misgiving as to the reception which their testimony will meet with? They could record the history of every other miracle in the Bible down to the resurrection and ascension of Christ; and

make use of no long preface to prepare the mind of the reader for something strange and unaccountable;—and when announced, they do not pause and appeal to the book of Jasher or to any thing else, with a view to sustain themselves and command belief. Every record is made with a coolness and a deliberation which look like any thing rather than the fear of not being credited. And we love the Bible for this very thing: it looks like *the book of God*, instead of “the book of Jasher.” There is something here which carries great weight with it.

Our Reviewer appears to have had some knowledge of the arts of controversy, and to have availed himself of that knowledge, on several occasions: sometimes he has found it convenient to act upon the principle, that “the better part of valour is discretion.” We have an example of this in his passing by, without noticing, a single consideration found on pages 110, 111 of the Examination. The book of Jasher is referred to once more in the Bible, viz., in 2 Samuel 1: 18. There, on the occasion of the death of Saul and Jonathan, David composed an Elegy; at the commencement of which, we are told, as in the passage in dispute, “this is written in the book of Jasher.” *What* is written there? The Elegy of course.* Well, then, here is an event recorded in this book, at least four hundred and thirty years later than that referred to in the passage in Joshua! Did the learned Professor’s “winged Pegasus” continue his flight for so long a period as this? How shall this difficulty be disposed of? On the supposition that a poem was written announcing the event, as the Reviewer himself maintains, immediately after the miracle and before the sacred penman had had time to word it, how shall we account for the fact, that another event, which did not transpire till four hundred and thirty years afterwards, is written in the same book and said to have been recorded by the same writer? Must we regard Jasher, or the author of

* The passage referred to in the book of Jasher, ch. 56: 9, is represented as being Jacob’s dying address to his son Judah!

that book, a prophet? Why did not the Reviewer think of this difficulty ; or knowing it, why did he not look out a way around it ? It would have enabled us to understand far better than we now do, the extent of the flight of his famous " Pegasus." Perhaps he would escape from this dilemma as a certain Mormon did from one not less fatal to the claims of this book. He had been asked to account for the fact, that in the book of Mormon there were several literal quotations from Shakspeare. " Now," said the inquirer, " your book claims to have been written some seven or eight hundred years before the Christian era ; how is it, that your author quotes from Shakspeare ?" " He does not," replied the confused Mormon, " Shakspeare quotes from him."

In the same way the ground of the Review may be defended, and in no other ; you must admit that a book has been twice quoted by inspired men, while the book itself is not in existence till a thousand years or more afterwards ! A piece of fugitive poetry by a profane author, a flying scroll dropped from the pocket of a " pedestrian muse," a record made by the genius of a " winged Pegasus," and thrown upon the winds, in his flight hap-hazard through the heavens, quoted by inspired men, in order to gain for themselves a credibility in the subject matter of their own testimony in respect to a transaction which thousands and tens of thousands could testify to as well as themselves ! Surely, a faith that can bridge such a gulf of difficulties as this, is not to be despised !

Our Reviewer has succeeded, as he thinks, in convicting the author of the Examination of a great mistake in supposing that Josephus had noticed the book of Jasher. After quoting our reference, he says, " But to those of our readers whose memories may not be so fresh in this author, (Josephus,) what will be their surprise to be told, that Josephus, so far from giving an opinion at full length as quoted above, concerning the book of Jasher, has never once named the name of Jasher, throughout the whole of his histories, nor even so much as intimated that he ever heard of such a book !" (Review, p. 511.) On p. 512 of the same, he gives us the

words of Josephus, which have been believed to refer to the book of Jasher, "Now, that the day was lengthened at this time, and was longer than ordinary, *is expressed in the books laid up in the Temple.*" "We can easily see," adds this Reviewer, "that it is not among the wildest of conjectures, to suppose that the book of Jasher was intended." Nay; he admits that "this opinion gains a strength of probability amounting, *perhaps*, to inference."

It is no uncommon thing for a certain class of writers to attempt to argue both sides of a question. Either from excessive vanity in supposing that they could make out a much stronger case than their antagonists, they step over to the other side of the controversy; or they have not the penetration to perceive, that their arguments prove exactly the opposite of what they had supposed. We do not pretend to say which, in the case before us; but feel disposed to give the Reviewer all the advantage he may reap from a choice between evils. We can conceive of no higher motive that could have governed him, than a willingness to trifle with the good sense of his readers; at first to deny utterly that Josephus had said any thing that could be fairly construed into a reference to the book in question; then proceed directly to quote what has been by every one regarded as a reference to the book and its author, and afterwards admit that it is altogether probable Josephus *did* refer to the said book!

If however we have erred in this, we are not alone in our error,—as is abundantly evident to every one who knows any thing about the matter. The learned editor of the book, now lying before us, expresses himself of the same opinion. Mr. Home, Bp. Lowth, and others without number, think with him. Nevertheless, we are not unwilling it should pass without amendment, that Josephus *was* most profoundly ignorant of any such book, for the very grave and sufficient reason, *there was none*. Neither Greek nor Roman historians know any thing about it; which abundantly accounts for the fact, that the older MSS. of the Septuagint (the Vatican, and the Alexandrine) have not the passage in dispute. All which

goes to confirm us in the opinion we have long cherished, and many times expressed, that the book in question, at least in its present form, is not very ancient.

Is it not somewhat amusing and instructive to see our antagonist taking refuge, at this stage of the discussion, in the obscurity which he says hangs over the whole subject of said book ?—after valourously meeting the argument of the Examination, drawn from the absurdity of supposing that a record of the event could have been extant so as to have been quoted by Joshua ; and having glanced, too, at the hopeless dilemma in which the other reference to this book places him, the Reviewer gravely entrenches himself behind these difficulties ! An easy way truly, of getting out of trouble ! And must he not be favoured with an unusual amount of self-esteem, who can keep his countenance when he asks a generous reader to give any weight to his arguments or conclusions ? Having fought and retreated inch by inch over the whole territory, he gravely assures his reader that nobody knows any thing about the book !

He evidently shows an anxiety to close up the discussion on this part of the subject. He remarks, “ If its character could be determined to be such as is supposed ; if the little volume of miscellaneous forms ” (*poems?*) “ should be brought forth from the dust of slumbering ages entire and perfect, it yet has no further bearing upon the subject or argument, than to indicate the probable actuality of the event disputed.”

“ The little volume,” as we have already said, is before us. We perceive not the faintest traces of the “ dust of slumbering ages ” upon it ; on the contrary, it is quite a new book, divided up into chapters and verses like all that class of books, and bearing a marked resemblance to that whole family of Apocryphal writings which first saw the light about the commencement of the dark ages, and which contributed, more than any other cause, to form that darkness. The Ascension of Isaiah, the book of Enoch, the Apocalypse of Elijah, that of Zephaniah and of Zecharia, nay, even of Adam,

Abraham, Moses, Hystaspes, Peter, Paul, Cerinthus, St. Thomas, and of Stephen, together with a multitude which cannot even be named, all come before us claiming a very high antiquity, of course, but unfortunately, like "the little volume" in hand, bringing with them statements which point with unerring aim to the days of monkish sway, when superstition and bigotry were the winding sheet of the Church. Not only the theology of that age, but its literature, so far as it had any, was in most perfect harmony with the labours of our Reviewer, in that it was glad, at all times, to wrap itself in a mantle of marvellous obscurity.

Having overthrown, as he thinks, the first three arguments of the Examination, the Reviewer is brought to that which regards the poetic character of the disputed passage. "While the surrounding text is for the best of reasons the gravest prose, the passage itself is poetry." This remark is expressly limited to that part of verses 12-15 which refers to the questioned miracle; the rest we admit is prose. See Bib. Rep. for Jan. 1845, p. 113. We shall endeavour to be present, while this argument, like its unfortunate predecessors, is overthrown.

He commences his attack by assuring the reader, that "neither himself nor Mr. Hopkins knows enough of Hebrew *prosody*, to be able to affirm that this passage is *poetry*." It was not of *prosody*, directly, that we affirmed, but of *poetry*. We said then, and now repeat it, "accompanied with the necessary argumental investments," this passage is *poetry*, while all the surrounding text, or in other words, the *true* record, is *prose*. That, and the whole of that which relates to the point in debate, is *poetry*. The Reviewer denies this, declaring that neither of us knows any thing about it.

But if he himself is so profoundly ignorant of the distinguishing qualities of *poetry* in general and of *Hebrew poetry* in particular, as not to see them in verses 12, 13, how is he prepared to say whether Mr. Hopkins understands the matter or not? We shall be sorry, indeed, to learn that *his* ignorance on a given subject is proof that nobody understands it:

The flight of his famous Pegasus, according to his own showing, is not likely to prove very intelligible to him. That he does *not* understand the matter at all, he seems determined to place beyond dispute. "The characteristics," he says, "by which we are accustomed to distinguish poetry, are these, —to wit, the determination of the verse by a certain number and fixed order of feet, ascertained by the number and quantity of the syllables in each." Will the learned Professor deny that the book of Job (excepting chaps. 1, 2, and a verse or two at the close) is poetry? And can he find here his "determination of the verse?" etc. etc. Let him look also at the book of Psalms and that of Proverbs; then let him stretch his line upon the Prophets, and upon many other passages of Scripture, which are as clearly poetry as is Milton's *Paradise Lost*, and are as easily distinguished from prose as Exodus 15: 1-21 is from what precedes or follows it.

But, we will leave the question of our own, and that of the Professor's, knowledge of Hebrew poetry to be settled by an appeal to witnesses that are not only indisputably competent, but disinterested and impartial. Let it be remembered, we have asserted in the *Examination*, and repeated here, that the passage in dispute is poetry, while all that precedes or follows is prose; and on this circumstance have maintained, that the whole is an interpolation. But Mr. J. *denies it*; yet on p. 508, he says, "that which follows the question in v. 13, ("Is not this written," etc.) "is a little *more* poetical than that which precedes it." There are degrees then, it seems, in poetry, according to his own standard, and that too, when there is no poetry at all! But not to dwell here. Professor Hengstenberg of Berlin, in support of the point now under consideration, remarks, "the book of Jasher was undoubtedly a *poetical book*; this is evident both from the poetical character of the words, (referring to the passage in Joshua,) *HERE ALLOWEDLY BORROWED FROM IT, in which the parallelism of members cannot be mistaken.*" He can

determine whether the passage be poetic or not, by another and a very different consideration from that which regards "the number and quantity of syllables in each verse;" viz. "the parallelism of members." And the Prof. adds the testimony of Masius in support of the poetic character of the passage. "There can be no doubt," says M., "that the words, 'so the sun stood still in the midst of Heaven, and hasted not to go down about a whole day' are *rhythmical*, and are borrowed from the book of Jasher." M. Dupin regards the book of Jasher a collection of poems, "**BECAUSE THE WORDS cited by Joshua are poetical expressions, not very proper for historical memoirs.**" And Dr. Clark (see com. in loco) not only admits the poetic character of the passage, but maintains that it is even *rhythmical*. Will the Professor make war with his theological godfather?

The inconsistency, if not even folly, of the Reviewer's position here, is the more remarkable when we call to mind the circumstance which created a necessity for his "winged Pegasus." It will be remembered, that the ground taken in the Examination, is, that it is absurd to suppose, that a poem should have been written by Jasher or any body else, commemorative of the miracle, before a record of it was made, or would have been made, by the sacred historian, had it ever occurred. In answer, the Professor stoutly maintains, "that it is not only in accordance with nature, but is also *more* reasonable to suppose, that *the poetic effusion should be antecedent to the prose record*; and that the winged animal should have outstripped the tardier movements of the pedestrian muse." (Rev. p. 509.) Here it will be observed, the question of poetry is not only maintained, but the writer becomes so exceedingly anxious to get out a version of the whole matter in the form of a poem, "*before history*, with a graver dignity shall have had time to enact the imperishable record," that he even makes his "winged creature" outstrip the "pedestrian muse." A plain English translation of which is, if I understand it, "one poetic courier outstrips another;"

instead of outrunning a herald of prose. All which is bombastic sublimity, and withal very pertinent to the Reviewer's great object, no doubt.

But, when he arrives at the argument in the Examination, which is based on the very thing here contended for, that is, so far as the question of its *poetic character* is concerned, then forsooth, neither Mr. Hopkins, nor Professor Johnson, with all our critical acumen, our knowledge of Hebrew, (after it is translated into English,) and of Josephus, and the Rabbins,—“knows enough of Hebrew *prosody*, to be able to affirm that this passage *is poetry*.”

If then, kind reader, in our further humble endeavours to follow the Professor, we shall in some instances fairly lose our way, we must not be regarded as worthy of stripes or imprisonment. It is not, in fact, always easy to look after a writer, who seems bent on maintaining all sides of the question.

We come, then, to the annihilation of the sixth argument of the Examination. This, as the reader will find, (see Bib. Rep. p. 117,) is, “the absence of all knowledge of any such event, preserved either by history or tradition, in any part of the world—the utter silence of the whole human race in respect to any such day since time began.” This, as it is thought, is impossible, if such a day had ever been. The Noachian Deluge, which destroyed the old world, is every where remembered in the new: but here an event every way as miraculous and as grand, occurring much later and destroying *nobody*, is unknown to *every body*!

The Reviewer attempts to account for this, by supposing that “the flood left some natural monuments in all parts of the earth, to declare its existence, while the stopping of the sun and moon and the consequent prolongation of the day would leave none.” Does this gentleman ask us to believe that the *cause or causes* of this universal knowledge of a flood is the existence of certain marks or effects which it produced in the surface of the globe? Does he gravely assert that the North American Indian, the ancient inhabitants

of Mexico, to say nothing of still more barbarous tribes, have had the penetration to spell out the history of the flood, just as the geologist does, from the traces which remain in the rocks, and hills, or in the piles of water-washed pebbles which lie heaped upon the earth's surface? Is he ignorant, that among those nations and tribes which had scarcely the penetration to know any thing of a cause from seeing only the effect, *the fact* of a remembrance of the flood is proof of its existence next to that of sacred writ?

Perhaps we may as well leave this subject here, since, after having showed us how to account for the silence of the world in regard to that event, without being compelled to admit that it never took place, our Professor makes out to fish up a tradition from the profound depths of the past, which he thinks worthy of all acceptation: and shaking the scourge at us for having maintained, as we did in the Examination, that earth was as silent as the grave respecting any such event, he proceeds to bring forth the tradition. This we shall be disposed to regard 'a timely delivery:' the reader shall have it at full length.

"It was fabled, that in the far time the chariot of Phœbus was committed for a day to the guidance of his youthful son. The fiery coursers mount the skies with their wonted ardour. Soon aware of the absence of their rightful master, and spurning the authority of puerile ambition, they became more than ever impatient of control. Lifted to so dizzy a height, the untried charioteer becomes weak and at length stiff with fear. The reins slacken upon the backs of the celestial steeds, now full heated by the arduous labours of the morning. At the touch, they dash wildly away from the accustomed track, and wander at large over the wide scope of heaven. After coursing through all the region of the fixed stars, thawing from the torpidity of his eternal winter, the serpent that surrounds the pole, frightening the solemn Boötes with the lumber of his huge wagon to an undignified attempt to run, and spreading consternation through all the upper air, they at length come plunging precipitately earthward, and the moon sees with astonishment the horses of her brother taking their diurnal course beneath her own. Earth now becomes sensible of the disorder of heaven. Her clouds first are dissolved in vapour; the mountain tops begin to burn; the surface every where is dry and cracked; the herbage is withered

and parched ; the forests, instead of a protecting shade, afford material to the conflagration ; cities and nations seem devoted with the general ruin ; the fountains are slaked ; the rivers decrease ; old ocean is contracted in his bed beyond the power of the sea-god to resist, and through the yawning caverns the upper light surprises the gloomy sovereign of the shades and his dusky mate in the abodes of Tartarus. The omnipotent Jupiter now from his lofty throne, consulting the sum of things, sends forth the winged thunder-bolt, and strikes the hapless youth at the same time from the chariot and from life."

"Here then," adds the Professor, "is a tradition, in which, when we have made due allowance for the exaggerations of licensed antiquity, for the factitious ornaments of poetic imagining," etc., "we shall recognize all the principal features which a tradition of this miracle, (the stopping of the sun and moon,) could be expected to contain. Even for the Deluge, a retributive judgment of heaven so stupendous and awful, even for this we challenge the production of a traditional testimony more clear and satisfactory."

Verily, here is something remarkable. In a tradition, or something else, we scarcely know what to call it, in which the fiery coursers harnessed to the sun are represented as running away with it and dragging it all over the universe of God, the learned Professor can discover the remembrance of the *sun and moon standing still about a whole day!* No marvel that he should put in for "a due allowance for the exaggerations of a licensed antiquity;" it were well, at the same time, to stipulate for a little allowance for a few things this side of antiquity.

Well, he evidently thinks much of it ; perhaps we do him injustice that we think so little. He can get along by means of it somewhat smoothly with an argument which piled a mountain in his path, around which he saw no way either for himself or any body else. The profound ignorance of a world with respect to any such day since time was, is of itself sufficient to grind an opposite opinion to powder.

Without controversy there was an imperious demand for

something of the kind. Mr. Horne felt this, and therefore it was that he introduces the passage from Herodotus. In the absence of a better he is obliged to rest satisfied with that. But our Reviewer would have us estimate *his* as highly as *he* does. It is no new thing, however, that extreme want should create a value where it would not otherwise have existed.

The next argument in the Examination our Professor thinks as little of as we do of his tradition, if we may judge from the manner in which he has treated it. He has read, as he informs us, somewhere in the course of his researches after wisdom and knowledge, "that the preposition '*upon*' once gave rise to an elaborate discussion in the British Parliament, to determine whether it meant *before* or *after*." This, as it would seem, is sufficient to satisfy him, that when Joshua, standing at Makkedah, near the close of the day, gave command that the sun and moon should halt "*upon* Gibeon," a city lying directly east of him, he meant only that the sun should stand still either "*before*" or "*after*" Gibeon. This does not indeed, "out-Strauss Strauss;" for however strange may have been his conceptions in the paroxysms of his folly, he never thought to treat a serious matter with such unblushing levity as is here. However, it was the best disposal of that matter that the nature of the case and the cause to be maintained admitted. The passage which the Professor endeavours to defend, as any one may see, represents Joshua as standing at Makkedah, near the hour of sunset; giving command that the sun should pause upon or over Gibeon, and the moon in the Valley of Ajalon. But Gibeon is east of Makkedah some 18 or 20 miles; and Ajalon *southeast* nearly the same distance. The *sun* at the hour of the day required by the conditions of the question, must have been northwest from the locality which Joshua is occupying; and the moon, to have been seen at all, must have been just rising over Gibeon. Why did not the Reviewer, at this point, settle the whole difficulty, as he did in his last struggle with v. 15, (to which we shall attend soon,) by picking a flaw in the translation? He might have proved, at least to his *own*

mind, if not to his readers, that the *east* meant *west*, and by *the sun* we should understand *the moon*. We shall find ere we close, as I have just intimated, that he has actually undertaken about as much as this, in the way of Biblical criticism or philological disquisition.

The eighth argument of the Examination was, "This so-called miracle, (the stopping of the sun and moon,) is not once referred to in the Scriptures, not once cited by Prophets, Apostles, or any of the sacred penmen. This is incredible on the supposition that such an event actually occurred. Throughout the entire volume of Inspiration, there is a constant recurrence to the recorded events of Scripture—those which were the unquestionable displays of Divine and miraculous power—every historian referring back to manifestations of God's parental care of his people, or to the retributive chastisements of his enemies. But not once is this miracle referred to; not a solitary allusion to the arresting of the luminaries of heaven, that Joshua might have light to make a full end of the enemies of the King."

The reader must not forget, that this miracle, if it ever took place, was second to none recorded in the Bible. A more magnificent display of Divine power, a more grand and sublime example of the power of faith, is not on record any where: and yet the Psalmist, in his enumerations of God's miraculous works, (see Ps. 106-107,) not once thought of the event in question. He could sing, "Thou hast brought a vine out of Egypt, Thou hast cast out the heathen and planted it," etc., (see also Ps. 78, *passim et per totum*,) and not once mention this great work by Joshua. Paul in his Epistle to the Hebrews, when recounting the triumphs of faith, refers to that of Rahab, and Gideon, and Sampson, and Jephtha; but of Joshua arresting the sun and moon in the heavens, not a word is said! It is not enough to say of this, "it is incredible;" it is altogether improbable, if not impossible.

The only passage in the Bible which can be thought to be a reference to the event in question, is Hab. 3: 11—"The sun and moon stood still in their habitation." But if this was

literally so, how shall we understand v. 6 of the same chapter? "He stood and measured the earth; he beheld and drove asunder the nations; and the everlasting mountains were scattered, the perpetual hills did bow." Did any thing take place *literally* as is represented here? Are there any records found of scattered mountains, nodding hills? and where shall we look for an event which shall correspond *literally* with the declaration, "he had horns coming out of his hands;" or this, "Thou didst walk through the sea with thine horses?" The fact is, as every reader of plain good sense knows, the whole passage is to be understood as highly figurative and poetic; and that if we must understand v. 11 as referring to an event which occurred according to *the letter*, then we must look for the time and place where the Almighty was seen walking on glowing coals of fire, carrying a bow and arrows, riding on horses and guiding the prancing chariot. We must use one and the same rule for interpreting v. 6 as v. 11, or any other part of the chapter. No man, in the exercise of his reason, will stretch the line of a literal interpretation on v. 11, then lay it aside and take that which he would apply to metaphor, hyperbole, or some other figure of speech: he must measure all by one rule. Verse 11 is found, as the reader will see by recurring to "the song" which we have taken from the book of Jasher, letter for letter as it stands in Habakkuk. The supposition, then, which we regard as worthy of all acceptance, is that Hab. 3: 11 is not a reference to Joshua 10: 12-15, but on the contrary, is the passage which has been taken up and amplified and magnetized by the author of the book of Jasher, just as we find there. It is admitted in the Examination, that a single case of clear and indisputable reference in the Bible, to any such event, would settle the question for ever; then it is fairly shown that Hab. 3: 11 is *not* a reference, but is the original of the passage in dispute. The Reviewer, at this point of the discussion, evidently betrays the feeling, that "dissection" seems likely to happen to *his* cause instead of mine. His irony, combined with one or two awkward attempts at wit, and these set in a frame-work of misrepresentation, help him

over a difficulty of which he evidently knows not how else to dispose. It is far easier, he finds, to turn the arguments of his "modern Daniel" into ridicule, and blow the snuff of suspicion into the eyes of his reader, than to answer these arguments fairly and manlike.

Let us look at a single instance of misrepresentation. He endeavours to inspire the posthumous remains of his cause with something of life and interest, by representing the writer to have said, that "not a single expression in Hab. 3 can be for a moment supposed to have had reference to an act that ever transpired." By omitting the word "*literally*" in this sentence, he has put into the writer's mouth what the writer never said, as any one will see by turning to the passage in question, where he will find it repeatedly explained, by being varied several ways in order to prevent being misunderstood.

We do not know who are the readers of the Methodist Quarterly Review; and consequently cannot tell who may have read the statement just quoted. We suppose they are men in search of truth. If so, we are compelled to say, their prospects for finding it in the writings or essays of our Reviewer, are not the brightest, if we must judge from the specimen of his veracity now before us. Any man who will take the trouble to inquire into this matter, who will read carefully the remarks on this subject found in the January No. of Biblical Repository, 1845, pp. 123-127, will certainly see that we have said no such thing. The death of utter annihilation had already settled under the nails of his gasping cause, and neither stimulants nor galvanism could save it from the grave, but misrepresentation would prolong its existence a day or two; and accordingly we have it.

We do most firmly believe and have ever maintained, that all the statements of this chapter, like every thing else, which is truly the word of God, are true; having fact for their basis, but poetry for their dress. They all refer to, and, in the high coloured language of oriental poetry, *describe events which actually took place*: But what were the events? This is the question. To what does the sacred penman refer,

when he represents the Almighty as walking upon glowing coals of fire? He did something which the Prophet referred to; but what was that something? In like manner, something grand, magnificent and probably miraculous, is referred to in v. 11. "The sun and moon stood still," etc., but what was it? The Reviewer may say it was one thing; the author of the Examination may think it was something else: both admit and both maintain that it was *something*. The one contends that it was *literally* so; the other that if you say this of verse 11, you must say it of the whole poem; the nodding hills, the trembling mountains, the Lord with bow and arrows, etc., etc. But this would be most absurd. There is, therefore, not a solitary reference, not an allusion in all the Scripture to any such event as that which the passage from Jasher describes; wherefore we conclude, for the best of reasons, that no such event occurred.

But the Professor, having vanquished his antagonist, as he thinks, and given a very satisfactory account, at least to himself, of all the arguments with which the passage in Joshua had been assailed, excepting *two*, concludes that even these do not amount to much. After which, and just as he is retiring from the field so manfully defended, he brings forward the long promised "*conjecture*." It is, that v. 15 should read, "And Joshua returned and all Israel with him unto the camp at *Makkedah*," instead of Gilgal. The Hebrew letters in "Hagilgallah" he thinks are so nearly like those which are combined to form the name "*Makkedah*," that some early, careless transcriber mistook the one for the other. "Alas, master: for it was borrowed!" The reader will find it duly drawn out in Dr. Clark's commentary upon the passage; and what will be particularly interesting, too, will be the discovery, that the tradition which the Reviewer thinks so much of was referred to by the Dr. He thought so little of both, however, he did but name them. It seems to us not a little remarkable, that he who was so fearfully alive to every thing like speculation or theory, as to be able to smell the "abstractional intellectualities of Kant" in all parts of the

Examination, and detect, as by a kind of theological instinct, "Rationalism, skepticism," (and what not?) in every thing of the kind, *he* it is who can furnish us with such a "suggestion" as we have above! "Hagilgallah," in the Hebrew character, "is formed of letters so nearly resembling those which are combined in Makkedah, as to be easily mistaken the one for the other!" And the man who says this professes to understand Hebrew! He professes, also, a most profound regard for the sacred record; is alive to every thing which shall combine for its defence, and opposed to that which may serve to shake our confidence in it! Verily, the Bible in passing from the hands even of a Strauss, to those which can deal thus freely in "suggestions," made up of proposed alterations, is sent in effect from Herod to Pilate.

We deem it proper here to say, that we have been pained and disgusted with the bombast which every where appear in the Review. Could we have persuaded ourselves, that the merits of the question would have been clearly seen by every reader, and that the cause of truth would not in any measure have suffered from our silence, we should not have replied. If we have taken ground which can be maintained, it is *important* ground: if otherwise, the only favour we ask, is, that our position be overthrown *by argument*. We count him a friend and an honourable man, who, with his literary, theological, or philological claymore, shall cleave our theory and its arguments from head to heel. But let no one who wishes to be respected, as a scholar or a gentleman, attempt to settle a grave point like that we have now disposed of, by the potent energies of a "WINGED PEGASUS!"

The Reviewer, then, is welcome to the unenvied reputation which he may derive from the flippant assurances with which he has closed his labours, viz., that *he* has not "spent ten years of study" on the subject under debate; assurances gathered, we admit, by implication, but wholly unnecessary. No one who shall read his article, will need to be informed of it. He appears already to have reached that round in the ladder of self-exaltation, which leads him to infer the success

of an enterprise from the single fact, that he had undertaken it: a calamity from which we most sincerely ask ever to be delivered.

ARTICLE IV.

ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN GEOLOGY AND RELIGION.

By Rev. J. JAY DANA, Canaan Four Corners, New-York.

ONLY a few years have elapsed, since the attention of the public became directed to the subject of Geology. It is not strange, therefore, that very many now regard it with comparative indifference. It is only a short time since lectures began to be heard on this subject, even in our literary institutions. We can well remember when a young man could be graduated at one of our colleges, without knowing one rock from another. This ignorance was deemed no disgrace; for the science had not become known. Of late, however, both in this country and the old world, great advances have been made, advances which have given Geology a place among the sciences; and we hope the day is not far distant, when a knowledge of this science shall be deemed as essential to a finished education as that of Astronomy. We are happy to believe that the interest in this subject is increasing. A few years since, men could not see any practical benefit which could accrue from investigating the rocks; but when it was known that it could be turned to account, they were ready to encourage those interested in the prosecution of this study. When it was found that Geologists could state with great definiteness, the mineral resources of any portion of the country, and that these resources had a bearing on Agriculture, Commerce and Manufactures, Legislatures were led to encourage Geological surveys. If these surveys shall prevent the ignorant from quarrying glazed argillite for anthracite coal

and sulphuret of iron for gold, they will not have been made in vain. But they will do much more than this. They will show the respective States their own resources, and teach them what agricultural products they can most advantageously raise, and what it will be better economy to purchase.

While the public have become in some measure interested in the relations of Geology to Agriculture, Commerce, and Manufactures, very little attention has been paid to the bearings of this important subject on Religion. One reason for this is, that some Geological facts have been supposed to impugn revelation, and hence Geologists have been regarded as semi-infidel; and this has prevented some from interesting themselves in the subject. Whence originated the opinion that Geologists desire to impugn the Scriptures, we know not, for it certainly cannot be found in the works of leading authors. That they are infidel in sentiment is an *inference* drawn by theological writers, from the fact that Geologists, on data which they deem sufficient, consider the world more than six thousand years old.

We are not aware that any original work has appeared in this country, devoted exclusively to this branch of the subject. In England Dr. John Pye Smith has published a work on "The Relation between the Holy Scriptures and some parts of Geological Science," which has been reprinted in this country. He states some of the prominent facts of Geology, and shows that between these facts and the Bible there is no collision. Dr. Buckland has also published his "Geology and Mineralogy considered with reference to Natural Theology." This, also, has been reprinted here. These works need no commendation of ours. We feel, however, the want of a work which shall combine the excellences of both these valuable treatises, and trust the day is not far distant when this shall be attempted by some able hand. In the mean time we propose to state a few Geological facts and suggest a few hints respecting their relation to Natural and Revealed Theology.*

* We would suggest to the reader to study the works above mentioned

The investigations of Geologists have shown, that below the sand and gravel, which in some places cover the surface, the crust of the earth is composed of rocks, both stratified and unstratified, varying in thickness and in their component parts. They have found that the unstratified rocks bear but a small proportion to the stratified, the greater share of the strata are composed of the comminuted fragments of other rocks, reduced to their present form by chemical or mechanical agency, or by both together. It is true that *all* the various strata are not perhaps found in any one locality, but they maintain the same *relative* position the world over. No Geologist would think of looking for the carboniferous strata above the saliferous rocks, because he knows that the great salt formation dips under the coal.

These strata, deposited originally in a position nearly horizontal, have by some powerful force been more or less upheaved, and thus form every variety of scenery, from the beautiful to the sublime, the sight of which is adapted to give us exalted views of God.

It is generally admitted that the unstratified rocks are of igneous origin, and that they have been protruded from beneath. From the characteristics of primitive rocks ; from thermal springs ; from volcanoes, and from the known increase of temperature as we proceed toward the centre of the earth, Geologists have very generally (we believe now universally) adopted the conclusion that there is beneath our feet a molten sea ; that earthquakes are but the trembling of the shores lashed by the fury of its waves ; and that volcanoes are but the vent-holes by which the spray of this sea escapes, and serve as safety-valves to prevent the crust from being riven asunder.

The regularity of the strata at a distance from disturbing forces renders it a matter of certainty that they were deposited

in connection with Lyell's Principles of Geology, and Dr. Hitchcock's Elements of Geology. The latter work has an excellent chapter on the relations of Geology to Religion. It is very evident that the author has bestowed much thought on this branch of the subject, and no one can peruse this portion of his treatise without feeling his difficulties alleviated, if not removed.

in the bottoms of oceans, seas and fresh water lakes, whose waters, at the time of their deposition, were in a quiescent state. The quiescence of the waters is considered proved by the fact, that numerous fossils have been found lying in a natural position, as though they had sunk to the bottom of an undisturbed expanse of water. These fossils constitute one of the most interesting and exciting branches of study which the science affords. Nature has preserved for us in her grand Herbarium, specimens of ancient plants, and has made the earth's strata a vast anatomical museum; where she has deposited the petrified skeletons of animals that once inhabited what has now become the dwelling-place of man. Some of these animals are of species not now known, though most bear some analogy to existing races. They have ceased to live, but their sepulchres are with us unto this day. These fossils are of all sizes, from animals larger than any known, to the Infusoria, thousands of which were buried in a grave one-tenth of an inch in diameter. The immense size of some of these fossils, is a matter of astonishment. The organic remains of quadrupeds, larger by far than any now known, have been frequently discovered. In the new red sandstone of the Connecticut valley, Dr. Hitchcock has discovered the fossil foot-marks of birds which must have been of great size, as their tracks are about a foot in length and several feet apart.

A vast amount of mineral coal has been discovered, which consists of vegetable matter carbonized and mineralized. This enables us to form some conception of the amount of ancient vegetation, and also, of the amount of heat to which some portions of the earth's surface has been subjected.

The strata of rocks are found to be of great thickness ; and as they are mostly sedimentary, and must have been deposited slowly, the inference is that the time consumed in their deposition was immense : add to this the fact, that of the more than five thousand species of organic remains described below the tertiary period, scarcely any of this number have been identified with those now living, and we can no longer doubt that a vast period of time has elapsed since the "foundations

of the earth were laid," and that various changes have taken place, powerful in their effects.

Geologists have discovered in rocks of various altitudes, grooves which were, doubtless, worn by contact with some hard substance. The tops of the highest mountains bear evident marks of abrasion by water. They can trace lines of Boulders over vast territories ; and from these facts have drawn the conclusion that formerly powerful diluvial currents have swept over the globe.

The above constitute only a very small portion of the facts of Geology. Even a complete *summary* of them would of itself form a volume. Some may be disposed to deny the conclusions at which Geologists have arrived, because they are new ; but we think that the general harmony of those best acquainted with the data from which these conclusions are drawn, ought to lead the reader, who is uninformed on the subject, to rest satisfied with these conclusions, at least till he shall have discovered evidence of their falsity. There is, at first, something startling to one who has been accustomed to regard the earth as six thousand years old, to be informed that, in all probability, this period does not comprise a *tithe* of the years that have passed away since "the corner-stone thereof was laid and the morning stars sang together."

Let us look at the relations of these and kindred facts to religion. We are firmly of opinion that this science, which is as yet in its cradle, possesses elements which shall constitute it a powerful weapon in the hands of the Christian as an illustrator and defender of truth. We are not among the number of those who tremble for the safety of our holy religion, on account of the investigations of science ; because the facts of science, correctly understood, all tend to show more conclusively, that Jehovah is the true God, and the Bible his revelation to man.*

* Says Dr. Chalmers: "It is unmanly to blink the approach of light, from whatever quarter of observation it may fall upon us ; and those are not the best friends of Christianity, who feel either dislike or alarm, when the torch of science or of history is held up to the Bible. For ourselves, we are not afraid, when

Let us look at the relations of Geology to NATURAL RELIGION.

The discoveries of Geologists prove that *there is a God*. Blot out of existence, if you please, all the plants and animals now living. Place the earth in imagination as it was when the historic period commenced. Let an inhabitant of another world alight upon this planet and commence his investigations. He takes his position in the bed of a river, and on its banks he perceives layers of rocks, each differing in composition and structure. Or he starts from a mountain and finds as he descends, that rocks differing from those on the summit, variously inclined to the horizon, crop out at the surface. He visits another portion of the globe, and finds similar rocks occupying the same relative position.—Will he not be apt to inquire, “Why this regularity—this system?” He finds here an evidence of design, and hence concludes that there must be a designer. Suppose he make an analysis of these rocks, and observes the crystals of simple minerals. He inquires, “Is it mere chance that Galena crystallizes in the form of a cube? Why should one mineral be an octohedron, another a dodecahedron, and another an icosahedron? Why should minerals differing in their constituent parts, have essentially the same form? e. g. Why should the primary forms of quartz and calcareous spar be a rhombohedron?”

Suppose this observer is as wise and as subtle as some modern philosophers, and he will say that these various modifications of matter are but the “laws of nature.” True, but *where there is a law, there must of necessity be a law-giver*. Is nature her own law-giver? Has matter, which is naturally inert and passive and unintelligent, made her own laws? We say that water will flow down an inclined plane because of the

the eye of an intrepid, if it be only of a sound philosophy, scrutinises, however jealously, all its pages. We have no dread of any apprehended conflict between the doctrines of Scripture and the discoveries of science, persuaded as we are, that whatever story the Geologist of our day shall find to be engraven on the volume of nature, it will only the more accredit that story which is graven on the volume of Revelation.” Vid. Chalmers’s Works, Vol. I. pp. 247, 248.

“law of gravitation;” but how happens it that gravitation does not tend to force all bodies *from* rather than *toward* the centre of the Earth? We answer, because Nature’s great Law-giver otherwise ordained. He ordained the different shapes of the various crystals and made such accurate discriminations, that though two minerals may possess the same general shape, the Goniometer shows a difference in the angles by which the figures are bounded. Who is this great Law-giver but God, who has fashioned every thing after the counsel of his own will? A supervention of the laws of nature only places him a little further from his works; it does not destroy the necessity for His constant agency.

Let this observer pass from the primitive to the secondary rocks, and go up through all the strata to the topmost rock of the tertiary period, and he will find a vast abundance of organic remains, both of animals and plants. In some strata he finds fossils not found in others. He finds *Tribolites* the most common in the Silurian period, and a few of them in the Carboniferous strata, but can discover no traces of them above the coal-formation. The same is true of the *orthoceratite*. Now, he will ask, “Why are not the same fossils found in all the strata? Why are *any* organic remains found?” Will he call to his aid the “Laws of Nature,” and say that, in accordance with these laws, one portion of the rock became something which resembles a *Tribolite* and another became an *orthoceratite*? Nay, start not, for since 1840 we have heard a grave theologian (no great geologist, however) assert that the rocks were *created* just as they are, fossils and all. What would be the conclusion at which the observer would arrive? He must admit that they are the organic remains of ancient animals, or, he must take the ground that they were formed just as they are. In either case there are evident marks of design, and this demands a designer. If he will admit that the more probable solution of the phenomenon is, that these organisms were once endowed with life, he comes to another question, “Whence came this life? Does matter possess the power of giving life? If so, why does not

all matter possess vitality?" When arrived at this period, he can no longer question the existence of an Intelligent Being who possesses the power of bestowing or withholding life.*

We cannot but admire the fact that between the leaves of His great book of revelation of Himself in His works, God has impressed the remains of ancient animals and plants for our inspection. They show marks of design and of change, thus indicating that matter is not self-existent nor eternal; and that, before man was created, there was an Intelligent God. How long a period these changes have occupied, we cannot estimate, but this we know, that the principal part of them must have taken place before the historic period; because among these organic remains there have never been discovered the bones of men in such a position as to indicate that his creation was not among, comparatively speaking, the most recent events. The existence of the earth before the Adamic creation, relieves to some extent the difficulty felt by some minds, which ask, "If God is Eternal, and the world only six thousand years old, why did he not create it before?" He has in Geology given us a revelation of what he was doing with regard to the earth, previous to the historic period. He has constituted the earth her own chronometer, measuring time by epochs, and has recorded on her face the transactions of each period, so that we can now learn what was done in each period, by an examination of the organic remains, and can thus determine the relative age of the rocks which contain them.

The absence of all fossils in some rocks, shows that there was a period when no animals existed; and their existence in the later strata demands an Intelligent God, yes, a being of Infinite Perfections. In the older rocks we find some fossils

* Dr. Chalmers says, "If fossil remains are not to be looked upon as the vestiges of living creatures, it would follow that what we have been in the habit of considering as forms of nice and excellent adaptation, may have been produced without an object, and so after all be perfectly meaningless. Vid. Chal. Works, Vol. I. p. 252.

of a more intricate organism, than in rocks of a later period, thus overthrowing the theory of some that nature began with simple organizations and proceeded to those which were more complicated. Dr. Buckland states, that fossil Sauroid Fishes are found to be less simple in their organization than the ordinary forms of bony fishes.

Palaeontology shows that there "have been on the globe, several nearly entire extinctions and renewals of organic life, each of which demands the existence of a Being of Infinite Perfections."^{*} In proof of such extinctions of life it is only necessary to say, that some strata have become the sepulchres of animals not found in other strata. Life is a mysterious principle, and its existence is manifested by some organism more or less perfect, by which the principle is sustained ; and when we find the organism, we infer, not that there never was life, but that the life that was, has become extinct. The impartation and withdrawal of life demands the existence of a Being who has power to kill and to make alive.

2. Geology makes a revelation of *God's Attributes*. His *Power* is manifested. Who can survey the extensive ranges of mountains, some of which are several miles in height, and not perceive the exhibition of immense power ? When he finds the tops of high mountains covered with rocks, containing organic remains which bear every mark of having been deposited in the places where they now are, while the waters were calm, and that they have been upheaved from the bottom of the ocean to their present altitude, he must confess that, compared with this, all exhibitions of human power are less than the small dust of the balance. The tortuosities in some rocks show, that they were elevated in a plastic state ; while the existence of " faults " would indicate that other strata became consolidated before they were removed from their original position. He cannot contemplate the doctrine of injected rocks, without perceiving evidences of Divine power.

* Dr. Hitchcock's Inaugural Address, p. 32.

Who that has ever stood at Niagara Falls, and seen its vast stream continually flowing and roaring and making even the earth to tremble, could resist the impression that God was great? Here is a display of Divine power well adapted to make man feel his insignificance. But, if we look at it geologically, our impressions of Divine power will become yet more vivid. To form these falls, it was necessary that around certain points the land should rise, and thus form those immense basins which should collect the waters of the surrounding regions into vast Lakes: there must be a subsidence, or a less elevation of what now constitutes Ontario, and then the waters obeying the laws of gravity, rush on to their destination.

Let one visit the Adirondack Pass, in Essex Co., N. Y., and behold its naked precipice of rock of a thousand feet in height, and his mind staggers while endeavouring to compute the power here exerted. Says Dr. Emmons, "We look upon the Falls of Niagara with awe and with a feeling of insignificance, but much more are we impressed with the great and the sublime in view of the naked rock of the Adirondack Pass."*

The volcano gives another example of God's physical power. For ages it has been belching forth smoke, ashes and lava. Thousands of feet above the level of the ocean is the top of the crater, and, as the ocean has an average depth of from two to three miles, the sea of fire with which this volcano communicates, and from which it derives its liquid rocks, must be as far below the level of the sea as the crater is above. From this molten sea, up through this vast distance, are elevated ashes and stones and lava of sufficient amount to cover vast extents of territory. We have here a proof of the Psalmist's remark that "God toucheth the hills, and they smoke."†

Boulders furnish another illustration of God's power. With

* Vid. Emmons, Geol. Rep. of N. Y., pp. 217, 218.

† Vid. Ps. 104: 32.

regard to the nature of the agency employed in transporting such immense masses of rocks over plains, hills, valleys and mountains, Geologists are not all agreed; but all admit that the power exerted was immensely vast. Some boulders are evidently water-worn, while on others the angles remain almost as fresh as when by some unknown cause they were severed from the parent rock and commenced their pilgrimage of thousands of miles.

The researches of Geologists have displayed the *Wisdom* of God. There has been, in every age of the world, an adaptation of means to the accomplishment of an appropriate end. One end which appears to have been before the Divine mind, was to fit this globe for the residence of man, and hence in looking back over the successive changes which have taken place, we find that at the close of each period an approximation to this was made, which was not to be found in any anterior change. In each age which preceded man's creation, there was an adaptation of the state of the globe to the animals which inhabited it, and there was an adaptation of the organism of animals to their condition and mode of obtaining sustenance. Comparative Anatomy points out from the organic remains of ancient animals their peculiar habits. The Saurian Period abounded in animals of immense size and the earth was at that time adapted to their support.

Another end in view was to promote the *Divine Glory*, by making these exhibitions of Divine power and wisdom apparent to his intelligent creatures; and this he has done by preserving these ancient records of his acts, and thus bringing them within their reach. Man lives on earth too short a period to pass through such changes as the earth has undergone; but by surveying the ancient works of God, he has a view of wisdom displayed ages upon ages since. If he can find tokens of wisdom upon the earth at the present time, he can find the same tokens in the past; and thus the past and present become linked together, forming a chain of consequents and antecedents, which, if followed up, will lead his mind to the contemplation of an All-wise and Almighty God.

God's *Goodness* is apparent in the works of His hands. While all his attributes are worthy of admiration, his moral attributes more readily secure our praise. Were He infinite in power and wisdom, and at the same time not benevolent, He would have infinite ability to injure us, while there would be nothing to prevent the exercise of this power. By our constitution we are led to consider that it is the moral character of any being in which consists his chief excellence. Thus we judge of one another ; and thus we judge of God. We might be startled by exhibitions of Divine power, and affected with admiration at the manifestations of wisdom ; yet, unless we had confidence to believe that this wisdom and power were associated with a corresponding share of benevolence, our hearts would not throb with gratitude, nor our lips burst forth with praise. The arch apostate manifests great wisdom and power, but who thinks of being grateful to him ? And why not ? Because he is not actuated by love.

God has impressed his attributes upon his works, and has laid these open for our inspection, while He might have concealed all past transactions from the view of the present generation. The fact that He has thus displayed them, manifests in Him a consciousness that they will bear the strictest scrutiny of men of every grade of mind, without thereby causing the infinity of his Goodness to be called in question. We do not make these remarks to prevent any one from minutely examining God's works, or to deter him from forming his own conclusions respecting God's moral character as displayed in His works. We make them merely to show that what we may regard as exhibitions of a spirit opposed to benevolence, God has taken no pains to conceal from view ; thus showing that He either is not aware of having done wrong, or else that He puts the fault-finding spirit of His creatures at defiance.

God's benevolence is seen in the adaptation of the earth to the residence of moral beings. He has formed every thing so that it is promotive of his comfort. The strata are so disposed, that what he needs for his happiness from the bowels of the earth, is placed within his reach. The great Salif-

erous and Carboniferous systems are at hand. The disposition of the Metalliferous strata, render accessible the various ores, producing most abundantly those most needed by him.

The immense amount of caloric and carbonic acid which were present when the vast beds of vegetable matter were mineralized, have now disappeared. Geological changes have made man's residence a world of "hills and valleys" and streams of water. On the surface of the rocks God has placed a soil, which produces food convenient for him, luxuriantly and abundantly. Even those things deemed evil, are but displays of God's benevolence. The earthquake and the volcano often destroy multitudes of the human family; yet Geology shows these to be necessary for the safety of the whole system, and hence are evils small in comparison with what would take their place, were they removed.

The principal objection which can be urged against Divine benevolence from what has been developed by Geology is, the fact that Death has been in the world from time immemorial. We find fossil animals, and must either resort to the absurd expedient of saying that these remains were created in the rocks just as they are, or admit that Death has been in the world. We must admit that this was the case previous to the Adamic creation, or else suppose that it came in consequence of his sin. It has been common for theologians to take the ground that all natural evil comes in consequence of moral evil, and hence have ascribed the destruction of animal life to the curse which fell upon the race in consequence of Adam's sin. We know not why it is necessary to link the death of the lower orders of creation with the sin of Adam. It is capable of proof that death entered the world before Adam, and hence their death is to be ascribed to some other cause than to his sin. If it be said that by divorcing natural from moral evil, we shall implicate the benevolence of God: we answer, that in our opinion by coupling the death of animals with the sin of our first parents, we thereby teach that animals which knew not good or evil, and of course have done neither, were visited with evil for a sin in which they had

no agency or participation ; and that this view is more prejudicial to the Divine benevolence than the other.

Some ancient animals (as well as those which have lived within the historic period) were carnivorous. Geology asserts that they were probably created so, and so says every one except a precious few who hold that animal natures, as well as human natures, were changed by the fall. Such believe, that previous to Adam's sin, the old couplet was not true, which says,

“ Let dogs delight to growl and bite,
For 'tis their nature to.”

They hold that, in consequence of his fall, the character of their teeth, and in short the whole animal functions, were changed. This ground is too absurd to be opposed.

With regard to the creation of ancient animals, and their death, there is a certain dilemma, which has two horns, one of which must be taken. Either, animals were created to die, or to be immortal. He who asserts that God's benevolence suffers by admitting that animals were created to die, must be prepared to show (1.) that they were created immortal, and this no man can do ; and (2.) he must prove that by creating them immortal, God would have shown more benevolence than by constituting them mortal. It would be difficult for any one to show that had no carnivorous animals been created, the happiness of the animal race would have thereby been on the whole increased. In what consists animal happiness except in the gratification of their natural desires ?— Had there been no carnivorous animals, all would have had to depend upon vegetation for food, and with the natural rate of increase, suffering must have been the consequence. Those created carnivorous find in destroying others, an abundant source of gratification, and by preventing too rapid an increase of the herbivorous races, render the means of supplying their wants commensurate with what these wants require. The herbivorous are also saved from the evils which “ disease and

gradual suffering would produce if not prevented by sudden death." The happiness enjoyed by the carnivorous races, is all clear gain to the sum of happiness, save the small drawback of the sufferings they inflict upon the vegetable feeders.

If existence is a blessing, then a system which admits this existence is better than one which precludes it. Hence a condition of the world, which was adapted to animal existence previous to Adam's creation, was a greater manifestation of benevolence, than if there had been no adaptation for existence.

Since existence is better than non-existence, fossils may be regarded as a proof of Divine benevolence; for they indicate existence. It will be admitted, we presume, that the pleasures of animal existence more than compensate for the pains of death, especially as this death is not generally preceded by disease and suffering, and is attended by no moral considerations which make death a source of dread as precursor of ruin. In the case of human beings, the sting of death is sin; but with the lower orders of creation, there can be nothing of this kind to make death terrible. If it be admitted, that death does not exceed the pleasures of existence, then it follows that God can be benevolent, and yet permit death to enter the world and do his work among the lower orders of creation.

Vegetable and animal existence are under the same general law. Vegetables have what we call life, and it is connected with an organism as perfect in its kind as that of animals. The law to which we refer, is this—they have an origin, a progress, a perfection, and decay, or death. This is the grand system on which the works of nature, so far as life is concerned, are constructed.

We do not presume to limit the Almighty, yet we doubt not that this was the best system which Infinite wisdom could devise; the best for Himself, and for the promotion of His own glory, and the best for all His rational and irrational creatures.

It will be perceived that in the foregoing argument we have said nothing concerning the wisdom, power, or benevolence of God, as manifested in his creation of man; for our

aim has been to develop his attributes as displayed in the strata of the earth, and in paleontology.

If the earth, divested of every thing to be found upon the naked rocks, makes such a manifestation of intelligence, wisdom, power, and goodness in its formation, as to indicate it to be the handiwork of a Supreme Being, then geology furnishes another lesson on natural theology, which is to be added to those furnished by the other sciences. If these things are so, Christian men need not stand aloof from this study, for fear of its tendency to atheism or infidelity ; but enter into its deep mysteries with the assurance that this, as well as other sciences, may be made the handmaid of religion. If a geologist is an infidel, you can, if acquainted with his facts, meet him on his own ground, and show that what he admits to be facts, prove the existence and the perfections of God.

It is time to turn our attention to the relations of Geology to REVELATION. It has been urged, that between the teachings of this science and those of the Scriptures, there is a discrepancy so great, that the two cannot be reconciled. That there are *apparent* discrepancies between the facts of geology and some of the *interpretations*, we are free to admit. Future discoveries may, in some respects, modify the views of Geologists ; and an increase of light will probably give interpretations of the Scriptures, different from those commonly received, a place in the minds and hearts of Christians ; so that to raise the cry of discrepancy, and thus attempt to unsettle the minds of men respecting either Geology or Revelation, would be premature. So far as we have observed, we have noticed, that those most ignorant of Geology, have been the loudest in denouncing this science as tending to infidelity. But why thus hasty in these denunciations ? Has not the Bible stood unimpeached thus far, as a revelation of God ? Once, astronomy was regarded as inimical to Revelation, and he who denied that the earth was a continuous plane, and that the sun revolved around it, was deemed a heretic. It was at length discovered that the teachings of astronomy coincided in the main with the Bible

The day has passed by, when men can be kept from investigating truth by the cry of infidelity. Mind can no longer be trammelled in this way ; and when an individual claims to be a sincere inquirer after truth, and bears the marks of honesty in his investigations, we deem it unjust and unkind to excite odium either against him or the truth he would elucidate, by denouncing him as skeptical, or his favourite science as tending to infidelity. This spirit of denunciation, virtually assumes, that if a Geologist takes his hammer and investigates the rocks, he can have no other object in view except to undermine the truth of the Bible.

It may be taken for granted, that God will not make two revelations of Himself which will conflict with each other. He may make a revelation of one kind to angels, and one of another kind to men, and they may be very different ; but because there are some mysteries in the revelations to men that angels "desire to look into" but cannot fathom, shall the angels charge God with having contradicted Himself? Whether God has ever revealed Himself to any world as he has to man, we know not ; but if He has not, it would be no evidence that there is a discrepancy. Each revelation may be perfect in its kind, and adapted to the end it was designed to accomplish, even though it does not embrace all that is contained in other revelations. Because the Bible does not teach us all scientific truths, this is no reason why it should be rejected ; and because between this revelation and God's works there are *apparent* discrepancies, it does not prove that both are not equally the revelations of the same Being, and designed to promote His glory. It is not among the pretensions of the inspired volume to teach us science. Its principal object is to present the history of the great work of redemption in its conception, achievement, and final consummation ; and, because in its declaration of these great truths it forgets to mention those of a scientific nature, this does not prove the latter false or unimportant, except when compared with those which more immediately relate to the glory of God in the salvation of men. As the works of Providence had a more intimate connexion with

the work of redemption than the works of nature, we find more frequent reference to the former than to the latter. When the works of nature are mentioned, it is done, as it were, incidentally, and to enforce moral truth. Yet, if we mistake not, mention of the works of creation is so made, as to convey the impression that they are but counterparts of one great revelation, and that though in each different individual truths may be more fully developed, they are not designed to clash, but to supply each other's "lack of service." If it shall appear, that between the truths of the Bible, and the facts of geology, there is a general harmony, the apparent collisions are not of sufficient moment to warrant us in rejecting either, or in proscribing Geology as calculated to overthrow Revelation.

Let us look at some of the allusions to the works of God in the Bible, and see how they compare with the teachings of Geology. Here let us remark that in describing the New Jerusalem, the pen of Inspiration drew its illustrations from the mineral kingdom; thus denoting that this kingdom furnishes objects by which the splendour and durability of the heavenly city could be more adequately described than by any other objects in nature. In describing the "city that hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God," the Revelator says, "And the building of the wall of it was of jasper; and the city was pure gold, like unto clear glass; and the foundations of the wall were garnished with all manner of precious stones. The first foundation was Jasper; the second, Sapphire; the third, a Chalcedony; the fourth, an Emerald; the fifth, Sardonyx; the sixth, Sardius; the seventh, Chrysolite; the eighth, Beryl; the ninth, a Topaz; the tenth, a Chrysoprasus; the eleventh, a Jacinth; the twelfth, an Amethyst."*

We now proceed to state some of the truths of the Bible and the facts of Geology, and to show that between them there is no collision. And

(1.) The Bible ascribes the creation of the world to God.

* Rev. 21 : 18-20.

"In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." This statement Geology does not contradict. We have already stated that the facts of this science prove the existence of an Intelligent, Allwise, Almighty and Benevolent First Cause. Says an able writer, "It is obvious that these same facts prove clearly the non-eternity of the present condition of the globe; and even though we admit the ancient doctrine of matter's eternity, yet its most important modifications, requiring a Deity no less than its creation, must have taken place in time, and this conclusion is essential to Theism. And thus Geology, which has been supposed to favour the idea of the world's eternity, is the only science, as Dr. Chalmers has splendidly shown, that can prove its non-eternity."^{*}

The fossiliferous rocks especially show the handiwork of the Supreme Being; for these organic remains once possessed life, (either animal or vegetable,) and this they received from their Creator. There was a period when matter had not an organization adapted to support life, or to perform the functions which this mysterious principle demands. It has been already remarked that the facts of Geology illustrate the Divine attributes. So far from robbing God of a single perfection ascribed to Him in His word, they open to us a new field of vision where we can see them more clearly developed. No one can attentively consider these facts without having his conceptions of God enlarged. He cannot consider the works of nature without being convinced that the Being who has wrought all these changes with such infinite skill and power, is none other than He who says that His name is **I AM THAT I AM.**

(2.) The Bible speaks of the earth as having been covered by water, and the whole race of mankind destroyed by a flood. This fact Geology does not deny. The Sedimentary rocks clearly show that the particles have been held in aqueous solution. Upheavals of the strata are written on almost every page of the great "Stone Book." No Geolo-

^{*} Vid. Dr. Hitchcock's Inaugural Address, page 32.

gist would account it strange to find such an event as the Deluge recorded in the Bible. However he may regard such an event morally, he feels no physical difficulty in admitting to be true, as much as the exigencies of a passage in the seventh chapter of Genesis demand him to admit. We do not suppose that we are required to believe that the whole globe was at that time submerged, but only so much of it as was inhabited. With this limitation, no one at all familiar with the changes which have taken place on the surface of the globe, can hesitate to give his credence to the Scriptural account of the Noachian Deluge. That powerful diluvial action has taken place on the globe no one can question who has examined, with any attention, rocks in place whose surfaces are grooved, or the boulders whose rounded angles give abundant evidence of having been abraded by water. Indeed, no one can become conversant with the wonderful occurrences which have happened since the beginning; occurrences which the earth herself has recorded, and be skeptical regarding what in Scripture times were regarded as miracles.

(3.) The Bible announces the destruction of the world by fire as an event which will certainly take place. Peter says that "the heavens and the earth which are now, by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto fire." "The day of the Lord will come * * * in the which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also and the works that are therein shall be burned up."* Any difference of opinion among Geologists respecting the question whether the earth will be annihilated or only refined and purified, ought to have no weight against the science, because on this point theologians differ. It is an admitted truth, that by the application of heat a solid may become a liquid, and by a further addition of heat, this liquid may become a gas imperceptible to ordinary vision. We confess ourselves as doubting whether the above quoted passage is to be understood as teaching the

* Vid. 2 Peter 3 : 7, 10.

doctrine of annihilation ; yet we would not limit the power of Jehovah. With regard to the future destruction of the world by fire, no one will deny its possibility who will refer to the vast amount of caloric which was present when the coal was formed. If in addition to this he admits the prevailing theory of Geologists, that the centre of the earth is liquid fire, he will not question God's power to burn up "the earth and all the works that are therein."

Various other points of agreement between Geology and Revelation might be mentioned, but our limits forbid. We now turn to some of the supposed discrepancies between the two ; and here we shall be under the necessity of being brief. And

I. Respecting the age of the world. While both Geology and Revelation agree in representing the work of creation as progressive after the beginning, there is some difference between Geologists and Bible interpreters as to when this beginning was. Some of the latter have asserted that it was about six thousand years ago, while the former are unanimous in the opinion that long periods of time must have elapsed between "the laying of the corner stone" of the earth, and the period when it became fitted for the residence of man. One reason for this, is the vast amount of sedimentary rocks. Some who take the ground that in six literal days the whole work of creation was completed, have endeavoured to maintain "that the fossiliferous rocks were not the result of slow deposition and consolidation ; but were created at once with all their contents, just as we find them." This would be an easy way to get over the difficulty if it could be reasonably adopted. To the Geologist, however, it looks more reasonable to suppose that sedimentary rocks *are* sedimentary rocks, and that the organic remains of animals and plants were once animals and plants, than to resort to this expedient for the solution of the difficulty so long as the Bible does not render it necessary.

Others (theologians not geologists) have endeavoured to relieve the difficulty by taking the ground that these rocks were

deposited between the creation of Adam and the Deluge ;— and others that they were deposited at the time of the Deluge. To these theories there are insuperable objections which might be stated had we time.

Another theory is that the six days were not literal days of twenty-four hours each, but indefinite periods of time.*

The opinion now generally adopted among Geologists is, that there is no immediate connexion between the first and the following verses of the first chapter of Genesis. Professor Bush says, "The design of the sacred writer seems to be, simply to carry back the mind of the reader to the period previous to which this wonderful fabric in its present state did not exist. He does this, in order to convey, upon the highest possible authority, the assurance, that the universe, as it appears, had both a beginning and a Creator ; that it did not spring into being without a cause, nor, as the ancient philosophers imagined, existed from eternity." This writer advocates the sentiment that in the first verse of Genesis, the sum of what God did, is announced, while in the following verses there is a more full account of the work. We cannot forbear quoting another remark : "Of the interval between the original production of the matter of which the earth was formed, and the formation of light, nothing is said. * * * Accordingly, they, i. e. the Scriptures, afford no answer to a multitude of questions which might be asked respecting the *when* and the *how* of Divine operations."†

Dr. Chalmers says, (Works Vol. I. p. 251,) "Between the initial act and the details of Genesis, the world, for aught we know, might have been the theatre of many revolutions, the traces of which Geology may still investigate, and to which in fact she has confidently appealed as the vestiges of so many successive continents which have now passed away. Should the explanation we now offer be sustained, this would

* For a statement of these theories with the principal arguments for and against, the reader is referred to Hitchcock's Elements of Geology, section ix.

† Vid. Bush on Genesis, chapter I.

give an indefinite scope to the conjectures of Geology, without any undue liberty with the first chapter of Genesis.

Concerning this theory of the intervention of an indefinite period of years between what is recorded in the first and following verses of Genesis, we remark :

(1.) That the exigencies of the passage do not demand an immediate connection. Events which occurred at different periods are often described in immediate sequence, without any intimation of any intervening time.

(2.) This theory relieves any difficulties which Geologists feel respecting the Mosaic account.

(3.) It is consistent and reasonable, for it allows time for the slow deposition and gradual consolidation of the sedimentary rocks, and for the changes which have evidently taken place in the primary rocks.

(4.) It removes the supposed necessity of resorting to the absurd theory of the creation of the fossils in their present state.

(5.) It relieves the difficulty felt by some, who ask, "if God is eternal and the earth only 6000 years old," why did he not create the world before? Such have an answer, for Geology intimates, and Scripture does not deny it, that ages upon ages may have rolled away while this earth, after having been called into existence, was undergoing the changes necessary to fit it for man's residence.

Dr. John Pye Smith has presented a theory for the solution of this difficulty, to which the reader is referred in his work on this subject. Our limits forbid us to enter upon it.

II. Another discrepancy between Geology and Revelation is supposed to be found respecting the subject of Death. We have already at considerable length referred to this, in answering the objection to the Divine Benevolence, and shall be very brief in additional remarks.

Geologists maintain that for an indefinite period before the Adamic creation, the earth was undergoing changes; and that during this time the then existing races of animals and plants were destroyed. The Bible asserts, "By man

came death." We admit that Adam's sin was the occasion of his death and that of his posterity, but we find nothing in the Bible which intimates that his sin was the cause of the death of the inferior races. Why did death come upon Adam and his posterity? We answer, "Death came upon all men, for that all have sinned." Even those "who have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression," die; but, it is because all have sinned in some way. Thus the death of the human race is adequately accounted for; but the Bible does not recognize the capability of sinning, in a being without reason or conscience. And hence the death of such beings can have no connexion with sin, and must be explained on other grounds. How there can be any positive connexion between the sin of our great progenitor and the death of animals, a brilliant imagination alone can conceive.

That the carnivorous animals were *created* so, is ground more tenable than the supposition that they were created vegetable feeders, and had by the fall their animal functions changed. How Adam's sin made the lion any more bloodthirsty, or how his steadfastness in holiness would have prevented him from seeking his prey, are questions concerning which we should like light.

That owing to his depravity man often subjects the brute creation to suffering and death we admit; but had not Adam nor his posterity sinned, they would have needed food, and this implies the destruction of animal and vegetable life; and they would have wanted water to drink, and their thirst could not have been slaked without destroying multitudes of animalculæ. It may be said, that these are too trifling to be mentioned. We reply, they are animals, and in their kind perfect. Since no one will claim that had Adam remained holy he would have had food "such as angels use," it must be admitted that the wants of his being, even had he not sinned, would have required the destruction of life. We presume it will not be claimed that the fall is the occasion of our relish for animal food, or the origin of our capacity to masticate or digest it.

In objection to the views here advanced, it may be said that, in consequence of Adam's sin, "the whole creation groaneth," etc. (Vid. Rom. 8: 19-22.) That this passage refers to the brute creation remains to be established. Prof. Stuart maintains that *κτίσις* refers to the *moral* world.*

In the foregoing pages we have attempted to show that the existence of death previous to Adam's creation does not militate against God's benevolence; and we have also endeavoured to show that there is no necessity for insisting on a positive connexion between Adam's sin and the death of brutes. Such a connexion, we believe, the Bible does not teach; and if so, then the existence of death previous to Adam's sin does not impugn Revelation.

The Christian need not tremble for his Bible, because of Geology. This science may be made the handmaid of Religion. Even if its tendencies were infidelityward, as is claimed, who so well able to resist these tendencies as the Christian Geologist? It is exceedingly desirable that every minister should become a master of this science. He will find it an armory, whence he can take many polished weapons with which to do battle for the cause of truth—weapons which, if wielded with skill, will make infidelity hide its head.

ARTICLE V.

THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST PROVED BY THE NATURE OF THE ATONEMENT.

By Rev. JOSEPH F. TUTTLE, Delaware, Ohio.

DEMONSTRATION is the demand of our times. Nothing short of this satisfies. Lawyers, from the first rate downward through the five grades, must demonstrate, or lose their cause.

* Vid. Stuart's Com. in Loco.

Physicians, real ones and quacks, must demonstrate, or lose their practice. Statesmen, from the leader of a senate to the petty stump orator of the backwoods, must demonstrate, or be defeated. Clients, juries, patients, "the people"—every statesman's idol—are eager for demonstration, and set it down as positive evidence of a weak cause, if its advocate do not coolly lead all to see in sunlight demonstration complete!

This is significant. A careless observer might see in it nothing but food for laughter, or occasion for a sneer. The dogmatic demands of our generation may be unpleasant, but as precursors to calm and profound investigation, we may not despise them. This characteristic, which now seems so like affectation, will mature, until it sift to the bottom every thing worthy of investigation in politics, science, and religion.

The human mind is a curious creation. What affects one mind falls powerless on another. One reaches a conclusion in reasoning by a process, every step of which is bright as sunlight. He attempts to lead another to the same conclusion by the same process, and at best "he only sees men as trees walking." But this same mind may reach that conclusion by another process, which is perfectly satisfactory. At any rate, to demonstrate a proposition by a variety of diagrams, will not weaken our belief in its truth, and by thus doing we may fasten conviction on some minds, which otherwise might have never apprehended or believed the issue.

By two classes of errorists is the doctrine of Christ's Divinity attacked. The Universalists may conceal their sentiments, and yet generally, when driven by close argument to ultimate conclusions, they do not hesitate to avow their unbelief in this fundamental doctrine. Unitarians never shrink from this avowal. "Christ a mere man," is the "shibboleth" of the sect. If such an one as Dr. Channing could speak of Christ's crucifixion, supposing it to be vicarious, as a most awful outrage on justice, we need not fear to say that the whole sect is at least as corrupt. A distinguished antagonist of New England Unitarianism has said that a Unitarian cannot construct a logical argument on this subject; that his

reason has been so perverted that he cannot apprehend the force of a true argument. In further illustration of this point, he used the following amusing allegory, which is in point. "Two persons in a distant planet fiercely disputed the question, Of what material is the earth composed? One stoutly asserted that it was all water, the other as stoutly that it was all land. At length the disputants, in order to decide the question, constructed a very large telescope. The *water-theorist* happened to turn the instrument so that the Pacific ocean occupied the entire field, and shouted, "There, I told you so; it is all water, nothing but water!" The *land-theorist* gave the telescope a turn, and the Andes were all that was visible. Transported with delight, he cried out, "All land, all land, just as I said!"

The weakest Christian, in recounting the love of God, expresses himself as convinced that none but a Divine Being could accomplish the salvation of sinners. He seems to have an intuitive perception that the work is too great for any created being, be he a mere *human Christ* or the loftiest archangel. When he reads in Revelation that a God is his advocate, that a God devised the plan, that a God executed all the provisions of that plan, his heart is at rest. Any thing short of this assurance, distresses the living Christian. For this reason it is useful to demonstrate the proposition of Christ's Divinity, by a variety of diagrams, since in this way we fling new lights across the truth, and banish the last shade. Especially is this course useful when employed as a threshold to that stately argument which is revealed in the Bible.

The design of this article is to construct an argument in support of the following proposition:—*None but a Divine Being can make atonement for sin.* In prosecution of this design, we shall assume two facts without argument.

1. Man is a sinner against God, and in consequence obnoxious to punishment.

2. Being himself incapable of making reparation for his sin, there is an absolute necessity, in order to his salvation, that an atonement be made by some other being.

Let us examine arguments grounded in *probability*, without now appealing directly to Revelation. To do this to the best advantage, let us examine four facts, which may become criteria of judgment.

1. Examine the relations of the parties which are to be made *as one*. The one is the infinite and unchangeable Jehovah, the other finite and changeable man. The one is perfectly holy, the other perfectly sinful. The one is a Being whose omniscient benevolence comprehends and regards the best welfare of the entire universe, and earnestly desires to promote that welfare; the other is a being whose selfishness is so narrow and near-sighted, that it neither sees nor cares for the welfare of any but himself. The one is benevolent, the other is selfish. The one loves virtue and hates vice, the other hates virtue and loves vice. In every respect, God and man stand at extremes infinitely separated from each other.

To reconcile these extremes must be the work of one who proposes to make atonement for sin.

2. The atonement must make restitution for all violations of law. Aside from revelation, men have felt the truth of this position, and for ages it was a momentous question to be solved, "Can a divine law be repaired when once broken?" But in the light of revelation setting forth a perfect and holy law, and the repeated violations of that law by men, the question assumes a startling importance. The law is the expression of the Divine will, and it is therefore evident that God never can have mercy on those who have violated his will, without satisfaction being made. For, if he should be merciful on any other grounds, it must be regarded as an acknowledgment on the part of God, that his law is not so holy, nor his commandment so holy, just and good, as was pretended. It would say in effect, that the obligations of the divine law are so trifling that it matters but little whether men *regard* them or not. Besides, from this last position arises the fearful inference that God is harsh and tyrannical in punishing angels eternally, for breaking a law which his conduct shows he does not regard highly.

This principle of full restitution is corroborated strikingly in the natural world. Mere personal repentance makes no restitution. Causes and effects are chained together omnipotently. A drunken father dashes his infant son to the earth. He may weep tears of blood, and yet his son will be a cripple. God alone could atone for that brutality. A man indulges in the use of intoxicating drinks, until he has reduced himself to trembling madness. His repentance and suffering no more atone for his folly, than the death of the eagle which has thrust itself within the coils of a serpent will atone for its folly. Nature speaks of no repentance to atone for sins against God's laws in the physical system, which can restore a frame dissolved by lust, or racked by delirium tremens.

In nature there is no forgiveness of sin against physical law, without restitution, and in nature there is no such thing as restitution for sin. These causes inevitably produce their results. Much less may we suppose that transgressions of God's perfect moral law, by which he secures the happiness of an entire universe, a law which is the transcript of his own holy heart, will be forgiven without full restitution. "Without the shedding of blood there is no remission," is the voice issuing from the inspired oracle, and which is emphasized and illustrated by all the teachings of God through the works of nature.

This is the principle. Let us for a moment glance at the work of restitution in all its extent. What is the number of sins for which atonement must be made? "Who can understand his errors? Cleanse thou me from secret faults," is uttered by the Psalmist as though it may apply to every person in the world. A glance shows this to be true. The heart of every person is wrong. This state of heart vitiates all the actions which are committed by men previous to conversion. In the sight of God, all actions springing from unrenewed hearts "are evil and only evil, and that continually."

This is true of every individual. When we make an aggregate of the sins, concealed and avowed, of all the men that shall have lived when "time shall be no longer," we obtain

some conception of the extent of restitution which must be made. The proclamation goes forth to every creature, "Who-soever will, let him take of the water of life freely ;" but before this can be made, the atonement must be sufficient to hide the transgressions of every creature to whom the offer is made. The atoner's mantle must be capacious enough to cover all the sins of all the world, from the days of Adam to the day of judgment.

3. It is essential to the atonement that the atoner be able to command the confidence of the two parties at variance. This is a truism, that no party at variance with another, would be willing to intrust his interests to a mediator unless he had perfect confidence in him. This theological axiom sweeps a large circumference, as we shall see. It implies especially two things. 1st. That each party believes the mediator to be *impartial*. Of course this implies that he is a holy being, otherwise God could not intrust a single interest to him. If either believed the atoner to lean to one side or the other, confidence must be destroyed, and reconciliation be out of the question. 2d. This third essential includes another idea more important than the last. Each party must have confidence in the atoner as a being *capable of comprehending the interests of both*. Of necessity he must be able to comprehend the nature of sin, its effect on God's universe, what is the measure of restitution necessary, how God's character is to be affected by this strange anomaly, this rending asunder cause and effect, this saving men in spite of denounced wrath ! The atoner must understand all this, or God never can risk the compromise of his own holiness and glory. A child never is intrusted with plenipotentiary powers at a foreign court, because he cannot comprehend the interests at stake. Much less will the Great Jehovah intrust the interests of his mighty dominions, and his infinite holiness, to one who cannot comprehend them.

4. In order to secure the end designed, the Atoner must secure that obedience and love to God from sinners which is the

fulfilment of the law. The reason of this is obvious. For, even though the atonement should be ample enough to make restitution for all sin, even if all sin, up to the moment when the atonement interposed, were forgiven, yet it would be vain, unless the fountain of wrong action were dried up. Unless this were done, evidently the sinner would immediately plunge himself into the same difficulties, whence he must again be extricated by the same power, and so on to all eternity. It is a vain task to wash away the blood from a wound, unless you stanch the wound itself. He engages in a chimerical enterprise indeed, who attempts to drain a lake into which numberless rivers are rolling their waters. But infinitely more absurd and chimerical is the idea that an atonement for sin will answer its design without absolutely changing the sinner's heart. It must convert the rebel into an obedient subject, the selfish man into the benevolent man, the sinner hating God into the child loving God.

Most evidently this work must be a result of the atonement. The affections of sinners are withdrawn from God. The atoner's work must result in these affections being restored to God. In this way the law is fulfilled, God is honoured, and man is saved.

Thus we have examined four facts so obvious that it is believed no one will dispute them. We may now use these facts to test, not demonstratively, but on the grounds of probability, the pretensions of all proposing to make an atonement. There are three distinct theories respecting the dignity of the Mediator between God and man. Let us use the scale furnished by the facts already stated, that we may arrive at a result highly probable, if not demonstratively certain, as to which of these theories is correct.

1st. What are the probabilities concerning an atoner *merely human*? Applying the first fact, what is the dictate of reason in answering this question? Can a mere human being become the link to reunite the Infinite and the finite—between the Eternal and Holy God, and his rebel creature man? Can he annihilate the gulf which lies between infinite holiness

and infinite sinfulness? Can his arms grasp the wide extremes, and laying his hands on the heads of these parties, become a daysman between them? Reason can only reply that the pretension is highly improbable.

Apply the second fact in answering the same question. Can a mediator merely human make restitution for all the sins of the human family? Let your eye glance along those beetling mountains of human guilt, which are piled about mankind. Can a human voice say to these mountains, "Be ye removed and be ye cast into the sea, and it shall be done"? Can a man command a treasury of such mighty resources as to liquidate the debt which rests on the whole race? Suppose he put forth all his energies to accomplish the work, what more can he effect than simply to fulfill his own obligations to God, and for which he must himself say, "I am an unprofitable servant; I have done that which was my duty to do"? Is it possible that any human being can sustain the sins of the whole world, transferring all to his own account, that a world might be justified before God? Reason would seem to give a decided negative to every such pretension. To say the least, reason startles at the utter improbability of such a thing.

But what inference may be drawn from the third fact?—The mediator must command the perfect confidence of God and man, as a capable and impartial mediator. Can a human mediator lay in such a claim as this? It is acknowledged that the improbability is not so great in reference to the first particular specified under the third fact. We may conceive it to be possible for a holy human mediator to be impartial, so far as his ability permits. And yet it should be noticed that this impartiality would only amount to an *intention* to be impartial, while in reality the limited capacity of the mediator might lead him to great partiality.

But, when we remember that it is absolutely essential to the work of atonement that each party should have confidence in the atoner as able to comprehend the interests at stake, the question demands closer investigation. May we suppose it possible that a human mediator can comprehend all the vast

and varied interests of men ? The question conveys its own answer. But suppose this were possible, and that a man may claim the confidence of his fellows, as thoroughly understanding their interests ; can he claim the same confidence at the hand of God ? Here is an exigency in God's moral government. Rebellion has flung out its banner. In millions of hearts God is dethroned. The holy law is torn down from its pedestal of purity, and the insulting cry of these rebels rings through the whole universe, " we will not have" Jehovah " to reign over us." The exigency occurred once before, and vengeance lingered not. Lightning falls not more rapidly and remorselessly, than the bolt which drove the rebel angels to hell. The same awful tragedy seems nigh to a repetition. The actors are before all holy beings, and are not hid from the fallen angels. But to the utter amazement of angel and devil, one proposes to make an atonement by which rebellious men may be saved from vengeance, and yet all God's rights be maintained. Who does not see that he who thus stays the suspended sword, must know the extent of the work he undertakes ? Suppose it were a holy man, a Moses, a Daniel, or a human Christ. How would the question flash through holy and unholy hearts, Can he comprehend the ravages sin has made ? the hatefulness of that destroyer which has eternally ruined angels, forged chains of darkness, and created the bottomless pit ? Can he know how all moral beings are to be affected by this amazing change which he proposes to make in the plans of God ? Will it arrest sin, enhance Jehovah's glory, promote the highest good of all holy beings ? These and a thousand other momentous questions start up to every mind ; and shrinking hearts, looking at the position of that human being, demand a straight answer, Can such an one comprehend all this ? In a word, it resolves itself into the single question, Can a finite mind comprehend infinity ? If not, how can the aggrieved Lawgiver intrust the infinite interests of his universe to one entirely incapable of understanding them in all their mighty magnitude ? Again, the unaided intellect of man can give but one reply. If not absolutely certain, it is

highly improbable, that this condition can be satisfied by a mere man.

Let us now subject the same question to the test of the fourth fact: Can a mere human mediator secure the end designed in the atonement, by causing the sinner to obey and love God? Dr. Dwight slightly implies the train of thought here to be presented. In his sermons on the Divinity of Christ, one striking train of thought is announced in these words:—“This—the Divinity of Christ—is the only ground of consistency in the scheme of redemption.” Among other things involved in the work of redemption, showing it to be positively necessary that Christ be a Divine being, he points out “the creation of a new heart in man; the communication of divine knowledge, etc.; the continual communication of strength, etc. etc.” He announces another argument in these words: “The apostles otherwise chargeable with leading mankind into idolatry.” (Dwight’s Theol. Vol. I. pp. 566, 572.) The elements are contained in these two arguments, yet the precise thought is not seized. An examination of our standard theological writers will present the same result. In but one author is the thought now to be presented to be found; and yet, it seems so simple that it is wonderful that distinguished theologians have never grasped it. Perhaps they did grasp it, but considered it unworthy of notice or confidence. And yet, it does appear to us to be a diamond of the first water. In the “Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation,” this thought is expanded in the most beautiful manner. I take the liberty of using the thought as a strong link in this argument of probabilities. I have not perused that book since it was first published, but frequent meditation more and more convinces me that an argument based on this thought is sound.

God has been robbed of the affections of men: Can a human mediator restore them to God their only proper object? The question is not whether a human being, striving to benefit his fellow-men, can call out *strong love for himself*. We know that the names of Paul, Howard, Clarkson, and Wilberforce, will be held in continual remembrance among men.

The simple question is, Can a human mediator restore *to God* the love of sinners? If you please, in order to place the question in its most striking light, let us for a moment grant that some human being is able to stand between God and man, to make restitution for all violations of law, and capable of administering impartial and intelligent justice to each. Granting all this, will the *creature*, acting as mediator, lift human affections to the Creator? Would it not, in fact, defeat the very design of the atonement, and introduce more disastrous violations of the law, by gathering around the *creature* who secures the way of salvation, affections which belong only to God? "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God;" but Jehovah here appears only a stern, inexorable lawgiver, relaxing only when he has received his full due, whilst man, the mediator, is the generous benefactor, who incurred the vengeance due the sinner.

Some may seek to evade this conclusion, by asserting that this human mediator is the agent of God, and therefore God must receive the gratitude. Let me suppose a case. A father prohibits his son from going to the river, under pain of chastisement. The son disobeys, and a mis-step throws him into the swift current. The father sees his peril, but takes no step to rescue him. But a servant, of course the father's agent, plunges unbidden into the swollen river, and rescues the boy at the risk of his own life. The father, however, after inflicting the threatened chastisement, receives him into favour. Now, to whom will the boy's gratitude be rendered for his rescue, to the father or his agent, the servant? The first never moved to save his son, the second risked his life to rescue him, and the boy cannot, if he tries, be grateful to the father for what he did not do.

Let me suppose another case. A young prodigal has wasted a large sum of money belonging to his father, and for it is cast into prison, with the assurance that he shall not come out till he has paid every farthing. The father is inexorable, and demands his just dues. But an industrious servant of this inexorable master, by dint of industry, has earned a sum suffi-

cient to purchase his freedom. His heart is moved by the young man's condition. He denies himself his own expected freedom, discharges the young prodigal's debt, and sets him at liberty. To whom would the young man's gratitude here be given? To the father or his servant? There is no question as to how he would act. Even if he desired, he could not feel gratitude to his father for his delivery from prison, because it was the servant's self-denial and generosity which opened the prison doors. The mind obeys an established and necessary law, in thus pouring out its treasured affections at the feet of a benefactor.

Such is believed to be the fact in the atonement. If man endure self-denial, anguish, and death, to make an atonement for sinners, upon man will be lavished the gratitude of those who have been saved. Now, if this be a true law of the mind, does not reason pronounce the idea of an atonement, made by a mere human being, as highly improbable, since it would defeat the end aimed at by an atonement, the restoration of man's love to God.

Thus, by glancing back on the steps taken, it will appear that probabilities are accumulated to well nigh a moral certainty, that the first theory, that of a mere human mediator, is false.

2d. A more comprehensive theory now meets us. To sweep the whole ground, it may be put in this form: What are the probabilities concerning an atonement being made *by any created being whatever*? The difficulty of answering this question is greater than the former one. Yet even here we have strong probabilities, without appealing directly to the Scriptures.

The difficulty of answering this question seems to arise from the fact that between man and God there is space for a gradation of created spirits so great, that the highest may far outreach the comprehension of our weak minds. A created spirit may be so far above man in the scale of being, that to him he seems omnipotent. His intellect may be so far-reaching and mighty, that man looks upon him as omniscient. His

lightning rapidity from place to place, swift as thought, to the mind of man might seem to indicate omnipresence. This angelic, or superangelic being is so far exalted above him, that man, unable to comprehend such greatness, involuntarily inquires whether such a being cannot compass the work of atoning for the sins of men.

One fact in reasoning bears on the solution of this difficulty. The human mind may arrive at sure conclusions concerning things which it cannot comprehend. It can apprehend often what it cannot comprehend. Thus the arithmetician can multiply a quantity into itself so often that he cannot even announce the result intelligibly, and yet he is positive that that result is correct. The human mind apprehends space to be infinite, God to be eternal, the soul to be immortal, and yet the mind cannot comprehend infinity, eternity, immortality.

To apply this fact in reasoning to the case in hand. Let it be granted that some being is so far above man or angel, as to outreach man's highest conception, yet by using known facts and principles, we may reach a conclusion highly probable as to his power to make atonement for the sins of men. As, for instance, we have the fact that he is a created being, and of course a subject of God's moral government, just as really under obligations to serve and love God, with all his heart and soul and mind and strength, as the meanest creature. That obligation can no more be annulled in his case than with man. After doing all he can, he has only done his duty. After tasking his mighty energies to the utmost he has not accomplished one work of supererogation, the benefit of which he may claim to liquidate the violated obligations of others. Let him exert his matchless powers, whilst eternity accomplishes its ever revolving cycles; let his mighty heart beat with the benevolent desire to save sinners, and yet upon all his works will flame forth the tremendous inscription, "an unprofitable servant, doing only his duty." How, then, is he, though he be so great, to liquidate the vast debt standing against the human family? How is he to annihilate

these mountains of human guilt, and make such restitution that men may stand before God justified?

Besides this, we have another test fact. This superangelic mediator, however he may outreach our conceptions, is a created being, and of course a *finite* being, for with reverence we may say that we cannot create a being possessed of his own incommunicable attributes. Can he then command the confidence of Jehovah, as one capable of comprehending His plans and interests? Man might entrust his interests to such an one, and believe that he will fully understand them. But can his finite mind take in infinite interests, measuring with the glance of intuition the mighty breadth and length and depth and height of sin in all its tremendous results and tendencies? Is his range of vision wide enough to send a God's glance down through eternity, and over a universe wide as immensity, to know how the atonement is to affect all beings in all coming ages? If not, how can he fulfill an indispensable condition of the mediatorial office, claiming the implicit confidence of both these parties?

But this examination affords us another fact, from which we may safely reason. This mediator, whatever his rank or dignity, must be able to restore to God the love of sinners. Former transgressions must not only be cancelled, but the fountain of sin must be dried up. Otherwise, aside from its utter inefficiency in securing the design of an atonement, it would be only a costly premium on sin. Then for one moment suppose this superangelic mediator to have actually wrought out the redemption of men, and that now he sends out a proclamation to all rebels, "*Whosoever will, let him live.*" How will this affect the heart of the sinner? If it excite love at all, will it not be love for the mediator? As the redeemed rebel looks upon the atoner, he beholds a being so great as to transcend his loftiest thoughts, whose heart is full of holy benevolence, and *withal, one who at the price of his own blood and agonizing sufferings has rescued him from eternal ruin.* Will the affections of human hearts, under the circumstances, be lifted to God? A distant fixed star might more reasonably

expect to attract around itself and control the planets, whilst the great orb of day binds them with eternal chains. In such a case God would not be the great attracting centre for human affections. Those treasures dearer to Jehovah than diamonds, and above the price of rubies, would be withdrawn from the Creator and lavished on the creature. In a word, the result of such an atonement would be foulest treason.

We have thus collected the probabilities which antagonize the most general question which can be framed, Can *any* created being make an atonement for sin? As in the previous instance, if the demonstration be not absolute, the moral certainty is very strong, so much so that we cannot blame some Unitarians for altogether scouting the idea of an atonement. The difficulties in either case are so great, that either horn of the dilemma is sharp enough to gore mortally the heresy of a mere created atoner, or that other one, that no atonement is necessary.

3d. The remaining theory is that which has been the life of the church in all ages, that Jesus Christ, the Mediator, is a Divine Being. At the very outset it was assumed to be absolutely necessary for man's salvation, that some being make an atonement for him. We have examined the probabilities which arise from the atonement, as to whether a human mediator, or any created mediator, however high, can fulfill the essential conditions. These probabilities are so accumulated as to amount to a moral certainty. This being true, the inference is easy and logical. As an atonement—granted in the outset—is to be made by some being, and as probabilities against any creature whatever making that atonement amount to a moral certainty, therefore a Divine Being only can make the atonement. As the probabilities are very strong against the first two theories, of necessity—keeping in mind the above assumption—they are as strong in favour of the atoner being God.

Thus far we have examined antecedent probabilities. Let us briefly appeal to Scripture to complete the demonstration. Two facts we seek in the revelation which God has made.

(1.) Jesus Christ has made an atonement for sin. To be brief and pertinent as possible. "But God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet *sinners Christ died for us.*" In 1st Corinthians, it is said "*that Christ died for our sins.*" Peter says of Christ, "Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree," etc. In Revelation part of the new song is this ascription to the Lamb: "and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood." In Galatians occur these words: "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us." In Timothy it is said of the "man Christ Jesus, who gave himself a ransom for all." The words of our Saviour himself shall conclude the quotations which might be extended indefinitely. "Even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to *give his life a ransom for many.*" Words cannot be more pertinent to prove that Christ has made an atonement for sin.

(2.) Another fact we derive from the Scriptures: That Jesus Christ the Mediator is a Divine Being. "For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulder; and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, the mighty God, the Everlasting Father, [literally Father of eternity,] the Prince of Peace." Jesus Christ is there called absolutely the mighty God, and self-existence, an incommunicable condition of Jehovah's existence, is ascribed to him; he is called the *Father of eternity*. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." By comparing Malachi 3: 1, with Matthew 11: 10, it will be seen that Christ, the Messenger of the Covenant, as we see by Matthew that Christ answered to that person, was *Jehovah*. In Romans, words are used which are decisive: "Whose are the fathers, and of whom as concerning the flesh Christ came, who is over all, God blessed forever." And here let me repeat a familiar thought. Apply the words of this last passage to a mere man, and see how absurd the tautology. Let these words apply to Paul, or Luther: "Whose are the fathers, and of

whom as concerning *the flesh*, Paul or Luther came, etc. !” We can scarcely restrain our laughter. But permitting God’s word to speak out, in all its comprehensiveness, the great “mystery of godliness, God manifest in the flesh,” God incarnate, and this verse in Romans becomes a key to admit us into that mystery of mysteries, the doctrine of a Divine Man, an Incarnate God. But enlargement on this point is unnecessary. These quotations are brief and pertinent, and they convince us that Christ is indeed God.

The word of God settles these two facts beyond dispute. Let me repeat the proposition to be proved ; *none but a divine being can make an atonement for sin*. Let me centre on this point the two facts furnished us by the Scripture. Who was wounded for our transgressions, and bruised for our iniquities ? The mighty God, the Father of eternity. Who took upon him the form of a servant, and submitted to death, even the death of the cross, in order that his life might be a ransom for many ? The self-existent God. (See John 1 : 1.) Jesus Christ, who is over all, God blessed for ever. How can we for one moment entertain the thought that such an amazing and infinite sacrifice would have been made, if the atonement could have been made by some smaller sacrifice ? Would God, the Son, have become incarnate, to pour out his own blood a ransom for the lost, if any other means could have been devised to secure the wish of his benevolent heart ? Suppose the death and sufferings of some created being would have compassed the work, how would a multitude of the loftiest spirits around the eternal throne have vied for the honour of executing such an unheard-of plan of redemption ! To sum it all up, would Jehovah have been so unsparing to execute a *divine victim*, if any thing in the created universe would have answered instead ? The very conception is impossible. God would not have lavished his richest gift, at the cost of great self-denial in giving up the Son of his love, He would not have tasked infinite love for the richest boon it could bestow, if any other sacrifice or boon could have ransomed the guilty.

Is not the argument sound and logical? To our mind it seems so, and with this belief we commit it to the reader, with the wish that what has been written with honesty, may be read with candour. If this diagram proves a proposition so dear to the Christian church, by a process different from that usually adopted, it may not be useless. Copernicus may, by one process, reach the sublime theory of planetary revolution around the sun as a centre. An astronomer on the planet Jupiter may get at the same splendid result by another process. Whilst the Copernicus of Urania, with telescope sweeping the heavens from that outer verge of creation, may demonstrate the same truth by a process entirely different from the others. And yet, could these three astronomers, having watched the solar system from posts of observation so widely separated, be brought together to exhibit the process from which each evolved the same fact, their belief in it would be confirmed. With more profound admiration would they gaze out upon a system of worlds, conforming to a splendid theory, proved true by demonstrations on earth, on Jupiter, on Urania. To them, the three demonstrations would be three suns centering their light to elucidate and glorify the same magnificent truth.

A divine "Christ crucified," with all its mighty dependencies, is a more glorious truth than astronomer on earth or Urania ever grasped. It is the fact of all others enthroned a central sun, not for a few planets, but for Jehovah's mighty moral universe. Christ has been lifted up, and draws all men up to himself. The chains of this central orb are flung around the lost in hell, and they tremble in the presence of the holiness of that law, which could only be satisfied by such a victim. The holy of all worlds are sweetly yet omnipotently bound to this sun, and through eternal ages their rapture will waken glorious songs in heaven. But the power of that sun reaches farther than this. "Wandering stars" had broken away from their orbits, and seemed reserved for the "blackness of darkness." But that cross of the Divine man, that incarnate God, has such power that it reaches those

“wandering stars,” and again they revolve loyal planets around the sun. And the cross will bind them so mightily that they will never wander again.

If this be true, then certainly, demonstrate this central fact as you will and you fill Christian hearts with joy, and in the various demonstrations Christians will see so many suns mingling and concentrating rays, until the magnificent fact shines with the clearness of an eternal day.

ARTICLE VI.

ANCIENT AND MODERN HISTORIANS.

By Prof. E. D. Sanborn, Dartmouth College, N. H.

THE best historian is he who represents, with the greatest fidelity, *the life and spirit* of the age he describes. It is not sufficient that what he records should be strictly true, it should be true to the living archetype; it should be relatively as well as absolutely true. It is possible for a painter to represent a landscape, with perfect accuracy of outline, giving to every object its proportionate size, form, and position, adjusting, with the utmost skill and precision, the relative distances of the several parts, and yet by an artful blending of light, shade and colouring, he may destroy the fidelity of the picture and render it false to the original. So it is with the historian. He may make a true record of mighty revolutions in the political world, assigning to the prominent actors in life's drama their respective parts, their exact position upon the stage, and their relative military and political influence, and still, by distorting and colouring their motives, and shading their characters, he may represent these same actors, at pleasure, as a curse or a blessing to mankind. While the historian records those great events which change the governments of the world, and the fortunes of nations, he should not over-

look those noiseless and constantly progressive revolutions in manners, morals, and religion, which give a new character to society and change the destinies of nations. A history may contain no untruth, and yet leave a false impression upon the mind of the reader. All the particular events recorded may be true, and yet those modifying influences which give character to the age may be omitted.

The man who should attempt to record the events of the eighteenth century, without alluding to the rise of Methodism in England, or the "Great Awakening" in America, would certainly present a very imperfect view of the social and religious state of those countries, however accurate he might be in the details of political and military history. Hence the importance of knowing the principles of an author, and the particular influences under which he wrote. If the reader be informed in the outset that a writer of English history is a Whig or a Tory, a Catholic or a Protestant, his own reflections may, in some measure, neutralize the effect of the author's political or religious prejudices and partialities. To decide upon the merits of a historian, we must know the age in which he lived, and the influences to which he was subjected; and conversely, to appreciate the value of a history we ought to be acquainted with the writer and the party to which he belonged in religion and politics. If we arraign an ancient historian before a modern tribunal of criticism, and test his merits by the existing standard of historical excellence, we shall, inevitably, do him injustice. The failure of recent critics to make a just discrimination in this respect, has, undoubtedly, contributed to bring the old historians into comparative disesteem. It has become fashionable among scholars to talk of the childishness, the vanity, and superstitious credulity of Herodotus, and to complain, with seeming honesty, of Livy's obtuseness and reckless disregard of truth. These writers are gravely charged with carelessness, partiality, and even the grossest dishonesty, because they did not write history as the critics of the nineteenth century think it ought to be written. It will not avail them to plead, in their behalf, that they wrote

as a Greek or Roman, of those times, might be expected to write. It is enough to condemn them that they have not written as Hallam or Niebuhr would have written, had they been the contemporaries of these authors. Herodotus and Livy have faults peculiar to their times. They are such as never can be repeated. Modern historians, it is true, are free from them. They have shunned the errors of an early age; and, in their extreme caution, have plunged into faults of an opposite character, still more injurious and far less pardonable. The early historians were *artless*. They believed *too much*. They received human testimony with too little doubt. They sometimes mistook appearances for realities. Modern historians are *theorists, wily advocates*, using the facts of history to weave the web of their tangled sophistries, in order to prejudice men in favour of their party or creed. Antiquity does not furnish a single *philosophic* historian, in the modern acceptance of that term; and yet, there are some among the old writers who, in all the qualities of a good historian, have never been equalled. "The spirit of history," says one, "is frequently history deprived of its spirit." The philosopher in pursuit of principles, reckless of details, plays the anatomist; and while he dissects away those less substantial parts on which life and beauty depend, he leaves to his readers only the skeleton of the dead past. In the hands of such men, history becomes a succession of learned disquisitions upon the moral and political elements of social progress. They frequently exhibit profound views of human life, and develope those controlling laws which regulate and limit the advancement of the race—laws with which every student of history ought to be familiar—still they do not write *history*. Their works are necessarily fragmentary. They are erudite dissertations, learned essays, critiques, any thing but lucid narrative. Another class of modern philosophic historians make use of history for the purpose of proving a theory in politics or religion. Such a writer often plays the eclectic, and selects only those particular facts which sustain his own views. Better far go back to the childlike simplicity of

Herodotus, and collect both fact and fable, and weave them into a graceful and pleasing narrative, leaving the reader to draw his own inferences from the furnished data. The errors of the imagination are less injurious than the perversions of the speculative reason. In the one case, what history loses, poetry gains ; and truth may be recovered by stripping off its borrowed robes. In the other, truth perverted and misapplied not only loses its salutary influence, but becomes positively hurtful. It sheds a false light, which leads the sincere and honest inquirer astray. If we carefully consider the condition of the first writers of history, we shall no longer wonder at the poetic character of their narratives. The *imagination* is ever developed before the *judgment*. Men *feel and enjoy* before they *reason and decide*. Hence poetry, which is the language of emotion, precedes prose. The beginnings of history lie hid to the inquirer. The first man's discourse to his child is the fountain whence oral history flows. In its progress, it is enriched by countless tributary streams of tradition. Poetry gathers up those traditions, and from them weaves the mazy web of mythology. When the seeker after pure historic facts begins to trace those lines of truth that run, like golden threads, through this complex tissue of reality and fiction, he is at once involved in uncertainty, and begins to question the fidelity of all history. Truth and error are so intimately blended that, for the sake of the truth, he is obliged to adopt the error with which it is united. For obvious reasons, the first written histories could rise but little above tradition. They must be confused, contradictory, and exaggerated. The writer who is himself the product of the age in which he writes, rarely possesses the patience or discrimination necessary to separate fact from fable. He is perhaps in advance of his generation in culture and intelligence, and yet he is the index and exponent of the mind and heart of the nation to which he belongs. Like his fellows, he knows the past only by tradition. The same dim light guides the teacher and the taught. He gathers up the impressions of the many and sets his own seal upon them. He

writes to please his contemporaries. He has not yet attained to that elevation of soul which prompted Thucydides to write "*for eternity.*" Such lofty aspirings are the result only of high intellectual culture. The historians who preceded Herodotus were such writers as we have described. Indeed, it is only in an indefinite and popular sense, that those collectors of traditions, myths, fables, allegories, and epigrams, can be called historians. They were prolix story-tellers, who pursued their vocation for the amusement of an imaginative and superstitious people. The wares they furnished were adapted to the market to which they were brought. The works of Herodotus constitute the transition from story-telling to true history. He rejected the practice of his predecessors of relating the traditions of a single city, and undertook to write, in one beautiful whole, all the most important events relative to the principal nations of the then known world. Examine his materials, a crude mass of facts, fictions, mythologies, dreams, omens, prodigies; in a word, all the monstrous creations of the unrestrained imagination and blind credulity of a youthful people. For whom did he write? Not for the practical, talented, and phlegmatic Englishman, not for the speculative, erudite, and philosophic German, but for the inquisitive, lively, and credulous Greek. He was himself the child of a poetic age, born beneath the same genial skies, and subjected to the same moral influences as those for whom he wrote. His narratives were not destined to reach the public eye through the circulating library, nor in cheap editions, scattered, like the leaves of autumn before a November blast, but they were to be recited at the great Olympic festival, or read from manuscripts to assembled crowds of his countrymen. They were not written for the eye of cold skeptical critics, who ask for authorities, and try every assertion by the test of argument, but they were designed to delight the curious minds of countless, interested, excited, and intelligent listeners, men who heard, with delight and applause, tales of strange beasts and birds, and still stranger men. Such an audience stayed not to question the accuracy of the narrator, who de-

scribed cities with stupendous walls, hanging gardens suspended in mid-heaven ; who told of towers piercing the sky, of mysterious rites, of gods with ineffable names, of mighty pyramids that concealed the dead from human view, and of crystal tombs that showed their inmates to every passer-by, of giants and pigmies, of men with but one eye, and (what surpasses all) of women, gigantic Amazons who *hated men*, and lived alone. The historian wrote too of Greece, “the nurse of heroes,” the land of glorious achievements ; he spoke of her dauntless warriors, of their invincible love of liberty, of their bloody battles, and glorious victories. He wrote for the ears of those who inherited the virtues of their fathers, who gloried in their deeds, who were proud of their native land. He wrote for a people whose vanity was proverbial, whose love of fame was unbounded. What cared they if the number of the troops of Xerxes was exaggerated ? If the monarch’s resources were represented as inexhaustible, and his minions innumerable ? Then the glory of Grecian arms becomes the more conspicuous ; and the honour of their venerated ancestors the more exalted. But who can affirm, with certainty, that the accounts of the Persian invasion, as given by Herodotus, are essentially erroneous ? Nothing can be urged against them but their seeming improbability. Is it possible for modern critics to say what may and what may not have occurred in that early age ? If the pyramids had been demolished soon after Herodotus visited Egypt, who, in the nineteenth century, would have credited his accounts of them ? Under a different system of government, and a different state of civilization, it is impossible for us to estimate, with accuracy, either the motives or actions of men in remote antiquity. So far as modern researches tend to throw light upon ancient history, Herodotus has been found to be remarkably accurate in his statements. The recent discoveries in Egypt, from the interpretation of hieroglyphics, have given new and undoubted confirmation to his history of that country. An accurate comparison of the works of Champollion, Wilkinson, and Rosellini, with the account Herodotus has

given of the manners and customs of the Egyptians, will show that he has fewer errors and prejudices, by far, than modern English travellers, who describe American manners and institutions. Arguing from what is known to what is unknown, it is reasonable to incline to the side of charity. It must be remembered that Herodotus records, in many instances, what he heard and saw. He did not rely upon *reports*. He visited the lands he describes, and received the traditions of the inhabitants from their own lips. He also wrote down the results of his own observations, and his records will bear a favourable comparison with those of travellers of any age since his own. It is true he is sometimes deceived or imposed upon, and who is not? He is sometimes mistaken, and who is not? He also makes his record of events in his own way. He created his own fashion. He had no models for imitation; no predecessors in the same field of discovery to consult; no standard of historic truth by which to test his own accuracy. To be sure, he does not record a tradition or myth with the solemn gravity of a Bryant, tracing every fable to its source, and investing the whole narrative with a drapery of recondite and useless learning, nor does he analyze the complex tissue of society like a Miller, or describe the origin of political institutions like a Hallam, following every event to its cause, and deducing from accumulated facts the great principles which govern men and nations. Nor does he record his "Inklings of Travel" like a modern coxcomb, who quarrels with his landlord, finds fault with his accommodations, and puts under the ban of overwhelming censure every custom, law and fashion that accords not with the standard usages of the great nation of which he is the honoured representative. He does not write like a Humboldt or Niebuhr respecting the natural history of a country, its botany, geology, zoology and meteorology, and yet he is not indifferent to these subjects. He mentions the natural productions, minerals, plants, trees and animals of the countries he visited. Every thing wonderful in nature or art he describes; not like a philosopher, who thinks more of classes, genera and species, than of beauty,

variety and order, but like an artless and inquisitive boy, who is alive to every novelty, who drinks in, with intense interest, the marvels of a former age, who sympathizes with all that is good and great, but can comprehend fully the influence neither of the good nor great, upon society. Herodotus has been charged with *credulity*. It is probable that he believed too much; and in history it is better for the world that a writer should believe *too much* than *too little*. The excess may be abated; the deficiency can never be supplied. The credulity of the early writers involved no very serious consequences in regard to posterity. It related, chiefly, to those childish marvels which one may believe or disbelieve without moral turpitude. This species of credulity does not poison the fountains of truth, like the lying legends of ghostly fathers, who do evil that good may come, nor yet like the falsifying of records by philosophic historians who compel history to prophesy deceit to the nations. Compare Herodotus with the most celebrated historian of the nineteenth century, Archibald Alison, and let the lovers of truth decide to which belongs the palm for accuracy and fidelity. In this age of steam communication, when the facilities of travel have been indefinitely multiplied, and the means of verifying reports are within the reach of the most indolent, this philosophic and learned historian has embodied, as we believe, in any nine pages of his history, when he treats of American affairs, more positive misrepresentations, more gross and unpardonable violations of truth, than can be found in the whole nine books of Herodotus. Speaking of the migratory character of the Americans, he makes the following sweeping assertions: "Not only is landed property almost always sold and divided at the death of the head of the family, but even during his lifetime, immigration from one spot to another is so frequent, that it may be considered *the grand social characteristic of the American people*. However long and happily a proprietor may have lived upon his little domain; though it may have been the sepulchre of his fathers, the play-ground of his infancy, the harbour of his wedded love, the nursery of his

children ; though it may be endeared to him by all the ties that can bind man to material nature, and the severance of which in other countries constitutes the last drop in the cup of the vanquished, an American is *always* ready to sell it, if he can do so for profit ; and putting himself and his family with all his effects, on board the first steamboat, transport himself and his household to a distant part of the country, and commence again, perhaps at a distance of some hundred miles, the great and engrossing work of accumulating wealth." Mr. Alison denominates this migratory propensity, which is applicable, in its full extent, only to the Western frontiers of our country, "the grand characteristic of society in America," and styles the condition of society among us as "the Nomade agricultural state." Further on, upon the same topic, he adds : "Hereditary feeling is unknown in America ; even family portraits, pictures of beloved parents, are often not framed, as it is well understood that, at the death of the head of the family, they will all be sold and turned into dollars, to be divided among the children." Assuming that the Americans are universally avaricious as well as fickle, he predicates of the whole people a deep and pervading feeling of discontent. "All classes and ranks," says Mr. Alison, "are dissatisfied with their condition, and plod on in sullen discontent, which is so strong as to be apparent in their habits, their manners, even the expression of their countenances. The scholars are dissatisfied ; they complain of the superficial character of their literature, and lament that its tone, instead of rising, is progressively sinking, with the extension of the power of reading to the working orders of society. The professional men are dissatisfied ; they allege that their rank is lower than in Europe ; that they are overshadowed by commercial wealth, and find no compensation in the esteem or respect in which their avocations are held. * * * The merchants are dissatisfied, they declare that they are worn to death by excessive toil. * * * Even the mechanics and cultivators are dissatisfied ; outwardly blessed beyond any other class that society has ever contained, they are ground down by the pressure of competition and

incessant thirst for riches and advancement." These unqualified assertions are fully equalled in prejudice and falsehood by his observations on the religious condition of the American people. A few sentences must suffice. "Episcopacy is the prevailing religion of the higher classes in the principal cities of the Union, except Baltimore. * * * Already the ruinous effect of the dependence of the ministers of all denominations on the voluntary support of their flocks, has become painfully conspicuous. Religion has descended from its function of denouncing and correcting national vices, and become little more, with a few noble exceptions, than the re-echo of public opinion." Then the grave historian proceeds to endorse Miss Martineau's well known slander of the clergy, by quoting her own words. From the same source he probably derived the following veracious statements: "Original thought, independence of character, intrepid assertions of opinion against the prepossessions of the majority, are *unknown* in America. So completely do their ideas flow in one channel, that you would say they are all cast in one mould, and stamped with one image and superscription. * * * There is, in opposition to the will and passions of the majority, no security whatever either for life or property in America. * * * Murder and assassination, in open day, are not unfrequent among the members of Congress themselves; and the guilty parties, if strong in the support of the majority, openly walk about and set all attempts to prosecute them at defiance. * * * The atrocities of the French Revolution, cruel and heart-rending as they were, have been exceeded on the other side of the Atlantic; for there the terrible spectacle has been *frequently* exhibited, of late years, of persons obnoxious to the majority being publicly burned alive by the people, and, to render the torment more prolonged and excruciating, over a fire purposely kindled of green wood." The same reckless generalization and wanton violation of truth pollute every page of this distinguished author's account of America. Were we to meet with such exaggerations and rhetorical flourishes in the flowery pages of a writer of the Celestial

Empire, we should pity and forgive the conceited pedant who penned them. But when a grave historian, of profound learning, through sheer prejudice, thus corrupts the very fountains of knowledge, he deserves no pardon. He ought to be exposed and punished by that same "omnipotent public opinion," which he affects to despise. Admitting that particular instances of avarice, servility and cruelty are to be found in our country, (and in what province or district of the earth are they not found?) is it worthy the candour and justice of a profound thinker to predicate these particular vices of a whole people? Such rapid induction does not become the philosopher. The credulous Herodotus did not so. If he chanced to hear of the villany of some sacrilegious person or assassin, he did not take the criminal for the type of the nation, and pronounce them all given to sacrilege and assassinations. Nor, if he chanced to see a company of inebriates carousing, at a public inn, did he, like a Hall or Hamilton, deliberately write down, in his note book, the astounding fact that the citizens of that country do habitually congregate, on appointed days, and get drunk together. He did not possess such a spirit of generalization. Had he learned from tradition or hieroglyphic records, that in a former age one Moses "slew an Egyptian and hid him in the sand," it may be doubted whether he would have recorded the fact as a common occurrence, gravely announcing "that murders and assassinations in the open day are common" in Egypt. No; the "*childish*" old traveller had not reached that sublime height of philosophy, which derives a law from a single fact. His heart and soul were not corroded with jealousy, nor was his judgment biassed by theories. He looked on men as they lived and moved in society, and wrote down the honest convictions of his soul. These "first impressions" in Egypt and Babylon are now as fresh and racy as though they had been penned but yesterday. A cheerful temper shed its genial influence on every page. He admired all that was new and beautiful, he was shocked at nothing but profanity and atheism. Did he meet with strange customs? He wondered at

the caprices of men, but did not censure. Did he meet with beautiful creations of art in foreign lands? He admired their fair proportions, but did not envy. Did he hear of strange gods, with their mystic rites, holy fanes, and unspeakable names? He contemplated the new deities, and their worship, with a decent respect, never presuming to blaspheme. Did he hear among remote nations, of achievements of heroes and men of renown? He recorded their brave exploits for the imitation of his countrymen, never seeking to tarnish their glory by base insinuations, or by the imputation of unworthy motives. Such was the credulous Herodotus; and who are they who are now taking up stones to cast at him? They are the Pharisees of history, "who tithe mint, anise and cummin, and omit the weightier matters of the law;" men who record, without a doubt, any falsehood which tends to degrade their neighbours or defeat their rivals in political or religious promotion. It is not because men have recently become more fond of truth and averse to error, that they do so carp at the mistakes of the old historians; but this way leads to notoriety and fame, therefore many do walk in it. It is not because Herodotus and Livy abound more in misstatements and errors than other authors in the same department of literature, from the days of these writers till now, that they have been so vigorously assailed by recent critics, but rather because there is a greater show of learning and far less peril in attacking the dead than the living.

Herodotus will, certainly, bear comparison for truthfulness, with travellers of any age. Compare his graceful narrative with the clumsy fabrications of the age of chivalry. Compare his supernatural beings, with the giants, dwarfs, dragons, enchanters, ghosts, witches and goblins, that swarmed in the stories of travellers and the songs of minstrels during the same period. Sir John Mandeville spent thirty years in foreign travel. His narrative abounds in the most improbable fictions, yet it was sanctioned by the pope, and apparently believed by himself and his readers. He pretends to have seen the very rock to which Andromeda was chained, and gravely

adds that she lived before the flood. He also describes a lady who had been converted into a dragon and was confined in the isle of Cyprus. He speaks of a race of men fifty feet high, who inhabited an island in the East Indies, and of another race who had their eyes in their shoulders. A Swedish navigator, not two hundred years ago, affirmed that in the island of Nicobar, in the gulf of Bengal, he discovered a race of men with long tails, like cats. The island, it is said, is now well known, but the men have disappeared. If such absurd fancies could be tolerated in Christian travellers, ought not some lenity to be shown to the comparatively venial blunders of the father of history? It would not be difficult to find a parallel for the credulity of Herodotus, or the carelessness of Livy, in modern historians. Robertson's romantic "*History of America*" would alone be sufficient. But it should be remembered that credulity is a relative term. What would be incredible in one age, would not be so in another. When Bruce, the celebrated traveller, returned from his wanderings, but few men gave credence to his accounts of nations before unknown and countries before unexplored. More accurate information has brought this early traveller again into repute, and confirmed the accounts he gave. Let every author be tried by his peers; let the jury be acquainted with all the facts in the case, and then a righteous verdict will be pronounced. Before such a tribunal Herodotus will not suffer. He will not only be acquitted of "malice prepense," but his good intentions will be rendered abundantly conspicuous. Modern writers would do well to copy his simplicity, his cheerfulness and his vivacity; to imitate his graceful style, his agreeable delineations of life and manners, his dramatic exhibitions of state counsels and plans of policy, and to cultivate his art of interesting the affections of the reader, his skill in setting forth the picturesque, the naïve and the beautiful. Let them cultivate the imagination and taste more, and the rules of logic less. Let them, like Herodotus, introduce more of every-day life, manners and opinions, and less of the unmeaning ceremonies and stupid pageants of courts;

let them portray more fully the struggles of the masses to obtain independence and freedom, and pass over, more cursorily, the horrors and carnage of the battle field. Let them once more unite the dissociated provinces of the novelist and the essayist. Let them blend the graphic delineations of the one with the profound researches of the other, and history will be more attractive and more useful. Before attempting to write, as did Thucydides, "for eternity," authors should be divested of their religious and political partialities, and enter the field of inquiry unpledged and unbound. When Herodotus described the gods of Egypt, he did not stay to inquire whether this or that particular view of their worship would prejudice the claims of the Divinities he adored, but he wrote, *precisely*, what he heard and saw. When a Southey or Lingard writes history for the many, each author feels bound to favour his own church, and to record only what the Church of England or the Church of Rome may choose to sanction. Hume and Gibbon appear as the unblushing abettors of infidelity, and write like the pensioned advocates of a clique, and not like liberal and high-minded historians. The old historians interest all classes of readers, and will continue to interest them so long as the human soul retains its present constitution. Modern historians, who are characterized by partisan predilections, are read, with deep interest, only by those who hold the same political or religious sentiments with the authors. It is impossible to learn the truth of any man or any set of men *till all the witnesses have testified*. Men hardly expect a writer to record events precisely as they happened but rather as he wishes them to have happened. No man will write an impartial history of the English or French Revolution, so long as the great principles involved in those struggles continue to agitate society. Under strong party excitement, men never find the *juste milieu*. The character of Cromwell is now beginning to be appreciated and vindicated in England, because the principles he advocated are beginning to be known and adopted. Some high-minded Englishmen even dare to eulogize the Puritans ; and, doubtless their

same will increase with the progress of civil and religious liberty in that country. The time has not yet arrived for their full and triumphant vindication. The old leaven of infidelity and hatred of liberal opinions, with which Hume so deeply poisoned the public mind, still works. He played the part of a subtle advocate in favour of irreligion and arbitrary power. He was careful to state no more than he could render probable by choosing his own witnesses. Accordingly he passed over all records that would prove injurious to his adopted clients, and magnified those minor points of evidence which supported their cause. He hated religion and every thing associated with it; hence the bold advocacy of human rights, when presented in a religious dress, is denounced as fanaticism. He did not wish to be known as the open reviler of divine truth, therefore he has employed the language of virtue to cloak his malicious designs. He *seems*, it is true, like a candid inquirer after truth, but "his neighbour cometh and searcheth him out." Mr. Brodie has arraigned the culprit before the bar of an enlightened public opinion, and claimed a reversion of the old verdict in his favour. His plea will be heard and the rights of truth will be vindicated. The reputation of Gibbon is fast declining on account of the partisan character of his history. His works are re-printed, but with copious notes appended to neutralize the poison he so liberally infused into the very heart of the narrative. It is not considered safe for the young to peruse his "luminous pages" without such an antidote. Better far had it been for the reputation of these men, if they had performed the humble office of compilers of other men's labours, than to have acted as the disguised advocates of a shameless infidelity. Better had it been for the world had they been as artless and credulous as Herodotus, and spent their days and nights in weaving together the countless legends of the dark ages, than to have made their finished periods the vehicles of a malignant moral poison. Such men as Rollin and Barthelemi, who gathered indiscriminately the fruit of others' toil and spread it in an inviting form before the public, deserve the gratitude of the world

infinitely more than these philosophic deceivers. Mere minuteness of detail or prolixity of narrative does not mislead or demoralize the reader; they simply occupy his time which possibly might be more profitably employed. The chaff is blown away, in the winnowing, while the tares fall with the wheat. It is comparatively easy to correct the errors of the imagination, but impossible, without divine aid, to rectify a disordered moral sense.

Herodotus and Livy are frequently classed together as though they possessed the same general characteristics and belonged to the same order of minds. In fact, they have but little, in common, except the indiscriminate censure of some modern critics. The same faults are charged upon both, though, more recently, Livy has been oftener assailed, and with more justice, than Herodotus. These historians belonged to entirely different epochs of civilization, and they are as unlike, in mental and moral traits, as the nations they respectively represented. The Greek was vain, inquisitive, excitable, and fond of novelty. The Roman was proud, reserved, austere, and indifferent to the records of other nations. Herodotus travelled into foreign lands in quest of knowledge. He endeavoured to trace every stream of tradition to its source. He inquired diligently into the early history and antiquities of the nations he visited, and with a prying curiosity sought information from every available source respecting their political and religious institutions. The results of his researches he has woven into a graceful and sprightly narrative, which, for simplicity, truthfulness and poetic embellishment, has never been equalled. Livy went to the capital of the Roman empire, consulted only the archives of his own nation, and collected materials from his predecessors, while he entirely neglected not only those monuments and memorials which existed throughout Italy, illustrative of the origin and early institutions of the "Eternal City," but the antiquities, literature, and monuments of neighbouring nations. When records failed him, he adopted those traditions which would reflect most honour upon the nation of which he wrote.

Truth was, with him, of no consideration in comparison with the honour and fame of Rome. It is not probable, however, that Livy deliberately falsified any portion of his record to enhance the glory of his country, but writing under the influence of strong partiality, he has too often attempted to palliate or justify the avarice and oppression of his countrymen. Foreign nations, that warred with Rome, have received but scanty praise at his hand, even when justice and honour fought with them. It must be borne in mind, in reading ancient history, that "*Punica fides*," and "*Græcia mendax*," are phrases of Roman origin. Had the historians of Carthage survived her fall to tell the story of their country's wrongs, Roman perfidy and oppression would have been as notorious as Carthaginian faith, and the glory of the Scipios would have faded before the fame of Hannibal. But we charge upon Livy only those faults which "lean to virtue's side." His admiration of Roman prowess warped his judgment in estimating the character of his country's foes. "All the merits and all the defects of Livy," says Macaulay, "take a colouring from the character of his nation. He was a writer peculiarly Roman; the proud citizen of a commonwealth which had, indeed, lost the reality of liberty, but which still sacredly preserved its forms,—in fact, the subject of an arbitrary prince, but, in his own estimation, one of the masters of the world, with a hundred kings below, and only the gods above him. He contemplated the past with interest and delight, not because it furnished a contrast to the present, but because it led to the present. He recurred to it, not to lose in proud recollections the sense of national degradation, but to trace the progress of national glory." * * * "The painting of his narrative is beyond description vivid and graceful. The abundance of interesting sentiment and splendid imagery is almost miraculous. His mind is a soil which is never overteemed, a fountain which never seems to trickle: it pours forth profusely, yet it gives no sign of exhaustion."

Livy was no antiquarian in the modern acceptance of that word, though he admired the past and revered its virtues

and its heroes. He took the story of Rome's origin as he found it embellished by tradition and poetry. He stayed not to inquire whether it were probable, or to question its authenticity. He seemed deeply impressed with the grandeur of the work he had assumed, and determined to create a history that should set forth, *in appropriate language and thoughts*, the greatness and majesty of the world's mistress. His object was not so much *to discover truth* as to describe, in a becoming style, her acknowledged greatness.

The steps by which his country rose to fame were, in his view, far less important than her ultimate exaltation. He prized the birthright of a Roman citizen too highly to admit, for a moment, that it had been transmitted to him from an ignoble ancestry. With such views, we could scarcely expect an author to be remarkably critical in seeking for authorities or in weighing the testimony of witnesses adverse to his favourite plan. Conscious of his ability to do honour to his country, he sought to rear to her memory a lasting monument that should do credit to her world-wide renown. He was, therefore, more anxious to polish the language of the old annalists than to correct their mistakes. The fame of the old Roman generals was dear to him. He looked upon their glorious deeds as a rich legacy bequeathed by them to their country. In the absence of authentic records, he, undoubtedly, recurred to family histories and to the flattering eulogies pronounced by mercenary orators at the funerals of the illustrious dead. These remarks apply, however, only to the early history of Rome. Where the materials were abundant, there is no evidence that he did not follow the best authorities. In forming a true estimate of the fidelity and accuracy of Livy, we must remember that the most valuable portion of his entire work is lost. Of one hundred and forty-two books only thirty-five remain, and these relate to those periods which were least known. Had that portion of his history been preserved, which was compiled from existing materials, at the capital, and for which there was no lack of authentic records for a complete and accurate illustration, the character of Livy would, with-

out doubt, have suffered far less from the censures of critics. His indifference to the chronicles and memorials of subjugated nations around him, and his admiration of Roman greatness, prevented his making a careful and thorough search into the humble origin of the Roman commonwealth. But when Rome was in her glory, when her arms had subdued the world, the historian might gratify all his national pride, yield to the fondest admiration of his country's renown, paint her overshadowing greatness in the most glowing colours, and yet not falsify a single line of her annals. The loss of this portion of his history can never be adequately supplied. The literary world has never known a greater. Bolinbroke often expressed the wish that we could exchange what we now have of Livy for what we have lost. Both literature and truth would probably be benefited by the exchange. To judge of Livy's merits, by the limited remnant of his great work, is as unjust as it would be to decide upon the merits of Hume or Lingard by their brief sketches of the Anglo-Saxon Heptarchy, or to put Mitford and Thirlwall on trial at the bar of enlightened criticism on account of the imperfect and unsatisfactory narrative they have given us of the heroic ages of Greece.

As a work of art, the history of Livy possesses unrivalled excellences. "No modern critic," says Dunlap, "has ever ventured to deny the spirit and beauty of his narrative, and the eloquence of his harangues. His words are well chosen, his expressions dignified, his periods harmonious." I have before alluded to the marked differences of character and style between Herodotus and Livy, and to their peculiar characteristics as they respectively represented different epochs in civilization. Let us look at some points of difference in style. Herodotus is prolix though never tiresome. He crowds his narrative with facts, anecdotes, and incidents, described with the minuteness of a diary. So we should expect an intelligent and curious traveller to do. Livy is diffuse, abounding in rhetorical beauties and illustrations, leading his reader into a very wilderness of literary sweets. Herodotus talks to his readers with all the simplicity, sprightliness, and good

nature of childhood; Livy discourses to us with the consummate art of a finished rhetorician, and with the stately reserve and cool complacency of a secluded scholar. Herodotus was a man of the world, visiting distant lands in quest of information, examining existing monuments, gathering up old traditions, questioning alike the priest and the peasant, and recording their responses for the amusement and instruction of his countrymen. Livy was a man of letters, seeking for information only in books, weaving, with unrivalled skill, his parti-coloured robe of history from the shreds and patches which he gathered from pontifical annals, family registers, genealogical tables, funeral orations, biographies, commentaries, and the meager and imperfect sketches of his predecessors in the same department of study. Herodotus drew portraits of living men, with a pencil dipped in colours drawn from the affections of a warm heart and lively imagination. Livy executed glowing pictures of mighty events, delineated with an accuracy of judgment and refinement of taste never before equalled. Herodotus has thrown around his narrative a dramatic interest. His actors converse together with the freedom and earnestness of a debating society or a political club. The whole air and mien of Livy's history are scholastic. His speakers utter their sentiments in elaborate harangues, with the dignity and courtly reserve of a senate chamber or a hall of legislation. The Greek interests the affections and enlists the sympathies of his readers; the Roman appeals only to their judgment and taste; the former is the historian for the million, the latter for the scholar. Both of them possess unrivalled excellences, and neither is without his faults. But if we admit all that is charged upon them, if we allow that Herodotus wanted discrimination in the collection of his materials, and that Livy was careless in the comparison of conflicting accounts, and deficient in research; if we concede to their accusers that they were both swayed by national prejudices and partialities, where is the historian of any age, with the exception of Thucydides, against whom some or all of these charges may not justly be preferred? Their faults were such as are common to all patriots;

their excellences the fruit of superior genius. They were neither bigots nor partisans. They did not write for a religious sect nor a political party. They wrote for coming ages, though it was their primary object to interest and instruct their own countrymen. They were read with delight and profit by men of their own time. They have continued to please and instruct every generation that has succeeded their own, and they will continue to be read, despite of critics, "down to the last syllable of recorded time."

The first and most important element of history is *truth*. "History," says Cicero, "is the light of truth." If Herodotus and Livy are estimated only by the amount of truth they record, and censured only for the errors they have committed, they will then bear a favourable comparison with the most celebrated modern historians. In recent times, history is made to subserve the same end as did the commonplaces of the old rhetoricians; it is made a mere storehouse of arguments, to which the various religious and political partisans resort for weapons. Showy and superficial historians, like Voltaire, make the facts of history the foundation on which they base their philosophical speculations. Of course, such writers exercise great discrimination in the choice of periods and events. We have now whig histories and tory histories; monarchical histories and democratic histories; Catholic histories and Puritan histories; Christian histories and infidel histories. Facts and events are classified to suit the theorist. What philosophy has gained truth has lost. The artlessness of Herodotus, and the impartiality of Thucydides, are among the things that were. They are mentioned with approbation, but never *imitated*. Such noble virtues, like the polar sun, are too far removed to warm. The short-sighted historian of to-day has, perhaps, a private end to gain, a favourite reform to promote, or some Utopian policy to recommend. History is made the theatre on which he exhibits his benevolent plan, or describes the machinery of his political scheme. He questions the oracles of the hoary past, and so interprets their ambiguous responses as to promote his own purposes. History is thus

coloured by the medium through which it passes. Instead of facts we have theories. Instead of a detailed narrative of important events, we have grave speculations upon the motives and policy of the actors. Instead of impartial biography of eminent men, we have fulsome eulogy or indiscriminate abuse.

Instead of history as it should be, we have philosophic principles, infidel or Christian, according to the character of the writer, all labelled and assorted for the benefit of the inexperienced and uninitiated. Those who re-write the annals of Greece and Rome, select those facts which tally with their own views, and wholly omit or misinterpret such as conflict with them. Compare Mitford's Greece with the accounts given by native writers. You find the same soil, the same scenes, the same events, but the actors, "oh how changed!" Mitford was a monarchist. He hated democracies as cordially as Alison. He, therefore, saw nothing to admire in the flourishing republics of Athens and Sparta, while in the tyrant of Syracuse and Philip of Macedon, he found every thing *noble, princely, paternal, godlike*. A turbulent democracy was an offence unto him. He could not tolerate their popular assemblies, their reckless legislation, and their abuse of good men. These defects outweighed all their virtues. Hereditary titles, royal magnificence, and costly equipage better pleased his taste; therefore, he lauds the "mild and paternal" sway of despots, and condemns, in no measured terms, the legislation of the "fierce democracie." By a similar process, and from like motives, Clarendon makes Charles I. a *martyr* of blessed memory, and Laud a saint. By an artful collocation of facts, and a slight shading of opinions, Hume converts the Puritans into mewling fanatics, and their bigoted persecutors into high-minded and honourable men. "The best historians of later times," says Macaulay, "have been seduced from truth, not by their imagination, but by their reason. They far excel their predecessors in the art of deducing general principles from facts; but unhappily they have fallen into the error of distorting facts to suit general

principles. They arrive at a theory from looking at some of the phenomena ; and the remaining phenomena they strain or curtail to suit their theory. It would be nearer the truth, had the critic affirmed that they form their theory, and then summon history to testify in its favour ; for it can scarcely be doubted, that every writer, before he enters upon his work, has imbibed those strong political and religious partialities, which, in so many instances, give a false colouring to history, and lead men blindfold into error. So long as party spirit reigns, we may not hope to find the model historian, which Lucian described centuries ago. " Let a historian," says he, " be fearless, incorrupt, free, the friend of independence and truth, calling a fig a fig, and a spade a spade, giving nothing to hatred, nothing to love, touched neither by shame nor pity nor diffidence ; a judge equally just and kind to all parties, a foreigner in his books, a citizen of no estate, bound by no laws, subject to no king, utterly careless what this or that man may say of his works."

ARTICLE VII.

THE FORMATION OF COMPOUND WORDS.

By JOSIAH W. GIBBS, Professor in Yale College, Ct.

1. *Composition*, or the formation of compound words, is a special mode of forming new words and developing new ideas.

2. Composition, considered externally, is the combination of two words, expressing distinct ideas, so as to form one word, expressing one idea. The word thus formed is called *a compound*. This definition is sufficient for the merely practical grammarian.

3. Composition, considered in its internal nature, is, like many other linguistical processes, a development of the

species from the genus. That is, the name of the genus, as *boat*, by prefixing the specific difference, as *steam* (i. e. moved by steam) now denotes the species, as *steamboat*. This is the more philosophical definition.

4. In reference to the mental process in composition just described, the compound consists of two parts ; viz. *the general*, or that which denotes the genus, and *the special*, or that which denotes the specific difference. The latter, which is the leading member of the composition, usually precedes, and has the tone or accent.

5. The unity of the word consists in the tone or accent, which binds together the two parts of the composition. The mere orthography is an uncertain criterion, being sometimes entirely arbitrary.

6. The unity of the idea consists in its referring to a specific thing, well-known as having a permanent existence.

7. Every composition is binary, or every compound consists properly of only two members, although these may themselves be compounded. Compare *household-stuff*, *deputy-quarter-master-general*, which must be analyzed conformably to this principle. The most plausible exception is Lat. *suovitaureus* (whence *suovitaurelia*), 'a swine, sheep, and bull.'

8. Composition is an original process in language, distinct on the one hand from derivation, that is, the formation of words by internal change of vowel and by suffixes, and on the other from the mere syntactical combination of ideas.

9. Composition differs essentially from the formation of words by internal change of vowel and by suffixes, in this, that derivation gives us different forms of ideas ; as, *drink* (noun), *drinker*, *drinking* (noun), *to drench*, all forms or modifications of the radical idea *to drink* ; *to set*, *to settle*, *sitter*, *setter*, *seat*, *sitting* (noun), all from the radical idea *to sit* ; while composition gives us species of idea, as, *school-house*, *state-house*, *alms-house*, all species under the general term *house* ; *door-key*, *chest-key*, *watch-key*, species of *keys*.

10. As a mode of forming words, composition is later in

its origin than derivation, and has arisen from the inadequacy of derivation to express the definite ideas which become necessary in language. Thus, mere derivation would be insufficient to express the different kinds of keys, as, *door-key*, *chest-key*, *watch-key*, or the different kinds of glasses, as, *beer-glass*, *wine-glass*, etc.

11. Notwithstanding which, there is some common ground for derivation and composition, and the two forms may alternate. In such a case the derivative is the most forcible, and the compound is the most precise in its import. Thus we have in English (neglecting accidental differences of usage), *hunter* and *hunterman*; *speaker* and *spokesman*; *trader* and *tradesman*; *plougher* and *ploughman*; *hatter* and *hatmaker*; *steamer* and *steamboat*; *bakery* and *bakehouse*; *brewery* and *brewhouse*; *patchery* and *patchwork*; *treasury* and *treasure-house*; *deemster* and *domesman*. So also where the words are radically distinct; as, *fowler* and *birdcatcher*; *Hollander* and *Dutchman*; *journal* and *daybook*; *marine* and *seaman*; *navigating* and *seafaring*; *propitiatory* and *mercy-seat*; *vintage* and *grape-gathering*; *vintner* and *wineseller*. These coincidences take place only when the second part of the compound is a very general or indefinite term, or has become so by use. In this way words originally compound acquire much of the character of derivatives.

12. Composition differs also from the mere syntactical combination of ideas. Composition is a development of words for constant, not merely for occasional use. It is not an arbitrary process in language, or a process to be adopted at pleasure. A proper compound must express a specific idea formed for permanent use in the language. Wherever it takes place, there should be an adequate cause or occasion. Not every combination of two ideas into one is properly expressed by a compound. Ideas combined at the moment of speaking or writing, for the first time, do not form compound words. It is owing to this principle that we have *deathwound* not *lifewound*; *fatherland*, not *sonland*; *foxhunter*, not *sheephunter*; *earthquake*, not *seaquake*; *brownbread*, not

freshbread ; *seasick*, not *terrorsick* ; because the latter of these couplets are not called for.

13. The difference between the compound word and the mere syntactical construction may be seen,

(1.) By comparing *blackbird*, a species of bird, with a *black bird*. So *redbird*, *blackberry*, *madhouse*.

(2.) By comparing *foxtail*, a plant so named from resemblance, with *the tail of a fox*. So *bear's-ear*, *goat's-beard*, *lady's-finger*.

(3.) By comparing *ratsbane*, a substance so called from its nature, with *the bane of a rat*. So *catch-fly*, *king's-evil*, *liverwort*.

14. The unity of the compound is further evident by considering,

(1.) That in many words the members of the composition do not appear at first view, nor are they generally understood ; as, *biscuit*, *curfew*, *daisy*, *kerchief*, *quinsy*, *squirrel*, *surgeon*, *verdict*, *vinegar*.

(2.) That in many words the meaning has so altered that the reason of the composition is not obvious ; as, *frankincense*, *holyday*, *landlord*, *mildew*, *quicksand*, *quicksilver*, *pastime*, *privilege*, *Sunday*, *vouchsafe*.

(3.) That compounds may often be expressed by simple words, either in the same or another language ; as, *brimstone*, sulphur ; *may-bug*, a chaffer ; *wineglass*, a tumbler ; *sheep-fold*, Lat. ovile ; *vineyard*, Lat. vinea ; *footman*, Lat. pedes ; *oakgrove*, Lat. quercetum ; *dovehouse*, Lat. columbarium.

ARTICLE VIII.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

- 1.—*The History of Rome.* By THOMAS ARNOLD, D. D. Three volumes in two. Reprinted entire, from the last London edition. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia: George S. Appleton. 1846.

Arnold possessed peculiar qualifications for writing history. He was industrious in research, a lover of truth, sincere, independent, and imbued with Christian faith. Then he had the faculty of weaving facts into a beautiful narrative, and so arranging them as to render them impressive.

His History is justly celebrated in Great Britain, and will, no doubt, become so here. Niebuhr was his principal guide, and him he followed in most things, yet not servilely.

Alas! he lived only long enough to bring his history down very nearly to the end of the second Punic War. Like Niebuhr, he was cut off without living to complete his purposes in respect to history. He left us enough to lead us to regret our loss in his death.

Our room forbids a more extended notice; yet we must also say, that the style of execution is good, and such as our valuable books ought to be.

- 2.—*History of New Netherland; or New-York under the Dutch.* By E. B. O'CALLAGHAN. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia: George S. Appleton. 1846. pp. 493, 8vo.

This is another History got up in a becoming style, by the same house; a history, too, of part of ourselves. The author, Dr. O'Callaghan, has been engaged for years in collecting manuscripts, charters, deeds, letters, records, etc., with a view of furnishing a more thorough and more correct history of New Netherland than was extant. He has had access to all the sources of information, and has issued the present volume in the hope of contributing to his countrymen, both pleasure and profit. It extends to the year 1647, the close of Kieft's administration, and contains, beside the very interesting narrative, a very old map of New Netherland, found by Mr. Brod-

head in Holland, and a large Appendix of evidence, in the shape of contracts, charters, etc. We trust the editor and publishers will be rewarded for their valuable labours.

3.—*The Treasury of History: comprising a General Introductory Outline of Universal History, Ancient and Modern; and a Series of separate Histories of every Principal Nation that exists; their Rise, Progress, Present Condition, etc.* By SAMUEL MAUNDER. To which is added the *History of the United States*. By JOHN INMAN, Esq. New-York: Daniel Adee.

This work is now completed, in two large volumes, and sold at \$3 in Nos., or \$4 bound. The author is known as the compiler of the "Treasury of Knowledge," etc., and several other similar works, which have been received in England with great favour. The Treasury of History is a condensed compend of the history of all nations. It is necessarily brief, and, while it has its own uses, it should not supersede the reading of more extended records of the progress of events among different peoples. It will answer the purpose of a book of reference to those who have perused larger works, and may be useful in giving a general view to those who have not leisure for more minute inquiry.

This work is edited by Mr. Inman, who has subjoined a succinct History of the United States to the present year. This we consider exceedingly valuable, as it refreshes the memory in respect to many recent events, which we might else forget. The History of England is, also, carried down to 1845.

We were a little surprised to find the History of the Sandwich Islands concluded with the *death of Capt. Cook*, when so much that is interesting could have been added. The same defect exists in regard to the Society Islands, whose inhabitants are represented as having greatly "degenerated since Cook's time."

4.—*The Puritans and their Principles.* By EDWIN HALL. New-York: Baker & Scribner. 1846. pp. 440, 8vo.

We love the Puritans. Faults they doubtless had; but they were rather of the times than of themselves peculiarly. True, they differed from Churchmen in their principles, and the manners of many of them were not the most refined, but they were noble men and women, set for freedom of thought and speech, and having, in fact, done more than all else for the essential liberty of the constitution of England.

Of these noble men and their principles we needed some such manual as Mr. Hall has furnished. Their story may now be known

and read of all men; and we cannot but believe that the descendants of the Pilgrims, at least, will eagerly demand a copy of the book. The substance of it was delivered in a course of Lectures by the author to the people of his charge, designed "to set forth the causes which brought the Pilgrims to these shores; to exhibit their principles; to show what these principles are worth, and what it cost to maintain them; to vindicate the character of the Puritans from the aspersions which have been cast upon them, and to show the Puritanic system of church polity,—as distinguished from the Prelatic,—broadly and solidly based on the word of God." In carrying out this purpose, Mr. Hall has entered into the history of the Puritans, the story of their sufferings, the tale of their pilgrimage; has discussed church polity, and put the claims of the Prelacy to the test. He has told us well, of Wickliffe and his times—of Henry VIII.—of Edward VI.—of Mary—of Elizabeth—of the Conflict of Principle—of "the judicious Hooker"—of King James and the going to Holland—of the Voyage to America—of Plymouth—of Charles I.—Laud—of the Civil Wars—of the Church, its officers, government, etc.,—and finally of Dr. Coit and his famous or infamous book.

- 5.—*A History of German Anabaptism, gathered mostly from German Writers living in the Age of the Lutheran Reformation, and embracing a full view of the Peasants' Wars, the Celestial Prophets, and other Fanatics of that day, and of the Historical Connection between the present Baptists and the Anabaptists.* By PARSONS COOKE. Boston: B. Perkins & Co. Philadelphia: Perkins & Purves. 1846. pp. 412, 18mo.

This volume may be useful in opening the eyes of many to the evils of fanaticism, and also in showing the germs of certain forms of religious folly and wickedness, which have been developed in our own days. It is a veritable history of the rise of spirits of darkness amid the purer light of the Reformation, and discloses, in detail, the conflict which Luther was obliged to maintain with them.

The Anabaptists of Germany, whose proceedings are here narrated, were a sect of genuine libertines, and not very remotely related to the looser class of the Perfectionists; as also, in some of their principles, to the "No-government" men of our own land.

Roger Williams's relation to baptism and anabaptism are here portrayed in their true colours; and the fair exposé of his doings must convince every candid mind, that what has been denominated religious persecution on the part of the Puritans, was scarcely more than merited severity in view of his offences against civil institutions.

- 6.—*An Exposition of the Ten Commandments.* By the Rt. Rev. EZEKIEL HOPKINS, D. D. Revised and slightly abridged. New-York: American Tract Society.

This Exposition of the Decalogue by Bishop Hopkins, we are glad to see published, and shall rejoice in its wide circulation. The Ten Commandments ought to be more studied, as expressing in brief the whole will of God in respect to man's duties to his Creator, his neighbour, and himself. This exposition will be found to be forcible in style, energetic in thought, and comprehensive in its view of the principles contained in the Moral Law.

The author was one of the most celebrated divines and preachers of his day, a true son of the Reformation, and a bold announcer of the doctrines of grace.

- 7.—*The Method of Grace, in the Holy Spirit's applying to the Souls of Men the Eternal Redemption, Contrived by the Father and Accomplished by the Son.* By Rev. JOHN FLAVEL. New-York: American Tract Society.

Flavel is one of the purest and best Christian writers of olden time. His works are savoury. This, his Method of Grace, is a sequel to his Fountain of Life; the latter showing the provision of redemption for the souls of men, the former the mode of its application, by the work of the Spirit and the exercise of faith on the part of man. Flavel here develops richly and fully, the nature of the Spirit's influence in conviction, conversion, sanctification; the necessity for Divine illumination and strength; the satisfactory evidences of union with Christ; and presses home upon the conscience, with great power, the duty of yielding to the call of Christ, "Come unto me."

- 8.—*Letters to a Friend on the Evidences, Doctrines, and Duties of the Christian Religion.* By OLINTHUS GREGORY, LL. D., F. R. A. S. From the fourth London edition, revised and slightly abridged. New-York: American Tract Society.

Dr. Gregory's work on the Evidences of the Christian Religion has been blessed to the conviction of many. Coming from the pen of a layman of celebrity, it has more weight with men of the world than a work equally good, written by a divine; although, as Dr. Gregory says, there is no reason why we should not rely on the judgment of the ministry, in such cases, writing professionally, as we do on that of the lawyer and physician in their respective spheres.

There will be found in the volume many exceedingly interesting

and valuable chapters, as on the folly and absurdity of Deism—on mysteries in revealed religion—on the resurrection of Jesus Christ—on the Inspiration of Scripture—on Providence, etc., etc.

- 9.—*Thoughts on the Revival of Religion in New England, 1740. To which is prefixed a Narrative of the Surprising Work of God in Northampton, Massachusetts, 1735.* By JONATHAN EDWARDS. New-York: American Tract Society.

This is an admirable manual on the subject of revivals; one which should be widely circulated, that correct views of these works of God may be imbibed. Ministers and elders especially, should be familiar with it, and all who are guides should make themselves acquainted with its principles.

- 10.—*The Raising of Lazarus from the Dead.* New-York: American Tract Society.

This is a brief practical exposition of the 11th chapter of John, which contains the narrative of Lazarus's sickness, death, and resurrection, of the sympathy of Jesus with the bereaved sisters, and of his love and power exercised in administering consolation. Nothing can be more touchingly beautiful than the original portraiture of these scenes by John.

- 11.—*Letters to an Adopted Daughter.* By Rev. JOHN NEWTON. New-York: American Tract Society.

John Newton is celebrated the world over, both for his wickedness and piety. Once an abandoned wretch, he subsequently became a most devoted Christian and minister of the gospel. Having no children, he adopted two of his wife's nieces. Of these one died early; to the other he addressed these letters. They are full of affectionate piety, and adapted, as intended, to lead the young to seek their happiness in God, where only is it to be found genuine and enduring.

- 12.—*The Practical Astronomer, comprising Illustrations of Light and Colours, Practical Descriptions of all kinds of Telescopes; A Particular Account of the Earl of Rosse's Large Telescope.* By THOMAS DICK, LL. D. Harper and Brothers.

The resemblance of the present work to the preceding scientific works of Dr. Dick, will give the reader a just impression of its general scope and ability. The clear practical sense, the minute detail of facts, generalized by the most comprehensive views, the profound

reverence and simple piety which characterize the author, are delightfully visible here. Interest, instruction and moral impression combine to give it value and attractiveness. As a work of practical science, it is not surpassed by any of its predecessors; and the spirited account of the great improvement in astronomical apparatus made by Lord Rosse, one of the most wonderful scientific advances of modern times, possesses a great interest. The work forms one of the admirable series now publishing under the title of Harpers' New Miscellany.

- 13.—*Narratives of Remarkable Criminal Trials.* Translated from the German of Anselm Ritter von Feuerbach, by LADY DUFF GORDON. Harper & Brothers.

The records of crime are not usually a profitable kind of reading. The contagion of the example is generally greater than the warning of the fate of the criminal; and many a villain has been made by the very means taken to keep him from crime. But as much depends on the manner of the narrative, and as it is possible to extract some of the gravest lessons of virtue and wisdom from the misdeeds of others, it gives us pleasure to state that the present work is unexceptionable in this respect, while the cases possess extraordinary interest, and are replete with instruction. They afford much insight of human motives, and teach impressive lessons of the retributive justice of Providence, and the misery and evil of sin. It is beautifully printed.

- 14.—*Theology Explained and Defended, in a Series of Sermons.* By TIMOTHY DWIGHT, S. T. D., LL. D. *With a Memoir of the Life of the Author.* In four volumes. 12th edition. Harper & Brothers.

A great favour is done the religious world in the publication of a well printed and cheap edition of Dwight's Theology. It is a work which every clergyman will deem indispensable to his library, and every student a necessary part of his theological outfit. Its sound orthodoxy; its beautiful analysis of doctrines and duties; the masterly argumentation by which it sustains its positions; the clear and luminous style, often rising to eloquence and even sublimity, and above all, the devout reverence and earnest piety which hallows it, have for years placed the work in the very front rank of theological treatises, and secured for it the suffrages of the wise and good in this country and in Europe. It supplies a place which no other work fills; and is equally a favourite with nearly all the varieties of doctrinal belief to be found in the evangelical churches. It is as much at home in the lecture-room of Dr. Chalmers as of Dr. Taylor;

and leading men of the principal sects in Great Britain have expressed their general approbation of it: a rare fortune for a theological work; but easily accounted for by its intrinsic worth, and by its catholic and excellent spirit.

This is not the place to characterize its doctrinal peculiarities, nor to defend them. They are generally well known; but whether fully adopted or not, there is so much that pertains to the great truths in which all evangelical Christians agree, and that so excellent, that it will continue to be, as it has been, a favourite with all. While the clergyman can hardly dispense with it, the layman will find it one of the best sources of religious knowledge and spiritual edification. It will be a promising day for the cause of rational, intelligent, principled piety, when the great body of church-members familiarize themselves with the sound thought and systematic truth of such a work as this. We heartily commend it to the churches; and hope it may become as indispensably a companion of the fireside, as a tenant of the minister's study.

15.—*Philanthropy; or My Mother's Bible. Founded on an Incident which happened in New-York.* New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1846. pp. 169, 18mo.

A pretty tale it is: and the motto, "Every kindness we do our fellow-creatures brings its own reward." A poor orphan boy goes to his grandfather's to live, and there a mutual attachment is formed between him and a sweet female cousin, which grows with their growth. They finally marry, and Sandy at length sets off on a voyage to India, leaving Jeannie with enough to make her comfortable until his return. The vessel in which he sailed is captured by the Spaniards, and he confined in an inquisitorial dungeon. He effects an escape, is recaptured, and sent to work on the docks. In an effort to save some victims of an awful storm, he is driven out to sea, taken up by an English ship, and restored to London. On inquiry he learns the decease of his loved Jeannie. In passing up one of the streets, during the "no popery riots," he hears the shrieks of a child, runs to her rescue, and by violent effort, saves her from the flames. Caught in the act of seizing the child by the hair, a soldier, not doubting that he is a murderer, smote him with his sword, and inflicted a wound. The soldier took the child; he made his escape. The next day he finds himself described in the papers as an atrocious murderer, and a reward offered for his apprehension. Under his circumstances, prudence dictated exile. He sailed at once for the United States, and here accumulated a fortune in Philadelphia. A desire to relieve a friend called him to New-York. A fall on the ice in the street brought to his aid a young man of his own

name, Sandy, who assisted him to his hotel. He told the youth his history, and then asked for his. He at length sees young Sandy's mother, and is overwhelmed with the likeness both of the lad and his mother to his lost Jeannie; yet presuming that she had died childless, he regarded them only for their striking likeness to her. When just about to leave the city for home, he stepped into a bookstore to buy a Bible for a poor child. Whilst the bookseller went back for the book, an old Bible caught his eye, and on opening it he read, "Jeannie to Sandy." This excited his curiosity. On inquiry, he learned that it had been left to be bound, and that the boy would call for it, probably, that day. He finds that it belongs to Sandy's mother, and is determined, if possible, to have it. This leads him again to Sandy's house, and to more particular acquaintance with his mother; until, incident after incident, fact after fact, becoming disclosed, he discovers Sandy's mother, Jeannie, to be the child he rescued from the flames, and the child, too, of his own lost Jeannie, born in his captivity, and the Bible to be the very Bible which his own Jeannie had given him before their marriage. What a scene is here! The issue, of course, finds them all taken to his own mansion, dwelling amid profusion and peace.

The moral is good, and the intent of the book to encourage acts of kindness. The old gentleman's philanthropy, which induced him to purchase a Bible for a poor little child, disclosed to him sources of happiness which he knew not of before.

16.—*The Farmer's Dictionary; a Vocabulary of the Technical Terms recently introduced into Agriculture and Horticulture, from various Sciences, and also a Compendium of Practical Farming, etc., etc.* Edited by D. P. GARDNER, M. D. With numerous Illustrations. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1846. pp. 876, 12mo.

Books on agriculture have so multiplied within a few years; so many technical terms have been introduced, and so many are seriously turning their attention to this subject, that a Dictionary has become quite an essential article.

Dr. Gardner has evidently bestowed much attention on the preparation of this volume; and we trust he will meet his reward in its wide circulation. Farming and gardening are employments so pleasant and profitable, that many classically educated men are now engaging in them, and deserting the learned professions. They are making *good* farmers, too, because they appreciate the discoveries of science in respect to soils, manures, etc., whilst many a mere farmer by birth and inheritance, plods on in the old way, proud of his ignorance in despising the doings of the learned in his own calling. He reaps his reward.

- 17.—*The History of John Marten ; a Sequel to the Life of Henry Milner.* By Mrs. SHERWOOD. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1846. pp. 352, 12mo.

Mrs. Sherwood is deservedly a popular novel writer. Her attachment to the forms of her own church is apparent and strongly developed in most of her works, but they are, at the same time, of an evangelical spirit, and inculcate a pure morality.

Those who have read Henry Milner,—and they are not a few,—will wish to read this Sequel, which tells a tale of John Marten, the dearest friend of Henry Milner. The volume is designed to portray the trials and temptations of a young minister entering on the faithful discharge of his high trusts. This is done in a highly entertaining manner, with much of dramatic interest.

Mrs. Sherwood's writings are among the safest of this class.

- 18.—*Forecastle Tom ; or the Landsman turned Sailor.* By MARY S. B. DANA. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1846. pp. 216, 18mo.

This is truly a delightful book of its kind ; one of Mrs. Dana's best efforts. In beautiful style she tells the story of Forecastle Tom, first sadly indulged, then by a change of family relations most roughly handled, and thus driven from home, from a mother's fondness, and dear sisters' love. Tom took to the sea, and after passing through thrilling and trying scenes, and indulging in all manner of sins, he was found in the street by a brother tar, and taken to the Sailor's Home in New-York. Here, in this blest asylum of the weary sailor boy, he found true friends, who consulted his eternal interests, and pointed the sinner to his wounded Saviour. Tom was, at length, led to repentance and to trust in Jesus, and thus found peace. A vessel bound to his native place received him on board, and once more did he rest in his mother's and sisters' embrace.

This little volume breathes a pious spirit, and abounds in wholesome sentiments.

- 19.—*A Grammar of the Latin Language.* By C. G. ZUMPT, Ph. D., Professor in the University, and Member of the Royal Academy of Berlin. From the ninth edition of the original, adapted to the use of English students. By LEONHARD SCHMITZ, Ph. D., late of the University of Bonn. Corrected and enlarged, by CHARLES ANTHON, LL. D. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1846. pp. xx. and 594, 12mo.

We have, for some years, known the excellences of Dr. Zumpt's Latin Grammar, and think that, with its latest improvements, it can safely be pronounced the most complete Grammar of the Latin lan-

guage now existing. We are glad to see it made accessible to English students, under the immediate supervision of the author himself, in connexion with the learned translator, Prof. Schmitz; and published here under the editorial care of Prof. C. Anthon.

The author's reputation as a Latin scholar, is among the very first on the continent of Europe, and for more than thirty-one years has he devoted himself to researches and studies on the various points connected with the grammar of that language; so that he must necessarily have attained a high point of excellence. Of the principle which guided him in this work, he says, it is "no other than the desire to trace the facts and phenomena of the language to a philosophical or rational source."

The syntax will be found to be very profoundly developed, and should be profoundly studied by all who aim at being scholars. Then there are VI. Appendices, on Metre—Roman Calendar—Weights, Coins, Measures—Abbreviations of Words—Ancient Forms of Declension—Remains of Early Latin.

20.—*Journey to Ararat.* By FRIEDRICK PARROT, Professor of Natural Philosophy in the University of Dorpat, etc., with Map and Wood Cuts. Translated by W. D. Cooley. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1846. pp. 389, 12mo.

This is an exceedingly interesting book, giving us the narrative of a journey of peculiar difficulty and daring. Professor Parrot merits the thanks both of the scientific and Christian world, for his enterprise in attempting and accomplishing the ascent of Ararat.

This ascent has been pronounced *impossible* by some, and of course, Professor Parrot's veracity has been called in question. But we see no good reason for doubting the truth of the narrative. Things impossible to some, are quite possible to others. Energy and perseverance have often accomplished what has been considered impossible by phlegmatic indifference, and even by presuming science.

Since the Russian dominion has been extended to Ararat, scientific travellers have been more disposed and encouraged to pursue their researches into the natural history, geology, etc. of these hitherto comparatively unexplored regions. Professor Parrot has set a noble example, which will doubtless be followed by others, more especially as governments are more ready now, than formerly, to aid in scientific investigations.

After a third attempt, Professor Parrot and his company reached the summit of Ararat, on the 9th of October, 1829. There they erected a cross as a monument of their successful enterprise, under the auspices of a Christian government. The vertical height of

Ararat above the level of the sea, is 17,210 feet: its summit being of course, perpetually enveloped in glacial snow and ice, for several thousand feet. Hard work it must have been, to cut the steps in the ice, by which they were to ascend; but they did it, and, after persevering labour and much weariness, they succeeded in attaining the acme of their wishes.

The idea is sublime, that, after so long a time, and so unbroken and cold a silence, that peak has been reached by mortal man, on which rested the ark after the overwhelming deluge, in which every thing was submerged. Is this really the Mount Ararat, which first appeared above the surface of the waters of the flood,—the veritable spot on which Noah issued from his huge ship, and worshipped God in sacrifice? Did the snow and ice begin to accumulate soon after the subsiding of the waters, and are the fragments of the ark still there, deep imbedded beneath an hundred feet of ice?

However these queries may be answered, this book is attractive and valuable, not only for its narrative of the journey, but for its accurate maps and scientific papers on various subjects, as Barometrical Levelling—Magnetic Observations—Observations with the Pendulum—Geological Notes—Level of the Caspian Sea, etc. etc.

21.—*A First Latin Book.* By THOMAS KERCHEVER ARNOLD, M.A., Rector of Lyndor, and late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Carefully revised and corrected by Rev. J. A. Spencer, A.M. From the fifth London edition. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia: G. S. Appleton. 1846. pp. 333, 12mo.

This is a book on the Ollendorf system, which begins to attract much attention, and secure much favour. It is a departure from the old system of drilling the pupil regularly and perseveringly through the paradigms and rules of the grammar, prior to any practical application of his knowledge. This proceeds on the principle of imitation and repetition, the same by which a child acquires a knowledge of his own tongue, and requires the pupil, from the very outset, to study and recite exercises, and thus leads him gradually into a knowledge of the construction and idioms of the language.

This plan, undoubtedly, has its advantages, and to a certain extent must be pursued by every good teacher, if he would give his pupils an accurate knowledge of the language he attempts to teach. The old Mair's Exercises, so long in use, had this in view, and many a good scholar has been made, by a faithful writing of those lessons. So Leverett's Latin Tutor, and other similar books. Ollendorf's system is more complete in this respect, and is prepared with the design of dispensing with the old use of the grammar.

Such a system requires a judicious use, or it is likely to degenerate into the *easy* methods of learning: but with proper direction and other old methods of discipline, it is capable of being made serviceable in the cause of sound learning.

22.—*A Phrase-Book in English and German; with a literal translation of the German into English, together with a complete explanation of the sounds and the accentuation of the German.* By MORITZ ERTHEILER, Teacher of the German language in the City of New-York. Third edition. New-York: Greeley & McElrath. 1846. Price 25 cents.

The German is now becoming so common a subject of study in our country, that books of this sort will be much in demand. No one can dispense with the study of the grammar of any language, and know much about it. Phrase-books, like the one before us, are adapted to facilitate the acquisition of a language. The best way of using such a book of colloquies is, we think, for the teacher to read off the German idioms, and require the pupil to write them from hearing; then, after a page or two have been written, to utter the English phrases, and require the pupil to pronounce the corresponding German. Such a course pursued perseveringly, will soon enable the learner to speak the German, at least, sufficiently for all ordinary purposes.

23.—*History of the Great Reformation of the Sixteenth Century, in Germany, Switzerland, etc.* By J. H. MERLE D'AUBIGNE. Assisted in the preparation of the English original by H. WHITE. Vol. IV. New-York: Robert Carter, 1846. pp. 492, 12mo.

The fourth volume of D'Aubigne's History, so long and anxiously looked for, has at length come; and out it is, on the wings of the wind finding its way to almost every nook and corner of the land. What multitudes have read the previous volumes with the deepest interest, and *they* certainly will not be long without the present one.

No letters of commendation are needed here; the simple announcement of its appearance secures its acceptance. The fourth volume begins with the Protest of Spire, 1526, and closes with the disastrous events connected with the catastrophe of Cappel, 1531.

The work has lost none of its peculiar interest. The present volume abounds in thrilling passages, and discloses many incidents in the history of the Reformation not generally known before. It also contains a portrait of D'Aubigne, and one of Luther at the Diet of Worms.

- 24.—*The Life and Remains of the Rev. Robert Housman, A. B., the founder, and for forty years the incumbent minister of St. Anne's, Lancaster.* By ROBERT FLETCHER HOUSMAN, Esq. Slightly abridged. New-York: Robert Carter, 1846. pp. 374, 12mo.

These memoirs are truly pleasant and profitable. They narrate the life of a man of God, who entered the Episcopal Church of England,—as it is to be feared too many do—with but little knowledge of his heart, and perhaps, less of the true method of justification before God. Ere long, however, he formed an intimate friendship with Rev. Charles Simeon and Henry Venn, through whose influence he was led to embrace the humbling, yet elevating truths of the gospel, and became a devoted preacher of the doctrines of grace. Here are the leading points of his theology, in his own words: “Nothing but the *blood* of Christ can save from destruction; nothing but the *righteousness* of Christ can give a title to heavenly bliss; nothing but the *intercession* of Christ can make prayers and duties accepted; nothing but the *grace* of Christ can give a meetness for the inheritance and company of heaven; and nothing but the *presence* of Christ can be the light and joy and glory of the eternal kingdom. Without Christ, all is darkness and ruin and despair.” Of baptism he says: “It is not regeneration. Baptism is an outward work upon the body. Regeneration is an inward work upon the soul. Baptism is only *typical* of an inward change.” He was, also, friendly to private meetings for prayer and conference. All these things were against him, so that he passed not on without persecution for his evangelical views; but he was a good man, full of the Holy Ghost. Having exerted a wide influence, and spent his days in well-doing, he died in peace, beloved and lamented.

- 25.—*The Design of the Church; as an Index to her real nature and the true law of her communion.* By JOHN MILLER, Pastor of the Presbyterian Church in Frederick, Md. Phil.: James M. Campbell, 1846. pp. 197, 12mo.

If we are not mistaken this book will attract attention. It is suited to the times in the topics of which it treats, and offers some “nuts to be cracked” to different classes of readers. It begins with, The Principle of Design—then, The Design of Religion—The Design of Externals in Religion—Design of an External Church—Danger of attributing to Externals certain spurious Designs—A spurious Design of certain Externals—True Doctrine of Church Communion, argued from the Design of an External Church.

It will be seen that the volume touches on points of deep interest at the present time, points about which many minds are anxiously inquiring. It is a close, consecutive argument, not *easily* got over,

to say the least of it, and evinces a mind more than usually given to deep reflection and close processes of reasoning.

The spurious design of certain *Externals* attached to them by some is well exposed; and under the head of Church Communion, will be found sage observations on union of different denominations of Christians.

The author is a son of the Rev. Dr. Miller, of Princeton.

- 26.—*A Defence of Capital Punishment*. By Rev. GEORGE B. CHEEVER, D. D. *And an Essay on the Ground and Reason of Punishment, with special reference to the Penalty of Death*. By TAYLER LEWIS, Esq. *with an Appendix, containing a Review of Burleigh on the Death Penalty*. New-York: Wiley & Putnam, 1846. pp. 365, 12mo.

It is needless, at this late day, to say much in commendation of this volume. Let those who have not yet read it, be sure to read it. A panoply will it be to them, in the controversy with the sentimental philanthropists, many of whom, with all their interest in humanity, betray but small regard for divinity.

The "defence" is a strong cable: and the "Essay" a powerful wheel. Get the cable round the neck of any one, attach it to the wheel, and then turn it, and see what mighty execution it will do.

The Review of Mr. Burleigh is no trifle either. His argument bows amazingly before it; nor do we see how it can be straightened up again.

- 27.—*The Mysteries of Tobacco*. By the Rev. BENJAMIN I. LANE. With an Introductory Letter addressed to the Hon. John Quincy Adams, LL. D. By the Rev. SAMUEL H. COX, D. D. New-York: Wiley & Putnam, 1846. pp. 185, 12mo.

Mr. Lane treats of the influence of tobacco on the body, mind, morals, its illusory influence, its filthiness and expensiveness.

It is really too bad for the image of God to defile itself with the use of so pernicious and filthy a drug as tobacco. Why should men, Christian men, gospel ministers, begin the practice, or, having begun, persevere in it? They *can* abstain, they can discontinue the use, and be benefitted, and they ought. We know those once addicted to it in its worst forms, and to the greatest excess, who stopped short off, had the "blues" most awfully for a little while, and then became as fresh and healthy as need be. Try abstinence, only try it, and you will be convinced of the utility and luxury of doing without it. To throw off such a chain, and feel yourself free, ah! what is that not worth?

- 28.—*Thoughts of Blaise Pascal*. Translated from the French. Preceded by a Sketch of his Life. Andover: Allen, Morrill & Wadwell. New-York: Mark H. Newman, 1846. pp. 384, 12mo.

This book is well worthy the beautiful style in which the publishers have issued it. Pascal's "Provincial Letters," in which he confronts the Jesuits in so masterly a manner, is known the world over, and is confessedly one of the most powerful specimens of effective wit ever penned by mortal man. His "Thoughts" is profoundly philosophical, and exhibits the workings of a powerful mind. It were well for students to read it often. In the volume we have Part I. Thoughts relating to Philosophy, Morality, and Belles Lettres, including—Authority in matters of Philosophy—The Art of Persuasion—Vanity of man and effects of Self-love—Misery of Man—Condition of the Great, etc. Part II. Thoughts immediately relating to Religion, embracing—Necessity of Studying Religion—Marks of true Religion—Subordination and use of Reason—Jesus Christ—Thoughts upon Miracles, etc.

The work is preceded by a well written memoir of the author, unfolding the chief events of his life.

- 29.—*History of the English Revolution of 1640, commonly called the Great Rebellion: from the accession of Charles I. to his death*. By F. GUIZOT. Translated by WILLIAM HAZLITT. 2. vols. New-York: D. Appleton & Co., 1846. pp. 515, 12mo.

M. Guizot has brought his powerful mind to bear with great effect on the subject of history; and we trust that it will not be diverted from that impartiality so essential to the correct historian. We perceive in him, at present, a leaning toward authority in church and state, which, a few years ago, would not have been thought possible in him.

This History of the English Revolution we consider, on the whole, impartial: and so exceedingly interesting is it, that we rejoice to see it in an English translation, and more than all, to find a book of so much real value, making Nos. 8 and 9 of "Appleton's Literary Miscellany."—We wish they could continue it a long time with issues of this description.

- 30.—*Missionary Life in Samoa, as exhibited in the Journals of the late George Archibald Lundie, during the revival in Mertulla, in 1840—1841*. Edited by his Mother, Author of "Memoir of Mary Lundie Duncan," &c. New-York: Robert Carter, 1846. pp. 313, 18mo.

To those who have read Mary Lundie Duncan, this will be an acceptable volume. It is by the same author, and tells the story of

the life and death of Mary's brother. Early failing in health, he sailed for the South Sea Islands. There he became a missionary of the cross, to the benighted dwellers on the Samoan or Navigator Isles: and after a few years of toil in his Master's service, he departed to be with Christ. His bones rest far away from those of his beloved sister, but his spirit is now rejoicing with hers in the presence of Jesus. How sweet must be the communion of two such spirits there! Let us follow in their steps, as they followed Christ, and we shall soon be with them, amid the adoring throng, around the Majesty of Heaven.

- 31.—*Jacob's Well*. By GEORGE ALBERT ROGERS, M. A., Senior Curate of St. Mary, Islington, and Domestic Chaplain to the Right Hon. Viscount Lifford. New-York: Robert Carter, 1846. pp. 232, 18mo.

This is a small volume of practical lectures on the interview between Christ and the Woman of Samaria, at Jacob's Well. It is written in a plain style, being remarkable for nothing but its practical usefulness. It will be read with interest and profit, by those who love to dwell upon the incidents in the life of the Saviour.

- 31.—*The Pilgrim in the Shadow of the Jungfrau*. By GEORGE B. CHEEVER, D. D. New-York and London: Wiley & Putnam, 1846. pp. 214, 12mo.

This is number eleven of the Library of American Books; and we could wish they were all as much to our taste as this. But *quot hominum, tot gustus*, and so we must not complain, as long as truth and purity are regarded in the selection. The Pilgrim who here writes, has been a pilgrim before. In number four of this same Library, he gave us the blossoms and fruits of his Alpine wanderings: and now he has returned again, even from the shadow of the very Jungfrau, laden with baskets of beautiful flowers, which he scatters most profusely around him, for all who choose to pick them up.

Even the title we admire, because it is the thing itself, although it has been objected to by others, as rather an outlandish name: and the matter of the book is both interesting and profitable reading. Some, indeed, will not like it, because it tallies not with their notions of things, but we deem it truthful, and therefore we the more relish it, as being not only beauty but truth.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Germany.

THE Prophetic Theology of the Bible has been recently and ably treated by Professor Delitzsch, of Leipsic, embracing prophetic inspiration, the office of the prophets, the fulfilment of the prophecies, etc.—Tholuck has put forth a third and much improved edition of his critical commentary on the Sermon on the Mount.—W. Beste has issued Dr. Martin Luther's Glaubenslehre, etc., or doctrinal teaching, dogmatically arranged.—Seyffrath's Chronologia Sacra, or Investigations into the date of our Lord's birth, and the Chronology of the two Testaments, is a work of great importance. Indeed, it is the only thorough one on the subject, presenting almost every thing valuable which relates to the chronology of the nations mentioned in the Scripture. He advocates the era of the world which accords with the Septuagint.—Tischendorf's first volume of Travels in the East is out. He has discovered literary documents of great value in some of the oriental monasteries, and made observations, which tend to illustrate the Bible.—Dr. Reinhold Klotz's Manual of Latin Literature, will be hailed by the lovers of Latin learning. A complete work on this subject has been much needed, one better than Bähr's, the only one now existing, we believe, of much worth.—Dr. Otto Jahn has been appointed ordinary professor in the University of Greifswald.—We believe we have not before recorded the decease of Dr. H. A. C. Hävernicks, Professor of Theology at Königsberg. His death is greatly lamented. He was a noble champion for the truth.

France.

Those who desire to get an account of the German Philosophy will find it in a Report by Remusat, entitled : *De la Philosophie Allemande*.—The *Journal des Savants*, of 1845, contains some important papers, by Cousin, on philosophic documents ; by Letronne, the table of Abydos, a specimen of the reproduction of Egyptian hieroglyphics.

Great Britain.

The Reformation and Anti-Reformation in Bohemia, from the German, is a useful work.—*Meditationes Hebraicæ* ; or a Doctrinal and Practical Exposition of St. Paul to the Hebrews, by Rev. William Tait.—Thoughts upon the Holy Spirit and His Work, by the author of "Thoughts upon Thought."—The Bible Student's Concordance, by which the English reader may ascertain the literal meaning of any word in the original. By Aaron Peck, Professor from the University of Prague. It is concordance and lexicon combined.

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JULY, 1846.

ARTICLE I.

THE SUFFERINGS OF CHRIST.

By PROF. TAYLER LEWIS, LL. D.

The Sufferings of Christ. BY A LAYMAN. Harper & Brothers.

WHO was HE that died on Calvary? What was the nature of HIS sufferings? What bearing have they upon our salvation?

We may well ask, What is all science, and all philosophy, when compared with the infinite importance of these momentous inquiries? What utter triflers are those who can occupy their minds with other questions of history, of economy, of politics, of ethics, of metaphysics, of theology even, whilst these remain, not only unsettled, but unheeded! According as they are determined in one way or the other, must religion, especially revealed religion, rise into a matter of awful solemnity, or cease to be a subject of alarm, of earnestness, or even of settled seriousness, to any thoughtful soul.

If Jesus was merely a man, if his sufferings were only those of a man, if his death has no other relation to our sal-

vation, than that of any other good man who died in attestation of the truth of his doctrines, and the sincerity of his instructions—if this is all the real interest belonging to that event which eighteen hundred years ago commenced a new moral era in our world, it never could have maintained that deep hold upon the souls of men, to the power of which centuries have borne witness. Had there been connected with it no other associations than these, Christianity would long since have been numbered among the systems that have appeared for a little while and then vanished away. Its only record would have been some obscure chapter in history, having perhaps an interest for the literary and philosophical antiquarian, but, to the great mass of men, as unknown and uncared for as is now the history of the Essenes, or any of the Oriental sects of philosophical religionists.

Such views may now maintain some show of strength, by their position of antagonism to the more universally received doctrines of the church ; but how long would what is styled liberal Christianity with its negations, its undefined, ever changing, ever sinking dogmas, retain any firm hold upon the souls of men, after such antagonism should once have ceased,—after men should no longer regard it as a refuge from sterner and more startling truths, and when this meagre phantom should come to be acknowledged as the only representative on earth of that powerful system, which was once preached by Christ and his Apostles ? Let us imagine it at length triumphant over its dreaded adversary. How soon would such triumph be its own utter ruin ! How soon would a sensual and ungodly world learn to despise what it had only treated with seeming deference, because of its position in respect to that system, and that book, which had so long and so fearfully disturbed its peace ! In short, who would study the Bible except with an antiquarian or literary curiosity ? who would think of preaching from it ? who would ever quote it as conclusive authority in any question of morals or religion ? who would regard it with any peculiar reverence as a revelation of the deep mysteries of God, one half century after man-

kind had settled down into the opinion, that it contained no higher truths than are presented in the theology of a Parker or a Strauss,—in that of the extreme, or even of the more moderate liberal schools of America and Germany?

The power it has ever exercised over the human soul for good and even for evil, the intense interest which its study has ever excited, the heroic martyrdoms it has caused, the enthusiasm it has ever inspired, even the dark fanaticism of which it has, at times, been the occasion—all these show that it does present truths of stronger and sterner import; that it has far more of the supernatural and mysterious; that, in short, it does contain elements of far greater power, than any of the systems to which we have alluded.

These elements of greater power are found in the right answer to the questions with which we commenced this review. Divested of its doctrine of a Trinity, of an Atonement, of the awful mystery of the union of the Divine and human in one person, and of the satisfaction for sin made by the blood of incarnate Deity,—Christianity would soon lose all historical and doctrinal interest, even for those who should yet profess to hold this wretched “remnant of a creed.” It would never more convert the infidel. Its fearful declaration of judgment against the unbeliever would have for him no terrors, because he would contend, and rightly contend, that he already held and had ever held, to all that was of any value in its doctrines, with the advantage too, of being free from those difficulties of the mythical and the legendary, with which those, who would seek to convert him to their empty faith, are so sadly encumbered.

But if HE who died on Calvary, was, in very deed, the Only Begotten Son of God, existing before all worlds, and the maker of all worlds,—if this death, and these sufferings, were truly expiatory,—if without the shedding of *that blood* there could have been no remission of any even the least sin,—how awful a book is the Bible! how fearful are its doctrines! how can we escape if we neglect so great a salvation? If these things indeed be so, then what are we, and how deep

the damnation from which we are rescued ! How does all philosophy and all science dwindle in the comparison ! What insane triflers, we repeat it, are they who can esteem any thing else as great, any thing else as wise, any thing else as true even, whilst these great matters are unsettled, and their bearing undetermined in respect to all other questions of philosophy or theology ! Obscure and metaphysical dogmas, having little or no relation to *practical* duties ! exclaims the superficial secular historian, as he describes, but cannot understand, the convulsive agitations which, at times, the discussion of these doctrines has produced in the human soul, and in human society. But if Christ be God, then surely man was lost, hopelessly lost, without his mediation. In the light of this truth how infinitely magnified the value of the soul ! yet, when viewed in another aspect, how utterly out of place the common cant respecting the dignity and purity of our nature ! Surely, beyond all conception must that nature have been stained and polluted with sin, which, even in the holiest of men, required for its cleansing expiation, nothing less than the life-blood of incarnate Deity.

We have no fears of the final triumph of liberal Christianity. It lacks all the elements of power. Its negative system has no sublimities and mysteries, in whose contemplation the intellect is quickened by the very awe which they inspire. It has no terrors, and no hold upon the conscience. It has no fears for the sinner, no conflicts or comforts for the believer. It may boast of its rationality, but the intellect withers amid the barrenness and indefiniteness of its dogmas. The heart must grow cold and hard with no other moral aliment than its feeble and effeminate sentimentalities. To say nothing of any Divine aid, which of course is expected to be exerted on the side of truth, we may confidently believe that the system commonly received will in the end, and from its own intrinsic power, come off victorious in any conflict with its antagonist, whether regarded as contending for the submission of the human reason, or of the human affections. “ *Oh that doctrine of blood !* ” we once heard a man exclaim, “ *that*

doctrine of blood, any thing but that ;" and yet what element of power has liberal Christianity to put in competition with it in subduing the soul, and turning the sinner from the error of his ways? One verse of the common Methodist hymn,

Five bleeding wounds he bears,
Received on Calvary,

or the penitential stanza of Watts,

Alas ! and did my Saviour bleed,
And did my Sovereign die,

has broken down more rebellious hearts, than all the sentimental prattle about self-reverence and the dignity of our natures. With no more of poetry than what they derive from the touching narrative of the Evangelists, they have more of a convicting and converting efficacy, than is to be found in the sermons of a Channing, even with all the earnestness, and devotion, and sincerity, which formed such prominent traits in the character of that most amiable, yet erring man.

Without charging them with insincerity, we are convinced that Unitarians deceive themselves when they imagine, that the real ground of their objections to the doctrine of the Trinity is its repugnance to reason. Certainly, a plurality in the Divine unity has been a favourite speculation with the loftiest intellects, as a truth to which the highest reason led those who meditated most deeply on the mystery of the Divine nature. Most surely Pythagoras, and Zoroaster, and Plato, were not led to an absurd belief, out of a forced deference to obscure and misinterpreted texts. The real difficulty lies in a different quarter, namely, in the connection which this doctrine has with the Atonement, and the light in which, when thus connected, it presents to us the deep sinfulness and perilous condition of humanity. According to the comparative estimate of human innocence and of the slight danger of the soul, must be the low account of the person, and, consequently, of the sufferings of Christ. The more

vivid the conviction of sin and ill desert, the more cordially does the soul receive the doctrine of a Divine *Suffering Redeemer*. As one side of the scale rises, so must the other sink. All errors in *theology* have their origin in an erroneous *anthropology*, or, false notions of ourselves. A pungent conviction of sin is the surest guaranty of a sound orthodoxy. We never heard of a man's having any doubt or difficulty in relation to the Trinity, who had once been made to feel that he was indeed a sinner, utterly astray from God, and far gone from all true righteousness.

It is the second of these closely related questions on which the book which has suggested these remarks professes to treat, namely,—*the nature of the sufferings of Christ*. The author boldly takes the ground that these sufferings were not only supernatural and superhuman, but that they had their seat in the Divine nature of the Saviour. His professed object is to magnify the sacrifice, and present it to the conscience in a more solemn and alarming manner, than would be warranted by that view which regards the passion as affecting only the humanity. He maintains, that when presented in such an aspect, the cardinal doctrine of our religion has been divested of power, and laid open to many objections of the rationalist,—that, when thus viewed, the atonement is more in appearance than reality, and that, on such a scheme, there is not a sufficient reason for the incarnation. He takes, as his strong hold certain passages of Scripture, which, he thinks, cannot be satisfied on any lower hypothesis,—such, for example, as, “He *spared* not his only begotten Son”—“God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son.” These and similar texts; he affirms with much force of argument, must relate to the eternal in distinction from what may be styled the human sonship, and must therefore be regarded as spoken directly of the Divine Pre-existent Personality. Those also which set forth the humiliation, he contends, must be viewed as relating to the Divine in a special manner. In an argument, to which it is not easy to reply, it is maintained that, if the humanity was the subject of the exaltation, the

pre-existent Divinity must have suffered humiliation. "Who was it," he asks, "that took upon himself the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men? Who was it that humbled himself? Not the lowly son of the lowly virgin. No earth-born creature could have humbled himself by an everlasting alliance with his own kindred indwelling God, to be consummated with a seat at the right hand of The Highest." (Page 138.) The author every where presses into his service, all those numerous texts which declare that Christ did suffer, maintaining that they are to be taken as referring *prima facie* to the entire personality—that the Scriptures make no limitation, no qualification, and that every thing of this kind has been the result of an early scholastic philosophy which declared that—God was impassible.

Doubtless the union of the Divine and human natures, in the one person of Christ, may be regarded as pre-eminently the mystery of Christianity. *God manifest in the flesh!* The finite and the infinite, the eternal and the temporal, that which had a beginning, and that which was everlasting! frailty and Omnipotence, limited knowledge and Omniscience! the Son of man and the Son of God, constituting one Christ, one being, one personality! As before remarked, the doctrine of a plurality of hypostases in the Divine nature does not transcend the reason, as is shown by the fact, that independent of the written revelation, it has been a favourite hypothesis of minds that had meditated most deeply on the necessary conditions of the Divine Nature. But the doctrine of the God-man, of the Divine, not simply superadded to, or in connection with, (either as a temporary or abiding indwelling,) but as forming one person with the human, yet remaining Divine,—this baffles reason. Here she utterly loses her way. Her highest light is but thick darkness. Her only security against error is an unquestioning faith in the clear declaration of the Scripture. This assures us both that Christ is God, and that Christ did suffer. He "suffered in the flesh," says the Apostle; whether by this is meant the time, or the manner, or the medium through which it became possible; but it

was He that suffered, and He was no other than the Eternal Word that before all worlds was God, and was with God.*

This mystery of the two natures in one person is not escaped even by those who reject the doctrine of the Trinity, unless the very lowest humanitarian ground is taken, and any pre-existence of the Saviour, any mode of being whatever before he "came in the flesh," or even any appropriate sense to this very term—"coming in the flesh"—is absolutely denied. On the lowest hypothesis of pre-existency, we have the real difficulty for the reason, although it may not be of so startling a kind as is presented by the doctrine of the absolute Godhead. We have still that most mysterious fact at which reason staggers—a *prior and a posterior existence forming one personality*. He who was born in Bethlehem, was before Abraham. He who was David's son, was also David's Lord. He who was the offspring, was also the root of Jesse. He who begun to *be* on this earth, had a glory with the Father before the world was. In short, He is one who *is*, and *was not*, and yet *is*, and *was*, to all eternity. And this most mysterious person was no compounded partnership of natures, or mixed being, ranking midway between heaven and earth, but very man, in all respects, (sin excepted,) as we are; whilst at the same time, there was comprehended in the same personality, that which existed when the man was not. Well might the dying Melancthon regard this as the great mystery of mysteries. One of the last thoughts to which he ever gave utterance, was the hope that in eternity he might understand it as he had never done on earth. "Thou shalt enter into light," (says the dying saint to his departing soul.) "Thou shalt see God. Thou shalt behold the Son of God. *Thou*

* We do not think that the author has succeeded in doing away the force of the text, 1 Peter iv. 1, as used by Bishop Pearson. See pp. 119, 120. When he endeavours to make the word "flesh" stand constructively, for the whole united person, human and divine, he seems to use very much the same kind of reasoning that he elsewhere condemns. The human nature may be regarded as the *medium* of suffering to the whole person, and it may denote the manner in which the person suffered; just as the soul may be said to suffer in the body.

shalt learn of what kind is the union of the two natures in Christ."

There is no conception more incapable of being presented in a proper definition than that of *personality*. It is one of those ultimate ideas which no one can mistake, and yet how difficult to set it forth in any proper form of words. After every attempt of the kind, we must come at last to the simple method of conceiving of it as that which can use, and to which can be addressed, and *of* which can be uttered the personal pronoun, in its subjective and objective forms. Whatever can say of itself, *I*, and to which can be addressed the word *Thou*, and *of* which can be said *He*, or *Him*,—that is a person. When we read that Jesus said to the Father—*Glorify Thou Me*—the mind cannot avoid the recognition of two personalities, of the Father, and of the Son; and whilst it remains in a healthy state, no Sabellian or Swedenborgian refinement can ever divest it of the distinct conception. So also when the Saviour says—“*Glorify THOU ME with the glory which I had with THEE before the world was,*”—no Socinian gloss can evade the conclusion, that the *I* and the *ME* embrace the same personality, although the one is used of the man who a few years before was lying an infant in the manger, and the other of him who before the world was had been in the bosom of the Father.

But to return to a more direct consideration of our author's theory. We confess a strong inclination towards it in some of its features, especially as far as it can be regarded as directly opposed to that meagre scheme of rationalism, which altogether strips the sufferings of Christ of any superhuman character, and views the atonement more as a display than as involving a real expiatory and vicarious sacrifice. Although thus inclined to acquiesce in some of his positions, as containing, to say the least, less error and more truth than the extreme theory with which it may be contrasted, we are, at the same time, not ashamed to admit an exceeding strong reluctance to adopt any sentiment, on these mysterious subjects, which may even seem to be at variance with the received

doctrine of the Church, as set forth in the teachings of her most pious, most learned, and most devoted sons.

There is certainly great force in some of the grounds assumed by our author, especially as relates to the humiliation, and here he takes positions to which one who holds that the human nature alone was the subject of it, cannot easily reply. Who emptied himself? Most certainly, in some real sense, we must suppose it primarily to have been He who was in the form of God, and not he who was born of an earthly mother, except so far as it may be affirmed of the latter as contained in the same personality. It may be truly said, however, that we must not separate the terms of personality, or use the personal pronoun He as though it referred to two distinct existences. "HE who descended, was the same that ascended up far above all heavens." He who was humbled was exalted. He who suffered was glorified. He who died rose from the dead. If it be affirmed that some of these acts belonged to the one nature, and some to the other, it might, on the other hand, be maintained, that personality is so far to be distinguished from all other attributes, that it can never be separated from the whole being in all that respects action or the receiving of an action. It may be said of Christ, that infinite wisdom belonged to him as God, limited knowledge pertained to him as man; and so of other *attributes*, which may be regarded as strictly belonging to the two natures respectively; but in respect to acts and sufferings, which are but the converse of acts, the case seems to be essentially different. We would not rashly deny the distinction which would predicate some of the Divine, and some of the human nature, but this we would say, with all reverence and modesty in regard to so mysterious a subject, that our mind is incapable of receiving the distinction, without seeming, at least, to take into the conception two distinct personalities, however closely in other respects united. If we cannot walk on the very narrow line which the Church has drawn between the Nestorians and the Monothelites, we would prefer the error of the latter to that of the former; we would rather hold that

there was but one will common to both natures, and of course one operation, than maintain that which seems, by necessary consequence, to divide the personality. Community of act and suffering, however, may be grounded on a *union* of the Divine and human wills in one person, instead of their oneness and identity. If they were united in every act, and in every suffering, then must these have been the acts and sufferings of Christ in both aspects of his mysterious personality. If ever they seem to be divided, it is in that remarkable prayer, John xii. 27—“*Father save Me from this hour; and yet for this cause came I unto this hour.*” We see here the human weakness, and it may even be said, the human *desire* (as distinguished from will) in contrast with the settled *volition* of the God-man, and yet what strange consequences must result, if we suppose the *me* and the *I* at variance, or that, in this purpose, the human will was not in strictest union with the Divine!

Our author tells us that the doctrine of almost all theologians, and, in short, the voice of the Church, or of the great majority of Christians, is against him. Although he does this with a diffidence and humility, which the warm piety, every where manifest throughout his work, shows to be most sincere, yet he does not seem to find that difficulty in such a position, which, as we are perfectly willing to confess, would be felt by his reviewer. It would be with extreme reluctance, with much and careful examination and re-examination, that we should be willing to adopt, as settled for our own belief, any opinion opposed to what has universally, or almost universally, prevailed in the Church of Christ. Could we believe that she had been wrong for eighteen hundred years, in any interpretation of any important point in Christianity, (and by the Church we always mean the clearly to be traced succession of the good, and learned, and pious followers of Christ in all past ages, rather than decrees of councils,*) it

* In other words, the great majority of true Christians, as far as their opinions have been manifested. Others may think this indefinite, but no honest mind,

would inevitably produce a most dark and painful state of mind. Our faith is too weak to do without such support. We should dread the cloud of skepticism that might invade the soul, when thus cast upon the weakness of its own individual reason, or powers of interpretation, with the very faint hope of finding truth, where so many of more learning, more piety, more singleness of mind, more devotion to the truth, more trust in God for promised guidance, had only fallen into error. Private judgment of course each man must exercise. Each soul must judge alone and for itself, just as every man must die alone and appear alone at the bar of God. As for the mode, however, *in* which, and the aids *by* which this judgment is to be exercised, that presents a far different question which the common rhetoric on the abstract right seldom truly meets. We have admitted that we are inclined to some aspects of the writer's theory, when divested of much of that strong and startling language in which he is fond of indulging. We concede much force to many of the arguments by which he supports it. Yet if convinced that it has been absolutely, and unequivocally, and in all its features, condemned by the voice of the Church, as above defined, or of the great majority of true Christians, we could only hope that God would forgive us our timidity, and not impute a reluctance to controvert such decision to an aversion to the truth.

It may be maintained, however, that the Church has most distinctly held, without any figure, or any merely constructive use of language, that God did come down to earth, that he did humble himself, that he did become incarnate, that he was born, that he did suffer, that he did die, and that he saved the Church *by his own blood*. All this, to be sure, is generally qualified by a scholastic hypothesis, yet still in such a way as to leave the great truth unaffected for all such minds as may be willing humbly to receive the doctrine, and these explicit statements of it, whilst they admit their inca-

we believe, can greatly err in determining where the power of Christianity has been, and what is the true line of authority.

capacity to understand the philosophy by which it is sought to be made consistent with other theories. No theologian who has any reputation for soundness would venture to say, that this language has been used figuratively or by way of accommodation. There is, in some way, a most important reality in the affirmation, that God did suffer, which one had better receive without explanation, than not to receive at all. He who maintains it in its most literal sense, and rejects all qualification, is certainly nearer the universally received orthodox faith, than one who regards the sufferings of the Redeemer solely in their human relation.

There is, besides, still another aspect in which this subject may be viewed. The doctrines of the Church may be regarded as contained not merely in symbolical writings, and dogmatic statements, or in decisions of ecclesiastical bodies, articles of faith, and the writings of theologians; but also, and in some respects more properly, in forms of worship, in prayers, in hymns, in books of devotion and experimental religion. Here we have what may be called the *living doctrine*. It is a voice which we may regard as more truly proceeding from the very heart of the body of Christ. Here we have the affirmations in all their boldness. There are no qualifying philosophical statements in respect to passibility, to abate the warmth and force of what might seem too startling to the reason. As far as our examination of such productions extends, especially in respect to the hymns of the Church, we find no misgiving. From Prudentius and Gregory down to Watts, and Wesley, and Keble, and Montgomery, they are, in this respect, all alike. The devotional poet has only expressed the feelings of Christianity, when, in the exercise of its highest and most real power, the soul indulges affectionately and fearlessly in those declarations respecting its great redemption, which, as unqualified doctrinal statements might seem too extravagant. On this point the appeal may be made with confidence to the old Latin and Greek hymns, and to the sacred poetry of all Christian ages, whether Romish or Protestant. It is not thus simply because the lan-

guage is that of poetry. The feelings called up by the mysteries of redemption require no aid from fiction. They may seek the highest and boldest style of language, whilst it is at the same time felt that any metaphysical scholia would *only* abate, and perhaps *render false*, the true emotion which these expressions are adapted in their simplicity to inspire. On this theme, poetry may be sobriety, when philosophy is madness. Any language falls short of the reality. We cannot bear the thought, that age after age has indulged only in a pious sentimentality—that the enthusiastic confessor of the primitive church, the devout Greek or Romanist, or the pious Protestant, have so loved to speak and sing of God as suffering and dying for the sins of the world, unless it had been really felt, that there was something *superhuman*, not merely in the person of the Redeemer, but also in his expiatory passion upon the cross. And it will ever be so. Refine and speculate as we may, still, in the indulgence of devotional feeling, the soul rejects all qualifying or abating terms. Take for example, the words—

And did the *Holy and the Just*,
The *Sovereign of the skies*,
Stoop down to *wretchedness and dust*,
That guilty worms might rise?

Or these—

Well might the sun in darkness hide,
And shut his glories in,
When *God the mighty Maker died*,
For man the creature's sin.

We may say that this is poetry—still the language is no more clear and decided than that of dogmatic theology, (as we shall soon show by extracts from Pearson,) except that it omits those qualifications, which, even if they may be in some sense true for the intellect, are in danger of containing error for the heart.

In that dread agony,
The Lord of all above, beneath,

Was bowed with sorrow unto death.

* * * *

The sun set in a fearful hour,
The stars might well grow dim;
When this mortality had power,
So to o'ershadow him;

That He who gave man's breath might know
The very depths of human wo.

* * * *

When the Deliverer knelt to pray,
Yet passed it not that cup away.

* * * *

It passed not, though the stormy wave
Had sunk beneath his tread;
It passed not, though to Him the grave
Had yielded up its dead.

* * * *

And was the Sinless thus beset,
With anguish and dismay?
How may we meet our conflict yet,
In the dark narrow way?

Through Him—through Him, that path who trod:
Save, or we perish, Son of God.

There is no expression in this hymn that is not warranted by the language of the Scripture; there is not a sentiment which would not have been deemed orthodox in any age of the Church; mournful, too, and touching as is the strain, there is no other poetry in it, than the simple yet soul-subduing pathos of the Evangelists.

Nowhere do we find what may be styled the declaratory doctrine of the Church on this subject, set forth with more clearness than by Bishop Pearson. Nowhere has our author, with all his disposition to the startling, used stronger or bolder language. On account of its importance we present the passage at length.

"Now this Son of God we have already shewed to be therefore truly called the Only Begotten, because he was from all eternity generated of the essence of the Father, and therefore is, as the Eternal Son, so also the Eternal God. Wherefore by the *immediate coherence of the articles*, and necessary consequence of the creed, it

plainly appeareth that *the Eternal Son of God, God of God, very God of very God, suffered under Pontius Pilate.* For it was no other person which suffered under Pontius Pilate, than he which was born of the Virgin Mary; he which was born of the Virgin Mary, was no other person than he which was conceived by the Holy Ghost; he which was conceived by the Holy Ghost, was no other than *our Lord,* and that our Lord was no other than *The only Son of God.* Therefore, by the *immediate coherence of the articles, it followeth that the only Son of God, our Lord, suffered* under Pontius Pilate. That Word which was in the beginning, which then was with God, and was God, in the fulness of time being made flesh, *did suffer.* For the princes of this world, crucified the Lord of Glory; and God purchased the Church *with his own blood.* That person which was begotten of the Father before all worlds, and so was really the *Lord of Glory,* and most *truly God,* took upon him the nature of man, and in that nature, *being still the same person that before he was, did suffer.* When our Saviour fasted forty days, there was no other person hungry than that Son of God which made the world; when he sate down weary by the well, there was no other person *felt* that thirst but he which was eternally begotten of the Father, the fountain of the Deity; when he was buffeted and scourged, there was no other person *sensible* of those pains, than the Eternal Word which before all worlds was impassible; when he was crucified and died, there was no other person which gave up the ghost but the Son of him, and so of the same nature with him, *who only hath immortality."*

One would think on first view, and on repeated reviews, that this language was sufficiently bold to satisfy the most devoted advocate of the theory of this book. It is not easy to imagine readily, how such terms could be qualified, so as to be held not to mean what their first impressions would convey to the mind of every reader. "*The Word which was in the beginning, which was with God, and which was God, did suffer. The Person which was begotten of the Father before all worlds, He who was Lord of Glory, and most truly God, DID SUFFER.*"

In the next paragraph, however, the Bishop does proceed to qualify it, and to make that distinction which is generally made between the Divine and human natures. That such a distinction exists, and is often to be maintained, no one who believes at all in the incarnation would think of denying. All

Christology is confounded, unless it is held that, in it, there is no blending or confusion of the two natures, any more than in the union of soul and matter in one human personality, there is a confusion of the properties that belong to each respectively. The God did not sink in the man, nor did the man rise so as to become blended with the God, nor did these natures so unite as to form a third thing, distinct from, yet compounded of both. The finite did not become infinite, nor the infinite finite; omnipotence did not become weakness, nor weakness omnipotence. In other words, what was Divine did not cease to be Divine and become human; nor, on the other hand, did what was human cease to be human and become Divine, any more than in our ordinary compound humanity, matter became in any sense spirit, or had any of the attributes of spirit, or spirit became matter, and took to itself any of the attributes of matter. As far as attributes are concerned, the statement, in both cases, is comprehensible as matter of fact, although ever so mysterious as regards the nature of the subjects to which it relates. With all reverence, however, be it said, that quite a different aspect is presented when we come to speak of acts (*πράξεις*) and sufferings (*πάθη*) which are the converse of acts,—in short, whatever involves the idea of personality whole and indivisible. There are attributes of the Divinity which belong not to the humanity; there are attributes of the humanity which belong not to the Divinity.* We may even go so far as to say, there is a knowledge of the one which pertains not to the other. The God knew what the man knew not. It is hard, even to this extent, to preserve the idea of the unity of being, or to avoid a severance of the personality. We have passed already to the extreme

* So also there are attributes of the body which belong not to the soul, and vice versa. There are also some *seeming* *πάθη* which belong only to the one, although predicated of the indivisible personality through an incorrect, yet established use of language. Thus we say—the man was buried. We even say, in the language of the creed, *Christ was buried*, although it was not true, even in respect to the human soul. It is, however, easy to distinguish between this and a real *πάθος*, which belongs of necessity to the whole personality.

bound, if not beyond the bound, of the human reason. When, however, we advance a step farther, and venture to affirm in respect to acts or relations, or the voluntary receiving of actions, that the man did what the God did not do, that the man was the subject of *πάθη* in which the God had no *συμπάθεια*, and to which, of course, he must in that case have been indifferent;—when we thus speak, (with all reverence be it said, and with all readiness to retract any error on so important a subject,) we do use terms which seem to sever the personality, or we have entered a region where no ideas of any kind follow the language we employ. The words and the sound thereof are in our ears, but as to any distinct conceptions, except those of error, the mind is a perfect blank.

“Since,” says Pearson, “the Divine nature of the Son is common to the Father and the Spirit, if that had been the subject of his passion, then must the Father and Spirit have suffered.” The author seems to have well answered this argument. “It proves,” says he, “too much. The Divine nature of the Son is common to the Father and the Spirit. If, therefore, the Divine nature of the Son had become incarnate, then must the Father and Son have become incarnate also.” p. 32. The reply appears to us to be well made, and deserving a most serious consideration from any one who would fairly attempt to meet it. We are brought again to the distinction between properties or attributes, on the one hand, and acts and sufferings, on the other. In the first great article of our religion, we are taught to recognize three distinct personalities and the same *nature*: in the second, we have a still deeper mystery,—the union of two distinct natures in one *personality*. Attributes have regard to the nature, actions and sufferings to the person. In the first case, there may be sameness, or at least similarity of attributes and distinction of actions; in the other, distinction of attributes and identity of acts and sufferings. The Son may *do* what the Father *doeth* not. The Son becomes incarnate, but in this the Father hath no participation. So also, on the other hand, the Divine

nature of Christ hath attributes that belong not to the human ; but can we say that the one doeth what the other doeth not ? that the one suffers that in which the other had no share ?—Can we say this without bringing in the idea of a *partnership* (however close it may be) of *two* beings, or of the annexation or superadding of one being to another, instead of one indivisible personality ?

It may be said that although doings and sufferings are acts, and connected with unity and personality, yet the capacities to do and to endure may be regarded as attributes, and that therefore the great question still remains—Can capacity to suffer in any way, be regarded as belonging to the Divine, or, *can the Deity suffer if he wills to suffer ?* This is a question which no one should rashly answer in the affirmative ; but certainly it requires no little boldness to give a dogmatical decision in the negative. Athanasius contends very vehemently against this position, on the ground that it is not the nature of God to suffer, and that therefore he cannot will what is in opposition ; but with all deference to this noble champion of the truth, it does seem, that, in his argument, he has assumed the negative of the very question in dispute, namely—Is it the nature of God, without implying imperfection, to suffer, if he will to suffer ? No one certainly would contend that he is not in the highest sense impassible, as long as no reference is had to his own will ; but to deny the other proposition absolutely, might seem like imputing to him that very imperfection, which some would maintain is brought in, unless we hold to an absolute and unqualified impassibility. Who shall say that a capability or power of suffering, if willed, is proof of imperfection, any more than a capability or power of becoming incarnate ? Had not this fact been stated beyond all question in the Scriptures, and had we been called to reason about it a priori, every one would doubtless say that the latter involves the idea of imperfection as much, if not more so, than the former. And yet, in some real sense, God did truly *become* incarnate. It was not an annexation, or a superadding, or either a temporary or abiding indwelling. So

also as respects the humiliation: if there can be any separation in regard to acts, this must certainly have belonged, primarily and chiefly, to that which before the incarnation being in the form of God, emptied itself and took the likeness of man. Even then, if we can actually or logically sever the ideas of humiliation and suffering, still a capability of the one does of itself imply imperfection no more than a capability of the other. We may say—and indeed it is an intuitive or necessary proposition—that *God can never depart from his own idea*—Πάντων ἡμιονα τῆς ἐαυτοῦ ιδέας ἐκβαίνει;* but then we have no right to assume that this or that act or relation would be such a departure. We might, in this way, make the scholastic proposition a direct denial of Philippians 2: 7, and of the incarnation and humiliation in any sense; when it may be, and, if we take the Scriptures for our guide, it certainly is true, that a capability for these very acts and relations is the great means through which his highest, and most glorious, and all-perfect moral idea may be manifested to the universe.

It is a strong position, and one which our author employs with much effect, that the Bible never qualifies the bold language which it uses in relation to these subjects. Its writers indulge in no distinctions respecting acts done in the one nature or in the other. They seem to fear no charge of inconsistency in applying to him they style the Son of Man, and who had not where to lay his head, an existence before all worlds, and as the Creator of all worlds, whilst they hesitate not to predicate of the same personality, all the actions, and temptations, and sufferings of humanity.† They do not think

* Plato Repub., 380. D.

† We cannot help entertaining great doubts of the correctness of the very common interpretation given to the text—My Father *is greater than I*. By modern commentators generally, Christ is supposed to have spoken this of his human nature. But with all reverence be it said, how useless and unmeaning would it be, for him to tell his disciples that God was greater than humanity! This common view, however, is far surpassed in absurdity, by the wretched Socinian statement, that he who said this was a mere man, and in no respect any thing more. How it sounds! What modesty in any mere man to say, that

of any qualifying explanation even in that strangest and most startling of all sayings—that God purchased the Church with *his own blood*. They deem no comments necessary when they represent even the Eternal Father, “the Fountain of Deity,” as feeling the yearnings of paternal affection in that apparent conflict with love to man, which prevailed with him not to *spare* his well beloved and Only Begotten Son, but to *give him up* for our salvation.

“He suffered in his human nature,” says Pearson. The expression may be admitted without interfering with the view we are disposed to take. The objection to it, besides its being unscriptural, is, that it is unmeaning. It takes nothing from, and adds nothing to, what is conveyed by the two first words—*He suffered*. The latter clause must not destroy, or weaken it, nor reduce it to a mere constructive sense. There must be nothing to abate the reality of the conception—that *He* truly suffered and that *He* was God. It may be granted that he suffered in his human nature, if by it is meant that this was primarily the seat of the suffering, or the medium through which alone that Divine Person became capable of enduring it. In this sense it may be more correct to say he suffered in his human, than in his Divine nature, although, in other respects, both expressions are liable to objection.

It has unquestionably been the faith of the Church in all ages, that in the incarnation both natures were preserved distinct, “without confusion, composition or conversion.” As was said before, there was no transubstantiation of the one into the other, and no fusion of both into one, thus forming a third distinct yet compounded nature; in which case, as has been truly said, he would have been neither God nor man, but a *person* of a different *nature* from both, just as all chemically compounded bodies are distinct from each composing element.

God was greater than he! This favourite text of the Humanitarian is alone sufficient to convince any thinking mind, that there was, to say the least, something superhuman in the character of Jesus. Like all other texts which speak of his being sent, &c., it would seem to relate to his whole personality, human and Divine, but in his state of voluntary humiliation, subordination, and suffering.

And yet the Scripture does most expressly declare that the Word *became flesh*—*Ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο*. There must have been some reason for the use of this strong word, which the Socinian makes synonymous with *fruit*, whilst some old heretics carry it to the extreme sense, to which we have already alluded, of a transmutation of natures. It cannot be that the term was used accidentally, or that it is merely synonymous with the asserting copula, or that it does not denote, in some important sense, a real *γένεσις* of what before was not. May we not say, with all that fear of error which should be ever felt in relation to so important a point as this, that although there was no transmutation of substance,—although, *as far as the natures were concerned*, God did not become man, or man become God, yet, in one sense, there did result—with all reverence be it spoken—a third thing, namely, that most mysterious and before unheard of personality, the God-man, in two distinct natures yet one person for ever. In this view we can give the important word *ἐγένετο* its fullest force. One *nature* did not *become* another nature; nor did two natures by their union become a third nature, but it may be said, and truly said, that a Divine *person* became a human, or rather a Divine and human person.

If it be affirmed that the Divine nature suffered, it would seem to be open to the objection made by Pearson, that, as there is but one Divine nature, then must the Father also have suffered; although it is likewise true, that our author's reply would also stand equally good—that then also if the Divine nature of the Son became incarnate, the Father also must have become incarnate. But this difficulty is avoided entirely when we say, the Divine *Person* of the Word *became* incarnate or a human person,—taking now the word *ἐγένετο* in its strictest sense, as denoting a real *becoming* instead of either a temporary or permanent association.

Of this *person* it may be said, *He suffered*, and that, by such becoming incarnate, he suffered what each nature before, and by itself, could not have suffered;—namely, that to which the Divine, in itself, was impassible, and which, to the

human alone, and in itself, was utterly beyond all its powers of endurance, however assisted by any ab-extra, or, rather, extra-personal aid. According to this the passion of the God-man was not alone in his humanity or in his Divinity, although the former may with great propriety be regarded as the more direct medium through which the indivisible person became capable of suffering. We may, if the language is preferred, say that it was *endured* in the human aspect of the personality, and *sustained* by the Divine; not however by the latter as merely *adding value*, (according to the common very unsatisfactory explanation,) nor as a supporting ab-extra power, (a view which we can hardly avoid taking when we involve it in the distinction of nature,) nor regarded merely as in any state of association with it, that did not imply, one acting, one suffering, in short, one undivided and indivisible personality.

The conclusion then is, that because of the union of the two natures, *the sufferings were different, not only in degree, but also in kind, from what they otherwise would have been*; just as even bodily sufferings, if we may use the comparison, are very different, not only in degree but in kind, according as they are felt by one of the lowest species of animal life, or by a *person* in whom the material nature is united, not only to a sensitive, but also to a rational soul. They were *super-human*, (using the term not simply as a rhetorical or hyperbolical expression, but as denoting a real distinction)—they were mysterious, inexplicable, ineffable. They were such as they could not have been had not the Divine nature been present, and necessarily present, to make them that most wonderful passion for which we think our author means to contend, although his use of startling language sometimes lays open his statements to serious objections.

Allusion has been made to a comparison which may be derived from the human nature as composed of body and soul, or, according to some divisions,—of the body, the sensitive soul, and the rational soul. The comparison, we admit, stands at a vast distance, and yet there is no one more just, as far as it goes, or which can furnish more aid to our con-

ceptions by the illustrations to be drawn from it. It has been often employed, both by the Fathers and by subsequent theologians. Let us first then regard humanity as a personality arising from the union of two natures, matter or body, and soul. Now we may find it extremely difficult to define the true nature of those really mysterious sensations, pleasure and pain, or to determine what agitation or *κίνησις* of the material solids or fluids, or what *συμπάθεια* of the soul, constitutes the one state in distinction from the other,—whether it be in the degree, or kind, or ratio of the bodily vibrations and of the sympathetic spiritual chord, or whether, as Plato thinks, the one is the departure from, and the other a return to, an equilibrium, the one presenting a harmonic and the other a discordant numerical ratio of agitations and impulses. Still, whatever may be that secret which modern physiology, with all its boasting, has as much failed to explore as the ancient philosophy, and although we may be ever so much at a loss about it, we have nevertheless sufficient grounds for affirming, that in the production of these so common, yet so mysterious states, soul and body are both inseparably conjoined. There certainly could be no pleasure, or pain, or *πάθος* of any kind, in matter or body, without the presence of the spirit; and we may just as truly say of some affections, though not of all, that they never could be felt by soul without the union of body. In other words, there are some (call them, if you please, the sensual in distinction from the purely spiritual) to which soul, as separate and unembodied, is impassible.

In carrying out this idea, we can nowhere find the distinction more plainly set forth, than by Socrates in that most admirable analysis in the *Philebus*, where he divides all *πάθη*, pleasures and pains, into two great classes, both of which do truly affect our whole personality, but with this great difference, that the one species, the strictly sensual, commence and have their primary seat in the body, and *through it* affect the spirit, in which they terminate; the others commence and have their primary seat in the soul, although the *πάθος* which there has its birth, produces also a

pleasurable or painful affection of the body.* Indeed, it may well be doubted, whether, in our present state of existence, there is any action or emotion of the soul, in which the body has no share, any more than there is any affection of the body, in which the soul does not participate. Viewed, however, as unembodied, it may be safely said, that to the first class, or the strictly sensual affections, the soul is impassible; and yet by virtue of its union with the material organization, they become its *πάθη*, not constructively because having their seat in the associate of its personality, but truly and really, as deriving from it a character which they would not otherwise possess.

In this stage, however, the comparison may be charged with deficiency, because, without the union of soul, the body cannot be said to feel at all, but is insensible or *below passion*, just as to some affections, the soul, in a similar separate state, is *above passion*, or impassible. Let us then endeavour to improve the illustration by rising a degree higher. According to a very sound as well as a very ancient distribution, man may be regarded as having three natures, or rather a three-fold nature, consisting of the body, the sensitive soul, and the rational soul. Now, without carrying too far the imperfect analogy that evidently to some degree prevails, and according to which, the third may be conceived to bear to the second, something of the relation which the *Λόγος* bears to the humanity,—it may with some truth be said that the rational nature, in itself, is impassible. The only objection is, that the expression has little or no meaning, and not that it is false as matter of fact. We say little or no meaning, because passibility and impassibility relate to personality, which (at least as regards human nature) cannot belong to the rational soul without a connection with the sensitive; or, in the language of Plato, there cannot be *νοῦς* without *ψυχή*.† Regarding it, however, as impassible in itself, we may affirm,

* Philebus.

† Sophista, 249, A. Ἀλλὰ δῆτα νοῦν μὲν καὶ ζῶην καὶ ψυχὴν κ. τ. λ.

that by virtue of its union with the material body and sensitive soul, it has a most important share in all the *πάθη* or affections of the latter; and that, too, not by virtue of any constructive use of language, or any partnership imputation, but most actually and truly, as being in the highest sense the peculiar *πάθη*, not of a rational *nature* but of a rational *person*. In other words, the inferior nature, together with all that agitation, *motus*, or *κίνησις*, by which it is affected, remaining the same, then do we confidently affirm, that the pleasure or pain, which pertains to the indivisible personality, is very different, not only in degree but in kind, according as this sensitive or animal nature is, or is not, united to a rational soul.* The same sensation of an animal (that is, the same as far as the machinery of the material and sensitive is concerned) is very different from what it would be in a man. The rational *person* is affected by it in a peculiar manner, in consequence of something superadded, which makes even the affections of the sensitive soul different from what they would be without it. The *person* being thus affected by the union, it is truly and not constructively to be regarded as a *πάθος* of the rational as well as of the sensitive man. Thus the union, although the two natures remain unchanged and untransmuted, does give rise to a third thing; and to a peculiar *πάθος*, which belongs not to either when regarded as separate and distinct.

In short, to sum up what has been advanced on this head, we cannot properly say that the body suffered, or the spirit suffered, that the sensitive soul or lower nature suffered, or

* When thus viewed we may almost invert the old maxim of the schools—*Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu*. The sensations, especially those of the eye and the ear, are so affected and varied in their essential character, and made other than what they would be, by the presence of an innate rational nature, (which may, in a certain sense, be regarded as a prior modifying power,) that we might almost say, with as much truth, *Nihil in sensu, quod non prius in intellectu*. There can be no doubt, when the animal and the man look upon the same figure, or hear the same musical sounds, that even the sentient *πάθη* themselves are widely different, besides being associated, in the one case, with a higher class of ideas.

that the rational soul or higher nature suffered—but the man, the person, the indivisible personality suffered. We might use the qualifications—in *the flesh*—in *the sensitive or lower nature*,—but we can only mean by this the seat, the medium, through or in which the *person* endured it. The philosophical Greek language expresses this admirably. It does not say ἀλγεῖ ἡ κεφαλὴ—“*the head aches*,” but ἀλγεῖ τὴν κεφαλὴν—He, the man, *the person*, *aches as to his head*. The subject of every action, and of every suffering, is the totality, the entire and indivisible personality.

To make an application of this, it may be maintained, that the human person *in itself*, is capable, and capable only of what, for the sake of our present position, may be styled *ordinary* or *human sufferings*. The Divine person, it may be admitted, as far as the present argument is concerned, is, in itself, and in its separate state, impassible to any suffering. But by their union, and only by virtue of their union, does the Divine and human person, the personality of the God-man, become (in his human nature as the seat or medium, if any choose thus to view it, but still none the less really) capable of those *extraordinary*, superhuman, most mysterious, and ineffable sufferings, which Christ endured for our redemption—even those agonies on the cross and in the garden, the narrative of which must ever remain, to the Socinian and the rationalist, the darkest and most inexplicable portion of the Scriptures. Gloss it as they may, still must they have this mystery in their creed. They may reject the Incarnation and the Trinity; but how shall they explain those drops of blood, that agonizing cry, that great and strong fear amounting even to the anguish of dismay, that Christ endured in view of sufferings which so many of his disciples bore, not only with fortitude, but even the joy of triumph? We would remark here, in passing, that nowhere does our author exhibit more power of argument and of eloquence, than in pressing home the considerations drawn from these most solemn portions of the Bible.

The writer, however, goes farther than this, and seems

evidently to regard the Divine nature as passible without reference to the incarnation. This also would appear to be the doctrine of Dr. Chalmers, if we may judge from a quotation which is introduced from one of his lectures. Without expressing any opinion in regard to the strong view taken by that most eminent divine, we simply would allude to it here as evidence of the fact, that the most effective preaching, like the hymns of the Church, runs, by a sort of necessity, into this very mode of representing the sufferings of the Redeemer without the qualifications of scholastic statements.

The true mode of considering the merits of our author's work, would be to overlook some of his startling language, (into which he seems to have been led through a continual fear lest his positions should be mistaken,) and contrast him with the extreme modern theory of the atonement, against which he is contending. We fully believe that this latter, although it may retain some similarity of statement, has actually less of the spirit of the doctrine which has always prevailed in the church, than even an unqualified denial of the Divine impassibility. Allusion is made to that common view, which wholly separates the Divinity from any other than a constructive relation to the sufferings of our Saviour's life and death. In other words, it teaches that the Divine bears the relation simply of an *aiding power*, but in no other way (as far as we have seen the position stated) than might be consistent with the higher Unitarian theory of an extraordinary inspiration, or a permanent indwelling, in distinction from such a union as constitutes one person. As far as the suffering is concerned, the Divinity is certainly regarded as holding an *ab extra* relation. It is said to give a value, an infinite value and dignity to the passion; but the passion itself, the mysterious agony, is in no respect different from what it would have been, had a man sustained it aided by the Divine power. It was in no sense superhuman, or ineffable, except as those rhetorical terms may be used to heighten our conceptions of its value and importance.

This modern semi-Nestorian scheme has a natural affinity

to that theory of the atonement, which regards it as a display, rather than a true propitiatory sacrifice. It has also a direct connection with that extreme rationalistic view of the Divine impassibility, which maintains that God is strictly without passions, in any sense of the word comprehensible by the human mind, or by which it may distinguish him from a being of power and intellect alone, without any thing that may be intelligibly styled a moral nature. Along with this, too, comes as a matter of course, that philosophy of sin, which represents it as a political and social *evil*, rather than as having an intrinsic demerit aside from effects and consequences,—or as that which God *intellectually sees* to be injurious to the happiness of the greatest number, and therefore resolves to discourage and not to tolerate, rather than as something which he *morally hates*, and therefore *must* visit with pain for its inherent turpitude and malignity. This whole system of rationalism goes together. One aspect pervades it all. There is throughout, if we may use the term, a feeling of *unrealness*. The mind can hardly help regarding it as throughout a display and nothing more. There is no real, intrinsic sinfulness in sin, but only an intellectual mistake as to the truest happiness: there is no real anger against it on the part of God; there is no real propitiatory sacrifice, no real appeasing of the Divine wrath, no real passion except the ordinary sufferings of humanity. These, too, are intended rather as a sign, or a sort of typical language, (like the typical actions of the prophets,) to express God's purpose not to tolerate evil, instead of being that mysterious, vicarious agony which the God-man endured, when he bore the whole penalty of the Divine law as the substitute of his people.

In such a scheme, religion must assume a dry, rationalistic, and scholastic aspect. The dogma of God's impassibility is carried to that extreme that the soul can conceive of his exercising no moral preferences. The Deity is contemplated only in his intellectual character. *Indifferent* to the intrinsic demerit of sin, he is calmly *calculating* the consequences of tolerating that which only becomes a moral, (in any the low-

est sense,) because it is first a physical evil. The theory is quite intelligible, although it professes to be highly philosophical. All things being viewed through the unimpassioned and transparent medium of the intellect, there are none of those shades and difficulties, which, it is fully admitted, attend any view which seems to verge towards a recognition of the possibility of God's possessing passion. But it is at the same time destitute of moral power. When the soul is fully imbued with it, there must be, to say the least, a very defective conviction of sin and of its inherent demerit. There cannot be that deep sense of the Divine displeasure, which the glowing Scriptural representations must certainly have been designed to convey, and which the simple, unqualified views of the Saviour's passion so powerfully tend to produce. In short, we may thus attain to what some would call high views, or rational views, or transcendent views ; but we purchase our cold philosophy at the price of all which has truly power to move the soul. Even if our author has fallen into error in some of his representations, we have no reluctance in saying, that it is a much safer error than the opposite and more common extreme which has been set forth. We would rather have his heresy, if heresy it be, than the dry Nestorianism which pervades so much of our modern theology, and is to be heard from so many modern pulpits.

Why, with all its manifest heresies and corruptions, does the religion of Rome yet exert so much moral power—we mean not upon the common mass of her ignorant and superstitious followers, but upon those many serious, devout, and, at the same time, enlightened souls that she retains within her communion? The explanation may be found in the fact, that she makes so much of the sufferings of Christ. Reference is not now had to her external display in pictures and representations of the crucifixion, but to the importance attached to the passion in her forms of prayer and meditation, and especially in the sermons of her best preachers. How different the style of Massillon and Bourdaloue in this respect, from that of some of our own most acute, yet dry and

metaphysical divines ! How vividly do the former present the passion, whilst in regard to the design, the extent, and the efficacy of the atonement, every thing is vague and obscure ! How keen and scholastic is the other school, in regard to all these latter points, whilst in respect to the mysterious passion itself, how unimpassioned, how unattractive, and how cold ! It is thus that with a most perverted and unscriptural view of the doctrine of justification, and with so many practices that would tend to obscure it, this corrupt church yet retains so much of the power of the atonement. But it should not be so. If any should make much of the suffering of Christ, if any should make it the alpha and omega of their religion, it should be those who believe in justification by faith *only*, and who reject with a just abhorrence, as impious and blasphemous, any the least idea of partnership, in the securing of our salvation, between the highest and holiest of human works and the expiatory agonies of the Son of God.

No doubt it has been the common doctrine of the Church, or the great majority of true Christians in all ages, and in some sense we should so receive it, that the Deity is immutable, and therefore, as far as the one implies the other, impassible. In all discussions, however, respecting the limits and extent of this proposition, there is a great deal of what may be styled begging the question. Some seem to regard the proposition as equivalent to saying that he has no imperfection. Now the declaration that God is perfect, flows from the very laws and necessities of the human mind, whether we have definite notions attached to it or not. It is an identical or self-proving proposition. The term God implies perfection. It is involved in the very idea of the Divine Nature, that it must have all excellence, or that nothing can be good which it has not ; but the human mind of itself, and without the aid of revelation, cannot determine what that excellence is. It cannot, therefore, unless warranted by the Bible, assert that the exercise of real moral emotion, in any sense, or in a sense which makes some approach to our comprehension, would be evidence of imperfection. It may be true that his passions are not like our

passions, and yet our own may be the best medium through which we can form any conception of them. The impassibility is sometimes resolved into the immutability; but here again we are in the dark, and in great danger of using words and leaving all ideas behind. Some views of this latter attribute would not only exclude all emotions and passions, in any sense of the words, but also all acts—not only all *πάθη* but also all *πράξεις*; for we really cannot see why the latter do not imply change as much as the former. Has the Deity been eternally creating? Is he eternally exercising the same unchanging energy, both in kind and degree? Or does he create and then cease, or (not to shun the simple words of the Scripture) does he take a sabbath from his labours? If this does not imply mutability and imperfection, what right have we to predicate it of certain moral states and relations? God is angry with the sinner, and then, to use the strong language of the Bible, he receives him, and yearns over him as a son in whom his soul delighteth. But the sinner has changed, it is said, and therefore this language means no more than that he stands in a new relation to the unchangeable Divinity. He was before on the side which *seemed* to be wrath, he has now come round to the side of mercy. Once he saw God on Mount Sinai, *now* he sees him on Mount Sion. He was once in the camp of the Egyptians, and saw only the dark cloud and the terrific face which “looked out” upon the troubled host; he is now in the camp of Israel, and beholds the bright light which is given to cheer and guide the people of God. But who is satisfied with these explanations? They are not in the style of the Bible. Nothing of this kind occurs in the *usus loquendi* of God’s book! As well might we say that creation is wholly subjective, that the universe now contemplates God in this aspect or on the side of creation,—that once we were all on the side of non-existence, and yet he has ever been creating, and never ceasing from his labours. The sinner *changes* his position! But from whom did the first moving power towards this effect originate? Where did even the sinner’s change commence? Even admitting, for a moment, this plausible subjective theory, must it not be

equally real in respect to both terms. If there is a change in the sinner's relation to God, does it not inevitably follow that there is also a change in God's relation to the sinner?

In short, although the doctrine of the Divine immutability must be received as a necessary truth, yet we are unable to determine its application, or what is inconsistent with it. We cannot tell what is *absolute change*, unless we know that whole, of which, and in relation to which, the change is predicated. Otherwise, if we will speculate rashly about these attributes, we are in danger of running into a dreary pantheism, which destroys the Divine personality by confounding God with the universe, and makes him unchangeable because he includes all things and all changes within himself—or else, into an unintelligible transcendental view, in which the warm life of religion sinks down into a cold rationalism, or into a dreamy and passionless quietism.

When, then, we say, God is immutable, we can only safely mean, that he is unchangeable in his nature. The other doctrine, which in one aspect is also a necessary truth, becomes closely allied to it. Both may be regarded as contained in the first declaration, that He is perfect, or hath all excellence. He is, in his nature, perfect, immutable, impassible; but then, it does not follow from this, that the exercise of real moral emotion may not be a necessary part of this perfect nature, one of those very excellences in which He changeth not, and to all *loss or deterioration* of which, He (unlike lower created beings) is wholly impassible. It may be a part of this Divine nature, that when God wills, He may become incarnate, and assume that relation to humanity, which this term imports. A priori, we might have said that this was a violation of his perfection, immutability, and impassibility, unless such incarnation is taken in the loose sense of an inspiration, or of a temporal or permanent indwelling of a Divine *influence* in a human person. So also, when he wills to place himself in such a relation to humanity as to endure its sufferings, why should we say that the one is any more evidence of imperfection, or of any loss or deterioration

of nature, than the other, when this is the very question, namely—Is the Divine nature such that He can assume this or that relation, if he wills to assume it?

To return to the general inquiry—Has the Deity passions? Little difficulty is found in the Scriptural declarations, as long as God is represented as loving, or exercising any of the benevolent emotions.

The great objection arises when mention is made of emotions of the opposite kind. And yet, as far as passibility is concerned, the one class can no more be regarded as an imperfection than the other. Both when philosophically considered involve the same principle, and both are presented with the same freedom and boldness in the Scriptures. The Bible says that "God is love," and it also declares that "he is a consuming fire." The one implies the other. Love to right and the righteous (whatever that love may be) must involve hatred or anger, or, if the apparently milder term is preferred, aversion to sin and the sinner. The one, too, must be the measure of the other, rising as it rises, and sinking as it sinks. If one is only a modification of the intellectual nature, so also must be the other. The mind may give the scholastic view a place among its speculative dogmas, but it must either do violence to its philosophy and take, as its practical and living creed, the more common view as derived from the unqualified Scriptural expressions, or its conceptions on these points must be reduced to a perfect blank. It is taught by some, that the Deity has love and hatred, but that they are, in all respects, unlike the human passion. If so, the human can in no respect be taken as a representative or illustration of them, and the common name has no propriety. It can be only a source of unmixed error. We might as well designate by the same word, *magnitude* and *motion*, or any other two ideas, that have no common essence in which, with various differences of quality, modification, and degree, they may be held to unite. If God's love of virtue or hatred of sin is not, in some respects, like those which *we* are called upon to exercise, it is, of course, impossible for us to form,

we will not say a *true*, but, *any* conception in relation to them. Any moral power which the consideration of these attributes may exert in the soul, must necessarily be false in kind, as well as deficient in degree. But what are we to do with many parts of our Bibles, or for what purpose was revelation given to us? Why did the Holy Spirit employ such awful terms as the Hebrew *חַמָּה* and *חַרֹן אַף*, or the Greek *ὀργή*, if the great business of interpreters is to show that they mean nothing which has any correspondence in our own conceptions? When we read of the burning wrath, or "*heat of this great anger*," or of the overflowing loving-kindness and tender mercy, must we ever be on our guard against their literal effect upon the soul, until we have applied the corrective of some scholastic explanation? or will God most assuredly forgive us, if we do mingle with these terms such human conceptions of passion as they seem so naturally designed to produce in the soul?

If this mode of expression and conception is radically defective, the great difficulty is, to explain how the Author of revelation came to employ it. Admitting that any method that could be devised to bring the absolute truth down to our capacities, does, and must; necessarily, fall immensely short of the reality, yet, if the philosophical explanation comes nearer to it, why was it not adopted in the style of the Scriptures? We cannot, in our simplicity, at all understand, why the Spirit which dictated the Bible *for our edification*, should speak less intelligibly on these most important practical points, than Swedenborg, or Prof. Bush, or Dr. Channing. It may be said that when the Scriptures were written, the race was comparatively in its infancy; and that, therefore, the minds of men were not prepared to receive the truth. This is the famous doctrine of accommodation, which is so often brought in for this and other purposes. We could never comprehend it. There seems to be a vague notion, that the individual mind is now born with greater and higher capacities, or that that most undefined thing, the mind of the race, or "*spirit of the age*," has in the course of time ad-

vanced to a higher manhood ; so that, certain teachings respecting sin and God's relation to it, which would have been utterly unintelligible to the Jew or the ancient Greek, are now capable of being received by the common mind of the common mass. All who indulge in this language, are very careful to avoid telling us what they mean by it ; and, indeed, they would be sadly puzzled, if required to come down from loose rhetoric to clear and precise definition. Surely it cannot be the advance or mere accumulation of physical science, and physical facts, that has made this wonderful difference. The most able advocate of this doctrine of progress, would find it very difficult to show in what way chemistry, or geology, or conchology even, had enabled us to form better notions of those states of the Divine mind, that correspond to human passion. There is no light upon the subject to be derived from the ancient philosophy.* If it be maintained, that this advance and superior position of the human mind has been a consequence of the promulgation of these very views, it is certainly a very vicious and circular mode of reasoning ; because, in the absence of that antecedent preparation from other sources, for which we in vain demand the proof, it seems to imply, that a previous comprehension of certain

* There are some speculations of Cicero, (we think in his *Tusculan Disputations*,) that are very similar to the modern theology to which we have alluded. Something of the same kind may be found in Aristotle's metaphysical disquisition respecting his *κίνητος σκόλα*, or *Unmoving and Immoveable Mover*. (*Metaph. Lib. xi. 7.*) Plato also says, (*δοξαρον εἶναι*,) that it is unbecoming for the Deity, either to rejoice or the contrary—(*χαίρειν ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον*. *Phileb. pa. 33, B*). In fact some abstract notion of this sort has been indulged in by speculative intellects, in all ages of the world, from the earliest Egyptian or Hindoo philosophy, down to Spinoza and Hegel ; but what Christian heart could ever think of exchanging, for this cold transcendentalism, the warm and glowing language of the Spirit, as uttered by God's inspired Prophets and Apostles ? Besides, if these examples prove any thing, they only show, that in this department of knowledge, there has really been no such great progress made, and that notwithstanding all the assumptions of many modern theologians, the ancient philosophical world was as fully prepared for these lofty hyper-scriptural views, as those are, by whom the style and *prima facie* teachings of Revelation are discovered to be so much behind the science of the age.

truths is a necessary preparation for this very comprehension itself. If the human soul is capable of receiving them without such previous preparation, no reason whatever can be assigned, why revelation had not at first assumed an aspect, not merely so much more philosophical, but also so much nearer the truth.

Why could not Abraham, and Moses, and Job, and David, and Solomon, and Isaiah, and John the Baptist, and Paul of Tarsus, have received these more transcendent views, if they really are more in accordance with the absolute verity than those which were actually given? They had, it is true, little or nothing of physical science; but what has that to do with the matter? They were men of comparatively pure and elevated minds, they were contemplative men, they thought much and intently of God, they conversed constantly with Him, they were men of prayer, they must have had all that clearness of the *intellectual* nature, which results from the purity, and simplicity, and single-mindedness of the *moral*—a condition more favourable to the acquisition of correct and elevated views of religious truth, than any amount of what is generally termed science. Their writings, and the records left of them, clearly show that they were capable of the most lofty ideas of God. Could it be that he who said, *The Judge of all the earth must do right*; or he to whom The Almighty revealed himself as the I AM; or he who declared, *The Heaven and Heaven of Heavens cannot contain thee*; or he who said, *Thou art of purer eyes than to behold iniquity*; or he who in awe of the unfathomable mystery of the Divine Nature exclaimed, *Who can by searching find out God?—It is higher than the Heavens, what canst thou do, it is deeper than Sheol, what canst thou know?* or he who said, *In thy light shall we see light—Whom have I in Heaven but thee, and there is none in all the earth I desire beside thee*; or he who heard the Seraphim crying, *Holy! Holy! Holy!* and who declares that, *As the Heavens are high above the earth, so are God's ways above our ways, and his thoughts above our thoughts*;—could it be, we ask, that such as these were incapable of

having revealed to them those elevated views of the Divine Nature and attributes, for which, it is said, even the common mind in the present advanced age of the world is prepared?

We say we do not understand this favourite doctrine of accommodation. God has undoubtedly, in some respects, made revelation progressive, but it must have been for a different reason, and on a different principle from that which is commonly assigned. Besides, we have the same difficulty with the New Testament. The same style, in reference to this subject, is there adopted as in the Old; and yet, can any mind pretend, that through him who had been caught up to the third Heavens and heard ineffable things, God might not have communicated to the philosophers of Athens, to the acute Stoic, to the spiritualizing and idealizing Platonists, those transcendent views, which, it is maintained, have been reserved for times subsequent to the closing of the canon of Revelation?

The only sound conclusion is, that God chose the method he has employed in the Scriptures, not by way of accommodation for one age, but because it was the very best for all ages. Although it might not perfectly convey what is in its highest sense incommunicable to the human mind, still, it was that which, of all others comprehensible at all by us, comes the nearest to the truth, and which, therefore, it is not safe for us to gloss, improve upon, or in any way depart from. But, say some, this would require us to take literally all the language of the Scriptures, and to believe that God has hands, and eyes, and a human form. No other reply to this is needed, than that which is furnished immediately by the common sense. No one is, or ever has been, in danger of mistaking such plainly figurative language. The merest child, the youngest scholar in the Sabbath school, understands it. It was designed, not as a necessary accommodation to necessary error, but for the same purpose for which it is proper, and will be proper in all ages, viz., to give vividness and strength to language. No doubt figurative expressions are used in the representation of passion; but is the passion itself figurative

or unreal? If so, the figure, instead of giving vividness to truth, only imparts strength to error. We may well doubt, if even anthropomorphism would be a less venial error in the sight of God, than those refinements which destroy the moral power of some of the most solemn declarations of the Bible.

The conclusion then to which we come is this: Admitting that the *real* doctrine on the subject is ineffable, and transcending all finite comprehension, yet he who humbly trusts the method of the Scriptures, and, without any farther questioning or attempts at improvement, acts upon the belief that God truly *loves* the righteous and is *angry* with the sinner, and that his just wrath towards him is appeased by the expiatory sufferings of His own Divine Eternal Son—such an one, we say, is nearer to the ineffable truth, and has less of unavoidable error, than the man who adopts what he may be led to regard as the more philosophical conception. To one who studies the Bible with the most devotion, the strong and impassioned declarations to which we refer, instead of seeming to be imperfections, even necessary imperfections, in the Divine book, are the very parts, which, of all others, he would be least willing to lose. *In a little wrath hid I my face from thee for a moment, but with everlasting loving-kindness will I have compassion upon thee, saith the Lord thy Redeemer.—The God who is of old is thy dwelling place, and underneath are the Everlasting Arms.* Who that has any hope or feeling of a redeemed Christian, would exchange this style for any pantheistic expression of transcendental benevolence, or any Swedenborgian mysticism, or any philosophical rhapsody on the ubiquity of the Divine Providence?

But to return from this apparent digression on a subject which is so intimately connected with that of the book before us,—we would say, in conclusion, that we have been occupied more with a general discussion of the subject of the work, than with any examination of its merits in a critical point of view. There are exceptions which we might take to a good many passages. We cannot at all agree with the author's extreme view respecting the death of Christ. It seems suf-

scient, even on his own theory, to regard the Divine Person as actually suffering the agonies which attended the separation of the human soul from the body, without regarding him as laying down his Divine life. We were disposed, at first, to find fault with the style as too rhetorical and impassioned, but, on a reconsideration, are led to regard it as best adapted to the design which the writer proposes to himself,—namely, to arouse attention to a most important and practical yet neglected doctrine, and, at the same time, “to exalt and magnify the great atonement.” (Preface v.) With this end in view, we cannot help regarding it as a most timely and valuable production. Our American Church greatly needs works of this kind to arouse it from its semi-Nestorian lethargy. Whatever may be the true view, it can hardly be doubted, that in any aspect of the doctrine, we make far too little of the *passion* of the Divine Redeemer. The universal doctrine of the Church in all ages, that the Eternal Son of God did truly suffer, seems almost to have dropped out of our Theology, and out of our pulpits. Justification by Faith is preached, but, to a great extent, as a scholastic disquisition on the nature of faith, and the design of the atonement, whilst there is kept out of view that which is the very life of the doctrine, and which gives it all its dread importance. In many churches even this has been abandoned, and a mode of preaching introduced, which belongs as much to some systems of natural religion as to Christianity. Instead of its awful *peculiarity*—the propitiatory sufferings of the God-man, and the utter annihilation, when viewed in reference to it, of all human works, and of every other hope of salvation—there is the philosophy of the change of the governing purpose, the duty of submitting to God, of yielding up the heart, of seeking the truest happiness, and of resolving to serve the Lord. The religious experience, which is the result, has partaken of the same character. We do not wish to judge harshly, but it may with truth be said that one prominent characteristic of such preaching and such experience, is the practical absence of the doctrine of a Divine, agonizing Redeemer.

It is in the intense contemplation of this central truth, of this *peculiarity* of Christianity, that the soul forgets all else beside, forgets its wretched works, its fancied righteousness, its resolutions of reform, forgets itself, forgets even its sins, whilst it thinks only of Him, and is filled with Him, who, instead of the ineffable joy that was set before him, (*ἀντὶ τῆς χαρᾶς*, Heb. 12 : 2,) endured the cross, discharged our heavy debt, and washed our souls in his own most precious blood.

ARTICLE II.

REMARKS, EXEGETICAL AND PRACTICAL, ON THE BOOK OF ECCLESIASTES.

By Professor ENOCH POND, D. D.

The Title of the Book.

THE word עֲבֵדָה primarily signifies one who calls or assembles a multitude together; and secondarily, one who addresses them, when so assembled. Accordingly, in the Septuagint, it is rendered *Εκκλησιαστής*, *Preacher*. Our English translators have retained the Greek word, *Ecclesiastes*, as the title of the book, while in the book itself they constantly translate this word, and render it *Preacher*. The book might very well have been denominated *the Preacher*; or more properly, perhaps, a *preachment*, a *discourse*. It is a discourse, which may have been delivered, originally, to an assembled multitude of the Israelites, and was then recorded, under a Divine inspiration, to be read in their assemblies, and in the church of God, from that period to the end of the world.

The Author of the Book.

I agree with the Rabbins, with the ancient Christian fathers, and with almost the entire body of commentators, in

regarding Solomon as the author of this book. Indeed, I see not how this opinion should ever have been called in question. The author has much to say of himself, in different parts of the book, which can agree to no other man but Solomon. Thus, in the first chapter he says, "The words of the Preacher, the son of David, king of Jerusalem." "I, the Preacher, was king over Israel in Jerusalem." But none of the sons of David, except Solomon, ever "was king over Israel in Jerusalem."

Again, Solomon is represented, in the sacred history, as a man of consummate wisdom. "I have given thee a wise and an understanding heart, so that there was none like thee before thee, neither after thee shall any arise like unto thee." 1 Kings 3: 12. So the writer of this book says of himself, "I have gotten more wisdom than all they that have been before me in Jerusalem; yea, my heart had great experience of wisdom and knowledge." Chap. 1: 16.

Solomon is further represented by the sacred historian, as excelling all the Israelitish kings, in the grandeur of his buildings, the number of his servants, the splendour of his equipage, and the multitude of his possessions. Besides the magnificent temple which he erected in honour and for the worship of God, he prepared superb palaces for himself and his household, and increased in riches, till silver came to be as stones in the streets of Jerusalem. 1 Kings 10: 21, 27. Hear now the writer of the book before us describing his buildings, his possessions, and his wealth. "I made me great works; I builded me houses; I planted me vineyards; I made me gardens and orchards, and I planted trees in them of all kinds of fruit. I made me pools of water, to water therewith the wood that bringeth forth trees. I got me servants and maidens, and had servants born in my house. Also I had great possessions of great and small cattle, above all that were in Jerusalem before me. I gathered me also silver and gold, and the peculiar treasure of kings and of the provinces. I gat me men-singers and women-singers, and the delights of the sons of men; as musical instruments, and that of all sorts. So I was great, and increased more than all that were

before me in Jerusalem ; also my wisdom remained with me." Chap. 2: 4-9. Surely, no one acquainted with the history of Solomon can doubt that these words apply specifically to him, and in many particulars to no one else.

It is further recorded of Solomon, that he had *many wives*, strange wives, wicked wives, who proved a snare to him, and turned him aside from following the Lord. 1 Kings 11: 3, 4. And the writer of this book declares, "I find more bitter than death the woman whose heart is snares and nets, and her hands as bands." "One man among a thousand have I found ; but a woman among all those have I not found." Chap. 7: 26, 28.

It is said of Solomon, that he wrote *many proverbs*. He was undoubtedly the author of the book of Proverbs, or of the greater part of it. We are told in the first book of the Kings (chap. 4: 32) that "he spake three thousand proverbs." So it is said in Ecclesiastes, "Because the Preacher was wise, he still taught the people knowledge ; yea, he gave good heed, and sought out and set in order many proverbs." Chap. 12: 9.

These coincidences are enough to prove, as conclusively as evidence of this nature can prove any thing, that the book of Ecclesiastes must have been written by Solomon. The account which the writer, in various places, gives of himself was true of Solomon, and of no one else. Nor is it of any weight to allege, in opposition to this, that the book, in the original, contains some words not purely Hebrew ; words of foreign extraction. When we consider the extended commercial relations of Solomon, and the intercourse which he maintained, in many ways, with the surrounding nations, it is not at all strange that he became familiar with outlandish words. Nor is it strange that he should occasionally use such words, in a composition like that before us.

The Time when the Book was written.

The book of Ecclesiastes was not only written by Solomon, but seems to have been written by him *late in life*,

when he had run the round of worldliness and pleasure, and found it empty and vain. In this opinion, like the last, I am supported by the Rabbins, by the great body of Christian commentators, and (what is of more consequence) by evidence drawn from the book itself. Much of the language of the book is manifestly the language of years—of long continued observation and experience. It is such as could not have been uttered, with any reason or propriety, by one in youth. Witness one of the passages already quoted, in which the writer speaks of the great things which he *had done*;—things which could only have been accomplished in a course of years. “I made me great works; builded me houses; planted me vineyards; made me gardens and orchards, and pools of water to water the same. I got me servants and maidens, and had servants born in my house.” To be able to say all this, and much more of the same sort, the writer must have lived a considerable time.*

“I have seen all the works that are done under the sun, and behold all is vanity and vexation of spirit.” “All this have I seen; and I applied my heart unto every work that is done under the sun.” “I hated all my labour which I had taken under the sun; because I should leave it unto the man that shall be after me; and who knoweth whether he shall be a wise man or a fool? Yet shall he have rule over all my labour wherein I have laboured, and wherein I have showed myself wise under the sun. This also is vanity.” In these verses, as in many others which might be quoted, the writer speaks as a youth could not speak. His language is that of a man in years.

I may refer also to the description of the pains and infirmities of age, recorded in the last chapter of the book. This description, which is as graphic as it is true, proclaims the writer to have been an old man. He speaks here, as in other

* In the verses above quoted, Solomon speaks of having builded him *houses*. But we are told, in 1 Kings 9: 10, that the house of the Lord and the king's house were not completed, until after Solomon had reigned *twenty years*.

places, from his own experience. With him, the period had arrived, when "the grasshopper was a burthen," and "desire failed." The years had come of which he was constrained to say, "I have no pleasure in them."

The Plan, Subject, Design, and Interpretation of the Book.

Thus far, in remarking upon the book before us, I have pursued the track of the most approved commentators. Indeed, no intelligent, unprejudiced student can well pursue any other. But here our guides become discordant. As to the plan, the method, the subject, and object of the book, they disagree among themselves.

One tells us that the book, or a considerable part of it, is of a *dramatical* character. There are several speakers, giving utterance each to his own opinions. But who these speakers are, or where they are introduced—where the drama (if it be one) begins or ends, no one can tell. The whole book has the appearance of having been uttered by one speaker. The Preacher, the author of it, is one.

Some think that we have here a regular, methodical, didactic discourse, respecting the highest good of man; showing in what it does not consist, and in what it does. And they go so far as to point out the different parts of the discourse; the introduction, the divisions, the topics of argument, the peroration, etc. But to common minds, these different sections of the book are not obvious. Indeed, it is not likely that the royal preacher aimed to prepare his discourse methodically, at least, in the modern acceptation of the term.

It has been proved already, that the author of this book was Solomon, and that it was written by him when he was an old man. In the course of his life, Solomon had mingled largely with the world. He had amassed its riches, he had possessed its honours, he had pursued and enjoyed its pleasures to the full; and when he had run the whole giddy round, and made a complete experiment, he sits down, under

a Divine inspiration, to record the result. And he does it in the most emphatic terms—terms which lie at the basis, and constitute the motto, the text of the entire discourse: “Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher; vanity of vanities, all is vanity.”

And as it was experience which led Solomon to the choice of his text, so the greater part of the discourse is to be regarded as *a relation of his own personal experience*. At least, this is the idea which, as it seems to me, we are to carry with us through the entire book, if we would rightly understand it. We are to regard it as proceeding from Solomon the aged; and to be, in great measure, an account of the workings of his own mind—a narrative of what he had seen, thought and felt, purposed and accomplished, during his eventful life, and of the conclusions to which he was solemnly brought at the close of it. Mingled with the narrative, there would be, we might expect, many wise suggestions and counsels; and so, in fact, we find them. Here are striking analogies, weighty instructions, solemn warnings, pungent reproofs; but the leading idea running through the whole, is that of experience. Carrying this idea along with us, it will not be hard to understand those parts of the book, which have been regarded as most difficult of interpretation.

In studying the experience of Solomon, it must be kept in mind that he was a pious man, in his youth. No one can doubt this, who has ever read his prayers, at the time of his inauguration, and at the dedication of the temple, and who remembers the glorious answers with which his supplications, on both these great occasions, were crowned. And not only was Solomon pious at the commencement of his reign, but his life was in a good degree consistent and faithful for many years. It was not till the eleventh year of his reign that the temple was dedicated, at which time he offered that memorable dedicatory prayer; and it was several years subsequent to this, that “the Lord appeared to him the second time,” and renewed his gracious promises on condition of continued fidelity, while at the same time he severely threatened him, in

case he declined: 1 Kings 6: 38. 9: 1, 10. It may be said of Solomon, therefore—we *hope* it may—that during the greater part of his reign, he walked in the ways of David his father.

But it could hardly be expected of a good man, who plunged so deeply into the world, who drank so largely of the Circean cup, that he should escape unharmed. In the earnest pursuit of knowledge and of wealth; in the possession of increased and increasing honours; in the indulgence, to satiety, of sensual pleasures, and some of them forbidden pleasures; his heart became engrossed, his conscience blunted, and his affections were drawn away from God. His unworthy female associates, his wives and concubines, had a powerful influence in this direction. In the simple but expressive language of Scripture, “when Solomon *was old*, his wives turned away his heart after other gods.” How long he continued in this state of declension, we do not know. As he was advanced in life when it commenced, and as he was undoubtedly recovered from it before he died, we may hope that it did not continue many years. And while it did continue, Solomon was not as one who had never known and loved the Lord. “His wisdom,” we are told, “remained with him.” He had desires, endeavours, struggles, conflicts, monitions of conscience, and strivings of the Spirit, such as are known only to the child of God. The workings of his great mind, at this melancholy period, must have been very peculiar, and very instructive; and to record these, for the benefit of others, seems to have been a principal object with him, in writing the book of Ecclesiastes.

To discover the *summum bonum*, the chief good of man, had long been a problem with the wise men of the East. Toward this much mooted question, the mind of Solomon seems to have been powerfully directed. He sought to “discover what is *that good* for the sons of men which they should do under the heaven, all the days of their life.” Chap. 2: 3. The method which he took, in pursuing this inquiry, was not one of philosophical speculation, but of in-

duction, of fact. As he had abundant means for making the experiment, he determined to test it in his own personal experience. And so we find him (according to his own account of the matter, as recorded in the book before us) turning this way and that, chasing first this phantom and then that, and pronouncing one after another to be "vanity and vexation of spirit."

"I said in my heart, Go to now, I will prove thee with *mirth*; therefore enjoy pleasure. And behold, this also is vanity." Chap. 2: 1.

Again, "I sought in my heart to give myself unto *wine*, and to lay hold on *folly*. I made me great works; I builded me houses; I planted me vineyards," etc. "And whatsoever mine eyes desired, I kept not from them. I withheld not my heart from any joy. Then I looked on all the works that my hands had wrought, and on all the labour that I had laboured to do; and behold, *all was vanity and vexation of spirit, and there was no profit under the sun.*" Chap. 2: 3-11.

Still another experiment Solomon tells us of. "I applied mine heart to know, and to search, and to seek out wisdom, and the reason of things, and to know *the wickedness of folly, even of foolishness and madness.* And I find more bitter than death the woman whose heart is snares and nets, and her hands as bands. Behold, this have I found, saith the Preacher, counting one by one, to find out the account: one man among a thousand have I found; but a woman among all those have I not found."* Chap. 7: 25-28.

In describing the workings of his mind, amid his various experiments and observations, Solomon tells us of the *vain and sinful thoughts*, which he occasionally indulged. At one time he said in his heart, "As it happeneth to the fool, so it happeneth even to me; and why was I then more wise? This also is vanity." Again, he said, "There is

* Solomon's harem of outlandish women was no place to look for a virtuous wife, a confiding and faithful bosom companion.

nothing better for a man than that he should eat and drink, and that he should make his soul enjoy good in his labor." Chap. 2: 15, 24.

When he "considered all the oppressions that are done under the sun, and the tears of such as were oppressed, and they had no comforter," then, says he, "I praised the dead which are already dead more than the living which are yet alive." Chap. 4: 1, 2.

"All things have I seen in the days of my vanity. There is a just man that perisheth in his righteousness; and there is a wicked man that longeth his life in his wickedness." In view of instances of this sort, Solomon gave way to reflections such as these: "Be not righteous overmuch, neither make thyself overwise. Why shouldst thou destroy thyself? Be not overmuch wicked, neither be thou foolish. Why shouldst thou die before thy time?" Chap. 7: 15-17.

Again, when Solomon saw that "there be just men, unto whom it happeneth according to the work of the wicked, and that there be wicked men, to whom it happeneth according to the work of the righteous; then," says he, "I commended *mirth*; because a man hath no better thing under the sun, than to eat, and drink, and to be merry; for that shall abide with him of his labour, all the days of his life, which God giveth him under the sun." Chap. 8: 14, 15.

On one occasion, Solomon expresses the following strange opinions: "All things come alike to all. There is one event to the righteous and to the wicked; to the good, to the clean, and to the unclean; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not. As is the good, so is the sinner; and he that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath." Chap. 9: 2. At another time, he was so much beside himself as to believe and say, "That which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them. As the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that man hath no pre-eminence above a beast. All go unto one place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again." Chap. 3: 19, 20.

I have presented these extracts from the book under consideration, to illustrate what was before said, as to the nature and design of the discourse. We have here Solomon speaking in the language of *experience*. He is narrating the operations of his own mind, his thoughts, feelings, reflections, purposes, at different periods of his life, and more especially during the melancholy season of his religious declension. And if it be thought strange that a good man should ever have such thoughts—thoughts better becoming an Epicure or Atheist, than a wise and pious Israelite—and more especially that he should record them, in narrating his experience; I have only to reply, that other good men have done the same, and done it almost in our own times. The following is from the experience of the pious John Bunyan, as related by himself: “Whole floods of blasphemies against both God, and Christ, and the Scriptures, were poured upon my spirit, to my great confusion and astonishment. These blasphemous thoughts were such as stirred up questions in me against the very being of God, and of his beloved Son; as whether there were, in truth, a God, or Christ; and whether the holy Scriptures were not rather a cunning story, a fable, than the holy and pure word of God.”*

So the late Dr. Payson, in detailing his exercises, says, “O the temptations that have harassed me for the last three months! I have met with nothing like them in books. I dare not mention them to any mortal, lest they should trouble him, as they have troubled me. But if I should become an apostate, and write against religion, it seems to me that I could bring forward objections which would shake the faith of all the Christians in the world. What I marvel at is, that the arch-deceiver has never been permitted to suggest them to some of his own scribes, and have them published. They would, if I mistake not, make fearful work with Christians for a time, though God would doubtless enable them to overcome

* Ivimey's Life of Bunyan, p. 64.

in the end." Again, Payson says, "My difficulties increase every year. All the atheistical, deistical, and heretical objections which I meet with in books are childish babblings, compared with those which Satan suggests, and which he urges upon the mind with a force which seems irresistible. Yet I am often obliged to write sermons, and to preach, when these objections beat upon me like a whirlwind, and almost distract me."*

If it be said that the expressions here quoted are but occasional, in the private writings of Christians, and are manifestly contrary to the general sentiment of their minds, and feeling of their hearts, I admit it. And the same was true of Solomon. The infidel expressions quoted from him are but occasional with him, and were doubtless forced upon him, by the suggestions of Satan and of his evil heart, during the dark period of his wandering from God. Mingled up with these, not only in the same book, but often in the same chapter, are noble sentiments—excellent moral precepts—lessons of Divine and heavenly wisdom; and if it be asked, how we are to distinguish the good from the bad, the true from the false; I answer, just as we should do, in any other case. We are to refer to the standard of an enlightened reason and conscience; and more especially to the unerring standard of the Bible, taken as a whole. We are to be guided, in such cases, by the general current of Scripture; or by what has been denominated the analogy of faith. How are we to distinguish, in the writings of Bunyan and Payson, between the important truths of religion, and what may be regarded as the suggestions of Satan? Or, to adduce a case more strictly in point, I may refer to the book of Job. Here are several speakers, frequently uttering contradictory sentiments, all of which cannot be true; and how are we to distinguish between what is true, and what not? He who can answer

* *Memoirs of Payson*, p. 434. Similar expressions may be found in the recorded exercises of Richard Baxter, of Increase and Cotton Mather, and of other excellent Christians.

this question, can tell us how to make a similar distinction in the book of Ecclesiastes. In both cases, as I said, we are to be guided by an enlightened understanding and conscience, and by the general current of Scripture testimony, in reference to the same subjects. We have no right so to interpret any single passage, as to contradict the general current of Scripture. And we have no occasion in the books referred to, to do violence to any particular passages, in order to make them harmonize with the rest of Scripture. Job's three friends, and perhaps Job himself, in connexion with much that was true and important, gave utterance to improper things; things which are not to be approved or justified. And so did Abraham, when he denied his wife. So did Jacob, when he deceived his father, and secured his blessing by artifice and falsehood. So did Peter, when he dissembled at Antioch, and Paul withstood him to his face. And so did Solomon, during the dark period of his worldliness and declension. He had many vain, sinful, improper thoughts. He formed sinful purposes, and sometimes carried them into execution. And in the book of Ecclesiastes, he has confessed all this; has told of the pain which his errors and wanderings occasioned him; and has faithfully warned all those who come to a knowledge of his case, not to follow in his steps.

There is hardly a more important distinction, in reference to the Bible, than that between *revelation* and *inspiration*. Revelation is a direct and supernatural communication of truth from God to man. Inspiration has respect to the assistance which the writers received in penning the sacred volume. We can conceive of God's making revelations to men, which have never been committed to writing at all; or if written, may have been recorded without special inspiration. On the other hand, the Bible contains many things, written under a Divine inspiration, which cannot be regarded as the revealed truth of God. For example, the declaration of the serpent to our first mother, "Ye shall not surely die," was written under a Divine inspiration; but so far from being revealed truth, it was the first and greatest lie that was ever

propagated in the earth. So in the Bible we have, often, the speeches of wicked men; as that of Korah and his company against Moses; and that of the orator who impleaded Paul. These have been faithfully recorded by the pen of inspiration; still, they are no part of the truth of God, but the malicious murmurings and calumnies of his enemies. The books of Job and of Ecclesiastes were written, throughout, under a Divine inspiration; yet they both contain passages which, considered separately, are not the truth of God. The former contains the unfounded accusations and reproaches of Job's three friends; the latter, Solomon's account, faithfully drawn up—penned under the inspiration of the Almighty—of the vain and sinful thoughts which he harbored and expressed, during the period of his wandering from God. These expressions are not to be quoted or referred to, as revealed truth. Nor should Christians undertake, by dint of explanation, to make them harmonize with other parts of the Bible. They were written for our warning, and not for our direct instruction and belief. They were designed to show us the depths to which a good man may fall, and excite us to watchfulness against similar temptations and dangers. Let them be used for the purpose for which they were written, and not be perverted to another purpose, and they will then be profitable, as all Scripture is, "for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness."

I have said that the book of Ecclesiastes—in connexion with the writer's account of his own experience—contains excellent lessons of practical wisdom. I may go farther and say, that we have in this book clear and frequent expressions of Divine and holy *truth*. We have here set before us, not only the vanity and emptiness of the world, but the being, the perfections, the sovereignty and providence of God. We are impressively taught the great evil of sin. We are further taught the immortality of the human spirit, which, when the dust returns to the earth as it was, is said to return to God who gave it. We also learn the certainty of a coming judgment, and of a future and righteous retribution. "Know thou, that

for all these things *God will bring thee into judgment.*" "God shall bring every work into *judgment*, with every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil."

I have before remarked, that the grand topic of inquiry with Solomon, as with many other Eastern sages, seems to have been, *What is the chief good of man? In what does his highest happiness consist?* It was to solve this inquiry, that Solomon plunged into the world, and tried one foolish experiment after another—all which proved in the end to be but "vanity and vexation of spirit." But he does not leave the subject thus. He does not dismiss it, until the great problem is satisfactorily solved. "Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter: Fear God, and keep his commandments; for *this is the whole duty of man.*" Certainly no discourse ever ended better than this. No preacher ever brought his remarks to a nobler and more impressive conclusion. Here is, indeed, the chief good of man—sought with long earnestness, and with many and painful disappointments, but found at last, and sounded forth in the most solemn accents to the world: **FEAR GOD, AND KEEP HIS COMMANDMENTS; FOR THIS IS THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN.** This single sentence, if Solomon had written no more at the close of life, had been enough to retrieve his character, and vindicate his claim to that wisdom and piety, for which his earlier years were so much distinguished.

But this leads to another remark. The book before us satisfactorily proves, that Solomon was not "a cast-away." He did not "fall from grace," according to the usual acceptance of that term, and relapse into a state of utter apostacy; but merely declined from the path of duty, wandered, for a time, from the right way of the Lord; and on repentance and reformation, was at length restored. Of his repentance and recovery, the book of Ecclesiastes furnishes, to my mind, conclusive proof. And here I do not so much rely upon particular passages, as upon *the general strain of the book.* We know the temptations which beset and overcame Solomon. We know the courses of worldliness and sensuality

upon which he entered, and which proved the occasion of his fall. And now, in the book before us, he makes full and honourable confession of all this. He tells us that he did enter upon these forbidden courses, and *why* he entered upon them; and how they proved to him a "vexation of spirit"—a source of anguish "more bitter than death." He goes into particulars on this painful subject; palliating nothing, concealing nothing, and disclosing the humiliating and terrible results to which he successively came. "I gave my heart to know *madness* and *folly*. I perceived that this also is vexation of spirit."—"I said in my heart, Go to now, I will prove thee with *mirth*; therefore enjoy *pleasure*." But "I said of laughter, It is mad; and of mirth, What doeth it?"—Again, "I sought in my heart to give myself unto *wine*, and to lay hold on *folly*." And "I *hated* life, because the work that is done under the sun is grievous unto me; for all is vanity and vexation of spirit. Yea, I hated all my labour which I had taken under the sun."

The phraseology of Solomon's confessions, like that of his proverbs, is somewhat peculiar. It lacks the poetical, pastoral imagery of the Psalms, and is of rather a mystical, philosophical character. The fool, with Solomon, is a wicked man; and madness and folly are equivalent to transgression and sin. When he tells us, therefore, that he "gave his heart to know madness and folly," and "to lay hold on folly;" this is a public and solemn *confession of his guilt*. The phrase, "vexation of spirit," so often recurring throughout the book, is also one of peculiar intensity. It imports, according to the literal sense of the original, *contrition* of spirit, a *breaking of the heart*. The book of Ecclesiastes, therefore, or a considerable part of it, is to be regarded in much the same light as the penitential Psalms of David. It is a relation, from the lips of Solomon himself, of his own distressing experience, in wandering away from God. It is a public acknowledgment of his sin and guilt. And I can hardly conceive of a more interesting spectacle than to see this great and good man—this wisest of ancient kings—as-

sembling his courtiers and his people around him, near the close of life, to tell them of his mistakes and errors, and of the pain which the recollection of these things occasioned him; to make confession before them of his sins, and warn them against following in the same forbidden paths;—taking occasion, at the same time, to utter the most weighty counsels; to publish the most solemn truths; and to lead forward the minds of all, whether young or old, saints or sinners, to the grand conclusion: “*Fear God, and keep his commandments; for this is the whole duty of man.*”

Practical Lessons for the Aged.

The example of Solomon, as presented in the book of Ecclesiastes, is an instructive one to all those who—like him, at the period when the book was written—are advanced in years. We here find Solomon instituting a *severe and solemn review of his past life*. He calls to mind the thoughts he had indulged, the designs he had formed, the scenes he had witnessed, the works he had undertaken and accomplished, and the results of wisdom to which he had been led. And thus it becomes every aged person often to do. Every man's history should be an interesting and instructive one, at least to himself. And whether it be a written history or not, it should be a well-remembered history. It should be an oft and solemnly reviewed history. The history of every person living is soon to be reviewed, in the clear light of an eternal scene. “God will bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil.” In anticipation of that scene, it becomes us oft to look back upon our past course of life, review the ground we have been over, and see to it that we are ready to give up our account with joy.

We find Solomon not only reviewing his past life, but *making confession of his past errors and sins*. Let his example, in this respect, be imitated by the aged universally. No person, who has lived long in the world, can look back

upon his past course of thought and feeling, conversation and pursuit, but with emotions of sorrow. However his character may have appeared to other eyes, to his own it seems exceedingly defective. At best, it is shaded with many dark spots. It cannot be seriously contemplated without "vexation of spirit." In these circumstances, what is the man of years to do? Shall he shut his eyes upon the truth, turn away from the dark spectacle, try to forget his sins, and then flatter himself that they do not exist? This did not Solomon; and this should no person, in like circumstances, dare to attempt. "He that covereth his sins shall not prosper; but whoso confesseth and forsaketh them shall find mercy." Solomon confessed his sins. We trust that he forsook them, and found mercy. And every sinner, whether young or old, should do the same. He should search out his sins, and come to the knowledge of them. And when he has found them, let him bring them out singly and collectively, and slay them before the Lord. Let him humbly and penitently confess them before God, and if they have been of a nature to injure his fellow-men, they should be confessed before them also. This work may be painful to the aged sinner, but it will be honourable to him. It is the only way in which to retrieve and establish his character among men. It is the only way in which to prepare for the just judgment of God, and for the retributions of eternity.

Again; Solomon, when old and about to leave the world, seems to have had his thoughts much upon *death and eternal things*. Aware that "the silver cord must soon be loosed, and the golden bowl broken, and the pitcher be broken at the fountain, and the wheel broken at the cistern"—that he must shortly "go to his long home, and the mourners go about the streets," his thoughts seem to have dwelt upon these solemn subjects. He revolved them often in his mind, viewed them in different attitudes and lights, and spoke of them in that variety of impressive imagery which has just been quoted. In this respect, his example is worthy of all imitation, especially by those who are advanced in years.

The young may die soon ; the aged must. With them, the stage of life is almost run. The time of their departure is at hand. And what can be more appropriate for them, than to "walk *thoughtful* on the silent, solemn shore of that vast ocean they must sail so soon?" They should make themselves familiar with the scenes and the subject of death. They should "say to corruption, thou art our father ; and to the worm, thou art our sister and mother." Let them dwell on these subjects till they lose their terror, and can be contemplated rather with satisfaction than with dread.

Still again, we find Solomon, when about to close his earthly pilgrimage, diligently employed in *giving instruction to those who should come after him*. . Here is another point in which the aged generally may profit by his example. It has been well said, "Days should speak, and multitude of years should teach wisdom." Those who have lived long in the world, and have had much experience, and many opportunities for reading and hearing, for observation and reflection, may be supposed to be wiser than those in younger life. They *ought* to be wiser. Every old person has passed through scenes, and received impressions, and learned lessons peculiar to himself ; and these lessons he should feel under obligations to impart, for the benefit of others. He should warn them of the dangers to which *he* sees them exposed, but of which they, in their ignorance, may be insensible. He should tell them of his own mistakes and errors, that they may profit by his example. Especially should he caution them against negligence and delay, in preparing for the scenes and retributions of eternity. Let him say to one and all, in the impressive language of the book before us, "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might ; for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave whither thou goest."

Practical Lessons for the Young.

The Book of Ecclesiastes contains important lessons not only for the aged, but for the young. Like every wise man,

Solomon felt a peculiar solicitude for the young. He knew the importance of the rising generation. He saw them growing up to take the places of their fathers—saw all those institutions which he so much valued destined to pass shortly into their hands, and he could not but feel a deep interest in their welfare. He could not refrain imparting to them his dying counsels. He warned the youth of his own age, and through them of every succeeding age, that their sun would not always be bright; that it might soon be overshadowed; and that it became them, in the season of hope and promise, to prepare for “the days of darkness, for they would be many.” “Remember now thy Creator in the days of thy youth, while the evil days come not, nor the years draw nigh, in which thou shalt say, I have no pleasure in them.” “Remove sorrow from thy heart, and put away evil from thy flesh, for childhood and youth are vanity.”

Not only in this book, but in the Proverbs, Solomon every where manifests the deepest solicitude for the right instruction and welfare of the young. “Hear, ye children, the instruction of a father, and attend to know understanding. *Wisdom* is the principal thing; therefore *get wisdom*. Exalt her, and she shall promote thee; she shall bring thee to honour when thou dost embrace her. She shall be to thine head an ornament of grace; a crown of glory shall she deliver unto thee.”

But after all his earnestness for the happiness of the young, and all the counsels which he had imparted for their benefit, Solomon had too much knowledge of human nature not to apprehend that many among them would slight his warnings, and persist in wickedness. He knew how characteristic it was of thoughtless, inconsiderate youth, to affect liberty and independence; to be impatient of restraint; to walk in the ways of their heart, and in the sight of their eyes; to insist on doing as they pleased without control. Accordingly he addresses such, near the close of the book before us—among his *last* words, of which we have any knowledge—in a strain of dreadful irony—more affecting and awful than any mode

of direct address could be—and says, “Rejoice, O young man, in thy youth, and let thy heart cheer thee in the days of thy youth, and walk in the ways of thine heart, and in the sight of thine eyes; but *know thou, that for all these things God will bring thee into judgment.*” As though he had said, ‘You like to have your liberty, and you *may* have it. You like to pursue your own way, and you *shall* :

Taste the delights your souls desire,
And give a loose to all your fire:

but remember one thing: there is to be a *day of judgment*; of solemn, awful, impartial judgment:

God from on high beholds your thoughts;
His book records your secret faults;
The works of darkness you have done
Must all appear before the sun.

For all these things, saith the Preacher, *God will bring you into judgment.*’ It is difficult to see how Solomon could have dealt more faithfully with the young, of all characters, than he did; and if those of his own age did not profit by his counsels, if those of the present age do not profit by them; the fault must be theirs, not his.

Practical Lessons for the People of God.

The case of Solomon, as exhibited in his personal history, and in the book before us, is full of instruction for *the people of God*. Notwithstanding Solomon’s great wisdom, and his early and distinguished piety—notwithstanding his exalted rank, his numberless blessings, the peculiar obligations under which he was laid, and his many and strong inducements to continue faithful with his God; yet he fell. He trusted too much to his own strength. He ventured too far, in the vain search after happiness. His temptation was similar to that of our first parents, who would fain “be as gods, knowing good and evil;” and like them he was overcome by it, and fell un-

der the power of his spiritual enemies. His fall taught *him* important lessons; and it should teach Christians at this day the same. They should learn from it their own weakness and dependence. They should learn the importance of keeping out of harm's way. They should learn to pray with increasing constancy and earnestness, "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil." Cases like that of Solomon should serve deeply to impress Divine counsels and warnings such as these: "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, neither let the mighty man glory in his might, let not the rich man glory in his riches; but let him that glorieth glory in this, that *he understandeth and knoweth me*, that I am the Lord which exercise loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness in the earth." "Let him that thinketh he standeth, take heed lest he fall." Jer. 9: 23, 24. 1 Cor. 10: 12.

Again; the case of Solomon goes to illustrate God's usual method of dealing with his people, when they *do* fall into sin. "If his children forsake my law, and walk not in my judgments; if they break my statutes and keep not my commandments; then will I visit their transgression with a rod, and their iniquity with stripes." God *did* visit Solomon's transgression with a rod, and his iniquity with stripes. His old age was embittered with the most painful regrets, in view of his past backslidings and wanderings. He had deep contrition of heart, and "vexation of spirit," because of his sins. Nor was this all. "The Lord stirred up adversaries unto Solomon, Hadad the Edomite;" and "Rezon the son of Eliadah;" and "Jeroboam the son of Nebat." 1 Kings, chap. 11. His iniquities were also visited upon his children. The greater part of Solomon's splendid kingdom was rent out of the hands of his foolish son, and given to his servant. Also the immense wealth which Solomon had gathered—"the treasures of the house of the Lord, and of the king's house, and the shields of gold which he had made"—all was in a few years scattered, and given into the hands of the proud monarch of Egypt. 1 Kings 14: 26. Verily, it is an evil and bitter thing for God's people to allow themselves in sin. Every

step they take in sin is replete with danger, and is sure to bring them into trouble. If they were not God's people, if they were not in covenant with him, he might leave them, as he does the wicked, to prosper in their pride. He might suffer them to wander away and perish. But God's children *are* in covenant with him. Their Father in heaven hath bound himself by oath and covenant to take care of them; to raise them when they fall; to restore them when they wander; to humble them and keep them humble; and at length to receive them to his heavenly kingdom. And if he can fulfil his covenant toward them in no other way, *he must employ stripes*. He must, and he will inflict the rod. It is time that the people of God understood this matter thoroughly; and as they would avoid his chastening rod, let them avoid those things which make it needful for their covenant God and Father to inflict his chastisements.

Lessons of Warning for the Impenitent and the Worldly.

The Book of Ecclesiastes is an instructive and profitable one for *impenitent sinners*; and for sinners of every description of character. They should here learn, that though they may forget God, he never forgets them. Though they may not be sensible of his presence or his eye, still he is ever with them; his eye follows them in every place; he sees all their ways and counts all their steps; and he "will bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil." "Though a sinner do evil a hundred times, and his days be prolonged; yet surely I know that it shall be well with them that fear God, who fear before him; but it shall not be well with the wicked." No; "*it shall not be well with the wicked.*" Chap. 8: 12, 13.

But no class of the impenitent are so solemnly admonished in the book before us, as the *worldly*—those who love and pursue the present world. Of all men that ever lived, Solomon had the highest advantages for making a full experiment of the world. And he entered upon the experiment with the great-

est earnestness. He tried it, too, in all its forms. If wealth can make any one happy, it should have made him so ; for he possessed it to repletion. He acquired gold, till he hardly knew what to do with it ; and he made silver to be as stones in the streets of Jerusalem. So, if worldly honour can make any mortal happy, it should have had this effect upon Solomon. For he had climbed all its steps, and securely reposed upon its summit. Whatever honour, and power, and the gratification of ambition can do for any man, they had done for him. Or, if worldly and sensual pleasures can confer happiness, then Solomon must have been superlatively happy. For he denied himself no gratification of this sort. He withheld not his heart from any joy. Or if true happiness is to be found in outward splendour and magnificence, or in the successful accomplishment of great undertakings ; then Solomon must have been a happy man. For in respect to these, he excelled all the monarchs of the East. His fame went abroad to distant nations, and kings came together to hear his wisdom, and to see his glory.

Such, then, was the experiment which Solomon actually and personally made. Such was the extent to which he tried, pursued, acquired and possessed the world. It verily seems as though Divine providence prepared the way for him, and brought him forward upon the stage of life, and held him up as an *example* of all that the world can do for man, and of the utmost extent to which it can go, towards making him happy. And now what was the result ? Solomon has recorded it—recorded it in mature old age—truly and faithfully recorded it—recorded it with the pen of inspiration. And what is it ? Lovers of the world of every description, hearken. *What is it ?* “VANITY OF VANITIES, SAITH THE PREACHER ; VANITY OF VANITIES, ALL IS VANITY.” ‘I tried this experiment,’ the Preacher goes on to tell us, ‘and I found it *vanity and vexation of spirit*. I tried that, and I found it *vanity and vexation of spirit*. I tried a third, and it was *vanity and vexation of spirit*, and so it was with them all ; *all was vanity and vexation of spirit*.’

Lovers of the world, is not this enough? Ought not this to satisfy you? Ye, whose hearts are set upon wealth—who make gold your god; do you expect to become richer than Solomon? Yet his wealth failed to satisfy him; and shall yours ever satisfy you? Ye who aspire to fame, and dote upon worldly distinctions and honours; do you expect to attain to higher honours than Solomon? Do you expect to surround yourselves with greater splendour and magnificence? Yet his honours proved a bubble, at the last. Will yours (if you reach them) be any more substantial? And ye votaries of sinful, sexual pleasure, who know no other enjoyments than those of appetite and lust; look at Solomon, and learn a lesson of wisdom from him. Do your means of gratification equal his? Do you expect that they ever *can* equal his? And if his were vanity and vexation of spirit, what have you to hope from yours?

Lovers of the world of every description, learn a lesson of wisdom from the case of Solomon. Profit by the example which has been set before you. Having tried every thing earthly, and found it all vain, Solomon repaired anew to the unfailing Source of good. He came back to the fountain of living waters. To fear God, and keep his commandments, he found to be the whole duty, and the highest and only happiness of man. Let my world-loving, impenitent readers come with him to the same conclusion, and they shall experience the same result. Their oft-cheated, disappointed hearts shall then be satisfied. Their weary souls shall find a rest. They shall begin to realize, in their own experience, the truth of what our Saviour said to the woman of Samaria: "He that drinketh" at the fountains of earth—drink he ever so much—"shall thirst again; but he that drinketh of the water that I shall give him, *shall never thirst*; but the water that I shall give him, shall be within him a well of water springing up into everlasting life."

ARTICLE III.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE AFFECTIONS.

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THOSE discussions in mental science, which have, of late, enriched the pages of our American quarterlies, have done essential service to this interesting study.

It may fairly be submitted, whether the controversy of the elder Edwards, with his Arminian opponents, has not bequeathed to his disciples a phraseology somewhat liable to misconstruction, on the subject of the Will. This would not be surprising, even though no essential error were entertained by him in respect to this faculty. His object was single: his attitude antagonistical. He wished to place in a strong light, the Calvinistic bearings of his subject, and in doing this, was comparatively unmindful of other points, to which it was more remotely affiliated. This is perhaps a uniform feature of controversial writings. But the progress of a century since, has given opportunity to look at the subject of mental science in attitudes and relations, not distinctly recognized by the giant intellect of Edwards, and which has led many to the conviction that he has used forms of speech, in pointing out the connection between *the Will* and the predominant motive, which does not the most accurately describe the intimations of consciousness respecting it.

These extant discussions are having the effect to redeem the doctrine of the Will from any tendencies toward fatalism, and relieving it from the impression of a literal analogy between cause and effect in physics, and motive and volition in the department of mind. They sustain the full responsibility of our acts of will, as reported by consciousness, and place motives in their true position as the *condition* of the mind's voluntary action;—as the intelligent considerations in view of which it originates choice in conscious freedom and accountability; while most readers will doubt whether the advocates

of *contingent action* have succeeded (if that has been their aim) in effacing the conviction that *willing is always* in the direction of the greatest motive.

But the difficult point in the science of mind, is not yet reached by the very distinguished writers who have appeared upon the arena of this discussion. After conceding that, even with the broadest construction of the conscious freedom, sovereignty, and responsibility of the Will, its acts, *in fact*, are in the direction of the leading consideration present to the mind, the inquiry goes back a step, and asks after the doctrine of *motive-influence*. It seeks for the law of the subjective motive. What are the elements of which it is composed? What do we mean by propensity, bias, or native inclination? What by the accustomed habitudes of the spirit, whether derived from Adam, or acquired in any other way? What is the true analysis of that discolouring medium, through which the *objective* motive passes, often, in coming to the Will, and influencing the choice? A psychological solution of this problem would solve also many affiliated difficulties in metaphysics and theology, and go far toward making plain our pathway in the researches of mental science. If the generic classification of the powers of the mind be into the *understanding*, *sensibility*, and *will*, the inquiry would relate to the second item in the enumeration, and its actual states and *affections*; the law of their rise and inhabitation in the soul, and of their correlation with objective truth, and the determinate acts of the will.

This subject would also seem to be next in order, and may be fruitful of good results in the department of religious instruction, of morals, and of common life.

With the view of calling attention to it, we throw out the following suggestions, without pretending to exhaust the subject, or to speak with much authority among the *savans*, who are in arbitration upon the true lineaments of the mental economy.

1. *Affections are not substantive properties of the mind.*

They are distinguishable from its essence. They are accretions in its history,—matters of its experience,—feelings, emotions, states; attitudes of the mind in view of other objects, and not its created, substantive being.

Practical error may have arisen on this point, from that classification of the powers of the mind which makes the *affections* one of them; a misnomer avoided by most modern writers.

There is in the mind a constitutional susceptibility of emotions, an inherent provision and adaptedness to be affected by objects from without, by all truth, and by all the relations appropriate to our moral being. This we know from the fact, that we *have* emotions, and *are* affected in view of the various objects of our knowledge. This, doubtless, is a quality of all mind, infinite and finite—angelic or human—fallen or unfallen—intelligent, brute or insect. But every where too, the distinction between the mind and its affections is that between the container and the thing contained—between reason and reasoning—will and willing—agent and action. Thus Dr. Woods (Bib. Repos., Jan., 1842, p. 168): “I maintain that the mind *acts as really and powerfully*, in loving, and hating, and desiring, as in willing and choosing. It is indeed the *subject* of an influence from without, but it is an *intelligent, active* subject. It is not properly a *recipient* of its affections, but an *agent* in them.”

2. *Affections arise in view of objects made known to the mind.* We here refer to the great law of mind, that *feeling*, as well as thought, implies the presence or recollection of an object on which that feeling terminates; that knowledge is the prerequisite of emotion, and that we have no affections concerning an object of which we know nothing. Some report of the senses, some reminiscence of memory, or some combination of the intellect, must awaken emotion, or we shall have none. This matter is as well understood in the nursery, as in the cabinet; in the pastimes of childhood, as in

the laws of evidence, and the instructions of philosophy. The true position for emotions, is on the report of the understanding; on the decision of the intellect; on the apprehension of the mind as to the state of facts in given premises. So is it on the arena of human life. So, it would seem, it must every where and always be. The man who knows nothing of China takes no interest in the destinies deciding there. Your child may have died, but until you know it, you do not *feel* your loss. Revenge is consequent on the apprehension of wrong;—envy sees a successful rival;—hatred is in view of conflicting claims, or defeat, in respect to cherished objects. Faith apprehends the grounds of confidence, and love the characteristics of loveliness. On this principle are arranged the intercourse, and courtesies, and friendships of life. The commerce of the mind with objects presented to it, is in the order of this process,—its perception of them—its judgment on them—its emotions in view of them, and its determinate acts of Will respecting them. I perceive the house I am in to be on fire; I judge the fire will reach me; I feel the emotion of fear, and will the requisite means of escape. The mind, in a given case, may pass to conclusions with the rapidity of light, but this must be the order of the process, or it is devoid of intelligence.

Habit and the principle of association vastly facilitate the classification of objects; but the mind stands affected toward them, according to their apprehended qualities and relations. It may be mistaken, but its affections in any given instance, are the result of its mental notices; and hence they change with these notices. A friend approaches in the dress of an enemy; I feel aversion. He comes nearer; I see it is my friend, and my feelings change. So a familiar illustration. I hear a noise like that of thunder; I deem it to be thunder, and enjoy its sublimity. I learn it to be but a rumbling of a cart upon the pavement, and all sense of its sublimity passes from my mind. We here ask, Does not this law of *intelligent* action obtain in respect to all our moral and religious affections?

At what point does the affection of hatred against God arise in the sinner's bosom? Is it in man "or angel fallen," to hate simple, unmixed excellence, irrespective of its bearing upon their cherished course and objects? Is there, what for want of more descriptive phraseology, may be called disinterested malevolence? Will a man hate perfection *per se*—justice and righteousness for their own sakes, or their legitimate exercise, if it bear not adversely on himself or his, and he has no fear that it will? We think he will not. And hence the cheerful acquiescence of men in the inflictions of human law on offenders, and the public sentiment of the community on this point. All cannot be resolved into the principle of mere self-love or self-protection. There is a cordial approbation of the issue, as inherently righteous and deserved. Hence also, to a large extent, the admiration of God and the eulogies on his character, which obtain in deistical and Unitarian writers, and the well-known effects of their teachings. They are not of necessity hypocritical, though destitute of evangelical character; but their instructions bring not down the claims of God, as a righteous governor, holy, just, and true, across the path of man in his sin; and they leave their disciples undisturbed in the way of their own hearts.

Other forms of depravity they may evince; but those emotions of hatred and enmity are not excited which the sinner sometimes feels when "the commandment comes,"—when the truth of God is the sword of the Spirit in his soul, and the prerogatives of God hedge up his way. He hates that authority which is against him—that righteousness which condemns him—that supremacy which is his overthrow. The feeling of enmity toward God occurs at precisely the point where it does toward perfection in other beings—at the point of conflict and counter-claim—where he demands the surrender of objects and principles and habits to which the mind is devoted:—when God is revealed as the avenger of sin, and asserts his claim, against all the idol-abominations of our own hearts. It is at the point of strife in the soul, between

the supremacy of God, and the supremacy of self;—when, though unwilling to yield to the authority of God, the sinner yet dreads it, and anticipates its retribution—when the arrows of the Almighty stick fast in his spirit, and he yet refuses obedience.

Again: Under what circumstances does the feeling of penitence and submission arise? This state of mind involves a further progress of conviction than the affection just considered. Here, the sinner not only fixes on the controversy between himself and God, but is convinced too, that in this controversy God is right, and *he* himself is wrong. Truth, reason and conscience have gained ground on depraved affection; and, under a prevailing sense of the reasons for penitence and submission, he repents and submits.

What, also, is the analysis of the affection of love to God? It is our intelligent nature, apprehending the overwhelming reasons for this affection, in the perfections and ways of God, and in view of them, loving him. The grounds and nature of the emotion are the same in angels or men;—in its first or its subsequent exercise.

The emotion of esteem towards our fellow men, apprehends loveliness in its object; gratitude springs from a sense of kindness; and such is the solution of any affection attributable to man, as a moral, accountable agent. Some object must be present to the mind,—some reason, right or wrong, justifiable or unjustifiable, must call out its emotions, or it would, for aught we know, be in a state of utter quiescence, without evincing either conduct or character.

3. *Affections follow the law of habit.* The same general phenomena attend both. The law of the rise of affections and of their influence, is the same with that of habit, and, for aught we know, that of their dormant inhabitation (to use that language) in the soul, in constituting its predisposed susceptibilities. For all practical and important purposes, the doctrine of the one may be taken for that of the other; and the leading desires and propensities may be accounted as its

abiding states and habits. A conventional distinction is made between the two, by accounting one the accretions of our own personal lifetime, and extending the other to the entire, hereditary proclivity of the race; though this is not always clearly marked, and the things respectively denominated, run comminglingly into each other. Particular desires and propensities, may be the formation and growth of one's own personal experience, while the degenerate habits of a father may lay a foundation for those of his son; and we speak of the *habits* of a family or clan in referring to its characteristics in successive generations.*

The identity of the *doctrine* of the affections with that of habit, is very obvious wherever the subject can be brought out for illustration in human experience, and upon the theatre of active life. We can trace the analogy between them in their formation, their increase, their eradication, as well as in the fact of their being interchangeably cause and effect to each other.

Habit is formed through the commerce of the mind with the objects of its knowledge; the affections arise in the same way. Habits strengthen by indulgence, so do the affections. Given habits must be overcome by conflict, by successful effort and resistance, by the introduction of counter currents of thought and feeling, and by being *gradually* subdued and effaced by the energies of our moral being in uprooting and supplanting them by other mental associations, by new trains of thought, and the formation of new habits of feeling and action. And is it not so with the affections? Must not our evil passions and propensities be encountered in the same way? Do we not pursue the same mode of treatment in the prescriptions of morality and religion, in relation to both sinful habits and sinful desires? Is not all sin of the general nature of any particular sin, and all sinful propensity of the nature of

* It may be objected here, that habits respect the outward manifestations of the life. But do we not also speak of habits of mind and feeling? Besides, I refer to the one (habits), as being more extant and obvious, to illustrate the principle of the affections as more recondite and out of view.

any particular propensity? Is not the propensity of the drunkard similar to that of the debauchee in its formation, and growth, and uprooting too? And may we not put that of the liar or the thief in the same category; and that of the revengeful man or the envious, or of whoever is the dupe of any wrong affection or passion; of whoever follows the lust of the flesh, or of the eyes, or the pride of life? Does the Christian never complain of the sins of his youth, and find those wrong propensities and habits which were most indulged "in the days of his vanity," the most troublesome and restive of any in his pathway homeward to the kingdom of God?

If, then, the doctrine of the affections bears these analogies to the law of habit, they need not be so entirely that *terra incognita* which they have been thought to be. The passions and propensities may not be in such a sense primordial, as to be incapable of solution. They may submit to analysis as resultant states of mind, and with benefit also both to our apprehension of the truth of God, and to its dispensation for the acceptance of men.

The law of habit is extensively illustrated in the various trades and professions and occupations of life, and in the deceptive arts of the necromancer and buffoon. It can perhaps be resolved into the ready flow of the thoughts, and the easy presence and influence of all the requisites to action in accustomed channels. The principle of association comes into play at this point. The mind is familiar with the grounds of action; the motives for it stand readily out and prominent to its view, to the depression of those which have influence in a contrary direction. This is observable in our habits of *thought*. See this in the dexterity of the practised accountant; in the wonderful skill with which the voice or the instrument is managed in music; in the mental analyses and combinations indispensable in the use of language, and which are witnessed in the eloquence of the bar, the pulpit, or the senate chamber. Observe it in the mechanic arts, where often the most rapid and complicated movement of various

members of the body is carried on with uniform accuracy, and with scarcely sufficient attention of mind to enable the memory to retain the *steps* of the movement.

The same is easily detected in the department of our moral being. All the sentiments and emotions may be cultivated. The taste for the fine arts may become exquisite and impassioned. The charms of music may become captivating to the soul. The susceptibility to emotion may be vastly quickened, in the direction of any given passion or propensity.

In view of the analogies here traced, and the law of the affections here evinced, what is the analysis of that passion or propensity which is denominated *selfishness*, the most general of all, perhaps, in our apostate race? It is the regard for personal good, unduly excited. The desire for happiness improperly stimulated—the principle of self-love wrongfully in the ascendant and wrought into a passion, exclusive and overbearing from fictitious, illegitimate sources of influence. It is the due balance of mind worked out of proportion at this point: an excrescence based on the principle of self-love.

Its rise in our first parents, and in our world, is thus described: “And when the woman (under the temptation of the adversary, ‘Ye shall be as gods,’ etc.) saw that the tree was *good* for food, and that it was *pleasant* to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one *wise*; she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat.” The pretexts in themselves are plausible. They contain matters calculated to influence the mind, and to sway it when held in check by no counterbalancing considerations. And taking possession of the mind so strongly as to overmatch the force of the interdict and authority of God, the issue is not unaccountable. There was deception practised,—there was a beguiling of the understanding—an inflated motive in a wrong direction—an enlistment that way of the susceptibility to responsible, moral action. The taste, the eye, and the love of knowledge were addressed; and the force of the considerations to obedience which should have prevailed, were thereby depressed to a minor influence, and

transgression occurred. And are not the elements of selfishness as since practised, traceable in this process, though not seen there in the gross and palpable form of its confirmed ascendancy?

In the same way may any sinful passion or propensity be analyzed, and its growth and strength accounted for. It rises in the wrong use of inherently right powers, and principles of mind, and is confirmed by repeated acts of transgression. All sin follows the analogy of any particular sin. All sinful bias and propensity, that of any particular bias and propensity, as intemperance, thievishness, etc., both in respect to transmission from parent to child, and as to growth in individuals, and is to be accounted for generically and psychologically on the same principles as are family traits—distinctive marks in clans and tribes, and national characteristics. The grand difference is, that generic sin is an attribute of the race,—a peculiarity of the inhabitants of earth, contrasted with those of other worlds, which have not turned apostate. This analogy holds in the progressive degeneracy of both individuals and nations, unrelieved by the economy of grace. The first sin occurred under circumstances of great external temptation, applied to the desire of knowledge. Its enormity is seen in the light and obligations it violated, rather than in the strength of ripened and inveterate sinful propensities, inducing it. They are its fruit according to the principle of this article, and the inheritance of the race, rather than the special type of the first transgression.

Some have supposed that the intellectual powers were crushed in the fall, and that they need to be restored by an agency similar to a new creation, in order to their right action again. But the idea may be carried too far. We know not that the wrong action of mind has the necessary effect of marring its framework, or lessening its powers of intelligent action, or the scope of its being. The arch adversary may have as bright an intellect as unfallen angels. Adam knew more after the fall than before; and the craft and cunning of practised wickedness is often quite astonishing. Besides, if

transgression necessarily deranges and stupefies the intellectual powers, and lessens the capacity for intelligent action, it proportionally lessens responsibility ; and man apostate is not properly chargeable with the full weight of the penalty propounded to him before the fall, etc.

The confinement of the mind to small, grovelling, and unworthy objects, doubtless prevents the full development and just balance of its powers, and induces hereditary degeneracy, distortion, and imbecility. But this result is to be accounted for, by reference to the slow operation of the principle of association and habit, and the gradual assimilation of the mind to the objects with which it is conversant, and not from the direct and necessary effect of sin, to shatter and break up the mental constitution. Mind, as a generic fact, is advanced, and the Divine economy is of a higher cast, and richer development, through the existence of sin, or by reason of the moral system to which it is adjunct, and so we reason on the subject, in vindication of the government of God.

4. *Affections are responsible states of mind.* They possess the quality of conformity or contrariety to the law of God. This is true of those appropriate to us as moral beings, and such are now under consideration. They are the subject matter of requirement, or prohibition. Sin is predicated of some, and holiness of others. With some God is pleased, and with some displeased. Look at the great commandment in the law, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart," etc. "The end of the commandment is love." This state of mind towards God, is the required conformity to him. God requires love to enemies, and forbids anger, wrath, malice, hatred, strife, emulations, and such like. The elements of character are found in the affections.

The conviction of this truth is matter of consciousness. Every man lives under the abiding impression, that he is responsible for the state of his affections. He refers to the temper or spirit in which he acts in explanation of his conduct. He charges corruption upon his neighbour, or excul-

pates him, by reference to his affections. Human law fully recognizes this principle, as well as the intercourse of life.

Efforts to repress wrong emotions, it is true, are praiseworthy; as are efforts to repress sin in any form, in ourselves or others. But what virtue would attach to the stifling of emotions which are *not* wrong? The duty found in rebuking forbidden affections, arises from their essential sinfulness. There is duty, too, in having and cherishing good affections. They, in themselves, are excellent and praiseworthy, and commended alike in the word of God, and in the convictions of our own bosoms.

5. *Affections are voluntary states of mind.* This might be inferred from the fact of their being required or prohibited, and of our own conscious accountability for them. They do not occur without the consent of the will. They are, indeed, an order of its acts. Did one ever love God or his neighbour against his then present will? Do any of the unholy affections transpire without the commerce of the will therein? Every active state or attitude of the mind implies the correspondence of the will in it. The attention we give to external nature is voluntary, although we cannot correct the representations of the landscape. Our processes of reasoning as facts in the mind's history, are voluntary, although necessarily determined. So are the creations of the imagination and the flights of genius. The mind acts as a unit. Its denominated powers are but our classification of its varied states. They hold correspondence with, and run into each other. In one important sense we are responsible for our judgments, and our faith. Emotions are in view of objects adapted to excite them, but, as *existent facts*, are of the mind's will, for which consciousness convicts us of responsibility. Accustomed emotions and passions are the most easy and ready to the mind. Habits of *feeling*, as well as of thought and action, are formed. These become the beaten pathway of the affections in relation to given objects, and, with their associated and readily present reasons, induce the strong desires and propensities of the soul.

"Good and evil," says Dr. Woods, "are found ultimately in the disposition or affection of the heart, or nowhere." Bib. Repos., Jan. 1842, p. 156. Again, "Whether we call love to God voluntary or involuntary, an affection or volition, it is really the same thing. Whatever epithet we apply to it in a metaphysical discourse, it is the sum of obedience to the moral law." Ibid, p. 157.

6. *Affections are controllable.* True, when an affection transpires, and becomes an existent fact in the history of the mind, it cannot be otherwise than it is. It must go to the judgment as it has transpired, and be so known on the records of eternity. But what we assert is, that the affections and states of mind which have characterized it, may at any time be interrupted and intermitted. The mind is inherently changeable in respect to its predominating affections. We can, at will, change the character of its affections, and put forth others, instead of such like as we have put forth. The predominating characteristic of the mind to-day, need not of necessity be its predominating characteristic to-morrow. The will has control over its future history, to shift and vary the current of the affections at pleasure. We are not obliged to sin to-day, because we did yesterday; or to sin any longer because we have up to this moment. We are under no necessity of hating God any longer, because we do now. There is no physical necessity upon us, that our affections should be *continuous* in kind. They may at any time be arrested, and the characteristics of our mental operations and history change. The mind is open to *various* currents of feeling—to the *conflict* of motives, and their neutralizing force upon each other;—it can derive motives from reason and conscience. The senses may supply motives, opposed to the impulses of propensity, habit, and previous moral history. The suggestions of our intellectual nature may successfully compete with passion and long cherished affections. The drunkard may become a sober man; the thief be honest; the false-swearer cease his profanity; and the sinner against God, of whatever type, re-

pent of his sins and be found at the feet of Jesus in his right mind.

This is evident—

1st. From the fact that affections are the subject of requirement and prohibition.

God enjoins right affections and forbids wrong ones. The decalogue is an interesting point of reference here. Thou shalt have such and such affections, and thou shalt not have others. The principle of the requirement and prohibition is the same before the fall and since,—to man in innocence and in apostacy ; to angels as well as to men. But how could this be, if affections are no way controllable by us? As well might the beating of the pulse, or the motions of the planets, be the theme of command to us, as affections over which we have no control. We are admonished, exhorted, commanded, dissuaded, characterized in view of our affections. We are instructed, counseled, warned respecting them ; and the question of choice, concerning them, is submitted to us in a thousand ways, and the responsibility is thrown upon us, of following the one or the other, and choosing between them, and choosing our course among them ; possessing those which God approves, and repudiating those which he condemns. With as much directness as God enjoined obedience on Adam or the angels, Christ says to the sinner, “ Repent, and believe the gospel.” The prophets are equally unembarrassed and direct, in the requisition of right affections, and their issues. “ Turn unto me, O backsliding daughter.” “ Break off your sins by righteousness, and your iniquities by turning to the Lord.” “ Let the wicked forsake his way and the unrighteous man his thoughts,” etc. “ Be ye *holy*, for I am holy, saith the Lord.”

All the instructions of the Bible, over the entire field of obligation ; all its inculcations of moral and practical truth, recognize the control which we have over the affections. Speculation and metaphysics apart, the common sense of all men agrees, that the injunctions of duty and obligation are connected with the voluntary principle in the soul ; and that

at whatever point command, exhortation, counsel, and the pressure of obligation are found, there, too, is the conscious presence of the will, in its responsible office-work on character and destiny; *there* is planted its prerogative of deciding for or against the claims of the subject-matter submitted to its discretion.

2d. The *fact* that *character* and *destiny* are predicated of the affections, shows them to be controllable. This is but a distinct announcement of principles already evolved. The appeal is to the common sense of men—to reason—to the sense of justice. If unavoidable, how are they responsible states of mind?

3d. If affections are uncontrollable, then are they *perpetual*. An affection or propensity once in the ascendant, must then always be in the ascendant. Having gained the mastery, what shall displace it? If other motives may not come in, and other considerations simultaneously influence the choice, an affection having got predominance, will for ever maintain it. A man once angry must be always angry. Love or hate once ruling must perpetually rule. A *passion* uncontrollable must be unchangeable; and a being once swayed by one emotion can have no other. Every subsequent act of will must follow in the track of that which went before, and be of the same kind, and so on *ad infinitum*.

4th. The decisions of the reason and conscience are in their *nature* independent of the disposition or desire. When proceeded in they must be according to truth as received, whether agreeable or not. The judgment and conscience were given for the regulation of the affections and conduct. In all well-regulated minds they are uniformly the supreme faculties. In *all* minds they supply motives of conduct. They concur with the instructions of objective truth and the objective motives. They often come in conflict with the past experience, habits and biases of the soul, and suggest considerations counter to those supplied from the storehouse of the affections. Acting on our intelligent moral nature, these motives may prevail over those supplied by passion, habit, or propensity,

and bring the mind from its lusts, into obedience to reason and truth. They always do prevail when the mind is brought off from a wrong course of action, to one which is right. They often do. A man may be strongly tempted to steal ; and yet the conviction that it would be wrong and unwise may withhold his hand. He may have a vehement appetite for ardent spirits ; but a sense of duty to his family, his country, to himself and to God, may dash the cup from his lips, and forbid the gratification of what may have long been an indulged, and actually dominant passion. "A soft answer may turn away wrath ;" the cry for mercy unnerves the arm uplifted in revenge, and "*the goodness of God leadeth to repentance.*"

It is not denied that passion, propensity and habit, strengthened by indulgence ;—that they may become inveterate, and that in some cases, as in that of the sinner always in conversion, the instructions of truth, and the convictions of reason and conscience, need a co-ordinate Divine influence in order to preponderance. Our position is, that there is no metaphysical necessity for the continued dominance of any given habit or passion.

Agencies and motives are flowing in from various directions, to change the state and attitude of the will, and to break up the monotony of its acts. Conflicting passions may strive for mastery over *each other*. Fear may quench hate. The love of praise may unclench the hand of selfishness. So the gentler emotions may prevail over the more severe and malignant. A sense of justice may overcome the spirit of rapine, and the warning voice of conscience may cause the whole framework of the murderer to quake in his deed of death. Hence the resort to artificial stimulants, to quiet this monitor within, and make crime more easy. Hence the false reasonings which Shakspeare puts into the mouths of such monsters as Richard III. and the murderers of the children of Clarence, to make them equal to their task.

If affection are not controllable, what mean all the beacon lights set up in our world "to warn the wicked of his way," to guide the unwary, to admonish the heedless, and allure the

tempted to the paths of peace? What place indeed for objective motive *at all*, if it be not, in its nature, independent, and may not be found in conflict with any and every previous state or habit, or desire of the mind; and have influence to change and modify the current of the acts of the will? Motives to action come in between successive volitions and from various and independent quarters, with the prerogative of ever changing the character of the acts of the will. A present volition may take its place among them, in relation to future acts, but not for exclusive control. I may desire an orange, but from conviction that it will injure me, may decline to take it. Appetite and passion may powerfully urge me in a given direction, from which I may be effectually restrained by the warning voice of conscience. I may be strongly disposed to have my own way, but may have such an overwhelming view of the rightful supremacy of God, and of the binding obligations of the command, "My son, give *me* thy heart," as to yield my heart to God. I may have run greedily in the ways of sin, but be overtaken with such a sense of my sinfulness therefor, as to cry out, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" Indeed, causes are continually operating to alter and modify the affections, and give new form and direction to the character. Nothing is more common than this, or more proverbial on the theatre of human life.

The sin of our first parents is illustrative of the position we here take. They may be supposed to have had a strong inclination to holiness and quite confirmed habits of obedience; and yet the force of counter motive was not lost on them. They were susceptible of temptation to sin. Without any previous sinful affection, and against every previous affection, they sinned. Considerations entirely *ab extra*, prevailed over all their habits of holiness; the current of their affections changed, and their character became the reverse of what it was. The same principle is seen in the history of the angels, which kept not their first estate, and in every sinner who is converted to God.

To suppose that Adam or the angels fell, by reason of the withdrawment of the motives to obedience found in the light and habits of all their past history, would turn the transaction to a farce, and annihilate the character of God. No, they had a fair trial of the question of obedience. God did not eclipse his glory or depart from them, or implant in them a new nature, as a prerequisite to their sin, and congenial thereto. All of the past remained as it was. Knowledge, motives, habits, reasons for obedience, were out on the field of strife. Temptation combated them. It entered by the ear, the eye, the taste, and the conceit of increasing wisdom, and overcame them. There was a conflict of motives. The woman hesitated; she remembered the interdict, and presented it. Considerations were there on either hand; and the wrong prevailed, though they never had before.

Every change of character proves irrefragably that all the resources of a state, or emotion, or volition of mind, are not found in that state, emotion, or volition which preceded it; but that they come in from different and independent quarters; that they enter through various channels to influence the will from the senses, the reason, the conscience, the fears, the hopes, the imaginations, as well as the passions, to form the conditions of the existent chain. On what principle but this is the inebriate redeemed, or the tempted recovered, or any reform wrought in the character of individuals, or on the face of society? "My son, if sinners entice thee, *consent thou not*," is a passage based on the principle here stated. It charges the tempted youth to give heed to reason, and to give supremacy to the promptings of his intellectual nature, against the suggestions of passion.

How, on any other principle, is the conviction of sin, and its issue in repentance, intelligent and accountable? The whole process is one of reason and conscience, against propensity and passion; and whenever reason and conscience supply the greater motive under the aid furnished in the Divine economy, repentance occurs; the sinner repents, and is turned or converted to God.

Piety is coincident with the reason and conscience, and it is continued in the soul by substantially the same process as that by which it is first induced and seen in the first emotion of penitence or faith; with the advantage found in the signal victory of that first act of repentance, and the habit of right action then commencing, and ever increasing afterward, and, under the Holy Ghost, rendering obedience against old propensity more and more easy, and more and more the permanent habit and character of the soul.

Coincident with these views are the instructions of consciousness with regard to the affections. We are ever conscious that the past trains of our affections might have been otherwise than they have been; and that we can cherish or suppress those we now have; and that we can change and modify our emotions. Our memory is full of expedients by which we have done this, and by which we have put check or spur to the passions,—have given them prevalence, or brought them in, under the restraints of reason.

It does not satisfy the report of consciousness, that we have freedom of action in a given direction under the promptings of desire or propensity. That report embraces also the conviction, that our past course of action was not inevitable,—that it might have been otherwise than what it has been,—that it could have been arrested at any stage, and been turned into other channels at any moment. Abstract from that report the idea that our past course could have been otherwise than it has been, and you mutilate that report. Take from a wrong action, in any given instance, the attribute, that it might have been avoided, and you take something from the integrity of the impress of it which lies in the conscious recollection of it:—the positive transaction as recorded in the treasure-chamber of the mind, is shorn of some of its characteristics. Hence the feeling of regret, compunction, and the bitterness of remorse that we should act so foolishly—that we did not let reason reign, and were not more influenced by other considerations than those on which we acted. How often are these the compunctions of the murderer—how strikingly depicted

in the accents of the returning prodigal, and in the confessions of the publican in the Gospel! It is not denied that the statements under this head do, in some respects, contravene a perhaps favourite position of the distinguished writer already quoted in this article. In his reply to "Inquirer" (Bib. Rep., Jan., 1842, pp. 166-70), Dr. Woods asks (meaning to deny it), "Does even conscience or the moral sense govern him (man), except as the *inclinations* or *desires* of the heart give force to its dictates?" In answer to the question, whether "volition depends on motives *ab extra*," he says, "It depends ultimately on *inward* motives,"—that "the soul wills or chooses, from its own nature, state, or condition." "Whatever may be the motives presented from without, it is a well known fact that a man's inward *disposition*, or the character and state of his mind, does in reality determine his choices, and his voluntary actions." "The mind wills and chooses from its own *nature*," etc. "There is no more necessity in respect to the affections, than in respect to the volitions." "But our volitions and choices take place from the same necessity; that is, they proceed from the nature, state, and condition of the soul." Thus in former articles (see Theo. Review, June, 1834), he reasons at length, "that man in his natural state has *no susceptibility*" to morally right affections, and that the begetting of such a *susceptibility* is the work of the Holy Spirit in regeneration, and endeavours to avoid the consequences to human responsibility resulting from this position.

That volition flows easily in accustomed channels, and that the impulses of the inward disposition or propensity, are wont to prevail in choice, is unquestionable; but that this is *invariably* and of *necessity* the case, is not conceded; and this is the point here raised. The above extracts overlook the state of facts occurring in a *change* of character,—in the breaking up of previous habits,—in the successful resistance of previously reigning appetite and passion. They leave out of view one feature of the general subject of the mental phenomena; viz., that to an *existent* affection or volition, past

affections or volitions, the whole moral history, the passions, propensities, habits, and nature of the soul, stand related as *motives* and *inducements* to choice, and that this being their position in respect to the existent volition, they are *inherently* capable of being resisted. Choice involves a conflict of motives. It contemplates counter currents of influence in the mind,—motives opposing and neutralizing each other. Those from propensity may be in one direction, those from reason in another. The different propensities indeed may not harmonize in the direction of their influence. Motives *ab extra*, may enter in among those from *within*, and be among the prerequisites of the existent choice, to compete with the suggestions of propensity and habit, and according to their strength prevail against them,—break off the chain of coincident affections, and work a change in character and conduct. Success may be difficult in proportion to the inveteracy of previous habit and propensity ; but from the very terms of the statement (a choice in view of motives) is not inherently impossible. It is often witnessed on the arena of human life. See it illustrated in thousands of instances in the temperance reformation. The man turning away from his cups has not his propensity for strong drink cured as a prerequisite to his first effort in the direction of reason and duty. It is not first exchanged for a new propensity, *inducing* reform in the current of which he moves on easily and *naturally*, under the impulses of an “*inward disposition*,” of “*necessity*” governing his volitions in the work of recovery. He has at first but a bare preponderance of motive inducing choice in a right direction, and that from *without* or aside from his “*inward disposition*” and propensities ; and every step onward in reform, is in conflict with “propensity and inward inclination,” and in the use of every *outward means* and inducement, until counter habits are *formed*, and his reformation is established.

If motives *ab extra* may not prevail, why use them ? If appeals to the understanding and conscience are unavailing, “except as the inclination and desires of the *heart* give them force,” what encouragement to make them, with a

view to correct "the desires and inclinations of the heart?" How must we account for that struggle of the conscience with propensity which is often witnessed? Why does the dagger fall from the hand uplifted for murder, or concealed guilt rankle to despair? How shall we account for conviction of sin, or the first emotion of penitence for it, or for a change of character, inclination, habit or conduct, in any being, on any subject, if propensity *must* always govern, and the type of the precedent affection be seen in the existent one? It would surely be unphilosophical to say that character changes before volition does;—that a man is holy before he repents, or has one holy emotion of soul,—that right propensities, inclinations and desires, precede the first right affection. They are not so formed. They are resulting states of mind. They are the growth of its history in a direction calculated to induce, form and strengthen them. They, like habit, arise out of the action of mind. They yield no help in behalf of a change of affection or volition. Their force is the other way. At the point of change they are balanced, overcome, through motives and influences *ab extra*. See this in the apostacy of the first human pair, or that of the angels who sinned,—in the forming or reforming of the inebriate, as before mentioned. Trace it in the contraction of any habit or propensity, bad or good.

We acknowledge the doctrine of innate depravity; but the propensity there involved *results* from our connection with the fallen Adam, and does not deviate from the general law of habit and propensity as here stated, and as admitted in the ordinary concerns of life. Nor does the agency of the Divine Spirit, involved in the sinner's repentance, make it an exempt case. The influences of the Spirit do not constitute the sinner's holiness. Their commerce is with the constitutional elements of our being and the considerations of truth and obligation acting on them, and against the propensities and depraved sympathies and habits that hitherto have swayed the soul,—getting the victory over them, and inducing right affections in opposition to them.

True, these are not wholly destroyed in the first triumph over them. They often show themselves with mischievous influence afterward; but are progressively undermined and supplanted by new and right inclinations, dispositions and habits, formed in the succeeding history of the converted man.

To call the predominating motive in changed volition, desire, inclination, propensity, is but to confound terms. Besides it is manifest that the predominant motive in this case is not alike in kind with the propensity, and does not spring from it; but from truth, and objective sources of motive in correspondence with principles of our being other than and aside from depraved propensity.

The principle of the above extracts is carried into Dr. Woods's theory of the power of the sinner to repent; pp. 166, 167. "Whenever the question concerning power or ability comes up, put it thus: Has man a power which ever has accomplished the thing? a power which has, in any instance, availed? Has he a power which ever will avail, in the most favourable circumstances?" "Let us look at the question respecting the power of the unrenowned to repent and believe, without the regenerating influence of the Spirit. We inquire, then, whether any sinner has actually repented and believed without that influence? Whatever motives may have acted on him, and whatever efforts he may have made in his natural state, has he ever done this? And has he *power* in himself which will prove to be sufficient in future time?" etc.

We object not to the popular use of the word power, in sermons, and treatises for general reading; but of course do not expect that use of it in an essay, aiming at metaphysical accuracy, in respect to the constituent elements and powers of the mind. We have some doubts, also, as to the infallibility of the issue here joined. Is it always safe to infer from what is, what can be? and to settle definitely from the achievements, the powers of the human spirit? Will Dr. Woods say that the converted sinner has no "*power*" to fall from grace, because he never *has* fallen from grace, and never will,

“even under any circumstances?” or that Adam had no power to sin, before sin became an existent fact in respect to him? or that fallen angels received the “ability” to sin, at the *punctum temporis* of sinning? or, as the statement requires, afterwards? One might be tempted to deem it almost as conclusive to reason from what *can* be, to what *is*, and admit perfectionism in the gross, though Dr. Wood does not. May we not, on the subject of mind, as elsewhere, reason from admitted principles to legitimate conclusions; and from the well known attributes of the mental economy infer its capabilities in respect to a given subject, or course of action? Besides, is the want of power the real reason why the sinner does not repent and believe the gospel? and is it fair to truth to represent him as not having “the power, whatever efforts he make,” to this end; and is the Holy Spirit given to supply this lack of power? We have always supposed that the Holy Ghost was given to induce the right action of powers already in possession; to induce repentance,—not to communicate the power of repenting; and that it is not philosophical to say, that the fallen or the recovered sinner is, in the changes of character therein involved, put in possession of powers previously not belonging to him. Is not the existence of power presupposed in its use? Does it take other and different powers to see and regret our offences against God, than against our fellow-men? Is not every sin against God, and are not the constituents of right action, the same in respect to both tables of the law? and are not those constituents inherently in our moral being?

The Spirit of God is needed in conversion, to overcome propensity, not to communicate it;—to break the force of inclination and habit, by giving success to truth against it;—to counteract the motives to action in the whole assemblage of influences from the “old man, which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts,” and give prevalence to motives *ab extra*, over them; and make considerations drawn from truth, reason, conscience and God, predominant in volition:—and the first right affection or volition thus secured makes it true

of a man, that "he is born of the Spirit." The work of the Spirit correlates with the prerequisites of volition viewed as motives, and comes in aid of motives *ab extra*, against the depraved and hitherto prevailing biases and habits of the soul. In the first right affection or volition of the sinner, be it repentance, faith or submission in its special type, or whatever one of the Christian graces it assumes, as determined by the appropriate circumstances of it, commences the new nature:—the repetition and progress of such affections, thus secured, strengthen, and issue it at length into the confirmed inclinations and habits of the devotedly pious man. The presence of the Holy Spirit is not essential to obligation, showing that its office-work is not the supply of defective power. His influence in the *conversion* of man, is at the point where that of Satan was, in his *fall*. Its correlation with truth and motives, and their efficacy on the will, is often seen in conviction, and the progress thereof—gradually deepening it,—taking away excuses,—troubling the sinner in his course of transgression, and bringing him more and more under the influence of objective truth, against his yet predominating state of mind, until at length it prevails:—truth, reason, conscience by the Spirit, become ascendant over wicked propensity and appetite; volition changes, and the sinner repents, believes, submits and loves, in view of considerations adapted to these results.

The position here controverted is, that the soul *invariably* acts from its own "inward disposition and character,"—that propensity is, and of "necessity" must be, the *inevitable* law of choice, uncontrollable by considerations of truth or obligation, or motives of whatever nature, or from whatever source, or however sustained from without; and that conscience has force only as aided by the *inclination* and *desires* of the heart. It overlooks the fact that the agency of the Holy Ghost is foreign in its nature to the mind, and that "the word of God is the sword of the Spirit"—in conversion, and contemplates his work as a previous preparatory process in the mind: a process whose effort is to make the act in

repentance the legitimate result of a pre-existing propensity. This position assumes that the sinner is converted before he repents, or has any conscious and responsible movement of soul in accordance with required duty. But in what way a propensity having relation to law and duty, can be changed without the agency of the truth, and considerations from without addressed to reason and conscience, is not stated, or any analogy traced between the law of the Spirit's influences, and that of those influences derived from other sources. That there is no such analogy we are not prepared to believe; nor do we apprehend the philosophical accuracy of the idea that propensity must change, as an indispensable prerequisite to changed volition. The preponderance of motive must be in the other scale, but we see not why we are dependent on a change of propensity for this. To say that we are, first begs the question in debate, and then only encumbers the subject of mental philosophy, by moving the process one step further back, with no conceivable advantage. If the predominating motive may not change without a previous change of propensity, then how can we account for a change of propensity? Does not the propensity change through the influence of motives? How is a man cured of a thievish propensity? Is it not by instruction and discipline,—by motives and considerations drawn from the sources of truth, and addressed to his reason and conscience? So is it with all propensity. It is properly the result of mental action,—it is the accustomed state or habit of mind, which has grown out of its previous active states, and is to be rebutted, over-matched in its influence on choice, and eventually superseded, and worn away by an appeal to the sources of conviction, and the reasons for choice in a direction the opposite to which the given propensity would lead us. Those states of mind which are denominated desires, dispositions, inclinations, and propensities, are voluntary states of it, and of course are identical with volition in a large sense, and thus evince their position as the result of the predominating motive, and not its antecedent. Indeed the legitimate prerequisites of choice are

found in the universe of existent things and truths, brought to the mind. Their motive-influence in volition is in its nature, independent of previous propensities and habits, and though facilitated or impeded by propitious or adverse dispositions and habits of the soul, is not necessarily controlled by them. The Bible states the office-work of the Spirit to be, to reprove (convince) of sin, of righteousness and of judgment, on principles, as we suppose, every way rational and adapted to the ends of truth.

If Dr. Woods, by "want of power in himself," etc., means only to express our dependence on the Spirit, in the prevalence of objective truth in repentance, on the same principle as changes in volition, character and conduct occur on other subjects, without the superadded economy of the Spirit, neither our position here or belief would put us in controversy with him on that point: our objection is to the making of the predominant motive in volition identical with propensity, or the *necessary* fruit of it.

Speaking of man as a free agent, and at the point of his repentance, Dr. W. employs language quite in coincidence with the views we would here maintain. "He (man) is the *subject* of the Divine influence, or is *acted upon* by the Spirit; and he himself *acts*, that is, repents and obeys in consequence of that *influence*. God works in believers, and in consequence they work," "in our affections and desires we are truly *active*." "These mental actions are of as *high an order at least* as our *volitions*." "Our desires are exercised spontaneously *in view of appropriate objects*, and are *not controlled by a previous act of the will*. I hold that we are free, especially free in these mental acts,—free, certainly, in as high a sense as in those external acts that are completely dictated and controlled by volition." "Love and hatred and all the affections and emotions which *we exercise in view of moral objects*, are free, *unforced* moral acts, for which we are justly accountable." That is, voluntary states of mind, uncontrolled by any previous volition or state of mind; they are volitions in view of appropriate

objects brought to the mind and in accordance with the views which are entertained in this article.

We detect the same admission in the following extracts on the 170th page. “Let Inquirer tell how *he* exercises this power of choice. In all his more important and deliberate choices does he not carefully *weigh* the *motives* or *reasons* which come before him, and then decide *in accordance* with those which appear to him the strongest?” “And if at any time we will act *suddenly*, without deliberation, and from the *impulse* of some strongly *excited passion*, is not this very impulse of passion the motive that governs us?” “I predict that Inquirer and all other men, in the free exercise of the power of choice, will, in all future time, determine, will or choose, *either* according to what appear to them the strongest reasons, *after deliberation*, or under the influence of some strongly excited affection or passion, which leaves them no time for deliberation.”

The theory of volition is in these extracts happily sketched, and the correlation of motives from truth, and reason, and conscience, with those from indulged propensity and habit, as antagonist forces often, is lucidly grouped; but whether in conformity with what has been the subject-matter of animadversion in our previous inferences, the reader must judge.

Here we close the present article, and if it shall help in any degree to illustrate the doctrine of the affections, or shall enlist abler pens and wiser counsels in the service, we shall not have written in vain.

ARTICLE IV.

THE EPISTLE TO THE PHILIPPIANS.

By the late ROBERT PATTON, LL. D., Greek Professor in the University of New-York.

AFTER performing various missionary labours in different parts of Asia Minor, Paul and Silas, about the fifty-third year of the Christian era, in obedience to a heavenly vision, passed the *Ægean*, and, for the first time, preached the gospel in Macedonia. Their successful labours at Philippi, where they first unfolded the riches of Christ, are described in the sixteenth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles. Before the untoward events which led to their departure from this city, the good seed had been sown in the hearts of many, and the foundation laid for a Christian church. About twelve years had now intervened since the Apostle first planted the standard of the cross among them. Like good soldiers of Jesus Christ, they had remained firm in their allegiance. They had been cited frequently by Paul himself, as an example to other churches. Particularly their active and efficient zeal in furthering the gospel by their timely assistance to the Apostle, had excited the admiration of the churches; and, if we mistake not, communicates a peculiar glow of tenderness to the present epistle. If the fire and energy of Paul did not now and then burst forth, we should suspect the epistle to have flowed from the pen and heart of the disciple whom Jesus loved. And when we call to mind the flourishing condition of this church; the self-denying and expansive benevolence so honourably mentioned again and again by the Apostle; the sacrifices they had cheerfully made for the promotion of his comfort and for the furtherance of the Gospel, and the comparatively pure doctrines of the church, we need not be surprised at the tenderness of this epistle, dictated by a catholic Christian affection, rendered more intense by his *private* gratitude and attachment.

We cannot here detail the arguments concerning the place

and time at which this epistle was written. The commonly received opinion that it was written from Rome during the imprisonment of Paul in that city, has been attacked, but never overthrown. The allusion in the epistle itself to the Prætorian guard (1: 13, comp. Acts 26: 16); the family or household of Cæsar (4: 22); the earnest entreaty of Paul, in his second letter to Timothy, to come to him at Rome, from which place that epistle is conceded to have been written; and the fact that Timothy was now with him and united with him in this letter to the Philippians; together with the tradition of the church from the earliest ages expressed in the notice at the end of the epistle; these circumstances, we say, furnish a preponderance of evidence in favour of the received opinion.

That this epistle was written also near the close of his imprisonment is highly probable. At his first answer all forsook him. At the time of writing to Timothy, acquainting him with his loneliness and distress, Luke *alone* was with him. At the time of writing this epistle to the Philippians, Timothy was comforting him by his presence. Some considerable time must therefore have elapsed since his first arrival at Rome. He expresses also his confident expectation of a speedy and successful termination of his bonds (1: 25, 2: 24). The Philippians had heard of his distress at Rome, had made a collection, and sent it by Epaphroditus, who remained some time sick at Rome. The Philippians had heard of the sickness of Epaphroditus, and Epaphroditus was aware that they had heard of it (2: 25, 28). All this supposes some considerable time to have elapsed since his first arrival at Rome. The evidence preponderates, therefore, in favour of its having been written from Rome, about A. D. 65, or near the close of his confinement.

Epaphroditus, who brought the contribution of the Philippians to Paul at Rome, was now about to return. Paul seizes the opportunity; writes an epistle glowing with grateful and affectionate acknowledgments of their uniform love to him and to the gospel; adds such exhortations as were suggest-

ed by his own situation, and the information he had received of their condition as a church ; finds much to approve and but little to condemn ; affectionately advertises them of his own situation and prospects, and the success of the gospel ; adverts to the dangerous influence of the Judaizing teachers, or of the Jewish converts, and warns the Gentile converts against the indulgence of superciliousness in view of their superior spiritual attainments, which might induce them to look down with contempt on their Jewish brethren, only partially delivered from the yoke of carnal ordinances, and labouring under inveterate prejudices in favour of the rites and ceremonies of the Mosaic law.

To look, then, for some one definite object or design of the epistle, would be idle. He writes as a father to his affectionate children ; the warnings, commendations and other items, are such as might not have called for a special letter from the Apostle ; but are suggested rather by the circumstances than the opportunity sought on their account. Still, it is one of the richest of Paul's epistles ; rich in tenderness, in doctrinal instruction, in exhortations to steadfastness in the Christian warfare, in incitements to condescension, spiritual mindedness, and increase in love and knowledge. The Christian can rise from it only to fall on his knees and imbibe through prayer the same spirit.

The epistle commences with the usual Christian salutation : " Grace unto you, and peace from God our Father," etc. The Apostle frequently, at the very commencement of an epistle, expresses his gratitude to God for some particular grace in exercise in the church to which he writes. Coloss. 1 : 3, 4. We give thanks to God and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, praying always for you, since we heard of your faith in Christ Jesus, *and of the love which ye have to all the saints.* 1 Thess. 1 : 2, 3. We give thanks to God always for you all, making mention of you in our prayers ; remembering without ceasing *your work of faith, and labour of love, and patience of hope.* 2 Thess. 1 : 3. We are bound to thank God always for you, brethren, as it is meet, because

your faith groweth exceedingly, and the charity of you all toward each other aboundeth. Philemon 4 : 5, 7. I thank my God, making mention of thee always in my prayers, hearing of thy love and faith which thou hast toward the Lord Jesus, and toward all saints—for we have great joy and consolation in thy love, because the bowels of the saints are refreshed by thee, brother. For what then does he render thanks to God on behalf of the Philippians—for their steadfastness in the possession of the gospel in general, or for some particular exhibition of their faith and love? Our English translation runs thus (3, 5): I thank my God upon every remembrance of you, for your fellowship in the gospel from the first day until now. Which is commonly understood to mean, I thank my God for your uniform and steadfast adherence to the faith and practice of the gospel, from your first reception of it until now. The original Greek stands thus : *Εὐχαριστῶ τῷ Θεῷ μου ἐπὶ πᾶσῃ τῇ μνησίᾳ ὑμῶν * * Ἐπὶ τῇ κοινωνίᾳ ὑμῶν εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἀπὸ πρώτης ἡμέρας ἄχρι τοῦ νῦν.* A diversity of opinion exists among translators and critics on the precise import of the phrase *κοινωνία εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον*. Does it mean participation, partnership, fellowship *in*, or communication, contribution *unto*, the gospel? We incline with increasing conviction, to the latter view of the passage.

Adopting the other translation, the whole portion (3–11), will read thus:—I thank my God on every recollection of you (always whenever I offer my prayers to God in behalf of you all, doing it with joy), *ἐπὶ τῇ κοινωνίᾳ εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον*, for your contributing to the furtherance of the gospel from your first reception of it until now. Feeling a confidence, that God, who has begun his noble work in you, will perform it effectually till the day of Christ. As it is meet I should feel these grateful emotions and this joy on your behalf, for you are deeply rooted in my affections, inasmuch as both when in bonds and when at liberty, defending and confirming the gospel, you are all labourers with me in my apostolic office. For I call God to witness, how strong is my love for you all in cordial Christian affection.

It has been objected, that Paul would scarcely be expected to thank God for the charitable assistance afforded to him by the Philippians, and to pray that this same assistance might be afforded in still greater abundance. But the Apostle thanks his God, (and who would not ?) for the noble disposition the Philippians had uniformly manifested to afford timely assistance to him as an apostle, for the furtherance of the gospel, whose blessings they had tasted. Is this a narrowness of feeling unbecoming an apostle ? Would to God there were more of it, and more occasion for it, in the Christian world. How could the sincerity of their profession, and their love of the gospel, evince itself in a more lovely manner, in those perilous times, than by contributing, to their power, nay, beyond their power, to the necessities of the servants of Christ, and to the poor saints ? How feelingly he adverts to it again, toward the close of the epistle (4 : 10) : But I rejoiced in the Lord greatly, that now at the last your care of me hath flourished again, wherein ye were also careful, but ye lacked opportunity. And again (14) : Notwithstanding, ye have well done that ye did communicate with my affliction—*συγκοινωνησαντες μου τη θλιψει*. Now ye Philippians, know also, that in the beginning of the gospel, when I departed from Macedonia, no church communicated with me—*συνκοινωνησαν μοι*—concerning giving and receiving, but *ye only*. For even in Thessalonica ye sent *once* and *again* unto my necessity. Not that I desire a gift, but I desire fruit that may abound to your account. But I have all and abound. I am full, having received of Epaphroditus the things which were sent from you, an odour of a sweet smell, a sacrifice acceptable, well-pleasing to God. What exultation of joy can be more strongly expressed than this ? How exultingly he holds up to the view of the rich and noble Corinthians the example of the poor Philippians ! 2 Cor. 8 : 1, Moreover, brethren, we do you to wit of the grace of God bestowed on the churches of Macedonia, how that in a great trial of affliction the abundance of their joy and their deep poverty abounded unto the

riches of their liberality. For to their power, yea, and beyond their power, they were willing of themselves, etc.

The remarks of Macknight on the fifth verse evince, we conceive, a great want of critical acumen. "The apostle thanked God," says he, "for the attention with which the Philippians *heard* the gospel, and for the readiness of mind with which they *embraced* it, and for their perseverance in the profession of it—for I think all this is included in the phrase 'fellowship in the gospel.'" What a bundle of distinct meanings has he found in the simple expression *κοινωνια εις το ευαγγελιον*. He remarks again, on the translation "contribution unto the gospel": "It must be acknowledged, that good works of this sort are called by Paul *κοινωνια*, 2 Cor. 8: 4. Yet as the readiness of mind with which the Philippians received the gospel, and their steadfastness in the profession of it, were subjects of thanksgiving which better deserved to be often mentioned by the apostle in his prayers, than their present of money to him, though very liberally bestowed, I have no doubt that it is what he meant by their "fellowship in the gospel." Because, then, this seemed a higher reason for *thankfulness* than the other, it must be the sense in which the words are taken here. It is to be hoped that Paul will be permitted to be his own interpreter as to the high estimation in which he held this distinguishing grace of the Philippians, in the passages before cited. Dr. Scott also inclines towards the same mode of reasoning—stating it to be an inferior cause of gratitude to God.

Let us now turn to the examination of the verses and expressions singly.

Verse 5. *κοινωνια εις το ευαγγελιον*. The same form occurs in Rom. 15: 26. For it hath pleased them of Macedonia and Achaia to make a certain contribution for the poor saints (*εις τους πτωχους*) which are at Jerusalem. 2 Cor. 9: 13, While by the experiment of this ministration they glorify God for your professed subjection unto the gospel of Christ, and for your liberal distribution unto them, and unto all men (*κοινωνιας εις αυτους και εις παντας*). What then can we un-

derstand by *κοινωνία εἰς το εὐαγγέλιον*, but communicating, contributing, distributing unto the gospel, i. e. unto the furtherance of the gospel? But, says the objector, *εἰς* in this passage is put for *ἐν*. But can it be shown, that when *εἰς* accompanies a word, which, like *κοινωνία*, necessarily depends on the words connected with it for its precise shade of meaning, that in such a case *εἰς* can be put for *ἐν*? This would make confusion worse confounded.

Verse 6. Feeling a confidence that God who has begun this good work in you will perform it, etc. In 2 Cor. 8: 1, We do you to wit of the grace of God bestowed on the churches of Macedonia. The same grace of liberality for which the Philippians were so eminent, and for which the apostle holds them up to the view of the Corinthians, as a bright example, is distinctly recognized as originating in God, as bestowed on the churches of Macedonia by God himself; and the same expression which we translate *good work*, occurs in 2 Cor. 9: 8: That ye, always having all sufficiency in all things (referring to the wealth of the Corinthians), may abound to every good work (*εργον αγαθον*): as it is written, He hath dispersed abroad, he hath given to the poor. Here the expression is used for the same liberality manifested by the Macedonian churches which in the epistle to the Corinthians is mentioned again and again, as an inducement to the wealthy Corinthians to go and do likewise.

On this verse also, Macknight exhibits a very inconclusive mode of reasoning. "According to Pearce," says he, "the good work of which the apostle speaks, is that which the Philippians performed by sending him money once and again while he preached in Thessalonica. But the hope and wish which he here expressed, that God who had begun that good work in the Philippians, would continue completing it until the day of Jesus Christ, forbids this interpretation. For so far was the apostle from wishing to have more money from the Philippians, that he wrote to them (4: 18): Now I have all things and abound, I am filled," etc. Who ever thought (certainly Pearce did not) that the apostle felt confident

that the Philippians would continue to be his bankers till the day of Christ? He expresses merely his confidence that God who had inspired them with this noble principle would still continue to give it efficiency, that in this noble grace in which they had excelled, they would continue to excel. God was its author, and he would perfect it.

“Till the day of Jesus Christ.” The appearance of our Saviour in the glory of his Father to judge the world, was regarded by the New Testament writers and by the early Christians as the consummation of the present economy, and the commencement of the true glory and felicity of the Christian. On this scene they habitually gazed. It inflamed their holy desires, kindled their aspirations, and excited their diligence. This was the goal, and is regarded as such in a number of passages. The expression is perhaps equivalent to the more modern phrase, “*until death*.” Speaking of a church, however, as a collective body, the language of the early Christians possesses a peculiar force.

Verse 7 in our translation runs thus: Even as it is meet for me to think this of you all, because I have you in my heart; inasmuch as both in my bonds and in the defence and confirmation of the gospel, ye are all partakers of my grace; *συγκοινωνους μου της χαριτος παντας υμας οντας*. What can this mean in connexion with the fifth verse, when translated ‘fellowship in the gospel’? Does he state, as the ground of his affectionate regard for them, that whether he was in bonds or not, they (the Philippians) were all partakers of the same grace of God with himself, or of the same persecutions and distresses, as some suppose? We cannot, with this view of the fifth verse, elicit a consistent sense. But if *χαρις*, grace, means the grace and gift of an apostle’s life—the apostolical office, as in Rom. 12: 3, For I say, through the grace (*χαριτος*) given unto me, to every man that is among you, not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think, etc.,—then *συγκοινωνους μου της χαριτος* can only mean, that whether I am in bonds, or free and preaching the gospel, ye Philippians consider my sufferings and necessities, as an apostle of Christ,

your own ; and are prompt to minister to my wants ; i. e., you evince your readiness to assist me under every circumstance, in the furtherance of the gospel, of which, by the gift and grace of God, I am an apostle. In this view of the passage, the affectionate feelings of the apostle as a man, are most interestingly blended with his feelings toward the Philippians as a Christian and an apostle.

He now adverts in verse 12 to his own situation, and the prospects of the gospel. Doubtless the Philippians had been in painful solicitude concerning the influence of his imprisonment on the progress of the word of life. Well might he anticipate their solicitude. They who had done so much for the furtherance of the gospel, and rejoiced in its promulgation, could not but take a deep interest in the present condition of the apostle. And how anxiously does he seize on the least encouraging circumstance calculated to cheer their hearts ! So far, says he, from my imprisonment operating as a check to the spread of the gospel, this very gospel has been furthered by my bonds. So that the fact of my being in bonds for the sake of Christ (which amounted in one sense to preaching Christ), is recognized throughout the prætorian camp, is known to all the soldiers of the prætorian cohort and elsewhere.

To the captain of this cohort, who was styled *στρατοπεδάρχης*, the prisoners who were brought in bonds from the provinces to the city were delivered. And according to Acts 28¹⁶, the prisoners who came with Paul were delivered to the *στρατοπεδάρχης* on their arrival in Rome, but Paul was permitted to remain by himself under the guard of one of the soldiers of the cohort.

We pass on to the portion 19–26, inclusive, which presents several difficulties. *Οἶδα γὰρ, ὅτι τοῦτο μοι ἀποβήσεται εἰς σωτηρίαν* : For I know that this shall turn to my salvation. What can be the antecedent to *τοῦτο*, *this*—For I know that *this* ? And again, does *σωτηρία* in this passage denote *eternal salvation*, or deliverance, enlargement from prison, or advantage, benefit in general ? All which meanings

the word admits. Again, in verse 21; *Εμοὶ τὸ ζῆν Χριστός καὶ τὸ ἀποθάνειν κερδος*. Does *κερδος* denote gain to himself, or to the cause he preached? The preceding verse stands thus: According to my earnest expectation and my hope, that in nothing I shall be ashamed; but that, with all boldness, as always, so now also, Christ shall be magnified in my body, *whether it be by life or by death*. For to me to live, *Εμοὶ τὸ ζῆν*, i. e. *τὸ μου ζῆν*, my living, my being permitted still to live, is *Christ*, my dying—*κερδος*—gain. We merely state these difficulties without entering into a tedious detail of criticism, and now translate the whole portion as it seems to us the *usus loquendi* and the connexion require. For I know that this situation of affairs shall turn out for good, turn out well, provided your prayers abound for me, and the Spirit, which Christ is wont to afford to his ministers, be supplied. I know this, inasmuch as I am filled with a confident hope, that in nothing which befalls me I shall be ashamed; but as has always been the case, so now also, Christ shall be magnified—his name promoted by me whether I live or am put to death, whether my life be still spared, or whether I die a martyr—for if I live, my life is devoted to Christ and the advancement of his kingdom, and if I am put to death, my death also shall promote the same glorious cause—shall also conduce to the magnifying of Christ—*τῷ μεγαλυνεσθαι Χριστόν*.

From verse 22, as it stands in the English version, we never could elicit any consistent sense. But if I live in the flesh, this is the fruit of my labour; yet what I shall choose I wot not. The Greek runs thus: *Εἰ δὲ τὸ ζῆν ἐν σαρκί, τοῦτο μοι καρπὸς ἐργου καὶ τί αἰρήσομαι οὐ γινώριζω*: If, however, my life, my continuing in life, is *καρπὸς ἐργου*, advantage to my work—promotive of the work, as in Thess. 5: 13—*καὶ*, or the Heb. *ו*, *save, truly*, I know not what to choose. I find myself in a dilemma—I long to depart and be with Christ, which, so far as my feelings are concerned, is far preferable; but it is for your advantage, and that of the church, that I remain in the flesh.

An exhortation now commences at the twenty-seventh verse, and continues till the eighteenth verse of the second chapter. And here we are almost tempted to pause. Something whispers in our ear, "Put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground." What mortal mind can comprehend, what tongue or pen can adequately express the full import of this exhortation? We need to be caught up to the third heavens, to have our spiritual vision sharpened and hardened to gaze upon these glories. The soul of the apostle was swelling with a mixture of emotions. He yearned over the Philippians as the soul of a father over his children. He saw a spirit of pride, of self-sufficiency, of high-mindedness, of superciliousness, creeping into his beloved church; and by an allusion, for its eloquence unrivalled, and for its melting influence upon the hearts of Christians indescribably powerful, he calls them to a sense of duty. The same mode of exhortation, viz. by the example of Christ, is adopted by the apostle in some other instances: as 2 Cor. 8: 9, For ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, that ye through his poverty might be rich. Heb. 12: 2, Looking unto Jesus the author and finisher of our faith; who, for the joy that was set before him, endured the cross, despising the shame, and is set down at the right hand of the throne of God. But in none is the appeal made with so much fullness and with such overpowering efficacy as in the present case. The English version runs thus: Only let your conversation be as it becometh the gospel of Christ, that whether I come and see you, or else be absent, etc.—to 2: 18.

Verse 27. Only, *μονον*, so much for myself and my concerns: see to it, now, on your part, ye Philippians, that your conversation be as it becometh the gospel of Christ—*πολιτευεσθε*. In the same manner our translators have rendered the noun *πολιτευμα*, 3: 20: For our conversation is in heaven. The metaphor is beautiful and expressive—*πολιτευεσθαι*, to act, conduct one's self as being a member of a body politic. In

this passage the meaning may be ; see to it, that you conduct yourselves in your spiritual body politic, under the gospel, conformably to its holy doctrines and precepts. And as concord, unity, harmony among themselves, is more especially alluded to, the metaphor, we think, needs to be more clearly expressed, as it is in a sense explanatory. The apostle then proceeds ; “that if I come and see you, I may behold for myself, or if absent, I may hear of your affairs, that you are of one mind, labouring together with one accord for the faith of the gospel.”

Verse 28. Not intimidated at all by the adversaries of your faith, which situation of things, viz. *your* fearlessness and their persecutions and threats, is an indication of the destruction laid up for them, but of the salvation reserved for you, in each instance from God. For you are privileged, not only to believe on him, but also to suffer for his name, experiencing the same troubles which you saw I experienced, and which you now hear to be my lot.

Chap. 2: 1. If therefore—*ei τις ουρ*. The precise connection indicated by the particle *ουρ* is not easy to specify. It appears to be equivalent to the English particle *now*, which is frequently recapitulatory—If, *now*, there be any consolation, etc.—and seems to refer to the portion of the exhortation which preceded, especially the 27th verse, recapitulating, as it were, the exhortations and the connected circumstances, or recalling them to view before proceeding with the following direct appeal: These things now being so, ye Philippians—seeing that you are a Christian band, a holy body politic in the gospel, and bound to maintain harmony and unity in doctrine and practice, notwithstanding the threats of your enemies, etc.—if, *now*, there be any consolation and comfort springing from your mutual love as Christians ; if any participation in one and the same Spirit ; if any cordial affection and sympathies, I entreat you fill up the measure of my joy by being thus perfectly harmonious in doctrine and practice. Or, as the English idiom would rather require, By the consolation and comfort springing from mutual love, etc., I beseech you be of one mind, etc. The second verse has occasioned much

commentary. Theological and metaphysical science, and we may add, the stores of philology, have been ransacked in order to draw a distinction between the expressions *το αὐτο φρονοῦντες*, and *το ἐν φρονοῦντες*, conceiving the dignity and even inspiration of the apostle to be at stake if he has been guilty of a tautology ; hence *το αὐτο φρονοῦντες* has been found to mean, being of the same opinion in doctrine, and *το ἐν φρονοῦντες*, being of one accord in the performance of the offices of mutual love. In our view a tautology, so far from evidencing a deficiency of taste or ability or inspiration in the Scripture writers, frequently expresses, in accordance with oriental idiom, what we express in the occidental languages, by means of intensives or superlatives. So that the whole verse, *ἵνα το αὐτο φρονητε, τὴν αὐτὴν ἀγάπην ἔχοντες, συμψυχοι, το ἐν φρονοῦντες*, conveys to our mind simply this, that ye be perfectly harmonious in faith and practice.

Verse 3. Avoid all strife and vain glory, ambition, contentions for superiority, springing from mutual envy, as I informed you is lamentably the case here at Rome ; but in lowliness of mind, let each regard himself inferior to others. Be not absorbed with your own concerns, or in the concern for your own reputation and glory, but give heed also to the concerns of others. The words of our Saviour himself, Matt. 20 : 25—28, throw a strong light on this passage : “ But Jesus called them unto him, and said, Ye know that the princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them, and they that are great exercise authority upon them. But it shall not be so among you : whosoever will be great among you, let him be your minister ; and whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant : even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many.”

Verse 5. Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus : who being in the form of God, *ὡς ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ υπαρχων*.

What is the precise import of the phrase *ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ υπαρχων* ? Does the apostle mean to say, Who, being very God in nature, essence, and substance, or, resembling God, the image of

God, or merely clothed with authority from God? Does he refer to the glory which our Saviour had with the Father before the world was, or to the real nature and exalted character which he possessed while on earth, which however he concealed for the time, and did not ostentatiously display? All these opinions, and perhaps more, have been maintained, some supporting the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ, and some denying it. The passage therefore deserves the prayerful attention of every Christian teacher. Without loss of time we shall proceed directly to the examination of the phrase. The grand inquiry being, we conceive, What would the persons addressed in this case most probably and naturally understand the apostle to mean by the phrase *ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ*? This may be ascertained from the *usus loquendi* itself, and from the scope of the argument or main design of the writer.

1. The word *μορφή* cannot, we believe, be found in classical, Septuagint, New Testament, or Patristic Greek, in the sense of *nature* or *essence*, except perhaps in some of the fathers, where an attempt is made to explain the passage. Chrysostom, for example, says, *ἡ μορφή του θεου—φύσις*. “The form of God is the nature of God.” The passages frequently cited from Eurip. *Bacchæ*, line 4 and 54, cannot be satisfactory to any one who is aware of the license of poetical phraseology, and of the custom which prevailed among the Greeks and the Romans of giving a form, *μορφή*, a visible shape to their deities. The passages are these:

μορφήν δ' ἀμειψας ἐκ θεοῦ βροτῆσιαν.

From a God, I take the form of a mortal.

*ὧν οὐνεκ' εἶδος θνητον ἀλλαξας ἔχω
μορφήν τ' ἐμὴν μετεβαλον εἰς ἀνδρὸς φύσιν.*

For which reason I have assumed the mortal shape, having left my former *condition* and taken the *form* of man.

The established significations of the word *μορφή* are these—form, shape, external appearance, habiliment, visible condi-

tion, splendour displayed, image, similitude. A large collection of citations may be seen in Wetstein N. T., at this passage, where the citations from Josephus as the nature of the case dictates, are peculiarly valuable. We cannot conceive, then, that the Philippians, when they read this phrase, *εἰ μ. θ. ἰπ.*, understood any thing more or less than this: Who, being the *visible, palpable, manifest expression* of the *Deity*; beaming with divine effulgence, God manifest in the flesh, the express image of his person; alluding principally to that external display of divine effulgence, by which the Godhead shone through the man, and which they and Christians of all ages, although not seeing him in the flesh, yet believing on him, can and do realize. And this accords, as we proceed to remark, with

2. The scope of the apostle's argument, or his main design. He exhorts them to condescension, humility, modesty, self-abasement, and mutual subjection, notwithstanding their spiritual superiority over some of their brethren, who were not entirely liberated from the yoke of Judaism—pleads the example of Christ, who, being the brightness of the Father's glory, and the express image of his person, God manifest in the flesh, in whom dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily, who dwelt among us full of grace and truth, whose glory we beheld, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father. This Jesus, notwithstanding his exalted dignity, his palpable brightness, his ineffable glory, voluntarily humbled himself to the lowest condition, became a servant, bled upon the cross. This brings us to the phrase, "Thought it not robbery to be equal with God," *οὐχ ἀρπαγμον ἡγήσατο το εἶναι ἰσα θεῷ*. We confess we feel an inexpressible pleasure in the conviction which after considerable investigation forces itself upon us, that whether the phrase be taken more literally, as our translators have done, or more idiomatically, as many if not most of the distinguished critics have done, the sense is substantially the same, and consistent with the grand aim of the apostle, and the sublime strain of the exhortation. The various meanings attached to this phrase may be reduced to two.

1st. *οὐχ ἀρπαγμον ἡγήσατο το εἶναι ἰσα θεῷ.* Did not regard this equality with God in the light of a spoil, i. e. did not seize it with avidity or display it with ostentation, or retain it with tenacity, but made himself of no reputation, etc., and

2d. Thought it not robbery to be equal with God, i. e., did not conceive it an infringement on the prerogatives of God to assert this equality with him, i. e. might well have displayed this equality with God, the Divine majesty, authority and splendour—but, nevertheless, notwithstanding this, he made himself of no reputation, etc. This latter translation is certainly more consistent with the uniform sense of the word *ἀρπαγμος*, which denotes the *act* of *robbing*; while *ἀρπαγμα*, which is found in the idiomatical phrase above alluded to, denotes *a spoil*, or the *thing seized*. Although we are desirous as far as possible to avoid citations of authorities and phrases, and rather furnish results in a condensed form than a tedious detail of parallelisms and quotations—still, we cannot refuse the pleasure of mentioning the support which the literal interpretation of this passage, conformable to our excellent version, has received from the opinion of the venerable De Sacy, the great oriental scholar of France. His translation runs thus: He considered it not an encroachment on the prerogatives of God to display himself as God:

Verse 7. But divested himself of this glorious display for a season, became a servant, and being in the form and fashion of a man, humbled himself, being obedient unto death, even the ignominious death of the cross.

In review of this most interesting passage, we remark,

1. The apostle does not *directly assert* the divinity of our Saviour, i. e. it was not his aim here to dwell on this as a doctrine, and enforce it on the minds of the Philippians. He rather assumes it as a well known and well established doctrine, and applies it in his noble exhortation, and brings into view the visible manifest effulgence, the accorded divine glory which he might have displayed, but which display he waved. And the indirect manner in which the doctrine is brought to

view, renders the passage a not less satisfactory proof-passage of the doctrine.

2. It was necessary, however, in order to give its full force to the exhortation, to allude to the doctrine, and assume it clearly. The more exalted the prerogatives, the brighter the glory, the more dignified the real character, the more striking the humiliation. That the Pope should wash the feet of beggars in the imperial city is nothing; that a monarch who sways the sceptre over millions, should for a moment dispense with his regal splendour, and converse with a fellow-worm, is nothing; that an angel should come, glowing from the very throne of God, and become an ambassador of God on earth, is nothing. But that the only begotten Son of God, the King of kings and Lord of lords, should wave the glorious display of his ineffable brightness, being made a little lower than the angels for the suffering of death, should dwell among men, be spit upon, crowned with thorns, and nailed to a cross; *here* is a bright, a powerful example, an eloquent, an irresistible appeal. Methinks we hear the loud strain of the choirs of heaven, when they sweep the strings with enthusiasm, and sing: Worthy is the Lamb that was slain to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and blessing, while from earth is faintly responded, For he was slain for us.

ARTICLE V.

A PURE AND SOUND LITERATURE.

By REV. CHARLES WHITE, D. D., President of Wabash College.

MIND being the only part of man capable of excitement, impression, and improvement, every valuable change upon an individual or a community must be wrought by an action directly on the internal spiritual being. The persons exercising

powerful sway over their contemporaries, are those who have acquaintance and sympathy with the spiritual elements of man rather than the physical, who address themselves to intellect, who stir thought, who commune with the heart, who kindle and modify affection, who arouse volition. Wealth has power, bone and muscle have power, laws have power; but they who are furnished by education and talent to act on the intellectual and moral elements of society appropriate and wield the whole.

No class of intellectual labourers do more for good or evil than the contributors to our popular literature. No productions of mind pass more directly and largely, as elemental nutrition, into the character of our population, than do the works of these favourites of the public. What, therefore, shall be the intellectual and moral qualities of the books thrown abroad upon the country for general reading, is a practical and deeply momentous question.

We propose in this paper to offer our readers a few thoughts on *the value of a sound, pure literature*.

In this discussion polite learning will be left to stand on the basis of its own independent worth, without determining its comparative rank, and without at all disparaging other departments of study.

I. A preliminary consideration, showing the value of a sound, pure literature, is the displacement, which it would effect, of a superficial and corrupt one.

The removal of an evil may be as important a service, as the introduction of a positive good. The extermination of poisonous plants, by cultivation, may be as important a result as a harvest. The drying up a fatal miasma, in recovering low lands, may be even more important than all the subsequent crops which may be yielded. There is a light and vicious literature spread over our country, and even our world, fitly likened to poisonous plants, and to a deadly exhalation, which is to be supplanted and removed by the works of sound and pure writers. This injurious literature comes to us in the shape of pamphlets, monthlies, quarterlies, an-

nuals, novels in shilling numbers, and sometimes in more imposing volumes.

The first epithet just given to these works, light, frivolous, superficial, is sufficient to condemn them. By their levity, their emptiness, their almost vacuity, they enfeeble the intellect of the country essentially and permanently.

Originally, as is well known, the human mind is indolent thoroughly. Without shame it will consent to be put in leading strings, and go whither another's caprice or interest may dictate. Sometimes, more easily still, it will submit to lie passively open, like a common pond between contiguous neighbours, to receive whatever may be thrown in, clean or filthy. A superficial literature encourages this inherent depravity—this inveterate intellectual laziness. It furnishes for the mind occupation, but not employment; gives a good supply, but no solid growth; produces pleasure, but not invigoration; creates a sickly craving, but no healthy appetite. It makes men mere consumers and not producers. As waters passing along an aqueduct, it courses through the intellect without effecting either enlargement or advantage. It is of course, that the reading which makes little or no demand on the intellectual powers, will exercise and task them into no vigour or invention. There does seem to be at first view some increased magnitude of mind, on the part of the assiduous readers of our light popular works, but it is the fullness of the dropsy. The farther the enlargement proceeds, the greater is the internal disease and debility. These readers are like men breathing a rarefied atmosphere, they take in fuller, quicker inspirations, but they pant, they are faint, their lungs collapse. Give them a dense, fresh, vigorous air! Send abroad a rich and solid and manly literature, to recover the intellect of the country from prostration and breathlessness!

The superficial levity of our popular works contributes to depreciate the intellectual character of the country also, by creating a dainty and fastidious taste which unfits for all serious and sober studies. Precisely to the extent that a com-

munity is occupied and pleased with light literature, does a hearty disrelish of hard mental application grow up and become invincible. The voracious readers of such a literature forswear all books which demand patient research and intense thought, for the same reason that a child, fed on confectionary, declines plain, solid food, or a sinecure office-holder, the sweating toils of life. Indulgence in light reading will always be at war with all sound scholarship and all great intellectual exertion. As long as men can sit in their easy chairs and be furnished with glass and oyster-shell imitations, they will refuse to dig into quarries, even for the diamond; or to dive to the sea bottom, though it should be to bring up pearls. A vitiated taste, producing disgust with mental industry and profound learning, is at this moment preventing the intellectual attainments, and dwarfing the intellectual stature of the great body of the American people. Industrious minds, of only fair and respectable standing among their contemporaries in the times of Milton and Shakspeare and Johnson, in opulence of thought certainly surpass even the eminent literary writers of the present age.

But levity and emptiness do not constitute the chief objection to the popular productions referred to. Many of them are pernicious decidedly in their moral tendency. So far as they treat of men and the world their first injury is done by presenting life materially overdrawn, unduly successful, joyous, and exciting. Readers, fresh from those productions where they have been thrilled and absorbed with ideal beauty, pleasure, and splendour, turn and meet the cold realities of the world they live in, with a heart deeply saddened, disgusted, depressed. It is in this state of feverish thirst for stirring and brilliant things, and of consequent dissatisfaction with the unexciting incidents and monotonous matter-of-fact duties of real life, that the young abandon the ways of industry and virtue, and repair to vicious society, to the gaming table, to the theatre, to intemperance, to debauchery. But if the scenes, through which the sparkling authors of our light literature lead the young and vicious, be truly the bright

and the beautiful, it must be a mistake, we are told, to suppose there is so much danger in the simple fact, that they are imaginary. The result however is, that dazzling the visual organs, by means of the unreal and unattainable, makes the actual scene of our life and labour appear so covered with cheerless gloom, as to settle young buoyant spirits into inefficiency, or drive them off into dissipation and ruin. These authors, however the world may call them delightful enchanters, deserve the appellation of dangerous destroyers.

Many works belonging to our popular literature exert a demoralizing influence, by an extravagant excitement of the passive feelings, at the same time that they totally neglect any exercise of the active virtues. This seriously injures both. It is a well known law of our moral nature, that our passive and our active principles are deteriorated in precisely opposite methods, the former by exercise, the latter by the want of it. Being accustomed to distress, lessens the keenness of our pain on approaching it, and being accustomed to leave it unrelieved, diminishes our aptitude to acts of kindness. Although natural sensibility is blunted and enfeebled by being constantly witness to the miseries of life, yet, if our active nature is put into vigorous exercise in removing them, benevolent principle is so far strengthened by their action, that the aggregate of what is efficiently sympathetic in us, will be rather increased than diminished. But when, by the presentation of fictitious woes, we are thrown into excitement without being thrown into action; are pained at the evils men suffer, without being prompted to aid in their removal or mitigation, our sensibilities are worn out by familiarity with human affliction, and our active benevolence by neglecting them. Both operations together work a sad depreciation of our moral nature.

There is a large class of works, which inflict deep injury on the character precisely in the method here indicated. They lead us into scenes of unreal distress without asking or receiving from us any personal ministration, and call us to joy over imaginary bliss without moving us to make to it the least

contribution of our own, until, to both the actual suffering and substantial weal of men, we become almost as indifferent as men in their graves: until those active principles, which are the spring of all valuable accomplishment, seem too deeply paralyzed ever to wake again. Deliver us from those, who day and night excite their hearts, and lay to sleep their active virtues over sorrow and joy, which, being never experienced, demand no active relief. Too misanthropic, unsympathizing, peevish, selfish, cold, they are for any human companionship, or any valuable influence.

There is one class of works constituting a part of our popular literature, which effects a vitiation of the community, by the exhibition of an audacious, undisguised depravity.

Paul De Kock and Bulwer furnish examples. The former every where, the latter not unfrequently, introduces his readers to characters and scenes of avowed and open treachery, intemperance and licentiousness. It is the first impression of many persons, that writers, who indulge in the delineation of such professed and unblushing wickedness, will so surely awaken feelings of revolt and disgust, as to become their own antidote; to banish themselves from all societies refined enough to read and relish a valuable literature; and then to push their way into places, where morals are already as low if not some grades lower than their own. Would to Heaven this were so; that there were, as some charitably believe there are, such sensitive tendencies to virtue in man, that these foul writers would be sure to meet an indignant repudiation in all cultivated communities. But the humiliating fact is, productions of even unmasked depravity are sought for and read in the high places and low places and middle places of society, and that almost equally. In all these spheres, do they deeply corrupt manners and morals. Having crowded the imagination of excitable, impressible youth full with all vile things, they work their mischief in the simple process of furnishing oil to a flame, or prey to a young lion. They present the very nutrition on which bad propensities in man feed and grow. The vicious appetites are too susceptible and strong, too urgent and clam-

orous for gratification, to render it ever safe to lay open the scenes and objects which excite them, and which administer to them, however repulsive the development might be to virtuous sensibility.

Good morals are injured by many of our literary writers, in still another and an opposite method. We allude to an indirect and disguised encouragement of bad opinions, bad passions, and bad actions. Mischievous as are those unconcealed familiarities with vice just alluded to, contaminations diffused under a mask and a fair profession are more dangerous and fatal, because unsuspected. There is a portion of our popular reading, which, at the same time that it is making confident pretence to a love and advocacy of truth, purity and honour, is giving, unobserved, a death-wound to them all. The evil, like an infection in the air, is so invisibly disposed in the mass, that the unthinking are poisoned before they are aware of its presence. It lies under the surface, in the form of a sly insinuation against the Divine authority of Christianity; of a covert sneer at the faith and conscientious strictness of the pious; of a concealed ridicule of the fastidious carefulness of parents over domestic morals; of a suppressed contempt for the proprieties and purities of behaviour prescribed by good society. By this mode of writing, while nothing is actually said, every thing is communicated. Young readers are unsettled in principles, and corrupted in morals, by books containing not one explicit infidel sentiment, nor one open justification of vice.

Authors of this class, who effect their mischief in hidden and indirect methods, often give currency and influence to dissipation and infidelity, by introducing them in company with the blandishments of wealth and family, of fashion and pleasure. Vice, by losing in this association with refinement and splendour all its grossness, loses to the gay and young more than half its odiousness. It seems even to partake of the attractions which are made to attend upon it. The inebriate, the seducer, and even the murderer, as introduced to us by our most popular writers, is so gallant, generous,

wealthy, gifted, and fortunate, as to act far more as a decoy into crime than as a beacon to warn off from destruction. The fallen and the unfortunate, in the works of some authors, although ruined by crime, is described as having fallen almost wholly in consequence of a mere excess of those qualities, which make others angels. That which ruins him, we are assured, is a generosity too generous, a frankness too unsuspecting, a gentleness too mild, an affection too confiding. After they are fallen, they are represented as afflicted, and unfortunate, and penitent, and meek enough to have expiated their sin not only, but to have clothed themselves in more charms than they possessed before their delinquency. Who does not see that such innocent, beautiful delinquents will be more pitied than condemned, and, as examples, more imitated than avoided?

In estimating the evil exerted on society, by the impure portion of our popular literature, their influence within the sphere of domestic life demands a special consideration. There are very few popular writers, who, if they corrupt good morals, leave the relations of the family constitution unimpaired. As these domestic associations are the most permanent which are ever constituted, and as out of them issue the most powerful and the most desirable influences which society ever feels, an injury inflicted here is capital, lasting, irreparable. It is not mere accident, that the French have no word for home. Domestic ties are too feeble in France; conjugal, parental, filial and fraternal obligations too little regarded, to make homes numerous or well appreciated there. The strong influence of a portion of our popular literature is, to establish French society in this country; to relax the bonds which hold families together in a dear and holy companionship; to make husbands and fathers gallants, wives and mothers partners in intrigues, children pleasure-hunters and fashionables, and home a place of discontent, disorder, folly, waste, restlessness and bad passions. Nothing is more to be deprecated than the circulation of works, which have a tendency to act thus on the domestic relations. An evil influence at the homes of a community is like a destruction at the roots of our trees, a poison

at the fountains of our waters, a mortification at the seat of our vital organs. If principle and morals are unsound in these holy enclosures, our homes, the best sanctuaries of virtue, are sanctuaries no more ; the best walls that defend her, are broken down.

It is not intended by any of these remarks to assert that our corrupt literature is all impurity and evil, without any redeeming qualities. It has many harmless and even valuable attractions. Among others, there is often displayed a grace, sprightliness, and eloquence of style rarely surpassed or equalled. But this very beauty and wealth of language, which add so much to the value of sound, healthy works, only make the impure more dangerous. They serve to soften down the aspect of vices, and give them freer and wider currency. They oftener perhaps divert attention, occupy and absorb the reader, while, almost insensibly, underneath the captivating elegancies, a current of corruption is running directly into his heart, just as a false and impressive display of force will occupy the attention of soldiery, until the enemy unperceived has planted himself in the heart of a city.

Some of the most licentious works, which circulate in the country, in point of language, never utter a word to offend the most virtuous and sensitive, but maintain in expression the utmost propriety and delicacy. The style, however, is that which has more than meets the ear. The vilest scenes and objects lie half seen below. The whole imagination, in this way, is crowded and corrupted with the most polluted things, without raising a blush on the cheek of innocence.

Our light and vicious literature is a calm water with slimy reptiles at the bottom. It is a beautiful lawn where biting serpents are stealthily crawling. It is a natural phosphorescence, the evolution of light out of rottenness. It is an array of flowers on a thin, boggy covering ; whoever goes after them, falls into inextricable depths below.

The tendency of a multiplication in this country of works of this light and vicious description, is matter of just regret and alarm. Whatever philosophers may say of a fixed order

in nature, and of an unchanging stability, the world of mind and morals is one of constant transitions. The valuable is always sliding into the useless ; the harmless into the noxious ; the good into the bad. Polite literature has not escaped this tendency. Its light, unhealthy, pernicious publications, in numbers without number, are now seen coming up over all the country like the locusts of Egypt, borne by a mighty east wind. Happy for us, if there were a counter wind from the Alleghanies, from our Prairies, from the Rocky Mountains, to drive them all back into the sea. They drop down upon the whole surface of the land. The current that flows over to us, has no ebb and no remission. To look for it to subside, is like sitting down on the bank, to wait for the whole Mississippi river to run by, while the clouds are pouring waters back into its sources faster than they are discharged at its mouth. The best way to stop and turn back a strong current, is to raise up against it another and a stronger to bear it away. A dam athwart only raises still higher the waters, to burst away and carry down more surely all our obstructions. The best way to stop the ravages of a hungry army, is not to increase its appetite and thereby its rapacity, by removing provisions, but by feeding it full with what is better than can be obtained by means of plunder. Our best remedy for the destructive literature, which covers the land, will be the diffusion of a noble and a good one to occupy its place, and to feed the people with knowledge and understanding.

There can be offered to fatigued lawyers, harassed legislators, care-worn merchants, jaded physicians, exhausted students, productions affording both eloquence and truth, vivacity and purity, refreshment and instruction, thrilling interest, and intellectual discipline. The general circulation and popularity of these would effect a grand reformation in mind and morals, like the renewal of the face of the world after the desolation of the flood. All pure-minded and Christian men of intelligence would most cordially hail the auspicious change.

As a farther commendation of a sound and pure literature, we proceed to a direct consideration of the wealth and value of

that, which the great and good have furnished for the present age.

As the word literature designates, when employed in its popular sense, the more agreeable and graceful exhibitions of human knowledge, to bring any works under this term except the sound and the pure would seem almost a perversion. Certainly, nothing but the substantial and the uncorrupt deserves the epithets, agreeable and graceful. As however the light and the solid, the excellent and the vile, are usually clustered together under the general appellation of literary productions, our business now will be, to speak of the truly noble, beautiful, useful and solid, which is afforded us in the several species of writing, embraced in the term popular literature.

Among the most sprightly and entertaining of literary works, are Voyages and Travels. These furnish an unusual variety of instruction, attended with an unusual amount of interest. In delineating nature, society, manners, government, religion, the describers are eye-witnesses, and sketch with an instructiveness and truth, a freshness and vivacity belonging to original observers, who make their pencillings on the spot where they take their observations, and record their impressions in the very presence of the objects which produce them. Voyages and Travels of the right character contain a rich collection of natural phenomena. True, travellers and voyagers are not always scientific men, but they are competent to record what actually happens upon the heavens, upon the earth, and upon the waters. Their jottings down are a noble treasury of materials for the construction of philosophy, in the true Baconian method.

These traversings of sea and land possess all the stirring incident, all the perilous and strange adventure, all the suspended interest, which, by the most fastidious class of readers, are deemed indispensable in a popular literature. They are never wanting in developments of man as he appears in every nook and corner and continent of the world, in descriptions of curious religious customs, strange opinions, novel states of society. They are never wanting in the richest and grand-

est scenery. The greater part of it, unmarred by man, wears the beauty and magnificence left upon it by the original Maker and Builder. Tourists make their accounts of journeys, of countries and of people so living, present, and real, that readers at once feel themselves out in the wide world, breathing, in company with them, the bracing ocean air, penetrating distant continents, ascending rivers, looking down from mountains, entering the abodes of men, talking in his own cabin with the Polander, Swiss, African, Indian, Chinese, Hindoo, and Greenlander. There are authors of this class whom it is just to describe as copious with truth, exciting with adventure, vivacious with description, rich with literary embellishment. Possessing gayety without uselessness, variety without discursiveness, vivacity without levity, detail without tediousness, allurements without temptation, they are not only entirely a safe but a prolific fund of solid instruction and great refreshment.

Oratory is another department of literature, which furnishes some of the noblest and purest models of taste and intellectual power to be found in our language. Much of the more brilliant eloquence of every people has been oral, and therefore perished with the occasion which produced it. That which has been preserved exhibits a mental energy, a magnanimity of sentiment, and a moral tone, of a very high order. Even when the causes, on which men have spoken, have not been of special impressiveness and importance, by the excitement of opposition, by the collision of mind, by the impulses of an intellectual rivalry, there have been awakened an original invention, a logical skill, and a luxuriance of thought and imagination, which greatly enriched the literature that appropriated them. There are sometimes important conjunctures and interests, which call out higher displays of intellectual power, and furnish nobler contributions to the standard works of the time. It has occurred in deliberative assemblies, that the weal of one fourth part of mankind was suspended upon the result of a single debate. Sometimes at the bar, the honour and life of an individual, who had concentrated upon

himself the sympathy and the thoughts of an age, has constituted the grand absorbing subject. In our old Continental Congress, under the form of a proposition to separate three millions of colonists from the mother country, was agitated the grand and general question between power and right. And the speakers well understood that, in the decision then to be made, were interested, directly or remotely, the liberties and privileges of all the civilized, that should afterward dwell on the earth. At that most imposing of human tribunals, the Diet of Worms, composed of church dignitaries, civil functionaries, and crowned heads from the chief courts of Europe, the condemnation or acquittal of Martin Luther was to decide, whether the darkness of the previous thousand years should burst away, and awake a world ; or should brood on, to protract and deepen its long, leaden slumber. On such exciting and vast occasions the human mind outacts and outsoars itself. Its eloquence assumes a splendour and a power, which surpass all models, precedents and expectations. The passages and volumes, offered to our perusal by the bar and the public assembly, are generally written under this unusual excitement of the intellect, and this lofty enthusiasm of the heart. They possess all that superior literary excellence and power naturally arising from the circumstances of their origin.

The pulpit, also, has used its advantages for an instructive and powerful eloquence. The pulpit stands midway between heaven and a world revolted. Its appeals are to the strongest passions that stir in man ; its arguments are drawn from three worlds ; its themes are, the immeasurable, the perfect, the eternal ! It is true, we have dull sermons by the thousand, and controversial volumes on matters of theology, by the alcove. It is true, also, that we have sermons and theological discussions of the highest order of composition, of the most brilliant and enduring eloquence. The French preachers, the most eminent of whom are Bossuet, Fenelon, Bourdaloue, Massillon and Saurin, with their enthusiasm of imagination and passion—the English, as Atterbury, Leigh-

ton, Taylor, Bates, Butler, Baxter, Howe, with their profound learning, elaborate argument, and exceeding wealth of thought—the American, as Edwards, Witherspoon, Dwight and Mason, with their practical sense, and direct unshrinking appeals—introduce into the popular reading, of which they are permitted to constitute a part, very important and very noble elements. They infuse a practical instructiveness, a loftiness of morals, an enthusiasm of truth, an earnestness of thought, a vigorous manliness of style, which are indispensable in the right and successful development and formation of the mind.

Another species of writing, furnishing productions adapted to improve both the taste and the intellect, is the philosophical. The subject-matters discoursed of in this class of works, are spread over the ground lying between strict Theology and impracticable Metaphysics. All moral disquisitions, in the unpretending form of dissertations, essays, and periodical effusions, belong appropriately to this department of literature. The popular and practical of our treatises on moral and intellectual philosophy, may also, without impropriety, be included.

Although man is the grand object here, as he is directly or indirectly in most literary writings, he is not treated of physically, as countries and climates have moulded him ; not historically, as political organizations and influences have presented him, but spiritually and morally. He is treated of in respect to the constitution and phenomena of his whole internal being. This includes the entire mental and moral capabilities which he possesses ; the influence he may receive and exert ; the vast interests he may hazard or secure. These philosophical works are occupied with our intellectual and moral relations, our intellectual and moral obligations, our intellectual and moral destinies. They are enriched with observations on life, worth, happiness, and immortality.

History furnishes a chapter for literary reading, of a highly interesting and important character, relating to the origin, character, and progress of the whole human race. His-

tory, it is true, becomes less interesting when it carries us to courts, camps, sieges and battle-fields. But the struggles of ambition and the resistance of power, the crowning of kings and the prostration of empires, are things collateral and subsidiary. The grand objects of history, standing high above these, are man, mind, society, government, the methods of Providence with the world, and the methods of the world with Providence.

In order to set before us truly and vividly these great facts, the historian takes us back to the beginning of the world, and then, from the first impulses of passion and of intellect, from the birth of society and government, conducts us down, along the whole current of human affairs and human developments.

History possesses no small amount of interest, from this ancientness alone. We love every thing that has seen distant times; that is moss-covered and hoary with the passage of centuries. It derives a much greater attractiveness, however, from its instructiveness. "History," says Cicero, "is the test of time, the light of truth, the life of memory, the rule of life, the messenger of antiquity." "It is philosophy," remarks Lord Bacon, "teaching by example." The great teacher of the world, the Bible, employs historical narration very largely, as the vehicle of instruction.

All matters of mind and morals being governed, like the phenomena of nature, by uniform laws, the world that is past will always be, in many important respects, a prototype of the world that is to come. The future will be the past, with the additional modification of incidental influences, just as the heavens, imaged in the waters below, are precisely the heavens above, with the added casual motion of the element where the shadow is embosomed. We need, therefore, to dwell in the past world long and familiarly, in order to know how to live in the present and the future.

History is an extensive table of causes and effects. Or, rather, it is a vast philosophical chamber, where, in order to test all theories and opinions, you witness a grand succession

of experiments on man, on society, on government, on education, on morals, on religion. To teach the nature and effects of the various forms of human government, the historian first leads us into the tent of venerable Abraham, and shows us the patriarchal system in actual operation; and then, in order to present us with the model of a Theocracy, makes us the eye-witnesses of the benign results of a government of that sort, under which the descendants of Jacob lived for eight hundred years. As an example of the best possible form and influence of a monarchy, he presents the same remarkable people, under several illustrious and pious kings. So the Despotisms and Republics of later times, as also all other forms of exercising supreme rule, are laid open to us. This is done, not so much by description as representation. We are conducted in person to the seats of power, that we may observe for ourselves the exercise of authority; and then we are invited to the abodes of the people, that we may be eye-witnesses of the different influences exerted there.

This sage teacher is specially concerned to record, with fulness and accuracy, whatever pertains appropriately to the developments and achievements of the human mind. It loves to carry us along over all the past pathways of the human intellect, but uses special eloquence to detain us at the brilliant literary epochs. At the tenth century, before the Christian era, it calls us to witness the human mind emerging and bursting in power on the world, in the persons and works of such giant spirits as Homer, Solomon, and Isaiah. The display of intellect at this period is represented to us so remarkable and unprecedented, as to appear like a new and splendid creation, rather than any development of what had before existed. History, with still greater interest, stops us in Greece, in the time of Pericles, another important literary epoch. As Athens stood pre-eminent in all that elevated the general community, we are specially invited into this city, and presented there with a panoramic view of the physical, moral, and intellectual energies which characterized that whole classic country. We see despotism crumbling down,

and giving place to a free form of government. We visit splendid specimens of art ; we hear Plato and Socrates discourse on Philosophy ; we go into the senate, and hear the orators, Æschines and Demosthenes, responding to each other, in powerful bursts of eloquence, like thunder-shock answering to thunder-shock, from clouds on opposite mountains. By means of these collected literary exhibitions, we are brought into the presence of the highest mental illumination at that time existing on the earth. In holding communion with this concentrated intellect of Greece, we hold communion with the whole literary spirit of an illustrious age. In the same way history conducts us to Rome, in the time of Augustus, another period of intellectual resurrection and power. There it introduces us to the great and gifted, who would have made that city the mistress of the world, without her generals or her armies. So, also, in all the following centuries, wherever and whenever mind has awoken from sleep, assumed new attitudes, shone out in unusual splendour, and attempted new labours for the benefit and the elevation of man, there history has paused with peculiar pleasure, gathered up her richest materials, and written her most eloquent pages.

History has another great and elevated subject. We refer to the true religion, to the part it has acted in the affairs and interests of the world. History marks and records the aspect and form which this divine agency has assumed, and the changes it has wrought in each nation and age where it has been allowed to exist. Describing it as the grand modifying and conservative principle of human society, as the original author of civilization, of peace, of human progress, of permanent amelioration, of happiness ; history enlivens and ennobles many of its chapters, by a faithful representation of its elevating tendencies and holy achievements.

Such being the noble objects and themes of history, if well written, it must always be richly fraught with the most interesting matters of instruction, with the most solid and dignified eloquence. It stereotypes the whole face of past

centuries, and then unrolls before us the splendid chart, for our study and entertainment. If the ocean had preserved the traces of every prosperous passage over its bosom ; if it had retained the gurgling of its waters over every spot where a vessel went down, held a broken spar or ship-fragment upon every rock and sand-bank where one was split or stranded, it would be an image of the palpable, important, and impressive instruction presented to us by faithful, graphic history.

A source of the elegant and the valuable in literature, more prolific than any of those which have been mentioned, is Poetry. No part of polite learning is more liable to be undervalued than poetry. Some have looked upon it as a fairy, that lives on the breath of flowers, walks the invisible air, presides over night-dreams, and day-dreams quite as unsubstantial. Others, though they have regarded it as possessing somewhat more of the actual and substantial, have yet looked upon it as a mere embellishment, like an architectural ornament, a cornice or a frieze, beautiful, indeed, but contributing nothing to durability or usefulness. It is very true, that poetry has much of the pleasing and graceful ; so is it true that it has no lack of the good and useful. If trees may be an image of it, it is their rich foliage, their noble, beautiful forms, and their clustering fruit. If the seasons may be, it is the harvest time of the year, the good time of ripeness, of cheer and of plenty. Thus, poetry blends the graceful with the important, the pleasing with the useful. Poetical productions occupy the same place in the works of mind, which the constellations do in the heavens. They constitute the bright places, which catch the eye and put the heart into a rapture. And then, in addition, they perform great and valuable services, just as these clustered stars, besides contributing their beauty and brilliancy, perform each the solid labour of warming and conducting a family of worlds.

Certainly, there are no productions of the mind which are more redolent of instruction, which are fraught with higher

invention or greater power. Indeed, when the intellectual powers are nerved to their highest point of action, and the moral spirit is pervaded by its loftiest and purest enthusiasm, the creations are always substantially poetical. Though the accuracy of metrical numbers be not preserved, the grand elements of the richest poetry will be present. If this be so, if the essential character of poetry be, that it is the language of our higher conceptions and nobler feelings, then this part of our literature, possessed of the superadded advantages of its elegant graces, should be turned to by readers, as affording invaluable models of taste and instructive eloquence. The best poetry has a concentration, and point, and graphicness, and imagery, which give it a vast effectiveness, as well as an unusual brilliancy.

The best thoughts, and the best feelings, which our language embodies and bears abroad to men, are to be found in the poetry of our native tongue. The student of these poets finds himself among those who never speak without furnishing him needed instruction, without stirring his sympathies, without cheering and delighting his meditations. They are not so brilliant as to dazzle, nor so unadorned as to be left unread; not so high as to be invisible, nor so low as to make his communion with them depressing. They swell and enrich all the channels of noble thought, and of pure and generous feeling.

We have a few writers of poetry, of still higher rank. Among the poets, let it be remembered, are Shakspeare, Milton, Pope, and Young. The first two know no superiors in giant power of mind. The two others, though of lower grade, also possess a high order of intellect. These men open to us a field of greater elevation and wealth of thought, than is done by any equal number of writers in the whole circle of English authorship. And these authors, of such intellectual magnitude, also stand unrivalled in poetical grace and beauty. Light and feeble works are rather injured than benefited by embellishment. Like the illumination of vapour, they are made thereby to appear still more unsubstantial.

But the elegance and brilliancy belonging to the productions of these master minds, like sunset glories on lofty mountain ranges, make the vastness and height underneath to appear in more grandeur, more strength, more majesty.

The subjects of poetry are, in themselves, of great dignity and interest, and assist to give to this department of literature its superior elevation and gracefulness.

Poetry wholly refuses to lend her language and imagery to embellish and diffuse either moral corruptions or poisonous opinions. Rhyme and measure, it is admitted, may be thus prostituted. But poetry, the true "*ars divina*," is outraged by such a connection. It is no more divine. Its power is crushed. Its loftiness is laid low. It is an eagle brought down from its glorious pathway to the sun, and made to walk, a grovelling thing, in the dust. Poetry consents to embody only the pure, the true, the beautiful, the noble. These qualities it finds largely distributed in the external world. Accordingly, one of its favourite themes is nature. Wherever, in his works, God has been unusually munificent; wherever, as in some valley, sleeping between two opened hill ranges, he has thrown together, in profusion, almost every refreshing, picturesque, and beautiful object; wherever he has planted grand forests, piled up mountains, cut mountain gorges, poured inland seas over precipices, or, in the space above, clustered and hung out worlds; there poetry finds the choicest subjects of her pencil; there, gifted to discover charms not seen by others, she catches a high and unappreciated inspiration. She appears invested with the native grace, the simple grandeur belonging to the objects which she loves and transcribes.

Human society presents valuable themes for poetry. The purity and truth, the affection and confidence, the gentleness and peace, the charity and happiness to be found in domestic scenes; the artlessness of nature, the contentment of few desires, the action of moral principle, the progress of civilization, to be found in larger communities—these constitute the subjects of our most amiable, graceful, and instructive poetical writers.

Man, in his own construction, is a poetical theme of transcendent interest. Great intellect and exalted virtue are far more consonant to the spirit and office of poetry, than any thing to be found in nature. The capacities of man to make approaches to the Divinity, his intellectual and moral aspirations and actual advances, after the great, the perfect, the infinite, are subjects which lift poetry to that sublime sphere where she manifests her highest power. Not satisfied with any general representation of the greatness of our nature and our possible accomplishments, poetry loves to pause on individual gifts, individual designs of magnanimity, individual acts of self-sacrificing virtue. As high motives and lessons, she loves to commit them to immortality.

Whether, therefore, we consider its great and attractive themes, or its own lofty nature, poetry may be affirmed to offer to the literary taste of the student, a gracefulness of form, an opulence of thought, a beauty of imagery and eloquence, which he will look in vain to find exceeded, through all the productions of the human mind. Our best poetry being, like good angels, the fairest, noblest, outward form of truth, virtue and glory, the safety and advantage of dwelling long and familiarly on these noble works, making them specially the welcome and vivacious companions of leisure hours, cannot be too strenuously insisted on.

The literature, which has now been referred to, as capable of being drawn from the several departments of Voyages and Travels, Oratory, Philosophy, History and Poetry, is truly a valuable and a splendid one. It does not, indeed, as nothing human can, come up to our "beau ideal" of a collection of elegant and instructive works for our country; but high excellencies it certainly possesses. It is here proposed, with great confidence, as a grand and invaluable substitute for the light and vicious reading, now so popular and prevalent.

Still it is true, that not only the literature first described, which has been condemned, but even that which has been commended as solid and instructive, the best which we possess, is, by some, deemed light and superficial, and held, on that ac-

count, in low estimation. These persons, among whom are included some of the judicious and learned, if they do not wholly discard polite learning, regard it as a mere grace, rather than a real good, a showy appearance, rather than a valuable substance, a temporary gratification, rather than a solid advantage. With these impressions, as was to be expected, they have looked upon the pursuits of literature as scarcely worthy of sound, manly, scientific minds.

It is well that there are men of this description. They have some truth and reason on their side. It is not without its utility, that they should for ever point us, as they do, to the exact sciences, to the mathematics and natural philosophy, and then earnestly assure us, that these are the foundation and the framework—the only things important to make a man. Foundation and framework are essential, truly, but these are not all that is valuable. What would a village of foundations and naked timbers be? And, what would be a community of men, who were mere framework, gaunt skeletons? Cover the houses; finish them within; surround them with shade, and water, and garden, and orchard. Clothe these ghastly skeletons; fill them out, and round them off with suiting material; shape them into grace and comeliness, accustom them to the civilities and gentleness of polished life. This is the literature of the matter. This is the practical, and useful, and beautiful, of man and his arrangements.

It is well that there are those, who can go out into a grand forest of pines and oaks, and think of nothing but masts and ribs for ships; and others who can pass down our valleys and rivers, interested only to look at mill-seats, facilities for slack-water navigation, and passages to push canals and railroads. But such scenery, to another order of minds, is a feeling, and a voice, and a blessed teaching, and acts on the inward spirit, to soothe, to soften, to lift it heavenward. It is to them an impressive literature—it is to them nature, in the character of a language full of high lessons and inspirations. The visible world, no doubt, was intended thus to speak to man, to speak to him attractively.

It is well that there are others, who can travel among mountain heights, out from whose rattling crags "leaps the live thunder," interested only to inquire for elevations in feet and inches, to ascertain whether the rocks are granite or pudding-stone, or to settle a question of coal or chalybeate formation. But there is more in these scenes, vastly more, than mere objects of dry, arithmetical inquiry. There is a glorious, ever-speaking literature. Mountains, "ye are wondrous strong;" in your broken grandeur ye do discourse high eloquence. Ye speak intelligibly the attributes of your Divine Author! Ye lift up the spirit of man to the great Eternal!

Well is it that there is still another class of persons, who can go out under our firmament, and, by telescope, ascend up among and beyond its worlds, and yet have nothing to talk of but parallax, azimuth, perigee or aphelion. Glorious stars! They are the poetry of heaven! Hung on the vestibule to light the way, with silent eloquence they point all the just to their holy rest. As a type and symbol of the glories within the heavenly world itself, their words are unto the end of the world. Beautiful expanse of stars! Shine upon us! Ye seem the benignant light of Jehovah's countenance, most intelligibly attracting us to reverence and devotion. Such is the literature of the heavens; day unto day uttereth speech, night unto night showeth knowledge.

It is well that there are persons of a still stranger description, who can look on man, bearing the impress of God, and holding in his hand an invitation to dwell in the presence of the eternal throne in heaven, and then set themselves down, as mere political economists, to dry calculations as to his capable labour and proper wages, his expense and profit, his consumption and production. Man, reasoning, gifted, enjoying, immortal! He holds and directs the lightning, weighs the planets, measures the stars, aspires after the infinite, walks with God. Here, in this higher sphere, where he appears as a thinking, feeling, growing, worshipping, Godlike spirit, is presented the literature of man—of his powers. accomplish-

ments and destiny. Certainly this last view of him possesses by far the most dignified and commanding interest.

These brief allusions to the office and sphere of literature, in contrast with those of the sciences, may show how easily its claim to the regard and study of scholars may be established. It is not that the sciences are to be depreciated. Important and indispensable they are to the practical arts of life, and also to intellectual discipline. We only urge that polite learning, when sound and instructive, be highly valued and honoured as it most richly deserves.

Let us pass to a brief reference to the *influence* of a pure and solid literature. The character of such a literature just given, as presenting nature in her most attractive and elegant aspects, and man in his noblest capacities, well-being and end, would lead us to expect from it important effects, both in matters of intellect and morals.

It is the study and love of such a literature which, more than any thing else, gives men the proper command and practical use of their own acquisitions and moral powers. The love and study of it are on this account positively essential to success in all those positions in society where personal knowledge and personal emotions must have expression and publicity, in order to have power. Men may be profoundly wise in jurisprudence, deeply read in ethics, unequalled in their knowledge of political economy and legislation; but if, through deficiency in literary taste and literary acquisitions, they are deficient in ability to bring out and forth their materials, in forms of power and eloquence, they are feeble advocates, dull preachers, inefficient legislators. The monuments of Egypt have, for ages, been covered all over with learning, but, until they found recently an interpretation and a voice, the world was no better or wiser for their inscriptions. Our wise men, with no appropriate utterance and eloquence, with no impressive forms and intelligible embodiment of what is within them, are undeciphered, unspeaking obelisks or pyramids. To those who are to act upon mankind by communi-

cation of their own emotions and intellections, good literary attainments and taste subserve the same purpose as weapons do to the army, or ordnance to the navy. They are the instruments by which their power is felt and feared.

There is another influence of a rich, sound literature, when widely diffused and received, directly on the mass of the community. This cannot be easily over-estimated or over-stated. It awakens slumbering intellect. It arouses paralyzed moral energies. It educates, most efficiently and usefully educates, both the general mind and the general heart. When used by the gifted minds of a people, to inculcate important principles of government, to form a right public opinion, to give useful direction to public affairs, to construct a noble, national character, literature shows an immense power over the mental and moral elements of human society. Thus wielded, it holds an influence which no arm of war and no kingly authority are able to exert. The history of China records twenty-two dynasties, and more than two hundred and fifty kings, but five distinguished literary lights, like Confucius, would have done more for the people of the celestial empire, than all of them together. It was not the Magna Charta, ratified by king John, that stopped royal encroachment, broke royal oppression, and made British subjects so nobly free. That was the achievement of aroused British intellect, acting on the country in its own favourite forms, of persuasion and power. A literature, that breathed the spirit of the times, created for the occasion, called on the people to assert their rights, and to enjoy them, in defiance of the frown of the aristocracy or the will of the throne. The appeal was irresistible! It was not the celebrated declaration of the year seventy-six, nor any mere skill and bravery in arms, afterward, which made this country what it has become. What we *were* before; what we were, intellectually and morally, embodied and published abroad, originated the declaration, and achieved the triumph in the succeeding protracted struggle. It was in the field of intellect; it was on the arena of principle, that the grand contest occurred. It was then, that

new doctrines of government, of human right, of liberty of conscience, of religious obligation, in the imposing form of a revolutionary literature, won our victories, and secured our great privileges and honours. Not physical power, but a pure and noble literature, in the hands of superior minds, moulds human character, and directs human affairs.

A sound and healthy literature has a more extended action still. It exerts an influence widely beyond the people and the time which gave it birth.

As literature is the intellectual and moral spirit of man, speaking, holding communication with its contemporaries, the whole influence of it depends on intellectual and moral sympathy; on the ultimate law, that heart acts on heart, and mind on mind, with great readiness and invariable certainty. The world having nothing isolated, the spirit of man being linked with the spirit of man intimately and universally, the mental and moral movement of an individual, according to the law referred to, communicates itself on every side; recipients become, in succession, conveyors of impulse, and thus the influence goes on endlessly. We have an illustration in point in the science of astronomy. When a number of masses of matter are well balanced around a great attracting centre, if there be introduced a new body, every other receives an impulse and a movement from its place, passes on in a new orbit, and in an altered velocity. So, when, in the system of minds, a new book, a new speech, a new truth, a new aspiration, a new mental or moral act, of any description, is introduced, there is an influence, a movement, a displacement, a new adjustment throughout a vast field of intellect. We have an illustration of this same thing, in that familiar law of nature, the equality of action and re-action. Each drop of water and each particle of air, when moved, moves equally each drop and particle around it. The same is true of more solid substances. In respect to all matter whatever, impulse that is received, is communicated to contiguous bodies. These last transmit the same to more masses, these to more still, in ever-widening succession. And phi-

philosophy does not allow us to believe the influence ceases, till we reach the confines of the material universe. It assures us, "that the momentary waves, raised by the passing breeze, apparently born but to die on the spot that saw their birth, leave behind them an endless progeny, which, reviving in other seas and visiting a thousand shores, will pursue their ceaseless course, till ocean itself be annihilated; that the track of every canoe, every vessel, remains for ever registered in the movement of all succeeding particles which may occupy its place—the furrow made is, indeed, instantly filled up by the closing waters, but they draw after them other and larger portions, and these larger portions still, in endless succession. So, likewise, philosophy teaches, that the pulsations of the air, set in motion by the human voice, communicate themselves to columns of atmosphere next beyond them, in succession, until the waves, thus raised, pass around the earth, and then around again, and thus the element we are breathing becomes a vast library, on whose pages are written all that man has spoken." Minds move more easily among themselves than particles of matter, far more readily receive and communicate successive impulses. Heart throbs to heart, thought wakes to thought, mind kindles to mind, with a quickness, a certainty and a power, as much superior to what occurs under the eye of the natural philosopher, as intelligent mind is nobler in its elements and capabilities, than dull, senseless matter. There shall come a message to our shores, that the descendants of the noble, classical Greeks, are making a last death-struggle against the oppressor, and scarcely will it be read, before a warm, contagious sympathy will begin to appear. Soon, in the large cities, public meetings will be held on the subject. Then the pulpit will catch the general feeling. The theatres and operas will give the heroic sufferers a benefit. The streets, and public houses, and markets, and parks, will take up the absorbing theme. Contributions, at appointed places, will pour in; high-spirited young men will put on arms, and set sail for the scene of conflict. A wave of enthusiasm will pass backward, from

the coast, into the country, ride over the Alleghanies, and move on, till it reaches the extreme boundary of population. One deep, thrilling sympathy pervades the whole land. Thus, a movement of intellect, or emotion, any where, easily becomes a movement every where. He that rises to make a speech, makes it to the whole civilized portion of mankind, now living, or hereafter to live, on the earth. All could not hear the orator's voice; but the thoughts and heart-thrills of those who did hear it, are communicated, received, transmitted, outspread, till they reach all who are sufficiently emerged from barbarism to appreciate them. He who writes a book, writes it, not for one age and one nation; he writes it for the family of man. Every record of history, every line of poetry, every doctrine of philosophy, every passage of oratory, every announcement of religion, is the beginning of a series of influences, to be limited only by the boundary of created being. The universe seems like one vast whispering-gallery, to carry all the utterances of mind throughout its immensity.

A literature of such a description as that which has been here commended, rich, healthful, elevated, diffusive, powerful, should have no rival, for a moment, in the hearts of our scholars and men of intelligence. Be it so, that our superficial, popular literature comes with many earnest pretensions to superiority of style, imagery and description; with many warm professions of desire to encourage innocence and virtue; its effect, intellectually, we do still insist, is, like that of the hydrocephalus, an enlargement of the head, but a paralysis of the intellectual organ; and, morally, like that of the consumption, hallucination and confidence, but a sure wasting of the vital organ. Through the influence of the soundly educated portion of the community, the whole should be repudiated and removed; our schools and colleges, reading-rooms and families, be thoroughly cleansed out; and then, pure and instructive works be invited forward, to pour their tide of truth and eloquence into all these places of literary reading, taste and influence. We invoke scholars, professional

men, men of literary leisure, literary writers, book publishers—all the good character and all the active talent of the country we invoke, in behalf of this great and important reformation in our popular literature.

Such a literary regeneration would constitute an era of mind—the way-mark of an age. It would be a high honour and a great glory. Our country ought to earn this honour. Most nobly would this glory befit her. That will be a proud day for us, when, not armies and navies, territory and wealth, but the writings of the great and pure, shall be the chief depositories of our power, and the most valuable materials of our greatness.

ARTICLE VI.

RELIGIOUS VIEWS AND HISTORY OF THE MAGI.

By REV. S. P. HILDRETH, JR., Walnut Hills, Ohio.

AN interesting scene in the life of Christ is described by Matthew, which has not been noticed by the other evangelists. He begins the second chapter of his Gospel with the words, "Now when Jesus was born in Bethlehem of Judea, in the days of Herod the king, behold, there came wise men from the east to Jerusalem, saying, Where is he that is born King of the Jews? for we have seen his star in the east, and are come to worship him." Who were these Wise Men? Nothing is said of them again in the Bible. To one who has not investigated their history, an air of mysterious romance is thrown over their visit, which causes them to seem almost like beings of another race. They emerge from obscurity, offer their adoration, present their rich gifts to the infant Saviour, and then vanish again like the angels in the night scene on the plains of Bethlehem. Some have supposed them to have been learned men, coming from a distant part of Palestine.

But they could hardly have been citizens of Judea, for we are told that they came from the east, and Jerusalem itself was in the east of Judea, being scarcely twenty miles distant from the Dead Sea. The best commentators think that by the phrase "from the east," is meant that they came from Arabia, Chaldea, or Persia. And most of them suppose the prophecy in Numbers and Isaiah—"There shall come a Star out of Jacob, and a Sceptre shall rise out of Israel. The Gentiles shall come to thy light, and Kings to the brightness of thy rising"—to have been fulfilled in this visit of the Magi. They could not have been Jews, for we are told that "being warned of God in a dream that they should not return to Herod, they departed into their own country another way." And although particular inquiries had been made by Herod concerning their first vision of the wonderful star, so that their place of residence must have been ascertained, yet when they returned to their own country, they seem to have been safe both from the wrath of Herod and from his further inquiries; neither of which would have been true had they remained in Judea. Those who think them Jews, suppose them to have been simply wise and pious men of that nation. But *μάγοι* is not the Greek term for wise men as a class: that would be *Σοφοί*. *Μάγοι* is specific. It is the name of a sect, who were all wise men, it is true, but not all wise men were *μάγοι*; just as in our time the members of the Royal Society are wise men, but not all wise men possess the title of F. R. S. And none of this sect lived in Judea. The word *μαγός*, says Greenfield, is derived from the Persian *magh*, and means a sage of the Magian religion, or as others say, a venerator of Fire. We know that in Persia, at this very time, flourished a large sect called the Magi. There pre-eminently were they considered wise men. Lempriere remarks, "Their professional skill in the mathematics and philosophy rendered every thing familiar to them, and from their knowledge of the phenomena of the heavens, the word Magi was applied to all learned men."

Rollin says the Magi were all of one tribe, and kept all

their learning and knowledge, whether in religious or political concerns, to themselves or their families. This knowledge and skill in religious matters, gave the Magi great authority both with the prince and the people, who could offer no sacrifice without their presence and ministration.

Cicero tells us that before a prince in Persia could come to the crown, he was obliged to receive instruction for a certain time from some of the Magi. *Nec quisquam rex Persarum potest esse, qui non ante Magorum disciplinam scientiamque perceperit.* (Cic. de Divin. l. i. n. 91.) Nor did he determine any important affair of the state, when he was upon the throne, without taking their advice and opinion beforehand. Pliny says, that even in his time they were looked upon in all the eastern countries as the masters and directors of princes, and of those who style themselves the Kings of kings. *In tantum fastigii adolevit (auctoritas Magorum) ut hodieque etiam in magna parte gentium praevaleat, et in oriente regum regibus imperet.* (Plin. l. xxx. c. 1.)

They were the sages, the philosophers, and men of learning in Persia; as the Gymnosophists and Brabmans were among the Indians, and the Druids among the Gauls. Their great reputation made people come from the most distant countries to be instructed by them in philosophy and religion. This, however, is not sufficient to establish their identity with the *Mayoi* mentioned by Matthew. We must also ascertain whether the religion of the Persian Magi was such as to justify the supposition that God would send the beautiful star to be their guide to the infant Redeemer. Were they idolaters, or worshippers of the true God? The general opinion, both in ancient and modern times, is that they were idolaters. In all ages they have been charged with adoring the Sun, and worshipping their sacred Fire. But if we look into impartial history, and examine carefully their religious tenets, perhaps our decision will be more favourable. For example, take the following passages from Herodotus and Cicero. The Persians erected neither statues, nor temples, nor altars, to their gods, but offered their sacrifices in the open air, and generally on

the top of hills, or on high places. (Herod. l. i. c. 131.) Cicero says: It is supposed to have been through the advice and instigation of the Magi, that Xerxes, the Persian king, burnt all the Grecian temples, esteeming it injurious to the majesty of God to shut him up within walls, to whom all things are open, and to whom the whole world should be reckoned as a house or a temple. *Auctoribus Magis Xerxes inflammasse templa Græcias dicitur, quod parietibus includerunt deos, quibus omnia deberent esse patientia ac libera, quorumque hic mundus omnis, templum esset, et domos.* (Cic. lib. ii. de Legib.) The Persians were divided between the Sabean and the Magian religion. The former of these sects had its rise among the Chaldeans, who, from their knowledge of astronomy, and their particular application to the study of the several planets, which they believed to be inhabited by so many intelligences, who were to those orbs what the soul of man is to his body, were induced to represent Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Apollo, Mercury, Venus, and Diana, or the Moon, by so many images or statues in which they imagined those pretended intelligences or deities were as really present as in the planets themselves. In time, the number of their gods increased. This image worship, from Chaldea, spread itself through all the east; from thence passed into Egypt; and at length came among the Greeks, who propagated it through all the western nations. To this sect of the Sabeans was diametrically opposite that of the Magi, which also took its rise in the same eastern countries. The Magi utterly abhorred images, and worshipped God only under the form of fire; looking upon that, on account of its purity, brightness, activity, subtilty, fecundity and incorruptibility, as the most perfect symbol or representation of the Deity. (Vide Rollin, B. IV. c. iv.)

In the Universal History, this point is still further discussed. "Among the precepts of Zoroaster, his disciples are directed to pay daily to the Sun certain *niyâish*, i. e. salutations, consisting only in words (and those too addressed to God) without any mention of *priestish*, or adoration due to

the Deity. The Armenians, who dwell in Persia, are wont to pray in like manner, making the sign of the cross, and bowing profoundly low, at the sight of the rising sun." "To say the truth, adoration, that is, prostrating or bowing the body, was, even among the Hebrews, a civil as well as religious rite." "The sun is no more than the Kibla of the Persians, (that is, the point of adoration, such as Daniel in particular is said to have practised, when he prayed with his face toward the holy city,) as the temple of Jerusalem was to the Jews, and that of Mecca is to the Mohammedans." This custom does not seem surprising, when we consider their opinions concerning the sun, some believing the throne of God placed therein, and that it is the seat of paradise: others entertaining a different opinion as to paradise, but praying nevertheless towards the sun, as a symbol of the Deity, on account of its purity. It is farther certain that the Persians never called Mithra (so the Persians call the sun) a god, or ascribed to it any name of the divinity; and so far from directing any petitions thereto, they constantly begin and end the ejaculations pronounced before the sun with the praises of the most high God, to whom alone their prayers are addressed. As to the fire before which the Persians worship, taking the word in an extended sense, they acknowledge nothing of divinity therein; but, esteeming it a symbol of the Deity, they first prostrate themselves before it, and then, standing up, they pray to God. Thus among the ruins of the ancient palace at Persepolis there are seen many marble statues of kings standing praying to God before the figures of the sun and fire, which are also placed on the wall before them." "Thus it was the manner of God's chosen people to prostrate themselves before the altar, and then to offer up their petitions. It was also a custom among the Persians to tender oaths before the fire upon the altar." It is evident that they looked with high regard upon their sacred fire, from the care which they exercised "in preserving it from being polluted by impure fuel, in which last case, the Persians went so far as to punish offenders with death. Their kings also, and principal

persons, were wont sometimes to feed the sacred fires with precious oils and rich aromatics, styling these *epularignis*, or fire dainties; but still all things done to, or by fire, were performed to the honour of God, and terminated solely in him." "They never confessed their sins to any but to God, nor besought a remission of them from any but from him: yet they inclined to perform these public acts of devotion before the symbol of the Deity, that is, before fire, or before the sun, as the witness of their actions. In like manner the Jews confessed their sins to God in the temple, the fire flaming on the altar near them; so that there was nothing of idolatry in this, though it might not be altogether free from superstition." (Vide Universal Hist., Vol. V. ch. xi.) We have multiplied quotations upon this point, because of its importance. If the charge be true, that the Persian Magi were idolaters, worshipping Fire and the Sun, then it would seem incredible that the announcement of the Saviour's birth should be made thus particularly to them. The evidence cited above, however, strongly confirms the opinion of the last author, that the priests of the Magi "by no means deserved the appellation of *ignarii sacerdotes*, i. e., fire priests, for they were truly *sacerdotes Dei*, priests of the Almighty."

If the Magi were not idolaters, how near did their system of religion approach to the truth? It would be highly interesting to investigate fully their religious tenets and mode of worship, were there space for it. Some of their opinions, to say the least, savoured very strongly of superstition. Though fire was held the symbol of the Divinity among the Persians, yet the other elements were also highly honoured by them, conceiving them to be the first seeds of all things; wherefore they studied, by every method possible, to preserve each of them in its primitive purity. On this account, they prevented, as much as they could, the air from being infected by ill smells: and, for their officiousness on this head, Herodotus, according to his usual custom, represents them as believing the air a deity. They hold (says he) the whole expanse to be Jupiter. (Herod. l. i. c. 131.) That they might, in like manner,

preserve the earth from impurities, they would not bury their dead therein : but suffered them to be devoured by birds, and wild beasts, that, finding a tomb in their bowels, they might not infect the air. In fine, the preserving all the elements pure, was by them esteemed an act of high piety, and as such, meriting the divine favour in this world and in the world to come. Fire and water, however, were in a peculiar manner the objects of their care, because they were most liable to be contaminated : and hence the Greeks, mistaking the degree of reverence they paid them, declared them, without scruple, worshippers of those elements. The Persians universally held, that whosoever wilfully polluted either fire or water, deserved death in this world, and everlasting punishment in that to come, and that whoever threw the bones of dead creatures into waters were certainly damned. For these reasons, the Magi, wherever they were, took care to have all the waters in their neighbourhood watched, assigning them keepers, whose sole office it was to look carefully to this matter, and to see that no filthy thing was thrown or dropped into them ; and for this, they had stated and well-settled salaries ; for, abhorring as they did, to represent the Almighty Lord of heaven and earth by artificial images of stone or metal, they chose to preserve fire and water in their utmost purity, that they might serve as symbols of the divine nature, and put them in mind of the infinite purity of God. As they held the ministration of angels, so they believed that one of these celestial guards was appointed to watch over the waters in general. This angel they called Ardisur, for whom a particular *niyâish* or salutation was prescribed, the title of which, in their ancient books, runs thus : *Hymn to Ardisur, for the benefits received from the sea, rivers, wells, and fountains.* In this hymn, they praised him for taking care of all these places, and prayed that he might continue to do so, returning God thanks for the various uses made of water, and the mighty advantages resulting to mankind from his wise disposition thereof throughout the earth. They were of opinion that, in paradise, such people were peculiarly blessed as had been cau-

tious of defiling water, and had in this sense preserved a respect for that element during their lives, for which cause they recommended the care of this element, as well as fire, to their women, that is, their private fires, and the water used in their houses; for it does not appear that they ever admitted women to minister in religious matters. (Vide Univ. Hist. vol. v. c. xi.)

We will now adduce a few quotations exhibiting their mode of worship, and then give an outline of their creed. Strabo relates, that there were in Cappadocia a great number of Magi, who were called *Pyrethi*, or worshippers of fire, and many temples of the Persian gods, in the midst of which were altars, attended by priests, who daily renewed the sacred fire, accompanying the ceremony with music. Diogenes Laertius (l. 6, seqq.) says, the Persian Magi "are employed in worshipping the gods by prayers and sacrifices, as if their worship alone would be accepted. They teach their doctrine concerning the nature and origin of the gods, whom they think to be fire, earth and water; they reject the use of pictures and images, and reprobate the opinion that the gods are male and female. They discourse to the people concerning justice. They forbid the use of ornaments in dress." Describing their private habits, he continues: "They clothe themselves in a white robe; they make use of the ground as their bed, of herbs, cheese, and bread, for food, and of a reed for their staff." In the Universal History, vol. v, p. 157, we find the following statement: "In the most ancient times the Persians had no temples at all, but reared altars, whereon they preserved their sacred fires, on the tops of mountains, and other solitary places. Zoroaster persuaded them, for the sake of preserving these fires more conveniently, to erect over each of them a *pyreum*, or fire-temple. This did not subvert their ancient principle, that the Lord of the universe ought not to be enclosed within walls, for their *pyrea* did not circumscribe what they esteemed an image or semblance of the Divinity, but only the symbol of his purity, and, as it were, a shadow of his nature." Lempriere says: "The Magi were divided

into three classes: the first consisted of the inferior priests, who conducted the ordinary ceremonies of religion; the second presided over the sacred fire; the third was the *Archimagus* or high priest, who possessed supreme authority over the whole order. They had three kinds of temples: first, common oratories, in which the people performed their devotions, and where the sacred fire was kept only in lamps; next, public temples, with altars, on which the fire was kept continually burning, where the higher order of Magi directed the public devotions and the people assembled; and, lastly, the grand seat of the Archimagus, which was visited by the people at certain seasons with peculiar solemnity, and to which it was deemed an indispensable duty for every one to repair, at least once in his life."

Their public worship is thus described. In every pyreum, or fire-temple, there stood an altar on which burnt the sacred fire, which was always kept alive by the priest. When the people assembled in order to their devotions, the priest put on a white habit and a mitre, with a gauze of cloth passing before his mouth, that he might not breathe on the holy element; thus he read certain prayers out of the *Liturgy* which he held in one hand, speaking very softly and in a whispering sort of tone, holding in his left hand certain small twigs of a sacred tree, which, as soon as the service was over, he threw into the fire. At these times all who were present put up their prayers to God for such things as they stood in need of; and, when prayers were finished, the priest and people withdrew silently, and with all tokens of awful respect. In all this there is little to support the supposition that the Magi were idolaters.

An examination of their creed lessens still more the probability that such was their character. This is found almost wholly in the writings of Zoroaster. Plutarch, speaking of his doctrine (Is. et Os. p. 369—Op. ed. Reiske, vol. vii. p. 468) says, he teaches, "that there are in nature two opposite powers, counteracting each other's operations, the one accomplishing good designs, the other evil. To the better power Zoroaster gave the name of Oromasdes, to the worse

that of Arimanius ; and affirmed that of sensible objects, the former most resembled light, the latter, darkness. The fated time is approaching in which Arimanius himself shall be utterly destroyed ; in which the surface of the earth shall become a perfect plain, and all men shall speak one language, and live happily together in one society." He adds, on the authority of Theopompus, " It is the opinion of the Magi that each of these gods shall subdue and be subdued by turns, for six thousand years ; but that, at last, the evil principle shall perish, and men shall live in happiness. The God who directs these things taking his repose for a time, which, though it may seem long to man, is but short." Diogenes Laertius (l. c.) gives it as the doctrine of Zoroaster, that the gods (meaning doubtless those of whom he last speaks, Oromasdes and Arimanius) were derived beings. Lempriere, in commenting on these authors, says, " It will appear probable, from a comparison of these with other authorities, that Zoroaster gave to derived substances, the names already applied by the Magi to the cases of good and evil, Oromasdes and Arimanius ; and that the first fountain of being, or the supreme divinity, he called Mithras. These principles he conceived to be perpetually at variance ; the former tending to produce good—the latter evil, but that through the intervention of the Supreme Being, the contest would at last terminate in favour of the good principle."

In a celebrated Arabian history of the religions of the East (Sharistani), it is said, " The peculiar doctrine of the Magi was the duality of the spiritual nature, which they affirmed to be good and evil, virtuous and wicked, benevolent and destructive : these natures they distinguished by calling the one light, and the other darkness, or rather, in their own terms, Yemdan and Abriman. Though the Magi affirm these two principles, yet the most ancient of them do not think themselves under the necessity of affirming that both existed from eternity ; on the contrary, they held only light itself existed, and that darkness was produced." (Sharistani apud Hyde, c. 22, p. 294.)

The Persians, in early times, acknowledged one eternal and omnipotent Being, the creator and preserver of all things: him they called Yezad. They acknowledged also an evil created being, whom they styled *Ahriman*, which signifies amongst them the devil. Some have affirmed that the ancient Persians held a co-eternity of these two principles; but writers better acquainted with the true tenets of this nation, agree that *Ahriman* was created out of darkness, and that Oromasdes first subsisted alone; that by him the light and darkness were created; that in the composition of this world, good and evil are mixed together, and so shall continue till the end of all things, when each shall be separated, and reduced to its own sphere. Some have endeavoured to account for the origin of the prince of darkness thus: Oromasdes, say they, said once within his mind, How shall my power appear if there be nothing to oppose me? This reflection called *Ahriman* into being, who thenceforward opposed all the designs of God, and thereby, in spite of himself, contributes to his glory. The souls of men, according to them, were at first unbodied spirits; but the Almighty, resolving to make use of them in warring against *Ahriman*, clothed them with flesh, promising them that the light should never forsake them till *Ahriman* and all his servants were subdued; after which the resurrection of the dead is to follow, with the separation of the light from the darkness, and the coming of the kingdom of peace. To say the truth, the notions they have of the beginning of all things, the state of our first parents, the attempts made on them by the prince of darkness, the last judgment, the salvation of the good, and the punishment of the bad, differ very little from what is delivered to us in the Scriptures on these heads; only they have a long account of the war between God and the author of evil, which, they say, ended in a complete victory gained over the latter and his adherents, who were constrained to surrender at discretion; that the Almighty did not annihilate his enemies, because, without opposition, his attributes could not have appeared with such lustre as they now do; that the world had existed

three thousand years before this decisive battle, the whole of its duration being fixed to twelve thousand; that, after this defeat, God, by holding up three fingers, gave the evil one leave to choose which three thousand years of the nine thousand yet to come, he would please to take, wherein to trouble and vex mankind; whereupon he chose the middlemost. Before, say they, this power was given to *Ahriman*, man lived in a state of innocence: but that, since his fall, war, and all other evils, have been introduced; that these however shall, in time, pass away, and man live again, for a certain space, in peace and glory. They place the day of judgment at the end of twelve thousand years; and, as to the damned, they assert that they shall be punished, according to the heinousness of their crimes, two angels being appointed to be the inspectors of their sufferings. At last, however, even these are to be pardoned; but never to be admitted to the joys of the blessed, but to remain in a certain place by themselves, and to wear in their foreheads a black mark as a badge of that state from whence, through the mercy of God, they were freed.*

The tenets of Zoroaster are developed with still greater particularity. Zerdusht taught the people that the Supreme Being was independent, and self-existent from all eternity; that light and darkness, good and evil, were continually mixed and in a continual struggle, not through any impotency in the Creator, but because such was his will, and because this discordancy was for his glory; that, in the end there would be a general resurrection, and a day of retribution, wherein such as had done well, and lived obedient to the law of God, should go, with the angels of light, into a realm of light, where they should enjoy peace and pleasure for evermore; and those who had done evil, should suffer, with the angel of darkness, everlasting punishments in a land of obscurity, where no ray of light or mercy shall ever visit them; that henceforward light and darkness shall be incapable of

* See *Universal Hist.*, Vol. V. p. 160.

mixture to all eternity. He took great pains to persuade his disciples of all the attributes of the Divinity, especially of his wisdom, and his justice, in consequence of which he assured them they had none to fear but themselves, because nothing could render them unworthy of the divine favour but their vices. Of all virtues, he esteemed what the Greeks called *philanthropy*, and the Apostles *brotherly love*, the greatest; for which reason he exhorted all his followers to acts of charity and beneficence, sometimes alluring them by promises, at other times driving them, as it were, by threatenings. He sometimes made use of parabolic relations; as for example, when he taught that on the fourth day after death the soul came to the bridge *Tchinavar*, and was there met by the angels *Mihr-Izad* and *Reshu-Izad*, who weighed in the balance the good and evil actions of the soul attempting to pass: and in case the former prevailed, then it went safely over the bridge; if the latter, it was thrown thence into *Gehenna*, that is, into the regions of darkness, where the souls of the wicked are punished. (Vide *Sadder*, part i.) He makes use of these terms to insinuate that the effects of our good and evil deeds transcend the grave, and either lead us to everlasting rest, or plunge us into never-ending misery. In the book *Sadder*, which is a compendium of the doctrines of *Zerdusht*, collected in his own words, this description of the state of the dead is placed in the first chapter, and in the second it is thus applied: Men who believe the religion of *Zerdusht* will be afraid not only of great, but of small sins; for, since all are weighed and numbered, and, according to the preponderating of this or that scale, they are to be happy or miserable for ever. Whoever thinks of this, will be afraid of adding weight to the left hand scale, and earnestly desire to heap meritorious actions into that on the right hand; because his all rests on this trial. He carefully instructed those who heard him, and directed them to instruct all who would believe in his religion, that no man ought to despair of the mercy of God, or suppose that it was too late for him to amend. He declared that though we had a faculty of distin-

guishing between good and evil, yet that man has no conception of the value which God sets on our actions, nor how far the intention may sanctify the most trivial act; wherefore even the worst of men may hope the divine favour from repentance and good works. This he exemplified by another parable, which is also recorded in the book *Sadder*, and which runs in these words: "It is reported of Zerdusht, the author of our religion, that one day, retiring from the presence of God, he beheld the body of a man plunged in Gehenna, his right foot only being free and sticking without. Zerdusht thereupon cried out, What is that I see? and wherefore is this man in this condition? He was answered: This man, whom you see in this condition, was formerly the prince of thirty-three cities, over which he reigned many years, without doing any one good action; for besides oppression, injustice, pride, and violence, nothing ever entered his mind; and though he was the scourge of multitudes, yet without regarding their misery, he lived at ease in his palace. One day, however, as he was hunting, he beheld a sheep caught by the foot in a thicket, and thereby held at such a distance from food that it must have perished. This king, moved at the sight, and alighting from his horse, released the sheep from the thicket and led it to the pasture. Now, for this act of tenderness and compassion, his foot remains out of Gehenna, though his whole body be plunged therein for the multitude of his sins. Endeavour therefore to do all the good thou canst, without fear or apprehension, for God is benign and merciful, and will reward even the smallest good thou dost." (*Sadder*, part v.)

As to exterior rites, he altered the old mode of burning fire on the tops of mountains, and in other places under the open air, engaging his followers to erect *pyrea* or fire temples throughout all the dominions of Persia, that this symbol of the divinity might not, at every turn, be liable to be extinguished. He gave them likewise a liturgy, which they hold to have been brought to him from heaven, and therefore refuse to make any alterations therein, though the language in which it is written is long ago grown obsolete, and is very little understood by the

priests themselves. The priests, or, as we style them, the Magi, were of three ranks: the first consisted of ordinary or parochial clergy, as Dr. Prideaux very significantly terms them. Their duty was to read the holy offices daily in the chapels, and, at certain stated and solemn times, to acquaint the people with the contents of Zerdusht's books, and to paraphrase on and explain them. In these parochial chapels there were no fire altars, but lamps only, before which their devotions were performed. The next degree of their clergy had the superintendency of these ordinary priests, and were to them what bishops are among us. These too had their churches, in which were altars, whereon fire was continually kept, there being a certain number of the inferior clergy to attend them, who, by four at a time, waited constantly near the altar, to supply it with fuel, and to assist such devout persons as resorted thither, with their advice and their prayers. Above these was the Archimagus, i. e. the high priest.

Zerdusht himself assumed this office, and resided in the city of Balch, where he governed his Magians, and instructed them in all sorts of learning.*

Facts like these, selected chiefly from the works before referred to, leave the impression that the religious tenets of the Magi were not far from the truth; and the question arises, almost involuntarily, Had they no access to or knowledge of the Bible? They had only the Zendavesta, a book, as can be proved by the most incontestable evidence, composed by Zoroaster near the time of Cyrus the Great, before a part of the books of the Old Testament were written. Whence then were these truths derived?

Zoroaster, the author of their sacred book, the Zendavesta, was not the founder of Magism. The religion of the Magi can be traced as far back as the time of Abraham, when it was prevailing to some extent over the plains of Chaldea. Indeed, its general principles may be traced up to Noah, and through him to God; from Noah and his children descending

* See Universal History, Vol. v. p. 401.

by tradition along the line of their posterity. From the days of Abraham and earlier, down to the time of Zoroaster, it was in perpetual conflict with Sabianism, or the worship of the stars and of images. In support of this view, a few quotations will be presented. "Some Arabian writers have endeavoured to insinuate that what they call the religion of the fire-worshippers, is not of great antiquity; but all impartial authors agree in rejecting this notion, and admit that Magism began very early, nay, even before the time of Abraham; certain it is, that the oldest book extant in the world favours this opinion, for thus speaks Job in his protestations of his integrity, and his fervent declarations, that he had always held the true faith and done all the good he could. Job 31 : 26, 'If I beheld the sun, when it shined, or the moon walking in brightness, and my heart hath been secretly enticed, or my mouth hath kissed my hand, this also were an iniquity cognizable by the judge; for I should have denied the God who is above.'" Nothing can be clearer than this, nor can any thing more fully prove that this heresy was as old as the Persians make it, who affirm that Kejomaras, their first king, was the author of their religion; and therefore of old they affected much to call themselves Kejomarsians, or Kejomarthites. But the point they chiefly laboured, in respect to antiquity, was the persuading themselves and others that their religion was the religion of Abraham. It would be no difficult matter to show the probable source of this opinion; but as this article is not intended to be a collection of critical inquiries, we choose to insert here some extracts from a celebrated Arabian history of the religions of the East, rather than to amuse our readers with conjectures of our own.

"The Persian kings in general," says this writer, "adhered to the religion of Abraham, and their subjects were always of the religion of their prince; there was likewise a chief or high-priest, reputed the wisest of wise men, from whose mandate there was no appeal, and whose sentence was never reversed, the same reverence being shown to them, as we heretofore showed unto our caliphs." "The Magi constantly

affirmed that they received their doctrines from wise men and prophets who were among their ancestors ; first from Kejomaras ; secondly, from Zervan the Great ; thirdly, from another prophet whose name was Zerdusht.”* We are informed by the same author that Zerdusht himself owned Kejomaras to have instituted that religion he came to reform, so that it may pass for a point tolerably well established, that the religion of the Persians is as ancient as their monarchy.

Dr. Thomas Hyde, Professor of Hebrew and Arabic in the University of Oxford, in his work *De Religione Veterum Persarum*, published in 1760, has the following paragraph on the same subject. “Indeed, from the beginning of their monarchy, we may be certain concerning the faith of the Medes and Persians in one God, from the time they enter the limits of oriental or occidental history. And truly concerning the antecedent time, we do not doubt, since in the beginning of the monarchy of the Medes, (as will be established by their historians beyond,) that faith seems not as if new, but it seems to have been that most received, as if for a long time, until then established, without compulsion, or other relinquishment of principle. And truly, if the thing be well examined, who should be able to convert them to the faith of God ? Who was so powerful, as to be able to convert and compel to a new religion, the Medes, (under whom at that time were the Persians,) the monarchs of all the world ? Since, therefore, in the times of Arbaces, in the beginning of the monarchy itself, the Medes and Persians are found following the orthodox faith, and neither before nor after that beginning, can be assigned any definite time in which they relinquished their worship or resumed it, it is to be presumed that the aboriginal Medes and Persians, in the first foundation of their religion, from antiquity, were well initiated in the worship of the true God, and in it afterwards always persisted.”† On page 2 of the same chapter, Hyde says, “We hold it to be cer-

* Sharistani apud Hyde, *Relig. Vet. Persar.* c. 22, p. 294.

† Hyde, *cap. I.* p. 14.

tainly ascertained, admitting of no doubt, that the aboriginal founders of the Persian and Median nation, were orthodox; as Shem, the son of Noah, from whom they were descended, taught his family and people, and established them from the beginning, with primeval simplicity, in the knowledge and worship of the true God. For it is devoutly to be believed, that Elam, the Father of the Persians, or the Grandfather, (the obedient son of Shem,) after a deliverance from the Deluge so stupendous, retained the religion of his father, and persisted firmly in the same; and, having in recent memory so great a miracle of Divine goodness toward himself, that he instilled among his sons and grandsons the wholesome doctrine received from his father Shem, and imbued them thoroughly with the same." From the authors afterwards cited by Hyde, we will quote only one. "Concerning the Magi, the visitors of Christ, prolixly writes Bar Bahlûl, a Syrian (then follows Syriac): 'The Magi were from Persia, from the sons of Elam the son of Shem.'* Josephus (*Ant. cvi. and sec. 1*) says: 'From Madai, the son of Japhet, came the Medeans, which are called Medes by the Greeks;' and in *sec. 4* of the same chapter, 'Shem, the third son of Noah, had five sons who inhabited the land that began at Euphrates, and reached to the Indian Ocean. Elam left behind him the Elamites, the ancestors of the Persians.'"

In the *Universal History*, vol. v. c. xi. p. 49, it is said, "The most ancient name of Persia, is that by which it is called by Moses, viz. Elam, from Elam the son of Shem, the father of its first inhabitants. (*Gen. 10: 22-14: 1. Jerem. 25: 25.*) The best commentators agree that the Elamites, who were the ancestors of the Persians, were descended from Elam the son of Shem. It is likewise allowed that the most ancient inspired writers constantly intend Persia when they speak of Elam; e. g. *Jeremiah 49: 39*, "But it shall come to pass, in the latter days, that I will bring again the captivity of Elam, saith the Lord," is always understood to

* Hyde, c. 31, p. 382.

mean the restoration of the kingdom of the Persians by Cyrus, who subdued the Babylonians, as these had before subdued the Persians." "As to the word Paras (from whence Persia), authors are not very well agreed as to its etymology. Some again, who seem to be nearest the truth, say that he was the son of Elam, the son of Shem." The same author, p. 12, vol. v., says, "The Medes are derived from Madai the third son of Japhet." This seems plain from Scripture, where the Medes are usually called Madai (Heb. מַדַּי), e. g. Dan. 5 : 28 ; 6 : 8, 12, 15 ; 8 : 20. Esth. 1 : 3, 14, 18, 19-10 : 2, etc.

Bush, in commenting on Genesis 10 : 1—"Now these are the generations of the sons of Noah"—gives a genealogical table of their descendants. "I. Japhetites. III. Madai: the Medes." "3. Shemites. I. Elam: the Persians, particularly of the province of Elymais." Thus we see that writers on Ancient History state with great unanimity that the original inhabitants of Persia were descendants of Elam, the son of Shem. Having just escaped from the Deluge, these two Patriarchs must have carefully taught the truth to their posterity. At first the true religion seems to have flourished among them in the utmost purity, but in process of time it became corrupted, when the rest of the world was overspread with Sabianism. Several ancient authors among the Magi affirm that they were reformed thoroughly by Abraham, but afterward lapsed again. However this may be, gross corruptions had certainly crept in among them. Once or twice Sabianism, or idol-worship, had completely gained the supremacy over the religion of the Magi (vide Rollin, book iv. c. 3, sec. 5), and thus throughout the Empire of Persia, the false and the true, to some extent, were mingled together. In the reign of Darius, the third king after Cyrus, Zoroaster, the Reformer, appeared. He removed all idolatrous principles from Magism, and embodied in his Zendavesta the creed of the Magi. This, as will be remembered, was almost like our own. It taught that there is one infinite God, and an Evil Angel, answering to the Satan of the Scriptures. Some au-

thors, however, say that Zoroaster taught the existence of two Angels, under the Supreme Being. For example, Rollin, in giving his creed, says, "his doctrine was, that there was one Supreme Being, independent and self-existing from all eternity: that under him were two angels: one the angel of light, who is the author of all good, and the other the angel of darkness, who is the author of all evil: that these two, out of the mixture of light and darkness, made all things that exist; that they are in perpetual struggle with each other; that where the angel of light prevails, there good reigns; and that where the angel of darkness prevails, there evil takes place: that this struggle shall continue to the end of the world; that then there shall be a general resurrection and a day of judgment, wherein all shall receive a just retribution according to their works. After which the angel of darkness and his disciples shall go into a world of their own, where they shall suffer, in everlasting darkness, the punishment of their evil deeds; and the angel of light and his disciples shall also go into a world of their own, where they shall receive, in everlasting light, the reward due to their good deeds: that after this, they shall remain separated for ever, and light and darkness be no more mixed together to all eternity."* Even this is not all. Zoroaster gave to his followers distinct information concerning the coming of Christ. Before citing authors in support of this position, however, we wish to present a quotation from the work of Dr. Hyde, *De Religione Veterum Persarum*, c. 31, p. 392. "In the Life of Confucius, who lived more than five hundred years before Christ, it is related that he was accustomed to say, '*Ipse Homo est in Occidente.*' Other expressions of this sort may be found in his Life, in the eighth volume, p. 23. But in his Life, published by D. Couplet, it is written, in the Chinese tongue—*Si fam Yeu Xim gin*, i. e. *Vir Sanctus in Occidente existit.* The Holy Man dwells in the West. It is doubtful whether, by these words, he had reference prophetically to Christ, or historically to the High

* Vide Rollin, B. IV. c. iv. p. 298.

Priest of the Jews. I incline to the latter interpretation. However this may be, it is certain that sixty-five years after the birth of Christ, the Emperor Mingh-Ti, from the words of Confucius in part, and partly from having seen in his sleep a vision of the Holy Man, sent legates into the West to search after the Holy Man and the Holy Law. But they, having approached to a certain island near the Red Sea, dared not proceed farther, and returned with the object of their mission unaccomplished." Roman historians tell us that all the Eastern world were anticipating the manifestation of some wonderful Being, about the time that the Messiah actually appeared. Socrates, who lived four hundred years before Christ, is said to have taught his followers that the time would come when the Divine Being would descend to earth and impart to men religious knowledge. But Zoroaster seems to have given his disciples more distinct intimations concerning the coming of Christ, than all others. In the thirty-first chapter of Dr. Hyde's work, may be found a quotation from Sharistani, in the original Arabic, of which he gives the following translation: "*Ex eis quae praedixit Zeradusht in Libro Zendavesta, est, quòd dixit ultimis temporibus apparituum Hominem dictum Oshanderbeghâ (i. e. Homo Mundi) qui Mundum Religione et Justitiâ ornaturus esset. Deinde ejus tempore apparituum etiam Petyâra, seu Diabolum, qui Rebus ejus et Regno ejus molestiam afferret per viginti annos. Tum posthac apparituum Osiderbeghâ, qui incolis Mundi revivificaret justitiam. Et sedaret Injuriam, et immutatas consuetudines in loca sua pristina restitueret. Et quòd illi obsecuturi essent Reges, eique facilitariter Negotia: et quòd opem laturus esset Religioni verae; et quòd in ejus Tempore obtimeretur Quies et Tranquilitas, essetque sedatio Dissidiorum et Recessio Molestiarum.*" Sic Sharistani, Scriptor Mohammedanus ex Libro Zendavestâ. Which may be rendered thus: "Among those things which Zoroaster prophesied in the book Zendavesta, is the following: He declared that in the latter days would appear a man called Oshanderbegha, (i. e. the Man of the World, which differs little from the title Christ

often gives himself of the Son of Man), who would adorn the World with Religion and Justice. Afterward would appear Petyarus, or the Devil, who would violently oppose his kingdom for twenty years. Then would appear Osiderbeghâ, who would revive justice among the inhabitants of the earth, and cause wrongs to cease, and restore to their pristine place immutable customs. Kings will be obedient to him, and the work be rendered easy: aid will be brought to true religion: in his time Rest and Tranquillity shall prevail, and there will be an allaying of Dissensions and a cessation from Injury." Thus writes Sharastani, a Mohammedan author, from the book *Zendavesta*.* Something similar to this, concerning the Messiah and the redemption of the world, is quoted by Tavernier from the sacred writings of the Magi. His citation is rather lengthy, and we shall therefore not present it. Those who wish to examine it, however, will find it in Hyde, in immediate connection with the preceding, and also rendered in English in the *Universal History*, vol. v. p. 408. We will conclude this branch of the subject by quoting a paragraph from the famous Arabian historian, Abulpharajius, as cited by Hyde: "Quin et planiora eum de Christo docuisse narrat Abulphargj in *Dynastiarum Libro*, p. 54." Here follows the passage in Arabic, rendered by Hyde thus: "Zeradusht Praeceptor Magusaeorum . . Persas docuit de Manifestatione Domini Christi, jubens illos ei Dona afferre: indicavitque futurum ut ultimis Temporibus Virgo Conciperet Foetum absque contactu viri: cumque nasceretur, apparituram stellam, quae interdiu luceret, et in ejus medio conspiceretur figura Puellae Virginis. Vos autem, ô Fillii mei, ante omnes Gentes ortum ejus percepturi estis. Cum ergò, videritis Stellam, abeuntes quò vos illa dirigat, Natum istum adorate, offerentes ei Munera vestra. Est quidem ille verbum quod coelum condidit." "That he taught more plainly concerning Christ, narrates Abulpharajius in his *Book of the Dynasties*, p. 54." "Zoroaster, the Preceptor of the Magi, taught the Persians

* Hyde, *Relig. Vet. Pers.*, c. 31, p. 388.

concerning the manifestation of the Lord Christ, commanding them to carry him gifts. He declared that in the latter days a Virgin should conceive without the help of man ; and when she should bring forth, a Star would appear, shining in the daytime, and in the midst of it should be seen the figure of a Virgin. You, therefore, O my children, having notice of his birth before all other nations, when you behold the Star, following whither it may direct you, adore him who is born, offering to him your gifts, for He is that Word which established the heavens.”* In confirmation of the supposition that the Magi of the New Testament were from Persia, we will quote the succeeding paragraph. “At apud eundem Autorem, p. 70, legitur. Antogius (yel potius Lycinius) ad Caesarem scripsit ; Persae Orientales, Regnum tuum ingressi, Puero, qui in regione Judaeiae natus est, Dona obtulerunt. Quis autem ille fuit, aut cujus Filius, ad nos nondum pervenit.” By the same author, p. 70, it is said, “Antogius (or rather Lycinius) wrote to Cæsar : The Oriental Persians, entering thy kingdom, have offered Gifts to a Boy who was born in the region of Judea. But who he is, or of whom he is the son, we have not as yet ascertained.” (Ibid.) The directions given by Zoroaster, as his language is quoted by Abulpharajius, though very minute, were literally obeyed by his followers, as we see in the second chapter of Matthew, as soon as the long-expected star appeared.

And now the question returns, with redoubled force, How came the Magi by this wonderful knowledge ? Some have supposed, as they worshipped the true God, and were a branch of the old Patriarchal Church, that distinct revelations were made to them, just as in Patriarchal times. But there is another, and as we think, a more satisfactory supposition. Several of the old Persian writers tell us that Zoroaster began life as a servant of one of the Hebrew Prophets. Take, for example, the following quotations. (Vide Hyde, c. 24. *Historia Vitae Zerdushti, ex Orientalibus Scriptoribus.*)

* Vide Hyde, c. 31, p. 390, *De Relig. Veterum Persarum.*

“The Arabian historian, Abu Mohammed Mustapha, in his *Life of Gushtasp*, says (here follows Arabic): After thirty years of the reign of Gushtasp had elapsed, appeared Zoroaster, a wise man, who was the author of the *Book of the Magi*. He was one of the Disciples of Ozeir (or Ezra), whom he heard, and with whom at times he conversed. But when he contradicted him, Ozeir pronounced upon him a curse, so that he fled away a leper. Afterward the Sons of Israel rejected him from their midst, and he departed into the East. There he composed his *Book*, in twelve volumes, in which he inserted the words of the Prophet David, which he had heard from Ozeir.”* “More fully and distinctly the Mohammedan Bundari narrates the affair. (Here follows Arabic.) Abu Gjaphar Al Tabari relates, that Zoroaster was from among the inhabitants of Palestine, and was a household servant to one of the Disciples of the Prophet Jeremiah, to whom be peace, by whom he was highly esteemed. But when he had deceived him by lying, he called down upon him a curse from God, and he fled away as a leper, and departed into the region Aderbayagjan, where he began to propagate the religion of the Magi. Then he addressed himself to Gushtasp, who was in Balch, and when he gained access to him, and explained his religion, Gushtasp admired it, and compelled his subjects to embrace it.”† “In nearly the same sense writes Megjdi, a Persian Mahometan, in the *Book Zinato Magjalis*. (Here follows Arabic.) Zoroaster was a man from Palestine, who was formerly the servant of a certain Prophet of Israel, and who mastered the rarest sciences. For some reason, the Prophet, becoming angry, pronounced a curse upon him, and Zoroaster, as a leper, fleeing from his native land, departed into Aderbayagjan, and there uttered his Prophecy.”‡ These writers may, or may not be correct. Be this as it may, we know that the Jews at this period were captives in Babylon. And we learn from chronology that the youth of Zoroaster must have been

* Hyde, cap. 24, p. 317.

† Ibid, p. 318.

‡ Ibid, p. 319.

in the old age of Daniel. May not Daniel have been his instructor? On this point a hint from the Bible sheds great light. The Magi were not all of one rank. Over them all was the Archimagus, like the Chief Priest among the Jews. Now we learn from the Bible, that the king promoted Daniel, because of his wonderful wisdom, to this office of Archimagus, or Chief of the Magi. Glance through his history. Dan. 1: 4, Certain wise youth are selected, who are to be taught "the learning and the tongue of the Chaldeans," and introduced among the Magi. 1: 17-20, The king finds Daniel and his brethren "ten times better than all the magicians and astrologers that were in all his realm." 2: 2, The king dreams, and calls before him the wise men to recall and interpret his dream. v. 13, They fail, and are ordered to be slain—"and they sought Daniel and his fellows to be slain,"—showing that he also was one of the Magi. v. 27, He reveals the dream. v. 46, The king worships Daniel. v. 48, "Then the king made Daniel a great man, and gave him many great gifts, and made him ruler over the whole province of Babylon, and chief of the governors over all the wise men of Babylon." 4: 9, Nebuchadnezzar addresses him, "O Belteshazzar, master of the magicians," &c. This was thirty-three years after Daniel had been made chief of the Magi. And in Dan. 5: 11, thirty-two years later still, the queen says to Belshazzar, when terrified at the writing on the wall, "There is a man in thy kingdom, in whom is the spirit of the holy gods, * * whom the king Nebuchadnezzar, thy father, the king, I say, thy father, made master of the magicians, astrologers, Chaldeans, and soothsayers. * * Now let Daniel be called, and he will show the interpretation." The office of Archimagus was for life, and we have here traced Daniel as possessing it for the space of sixty years. Can it be supposed that in this station of influence Daniel would withhold the truth? How probable it is that the young Magus, Zoroaster, learned from the lips of the prophet all that he afterward wrote concerning Christ. And now is it singular that the star should appear to the Magi? The whole race of the Magi were a

remnant of the old Patriarchal Church; in a world of Idolaters, preserving in its purity the knowledge of the true God. And if we suppose that among them were some of the Jewish nation who never returned from the Babylonish captivity, how natural that to the Magi should be given the special honour of presenting the homage of the Gentile world to the infant Saviour.

Doubtless, ere this, the question has arisen in the mind of the reader, What has become of this interesting race? It is pleasant to be able to answer, they still exist.

In the seventh century their grand Fire Temple, and the seat of the Archimagus, were still in the city of Balch, where Zoroaster himself resided, governing his Magians, and instructing them in all sorts of learning. (Vide Univ. Hist. Vol. V. p. 404.) About this period, in consequence of the increasing power of their enemies, the seat of the Archimagus was compelled to be located elsewhere. Until recently, however, their fire altars were burning both in Persia and in India. They are the Ghebers, or Fire Worshippers, described by Moore in his *Lalla Rookh*. They rejected the Koran of the false Prophet, and were therefore, in Persia, nearly exterminated by the Mohammedans; but a numerous body yet remains in India. Many accusations have been made against them, both in ancient and in modern times. For example, Zoroaster has been charged with allowing incest. But those who make the charge do not quote from the *Zendavesta*, or from its compendium the book *Sadder*, or from any other treatise written by an avowed Parsee. And the contrary practice of the Parsees at this day amounts almost to a demonstration that he did not allow it.

They are still charged with worshipping Fire and the Sun, but accurate investigations show that they yet retain unchanged the writings and the creed of Zoroaster; and bow before the Sun and their sacred fires only to worship the glorious Being of whom these are but faint symbols. Rollin, after giving a synopsis of their creed, adduced above, which might almost be mistaken for our own, says, "All this, the

remainder of that sect which is now in Persia and India, do, without any variation, after so many ages, still hold even to this day." (Anc. Hist. Vol. I. p. 395.) "A friend of Dr. Hyde asked the priests of the Persians at what seasons and with what ceremonies they adored the Sun. They answered, they never adored the Sun, or paid any sort of divine honours to that luminary, to the moon, or to the planets; but only turned themselves toward the Sun when praying, because they looked upon it to come nearest to the nature of fire."*

Tavernier says, "The Gaurs render no such honours to the fire, as agree with this term of worship. They are not idolaters. They acknowledge one God, the creator of the heaven and of the earth, and him only they worship."†

"Monsieur Le Brun, by the interposition of the English agent, had a conversation with one of their priests, from whom he learned many things, exactly conformable to what we have delivered. To M. Le Brun's first question, what he thought of the creation of the world, and the power of God, he said he believed God to be a Being of beings, a Spirit of light, above the comprehension of human understandings, infinite, in all places, almighty, from whom nothing could be hid, and against whose will nothing could be done. This conference happened in the month of January, 1707. (Le Brun, Tom. II. p. 387.)"‡

"The Persians never have said that the Sun is God, nor ever offered to it petitions as if it were God. But what the Persians wish for it Dr. Sanson teaches us in his 'Present State of Persia,' who, their priests in Ispahan being interrogated concerning the worship of the Sun, thus says: 'Solemnly they affirmed that they did not adore that planet, but the one God only;' and in the same chapter, 'This I observed, that they had no images, and evidently abhorred those who have them. When it was asked of them, Wherefore prostrate do you adore the rising Sun? they replied, that they offered homage to that creature, because, after man, God had

* Univ. Hist. Vol. V. p. 147.

† Ib. p. 157.

‡ Ib. p. 158.

made it most perfect of those things which he created from nothing. They say God has placed in it his throne; therefore its glorious majesty befits to receive their lowliest veneration. That salutation which is offered to the rising Sun is not peculiar to them alone. For the modern Persians have the same custom, and also the Armenians, who do the same by frequently signing themselves with the cross before the Sun. They believe also something of Paradise to be in the Sun itself; and the felicity of the Saints to consist in a clear vision of the Sun, in which, they declare, they see God by reflection as in a mirror; but no one is admitted to this felicity until three days after death." Since, therefore, as you see, they consider the Sun to be a creature of God, it is impossible that they should worship it as God himself, who by the Persians is called Creator of all things, with the remaining attributes." * "The Persians, from the origin of the nation, always have believed in one true, omnipotent, and immortal God. They commence all their books with a formula of this sort: In Nomine Dei Condonatoris, Misericordis, Justi. They believe all the attributes of God which we believe. That, for example, (as is used in their words,) he is, of all things Creator, and Ruler, and Preserver. That he is Eternal, Omnipotent, the Judge of all. That it may be better known what they think concerning God, and in what style they address Him, take the succeeding sentences from the highest authority among them, the Book Sadder, in whose preface the Priest who wrote this book has inserted the following effusions in song: In nomine Domini essentiae Divinae et Attributorum. Domini Abundantia et Dei vitae. Dei qui intellectum et animum creavit. Dei qui corpus et animum condidit. Domini existentiae et Domini vitae. Dei qui in toto orbe unus est."† These are the first six. Hyde quotes two pages and a half of similar sentences. We will close this branch of the subject by adducing a quotation from the Universal His-

* Hyde, c. 4, p. 106.

† Translation from Hyde, c. 33, p. 401.

tory, Vol. V. p. 162, which seems conclusively to disprove the charge of Idolatry. After giving a description of the ancient fire temple service, it is said: "At these times all present put up their prayers to God for such things as they had need of; and when prayers were finished, the priest and people withdrew silently, and with all tokens of awful respect. All these rites are still observed; but to prevent idolatry, the priest, as the people are going from their devotions, gives an exhortation, which runs usually as follows: "Forasmuch as fire was delivered to Zerdusht by the Almighty, as the symbol of his majesty, wherefore it was required that we should esteem it holy, and respect it as an emanation from the fountain of light, and that we should love all things which resemble it, especially the Sun and Moon, the two great witnesses of God, the sight of which should put us in mind of his omniscience; therefore let us, without superstition, keep the command given us, evermore praising God for the usefulness of this element, and beseeching him to make us always bear in mind the obligations we are under to do our duty toward him, which is as necessary to the health and happiness of the soul as light and fire are to the ease and welfare of the body."*

It may be thought that the Magi, or Parsees of modern time, have derived much of the truth which they possess from intercourse with Mohammedan or Christian nations. But the Mohammedans have always been their inveterate foes, and from them, of course, nothing would be received with favour. As to their deriving light from other sources, they might use the same argument in proof of the purity of their faith, upon which we ourselves rely. We point to the Jews, and various Christian sects, all having the same Bible, as conclusive evidence that it has not been corrupted or changed. For should an individual, or a party, interpolate or corrupt a passage, watchful eyes in other sects would detect and expose the change, when of course it would be rejected. The Magi regard the Zendavesta as we regard the Bible. Among them,

* Beauchamp's *Essays on Important Subjects*, sect. 3.

Dr. Hyde tells us, (c. 1, p. 25,) there are more than seventy sects; and by their watchfulness over each other, in like manner, innovations would be prevented. Zoroaster himself seems carefully to have guarded against future innovations, as we see in the rules which he left for the Archimagus. Rule 12, "Though, in consequence of his high office, the Archimagus may for his consolation receive visions, and other manifestations from God, yet he is not to publish them, for that would but confound the people, who are to adhere to the written law."

It may be asked what influence, as yet, our Missionaries have had upon them. A distinguished Professor in one of our Theological Seminaries put this question, not long since, to a Missionary from the East. The reply was, that he had found them perfectly inaccessible. So conscious are they that what they possess is the truth, and so clearly do they perceive their own superiority over the Mohammedans and the Idolaters by whom they are surrounded, that they are disposed to look upon other religions contemptuously, as unworthy of their regard. Yet the truth, wielded by the Spirit, is irresistible. And we trust all will pray that this interesting people may soon be made to rejoice in the full knowledge of that Saviour of whom they dimly heard two thousand years ago.

ARTICLE VII.

ROME, THE MAN OF SIN.

By Rev. JAMES A. HAWLEY, Ridgefield, Ct.

THE testimony of the Word respecting the character of Romanism is clear, explicit, and conclusive. This character is not given in the form of history, for Popery had no existence until the Scriptures were completed. It is given in prophecy, and is often couched in symbolic language; yet no

clearer prophecies are recorded, and the sincere and earnest inquirer need not mistake their meaning.

Paul asserts that "the day of Christ" shall not come "except there first come the apostacy" (*ἡ ἀποστασία*). The day of Christ is "when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God; and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power, when he shall come to be glorified in his saints, and to be admired in all them that believe."

This day of Christ shall be preceded by the apostacy, and the revelation or bringing to light of the "man of sin, the son of perdition." We are at once directed where to look for the origin of the man of sin. He arises from "the apostacy," and "sitteth in the temple of God." He comes not from Paganism nor Mohammedanism, but from the Church; and what has there ever been, or what can there ever be in the church, more worthy to be called "the apostacy," than the papacy? Or who assumes the name and attributes of God, but the pope? Constituting the head, and grand result of the apostacy, he justifies his title as the "man of sin," and "the son of perdition."

He "opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God, or that is worshipped, so that he, as God, sitteth in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God." (2 Thes. 2: 2-12.) Pagans may have assumed Divine prerogatives and titles, but no one bearing the Christian name, has set up such pretensions like "our Lord God the Pope; another God upon earth; King of kings and Lord of lords."

His "coming is after the working of Satan, with all power and signs, and lying wonders, and with all deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish, because they received not the love of the truth, that they might be saved; and for this cause God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie, that they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness."

Who have pleasure in unrighteousness, like those who buy and sell indulgences to sin in the name of God? Who like the dupes of the papal hierarchy are the subjects of strong delusion, believers in a lie, a system of falsehood, because they love the pleasures of sin, stifling the voice of conscience and hiding the light of nature to embrace the delusion?

It is not difficult to recognize "that wicked one" "whose coming is after the working of Satan," with every assertion of miraculous power and all authority, and signs and lying wonders, the efficacy of relics and images, and pictures, and the transformations of baptismal regeneration, and the blasphemous creations of the eucharist, and "all deceivableness of unrighteousness" received in them that perish.

Thus may we characterize its whole scheme of deception, by which the merits of works are substituted for the merits of Christ. It identifies popery as the subject of this prophecy, and the object of its fearful anathema; and the character here given of the man of sin, is as significant of that identity as his ominous titles, and characteristic conduct, all which is given with circumstances, particulars, relations, which show definitely who he is, and what he is, and how he is to be regarded; and were his identity less clear, the correspondence of popery with the subject of these prophetic descriptions, and this terrible judicial sentence, would show its character, and deserts, and destiny, with almost equal clearness.

The same inspired writer has given us other marks of the then future apostacy, 1 Tim. 4: 1-3. They who fall into this grand error, do it by "giving heed to seducing spirits, and doctrines of devils," yielding to the teachers of a cunning deception, and embracing a stupendous system of religious fraud, and substituting the worship of saints in the Christian church for the worship of heroes in pagan temples, which was emphatically the "doctrine of demons," before and after the triumph of Christianity. "Speaking lies in hypocrisy," employing with unscrupulous zeal every artifice to compass their ends, employing the lying wonders of pretended miracles to secure the confidence of the superstitious and deluded, claim-

ing that they have wrought them in the name of God, and "having their conscience seared with a hot iron," indulging themselves in, and producing in others, obdurate and abounding wickedness. "Forbidding to marry, and commanding to abstain from meats, which God hath created to be received," etc., furnish yet more striking and peculiar characteristics of the man of sin, which belong equally to Romanism, and prove them to be the same. Embodying as this description does the peculiar characteristics of the Papacy, it is hardly possible that the peculiar language of prophecy should more decisively indicate it than it does under the title and the character of the mystery of iniquity. That mystery of iniquity did then already work. And Diotrophes was but the representative of a class increasing unto more ungodliness, which reached its legitimate and complete development in the establishment of a hierarchy in the Christian church, at the pinnacle of which was the pretended vicegerent of God.

Daniel describes the man of sin in terms and characters analogous to those employed by Paul. He partly explains the symbols which he employs, ch: 7, v. 7, 8. The fourth beast, "dreadful and terrible, and strong exceedingly," having "great iron teeth" devouring and breaking in pieces, and with ten horns. This is "the fourth kingdom upon earth," v. 23. With the assistance of inspired explanations it is not difficult to trace the succession of the four beasts. The four kingdoms are the Chaldean empire, the kingdom of the Medes and Persians, the Grecian or Macedonian empire, which reached its highest elevation under Alexander, and the Roman empire. Within the limits of the latter there arose ten kings, which are the ten horns of the fourth beast, and among them arose another little horn which uprooted three of the ten kings. "In this horn were eyes like the eyes of a man," indicating the sagacity of the power which it represented, "and a mouth speaking great things," which is the appropriate symbol of the grasping and unrighteous claims, and of the vaunting and blasphemous pretensions of the man of sin. We have already seen how he has fulfilled the pre-

diction that "he shall speak great words against the Most High."

He justifies the prophecy that he "shall wear out the saints of the Most High," v. 25, by the slaughter of 50,000,000 of Protestants. He shall "think to change times and laws." As "the Lord our God," he enacts, annuls, or changes even the decrees of Heaven."

Though separated by intervening centuries, the prophecy of John presents a striking accordance with that of Daniel. He revives the symbol of the Beast with the ten horns, and presents additional and clearer proofs of the particular power thus represented, whose titles and character and terrible destiny proclaim the fierceness of His anger against that Babylon of abominations. "*The great whore,*" "*the mother of harlots,*" "is that great city which reigneth over the kings of the earth," Rev. ch. 17. The "woman sits upon a scarlet-coloured beast, full of names of blasphemy, having seven heads and ten horns." "The seven heads are seven mountains on which the woman sitteth," "and the ten horns are ten kings." "These have one mind, and shall give their power and strength unto the beast."

It is conceded that the woman sitting upon the seven mountains and among the ten kings, is the boasted "eternal city." If we grant that the beast having seven heads and ten horns is Rome, regarded merely in its political estate and relations, it only adds strength to the conclusion that the woman is the Papacy, assuming and directing that power, strengthened by political alliances, sustained by the kings that give their power and strength unto the beast, and, gratified by the pomp of power and the luxury of wealth, concocting her mysteries and abominations, with which to seduce and corrupt and destroy the nations. She "sits upon a scarlet beast, full of names of blasphemy," "arrayed in purple and scarlet colour, and decked with gold and precious stones and pearls, having a golden cup in her hand, full of abominations and filthiness of her fornications;" and upon her forehead was a name written, "*Mystery, Babylon the great, the mother of harlots and abomi-*

nations of the earth." She was "drunken with the blood of the saints," "and with the blood of the martyrs of Jesus." Her blasphemies, her scarlet badge, her vanity and costly display, her abominations and filthiness, and her rioting upon the blood of the saints, are notoriously characteristic of the papacy.

We can find nothing in all history, nor will our imagination help us to the conception of any thing, that answers so well to these prophetic descriptions, as the Romish apostacy. What other power has deceived the nations like that? Where else shall we look for such pretended miracles, as have been the instruments of that delusion? What abounding blasphemies and idolatries! What impious interference with Christ's authority, and with the politics of the world, asserting a divine right both to ecclesiastical and political supremacy, "so that no man might buy or sell, save he that had the mark, or the name of the beast, or the number of his name!" Rivers of martyr-blood have flowed to dye her garments with the scarlet that is the badge of her wickedness and guilt. Where else shall we look for the false teachers "who privily shall bring in damnable heresies;" "and through covetousness shall they with feigned words *make merchandise of you*: whose judgment now of a long time lingereth not, and their damnation slumbereth not?" What traffic in spiritual things deserves this reprobation, if not the sale of absolutions and indulgences to sin? If papal Rome is not the subject described in these prophecies, its complete resemblance to it justifies us in attributing it to the same parentage, in asserting of it the same character, and in expecting for it the same fearful end. We are not without evidence of the extent of this apostacy. If Babylon is the papacy, her disease is incurable, her reformation is hopeless, her doom inevitable; "Babylon the great is fallen, is fallen, and is become the habitation of devils, and the hold of every foul spirit, and a cage of every unclean and hateful bird," Rev. 18: 2.

This record is as decisive of her changeless and polluted character, as of her inevitable destiny. There is no partial

purity to encourage the hope of farther reformation, no promise of amendment to invite the farther stay of real Christians in her bosom, in the hope of effecting greater purity. The unalterable behest from heaven is, "Come out of her, my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues; for her sins have reached unto heaven, and God hath remembered her iniquities. Reward her even as she rewarded you, and double unto her double according to her works; in the cup which she hath filled, fill to her double." "Her plagues shall come in one day, death, and mourning, and famine, and she shall be utterly burned with fire, for strong is the Lord that judgeth her." "In her was found the blood of prophets, and of saints, and of all that were slain upon the earth." We wonder how they who believe that all this is said of the church of Rome, can also believe that she is a TRUE church, whose ordinances are valid, and whose faith and ordinances are adapted to secure the salvation of the soul.

If we were attempting to convince Romanists of their errors, by an appeal to the Scriptures, it would be necessary to go into a critical examination of these proofs on which we rest. But we speak to Protestants, whose memory only needs to be refreshed with references and statements, concerning which Protestants generally are agreed. We have seen what epithets and descriptions the word of God applies to the Romish church. These we may justify by an appeal to her well-known rejection of the true faith, and her assumption of damnable heresies. She rejects Christ as the only Mediator; she denies that "there is none other name under heaven given among men, whereby we must be saved;" and though she does not, *in form*, deny his Divinity, yet it is done as *really* as did Israel, when, without forsaking the worship of the true God, they set up and worshipped the idols of the surrounding nations. By rendering their homage to other mediators, and by invoking the aid of other intercessors, they do reject Christ from being the only Mediator; they deny that in our controversy with our Maker, He alone can lay his hand upon us

both. And the doctrine of Christ's divinity is not more fundamental to the Christian religion, or more important in its practical bearings, than is the doctrine that Christ alone is Mediator.

They also deny that God alone can forgive sin. In the doctrine of absolution by the priest, lies the great strength of Romanism. But "who can forgive sins but God only?" This blasphemous doctrine involves the assertion in behalf of the hierarchy, of the highest of Jehovah's prerogatives. They deny that "there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins." They affirm "that he should offer himself often, as the High Priest entereth into the holy place every year with blood of others. For then must he often have suffered since the foundation of the world," whereas "now *once* in the end of the world hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself." This is another vital doctrine of our faith. Christ's death alone is a sufficient propitiation for sin, and it alone avails to secure forgiveness. "Other foundation can no man lay than that is laid." The church of Rome denies that that one sacrifice is sufficient, and repeats the sacrifices of Christ as often as their Mass is said. "They crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh, and put him to an open shame."

The church of Rome denies the doctrine of justification by faith. This is the sum of her apostacy. This denial involves the rejection of most of the vital doctrines of true religion. It makes Christ of no effect—piety unnecessary—and faith a nullity; it places the soul at the disposal of the priest, and dishonours God by setting up a man as mediator, and as arbiter of the soul's destiny. It transforms religion from a living principle, to an outside ceremony, a bargaining with the hierarchy for impunity in sin, and for the fallacious hope of future happiness, in defiance of justice and of Jehovah's law. Every error of the most heartless pharisaism, is wrapped in that one fruitful dogma of a false theology, and its fatal poison rankles through that stupendous system of strong delusions.

We have not time, and if we had it were needless, to at-

tempt the designation of all this progeny of heresies, which constitute the system of Romanism.

We can only specify their denial that God is the only proper object of religious worship—that the Scriptures are the only and infallible guide of our faith and practice—that in regeneration our souls are purified by the truth, through the Spirit. That whole system, as it is received and practised, rejects all that is spiritual in religion. Instead of aiming to produce moral purity, it aims to quiet the conscience *without* religion. It aims to do this by outward rites and priestly intervention. It neither does, nor is designed to affect the heart, or purify the life.

Such denials of the true faith constitute *the apostacy*, which preface the exaltation of the man of sin—the mystery of iniquity. But the apostacy is not a mere negation. It does not consist in the mere denial of truth. It involves almost of necessity the adoption of correlative and positive errors. These damnable heresies of the Romish church afford additional and still more striking illustrations of the justice of those pungent and emphatic condemnations of the man of sin, already adduced from the word of God.

By their invocation of Angels and Saints, and their reliance on the sacrifices of the Priest, they set up other mediators between God and man; they preach another Gospel (if they preach at all); they build on another foundation, that cannot withstand the coming storm.

They proclaim the doctrine of unlimited absolution by the priesthood, they open and shut the gate of heaven; asserting for themselves the highest prerogatives of Deity, the forgiveness of transgression, the dispensation of their Maker's laws—nay, they would “*change times and laws;*” they abrogate or confirm, with simony and fraud, the counsels of Heaven, to accomplish the basest ends by the most execrable means.

Allied to this is the doctrine of Auricular Confession, which is equally an engine of power, and the minister of sin, and out of it has grown the doctrine of Indulgences, the

most hideous of all the progeny of the man of sin, and yet the legitimate offspring of the tremendous and blasphemous errors which grew up amid the ruins of that apostacy. For, if the Pope, standing in the place of God, and "showing himself that he is God," can utter the decrees of Heaven, and claims the right to forgive the sins already committed against Jehovah, why may he not also grant permission to commit other sins of equal enormity, and dispense pardon beforehand, absolving the culprit from guilt, and freeing him from the deserved penalty?

Their doctrine of justification by works, is the grand error of Romanism. That embraces almost all the rest. It sets aside the Divine Mediator, and sets up the intercession and mediation and merits of human saints and angelic intercessors. It denies the all-sufficiency of Christ's sacrifice, and substitutes the sacrifices of the priest, and the merit of human works. It even affirms that these superabounding merits may avail for others, who are still impenitent in the commission of the grossest sins. What necessity for consistent piety, when less than half our days may atone for the worst sins of the rest? What occasion for faith in Christ, when our own works, or the money, or the works of others, furnish an ample atonement for the worst transgressions? We have no need of Christ as a propitiation for sin, since all that is necessary is to propitiate the priest, and for this end "money answers all things." No cunningly devised "Mystery of Iniquity" was ever so adapted to stupefy or emasculate the conscience, none offers such incentives to sin by stimulating the carnal desires of the natural man, as this grand device of the adversary. Its origin is well defined; it comes from the great red dragon of the bottomless pit, which gave power unto the beast that supports this "*Mystery, Babylon the great, the mother of harlots.*"

Involved in this chain of abomination is another great element of its mysterious and iniquitous power. Its doctrine of apostolical succession is a chief pillar in its system of errors.

The ceremony of ordination with them is not one which merely changes the relations of man, it changes the man himself. He is not thus merely authorized to exercise certain functions, but he is empowered for it. He not only has a *right* to act in the name of Christ, but he has the *power* to confer spiritual gifts. He is not the same man that he was before. He has the *power* to transform the elements in the eucharist into the body and the blood of Christ, to transform the soul in baptism, or at least to direct the Spirit's agency to the accomplishment of that result. And in many cases he has the power to transform other men into spiritual agents like himself, capable of effecting like spiritual transformations. They regard the hierarchy as possessed of ministerial authority, imparted by a touch of the priesthood, and transmissible, like the fire of electricity, by the touch, and equally efficacious and omnipotent in its influence. This is the offspring, and not the ground of the heresies of baptismal regeneration and transubstantiation, the latter of which teaches that Christ is miraculously produced and sacrificed in every celebration of the eucharist; the former teaches that by the manipulations of the priest, sins are washed away, the soul and the character are transformed, either with or without the intervention of the Spirit's agency.

But there is another error which is the legitimate fruit of the arch heresy of apostolical succession, and its corollary of the peculiar sanctity of the priesthood, viz., the celibacy of the clergy, which, with its prostitution of the confessional, its debaucheries of the priesthood, and of all whom their lusts affect, justifies more than any thing else the apocalyptic title of the mother of harlots.

They not only rob God of the worship due to him alone, they bestow religious homage upon the angels and the spirits of departed saints; they pray to the Virgin Mary more than to the Son of God, attributing to her divine attributes, and addressing her with the titles of the Deity. Pictures and images are the objects of their idolatrous veneration.

We might extend the list of errors that undermine the faith of the Gospel, and enlarge indefinitely upon the pernicious bearings, both theoretical and practical, of these doctrines of the man of sin. Enough has been said to show that this is another gospel. The errors of that system are fundamental. The essence of religion is excluded from it. It scarcely wears the form of godliness, much more does it deny its power.

We have thus endeavoured, with the greatest brevity, to justify the thesis that the church of Rome is the man of sin. To our own minds the corollary that it is not a *true* church has all the clearness and force of demonstration. The testimony of the word of God forbids the conclusion that it is a true church. The epithets which it applies to the papacy; the character which it describes; the doom which it pronounces, cannot be reconciled with the idea that the church of Rome is a true church. Its rejection of the fundamental doctrines of religion is equally decisive that it belongs to the synagogue of Satan, and not to the true fold. Its creed may retain some truths, and even that which, if uncounteracted, would exert a salutary religious influence. Yet those which it rejects are such as show that the practical bearings and saving efficacy of all are gone. Romanists preach another gospel, and thus exclude or deny the gospel of Christ. "Let them be accursed," Gal. 1: 8. It is equally true that their pernicious heresies prove their rightful exclusion from the household of faith. We have no right to have fellowship with such works of darkness. Their system of error is as fatal to the soul, and more mischievous in its influence, than infidelity itself; and we can hardly conceive how they who affirm that the Romish church is a true church, can be convinced that *any* apostacy excludes the heretics from that pale.

Yet there are distinguished men among us who dissent from these conclusions, and whose opinions deserve both respect and investigation. Perhaps the argument for the validity of Romish baptism, involving as it does the position that the Romish church is a true church, has never been

more plausibly presented than by a late writer of distinguished eminence and ability,* in the Princeton Review.

A true church is not, of course, a perfect church, nor is it merely a nominal church. It must be worthy of the name of Christian. This is what we mean by true in that connection. While it makes allowance for imperfections in the members of the true fold, it does not allow that an apostate, atheistic church, the synagogue of Satan, teaching the doctrine of devils, is a true church. The character of a true church is denoted with sufficient accuracy, though not very definitely, in the Repertory (Vol. XVII. p. 455), by the phrase, a "Christian community." It must be really Christian in its character and influence, or it is not a *true* church or a Christian community.

In his first article (July, 1845) the writer in the Repertory presented an idea of "the church" as erroneous as his application of it to Rome. Misled by his etymology (a very common error of scholars), he regards the church as consisting of "the called," of believers; and because there are believers in the church of Rome, he infers that that is a true church. We admit that all true believers belong to the church universal; but does the Repertory believe that the great body of the adherents of Romanism, or even one in a thousand of them, are "the called"? No definition of a church could have been given more fatal to his conclusion than the one just referred to.

The word *ἐκκλησία*, in its application to Christians, does not primarily denote the "called." It was not, as he seems to suppose, a word *invented* for the occasion, when it was first used, but on the contrary it was a word in common use at that time. It was used to denote the mob at Ephesus, Acts ch. 19; so it was commonly used to denote any other assembly, whether secular or religious, regular or irregular, and hence it was *adopted* to denote the regular "meetings" of Christians. This was evidently the primary meaning; and

* Dr. Hodge, Biblical Repertory, July, 1845, and April, 1846.

hence an individual congregation was primarily denoted by the word. To this conforms the usage of the New Testament. It always speaks of the *church* in a city, and the *churches* in a province, with uniform exactness.

From this it is easy to see how the secondary meaning of the word church was developed; the *character* of a single, local community of believers, is common to every other, and hence the application of the name in a secondary sense to the whole fraternity of disciples.

In its application to Christians it denoted an organized body of *believers*. Believers then are not synonymous with the church. But believers, however they may be organized, constitute a church.

The very term church implies something different from individuality. Organization does not make men believers, but it makes believers a church. This he himself abundantly and clearly concedes in various forms. "If a body of men make no *profession* of faith, they cannot be a church" (p. 461), though they be believers—"By *baptism* we are formally constituted members of the visible church" (p. 451), yet no adult is a proper candidate for baptism until he is a believer. Hence the church consists not of "the called" of *believers*, but as he elsewhere says, of *credible professors* of religion.

But if the church consisted, as he argues, of "the called," Romanists are not "the called," as all concede. But the visible church consists of *all those who make a credible profession of religion*. If we could read the thoughts, we should be required to regard as members of the true church only those who are united to Christ as the branches are united to the vine. But as we cannot, we are obliged to receive all who give *credible* evidence of vital union to the Saviour. The same principles apply to communities professing Christianity.

It is worth our while then to inquire what is a *credible profession* of faith in Christ. And it only needs the obvious answer that it is one which *authorizes our belief* of the evangelical character of the man or church that makes it. Any

profession that does not do this, is obviously not a credible profession of religion. It is not reliable. It is unsatisfactory.

Dr. Hodge's views on this point do not differ from our own.

"As however no man can look upon the heart, we do not know who is a true believer," or "who is a member of the church or body of Christ." We ought therefore to regard and treat "as believers" those only "who make a credible profession of faith in Christ." If they "make no profession of faith," or "if they make a profession which is incompatible with saving faith," "*they cannot be a church.*" (p. 461.)

A credible profession, then, is the only test of character and of membership in the true church. He who makes no profession of faith is not to be regarded as a believer, whatever his private character may be. An inconsistent profession is evidence of no faith. A body of men whose "profession is incompatible with saving faith" are to be regarded as no true church; yet, in the very next paragraph, he again confounds the things he has just distinguished so clearly:—"Every man, therefore, who has true faith, is a member of Christ's body, which is the church; and every man who professes such faith is a visible or professed member of his church; and any number of such men, collectively considered, is a branch of the church. If, therefore, we deny to any man the character of a Christian, on account of the profession which he makes, we must be prepared to show that such faith is incompatible with salvation."—"To determine, therefore, whether a man or a church is to be denied the Christian character, we must ascertain what is the minimum of truth that can save the soul." (p. 461.)

Here he again confounds faith with the profession of the doctrines of faith, whereas faith is a living principle in the heart, and not merely in the head; and a *profession of faith* is valueless unless it is a *credible* profession.

We might admit the orthodoxy of the Romish creed (though we have abundantly disproved it), and yet we may consistently enough, on account of other things connected with it, deny the Christian character of those who profess it.

Their creed being barely compatible with saving faith, their rubrics, and their liturgy, and other things, far more practical than the creed, may not only justify, they may require us to withhold from them all recognition of their church estate, because they do not make a *credible* profession of faith. Does not Rome make professions in baptism incompatible with saving faith in Christ? If so, he has decided that "they cannot be a church." (p. 461.) Or, if she holds some truth, does she not at the same time hold and profess errors that nullify its influence—errors which not only counteract the truth, but which subvert the very foundations of faith? Hence we may see the fallacy of all this reasoning about their professing truth enough to save the soul, and "the minimum of truth that can save the soul" (p. 461), and the conclusion, from these considerations, that Rome is a Christian church. His argument from the Scriptures on this point is irrelevant, for the Bible speaks of the church as composed of *believers* and *saints*, not *professors* merely. If their profession is not "credible," we do not receive it as evidence of character. Besides, how many, with clear views of truth, have no piety? This sad result follows not from their having received less than the "minimum of truth," but from their want of faith.

It should be remembered, that faith is not in the creed. It is not enough to write the truth, or to repeat it. Of what avail is the assertion of the truth coupled with the denial of it, especially when the assertion is theoretical, and the denial is practical? What can be the efficacy of truth that is "perverted and overlaid," as it is in Rome? (p. 463, 464.)

He affirms that Romanists believe in Christ as the meritorious ground of salvation. But this is not the *real* belief of Rome. We wonder at this misrepresentation. He can doubtless find isolated expressions of such a doctrine in all the writings of Catholicism, or Jesuitical concession in controversy to silence the arguments of Protestants, or to make such men as Dr. H. believe that Popery is nearly orthodox; but to say that that is the faith of Rome is preposterous.

What then was all the controversy about at the time of the Reformation? Was not the doctrine of justification by the merits of Christ through faith the "articulus stantis, &c."? and did not Rome hold, as the great head of its system of errors, the doctrine of justification by works? We would much sooner think that Luther and Calvin lived and died unbaptized, than that they so misrepresented the papacy, if the facts are as Dr. H. represents.

No; to be a member of the so-called church of Rome, furnishes a strong probability of disbelieving in Christ as the meritorious ground of salvation. With them the priest saves, the church saves, and Christ is denied.

Whatever, then, may be their worship, or the amount of truth which they profess, or the possibility of their salvation, we are not required to receive or regard them as a Christian community, unless they give such evidence of piety as amounts to a credible profession.

Is it "therefore evident that the question, What is a true church? resolves itself into this, How little truth may avail to salvation?" (p. 462.) They may profess much more of truth than is necessary to salvation, while it is not productive of one particle of faith. But "how little truth may avail?" Why, he is "hardly competent to answer," (p. 462)—of course he is incompetent to tell us "what is a true church." How then does he pretend to tell us that Rome is a true church?

He has encountered a difficulty which he cannot master. False reasoning from sound principles has led him into concessions which nullify all his conclusions. He is "hardly competent to say how little truth may avail to salvation;" yet a decision on this point is indispensable, in order to determine the question, what is a true church. Why does he argue a question which he is confessedly incompetent to decide? Why say that Rome is a true church, when he does not and cannot know what a true church is?

But suppose there are a few real believers in Rome (which is by no means proved). One or two believers in a body of

two or three hundred, does not prove that to be a true church. *They* may belong to the true church, if by that is meant the whole company of believers ; but the visible body to which they belong is not therefore a true church. That body must be sound. Nor is it essential to this that every member should be found faithful. A few hypocrites do not destroy the claim of such a body to the character of a church, any more than a few believers in such a body can give that character. Exceptions do not destroy the rule either way. The general character of the body is all that is essential.

If we are warranted in believing that there is such soundness of doctrine, and such a prevalence of faith in that body, as to warrant the apostolic address, as a body of believers ; if joining that body can reasonably be regarded as making a credible profession of religion, we need go no further for evidence that that is properly regarded as a true church. But the existence of a single believer in such a body, otherwise corrupt, does not furnish such evidence of evangelical character.

His argument from the fact that the Jews were not re-circumcised, though the rite was performed by apostate priests, is of little weight, though much relied on. For there may have been a physical impossibility to hinder the repetition of that ceremony ; or if not, the cases are not analogous. This is apparent from the difference in the constitution of the church, before and after the coming of Christ. Then the promise was to the *natural seed* ; now it is to *faith*. Then the church was confined to one nation ; now in every nation he that feareth God and worketh righteousness is accepted of him. Then, to cease to be of the church, was to cease to be a Jew. Then the only excommunication was death. But it is not so now. Under the gospel, the continued destitution of Christian character is a sufficient ground for exclusion from the church.

We have only now to add that, if the Reformers in any case support Dr. H.'s views, we can only say they contradict him too ; and moreover, if they were consistent, they are not *our* theological masters.

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And why should we receive one sacrament of that church as valid, and reject the other, which has as many elements of validity as the other? On the ground that that is a true church, its mass should be received. On the ground of her orthodoxy, it should be received; on the authority of her ministry; on the ground of its significancy and design; on *every* account it should be received, if Dr. Hodge is right in claiming the validity of Romish baptism, and in asserting that the church of Rome is a true church. There is nothing more truly miraculous or absurd, or anti-christian, in this than in the other sacrament.

ARTICLE VIII.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

1.—*Hilpert's Dictionary of the German and English Languages.*

THIS gigantic undertaking, whose completion has so long been looked forward to by the lovers of German literature, is now happily brought to a close. The first part was issued in the year 1828, and the whole now forms two immense quarto volumes, comprising together about 2700 pages. The size of the work, however, although a matter of first rate importance in a lexicon, is by no means its only or its greatest recommendation. The design of Dr. Hilpert, and of those who have carried on the work since his death, has been to introduce into Anglo-German lexicography, those improvements which philological science has effected in the best lexicons of the ancient languages. Thus especial pains have been bestowed on tracing the etymology and primary signification of words, and arranging their various meanings in the natural order of their evolution; in doing which, care has been taken to separate those words which have the same form, but are totally distinct in their origin. In all these respects our English dictionaries are lamentably deficient. It is well known that our native lexicographers, including the latest and most celebrated, as Johnson, Todd, Webster, and Richardson, were ignorant of the northern languages. It is true that, as regards the more modern terms adopted into English from southern sources, their classical education enabled them, without much difficulty, to point out the original form of a word in Latin, Greek, or French, as the case might be; but in respect to the older and more vital part of the language, for which we are indebted to our Saxon forefathers, their blunders are constant and ludicrous in the extreme. Where Skinner and Junius fail, their servile copyists of course fail with them. So too as regards the arrangement of the various acceptations in which a word is em-

ployed; although Webster succeeded in introducing something like order into the chaos that reigned in this department before his time, his dictionary presents us with nothing like a philosophical system in this respect. In Hilpert's work, great attention has been paid to the synonyms both German and English; and the accentuation and pronunciation of both languages are carefully marked. In fine, the work is not a mere turning of an English dictionary into German, and of a German dictionary into English, but is a valuable contribution to the lexicography of both English and German, and will prove of the greatest utility to all who wish to obtain a better knowledge of the two languages and their affinities, than can be gained from any lexicons heretofore existing; and it is to be hoped that its sale in this country will be such as to materially aid in repaying the spirited publisher for his great outlay of capital and labour in producing it. The agent for America is Mr. William Radde, of this city. The work can be had of Wiley and Putnam.

2.—*The Novitiate; or, a Year among the English Jesuits.* By ANDREW STEINMETZ.

There is an air of sincerity imparted by the straightforward style of this narrative, which commands the reader's assent to its assertions. The young author relates his own year's experience in a way to engage a strong personal interest in himself, and to convey much information respecting the branch of the great Jesuit family in England. Though the best side is put outward, as would naturally be the case, to a novitiate, there is enough in the narrative to show the essentially debasing, superstitious, and oppressive character of the system, and to create all the horror of its influence in which the warmest Protestant ever indulges.

3.—*The Cyropædia of Xenophon, according to the text of L. Dindorf; with Notes for the use of Schools and Colleges.* By JOHN J. OWEN. New-York: Leavitt, Trow and Co.

The neat and careful typography of this work is noticeable. Always of great value, it is essential in a classical work. Mr. Owen's Notes strike us as more nearly realizing the true idea of classical editorship than usual. The practical acquaintance with the scholar's wants, acquired by long and successful teaching, has enabled him to supply the right word of explanation, at the right place, without making confusion by too much, or obscurity by too little. The work itself is very desirable as an elementary study; and the timely aid which the excellent Notes afford, and the beautiful appearance of the volume, will render it popular with teachers.

4.—*Harper's New Miscellany.*

It gives us pleasure to remark of this new series of books for popular reading, that its pledges of utility, good character and interest, have thus far been kept with more than ordinary fidelity. Truly useful reading which possesses novelty of subject, and attractiveness of style, and of outward appearance, and furnished at a price not beyond the means of the poorest, is a public benefaction. Four volumes have been added to the series since our last notice. Darwin's

Voyages of Discovery, in two volumes ; *Life in the Prairie Land*, by Mrs. Farnham ; *Voyages in the Arctic Ocean*, by Capt. Ross—all of the same delightful and profitable class, and, each in its way, discovering real ability, and possessing a charm. The work of Mr. Darwin is highly valuable, as recording the results of a very laborious and successful voyage of discovery, and the calm observations of an enlightened and scholarly visitor to some of the least known and most interesting localities of the globe. Mrs. Farnham's enthusiasm for Western life and scenery, her kindly sympathy with nature, and with the beautiful every where, give her book a more than temporary value. The Arctic Voyages, which have shed such lustre upon the enterprise of the British marine, and done so much for the advancement of geographical and physical science, are concisely and graphically sketched in Capt. Ross' work, and the reader is made the witness of some of the most perilous adventures and daring enterprises ever suffered or undertaken by man. We must say, that if the series will continue as good as it has begun, it will be worthy a place in every family library, and possess peculiar value for the young.

5.—*Miscellanies*. By MOSES STUART, *Prof. Sac. Lit. in Theol. Sem. Andover*. Mark H. Newman.

Some of the miscellaneous sermons and reviews of this distinguished scholar and thinker, have been gathered into a neatly printed volume, viz.: three letters to Dr. Channing on the Trinity ; two sermons on the atonement ; a sermon on the vicariousness of Christ's sufferings ; another on real Christianity ; a letter to Dr. Channing on religious liberty, and a series of supplementary notes, &c. This list of subjects will indicate at once the exceeding interest of the volume ; while the sterling good sense, profound learning, signal candour and ability with which the subjects are discussed, render it one of the really most valuable and important works of the day. As a controversialist, we regard Prof. Stuart as a model. His cool and generous temper, his candid concessions of what cannot be made sure, and then the thoroughgoing vigour with which the truth, freed from its admixtures of error, and relieved from all false light and false statement, is established, it is delightful to witness. Besides the numerous friends of the learned Professor who will be glad of the volume, the whole circle of those who love the truth will give it more than a usually cordial welcome.

6.—*Congregationalism and Methodism*. By Z. K. HAWLEY. New-York: Leavitt, Trow & Co.

This author has gone upon the principle that if controversy is necessary, it had better be thorough. The character and tendencies of some features of the Wesleyan church polity, have long been the subject of complaint ; and in these days of inquiry and agitation, it is not at all strange that they should be subjected to a new and closer examination. That the author has succeeded in showing, by the clearest of all testimony, facts and observation, that there are peculiarities in that ecclesiastical system, which, however good in Wesley's time, need to be modified, and are productive of results which all good men, if they will be candid, must deplore, we think the reader will

have to admit; and not less, the good feeling and candour with which the whole discussion is conducted. We trust it will do good, and help on the melioration which it so strongly points out to be needful.

7.—*The Union of the Holy Spirit and the Church in the Conversion of the World.* By THOMAS JENKYN, D. D. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln.

We much admire the earnest tone and truly evangelical spirit of this well-written essay, and cannot but hope its effect in directing and animating the missionary spirit, will be happy. Its eloquent appeals, and its vivid portraiture of the responsibility of the church, are finely adapted to awaken emotion. Yet we cannot lay aside the fear that some of its doctrinal expositions are liable to be misunderstood. There is an air of philosophizing about the explanations of the Spirit's influences, which, though it may not be positively erroneous, seems to fall short of the exalted view of the doctrine generally entertained. Too much explanation is often worse than none at all; and there is often obscurity added by the very attempts to make things clear. We think that Dr. Jenkyn's discussions are liable to this charge. Still, the preponderance of good is so great, and that good so very good, that, as we said, there is much to be hoped for from the influence which it may exert upon the church.

8.—*The Missionary Enterprise; a Collection of Discourses on Christian Missions, by American authors.* Edited by BARON STOW. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln.

This is a collection of twenty sermons, on different subjects relating to the missionary cause, and comprises some of the most eloquent and excellent homiletic productions of the age. There is Dr. Wayland's splendid discourse on the moral dignity of the missionary enterprise, itself worth the price of the volume. The work forms a most admirable manual for the Christian, and can hardly fail to deepen and to extend the missionary feeling.

9.—*Kühner's Elementary Greek Grammar.* By SAMUEL H. TAYLOR. Andover: Allen, Morrell & Wardwell.

The larger grammar of Kühner, from which the present is compiled, stands unrivalled in the estimation of scholars. This abridgment has many excellences of arrangement, philosophy and definition, which give it great value, and will, no doubt, render it popular with scholars and teachers. It is very neatly printed—an excellence worthy of special notice in a work of this kind.

10.—*The Puritans and their Principles.* By EDWIN HALL, Norwalk, Ct. New-York: Baker & Scribner.

Mr. Hall has presented a noble tribute to the memory, and defence of the principles, of the Puritans, in this sterling volume. We are at loss which most to admire, the affectionate zeal, or the signal ability, research, and candour, which the work displays. The leading events of their history, including a rapid sketch of the rise of the Puritan party in England, are succinctly delineated, and then the great prin-

ciples which gave that party birth, are reviewed and established with a force of argument and an energy of style worthy both of the subjects and the persons. We know of no single volume which combines so much to inform and to establish the descendants of those noble men in the faith of their fathers, as this: while all who love the truth as it is in Jesus, or who admire the sight of firm principle, deep piety and active intelligence, working out a glorious mission of liberty and love, will find it worthy of a perusal.

11.—*Napoleon and his Marshals.* By J. T. HEADLEY. 2 volumes. New-York: Baker & Scribner.

The conception of such a work as this is a very happy one, and one peculiarly fitted to the bent of Mr Headley's style and thought. It is an off-hand sketch of the great hero and his almost as heroic comrades, presenting the features of their characters and lives in bold outline, with plenty of light and shade, without aiming to fill up the picture, or to furnish any thing like a complete history. The bold points of character, the striking and picturesque, are brought out with great vividness and strength; and evince a power of description and an earnestness of feeling, which honour alike the head and the heart of the writer. With Mr. Headley's estimate of Napoleon, we are obliged to be dissatisfied. Because injustice has been done his character by English historiographers, is no good reason for canonizing him; and it may be questionable whether the soot of his enemies disfigures his true character more than the whitewash of his admirers. We like far better the candid and dignified view of Dr. Channing.

The sketches of the Marshals are generally excellent, and often eloquent and exciting in a remarkable degree. The whole work shows an intimate acquaintance with history, a keen insight into character, and the glow and warmth of a heart alive to the appeals of freedom, truth, and moral excellence. There are spirited etchings of the characters described, accompanying the volumes, which add to their interest.

12.—*Lectures on Mental Philosophy and Theology.* By JAMES RICHARDS, D. D., late Professor of Christian Theology in the Auburn Theological Seminary. With a sketch of his life by SAMUEL H. GRIDLEY. New-York: M. W. Dodd.

It was our intention to have seized upon the occasion of this publication, to refer to some of the historical events with which the life of Dr. Richards was associated. He lived and acted in the midst of two important epochs in the theological history of the country—that of the famous encounter of New-England theology with what bore the *soubriquet* of triangular theology, and that of the no less famous controversy between old and new measures. If to this be added the interest and importance of a life of laborious service in the ministry, of great talents most wisely put forth, of great undertakings for good happily executed, and singular success in his high vocation as a theological teacher, the reader can fancy something of the value of a proper estimate of his life. The memoir of Mr. Gridley is very good, though much too brief; Dr. R.'s friends and admirers will hardly be contented with so meagre a sketch. Of the value of the lectures of

which the main part of the volume is composed, we can hardly speak too highly. Strong good sense, and the utter freedom from all extravagance of view, or metaphysical subtlety, or undue deference to preconceived theories or old authorities, and of all disingenuousness of reasoning, and above all, the clear, reasonable, and Scriptural orthodoxy, form a striking, beautiful, and useful feature of the lectures. The theological student, and the intelligent layman, may be cordially commended to them, as among the very best of their kind that the country has ever produced.

13.—*An Inquiry into the Scriptural Views of Slavery.* By ALBERT BARNES. Philadelphia: Perkins & Purves.

14.—*Slavery Discussed in Occasional Essays, from 1833 to 1846.* By LEONARD BACON. New-York: Baker & Scribner.

The fair expectation that this vexed and delicate question should be approached with calmness and candour by gentlemen of the high character of the authors of these respective works, will not be disappointed. We are exceedingly pleased with the spirit of the discussion; and can safely assure the public that, whatever may be thought of the conclusions, no reasonable reader will find any thing to offend him, or unworthy the importance or intricacy of the subject. Mr. Barnes' views are decidedly anti-slavery, and the thorough and patient manner in which the Scriptural texts which are supposed to authorize or excuse slavery, are criticized, is worthy of his fame as an exegete, and his character as a Christian and philanthropist.

Dr. Bacon's Essays are likewise written with commendable good temper and unquestionable ability.

☐ *Several Critical Notices have been omitted for want of space.*

FOREIGN LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Germany.

In the department of Classical Literature there have been lately a number of important issues. Among them are F. A. Wolf's *Encyclopädie der Philologie*, herausgegeben von S. M. Stockman, zweite mit einer Uebersicht der Literatur bis zum Jahr 1845: *Kleine Schriften* von F. G. Welcker, 2 Thl. zum griechischen Literaturgeschichte. Bonn. 1845. gr. 8.—*Aristophanis Comædiæ, Recensuit et annotatione instruxit* Fr. H. Bothe. Edit. II, Vol. 2. (Vespæ, Pax., Aves.) Lips. 1845. gr. 8.—*Prolegomena ad Platonis Rempublicam*, Scrips. Geo. Fr. Rettig, Bernæ, 1845. gr. 8.—*Suidæ Lexicon Græce et Latine*. Post Th. Gaisfordum recensuit et annotatione critica instruxit Godefr. Bernhardt. Tom. II. fasc. VII. Halle. 1845. gr. 4.—*Die Mythologie der Griechen und Römer*, von Dr. W. M. Heffter. 2 und 3 Heft. Brandenburg. 1845. gr. 8.—*Beiträge zur griechischen Monatskunde* von Thd. Bergk. Giessen. 1845. gr. 8.—*Portæ Syriaci Græci*, ed. Thd. Bergk. Lips. 1843. gr. 8.—*Scriptores Poeticæ Historiæ Græci*, ed. Antonius Westermann. Brunsvigæ. 1843. gr. 8.—*Oskische Studien* v. Dr. Thd. Mommsen. Berlin. 1845. 8.—*Democriti Abderitæ Operum Fragmenta*, collegit, recensuit, vertit, explicuit, &c. Frid. Guil. Aug. Mullachius. Berolini. 1843. 8.

In the department of Theology, the following have lately appeared: *Die Christliche Lehre der Sünde, dargestellt von Julius Müller.* 8 2 vols. 1844.—*Commentar über die Psalmen von E. W. Hengstenberg,* 4 Bd. 1 abthl. Berlin. 1845. gr. 8.—*Die Lehre von Christi Person und Werke in populären Vorlesungen vorgetragen, von E. Sartorius.* 5 Auflage. Hamburg. 8.—*De Spe immortalitatis sub veteri Testamento gradatim exulta, Diss. quam scripsit. H. Aug. Hahn.* 1845.—*Die Glaubenslehre der Evangelisch-reformirten Kirche, aus der Quellen belegt von Dr. Alex. Schweizer.* 2 Bd. 1 abthl. Zürich. 1845.—*Libri Symbolici Ecclesie Evangelicæ Sive Concordiæ. Recensuit Car. Aug. Hase.* Edit. III. Lips. 1846.—*Patrum Apostolicorum Opera. Textum ex editionibus præstantissimis repetit, recognov. &c. C. J. Hefele.* Edit. altera. gr. 8. Tübingen. 1842.—*Gregor I. der Grosse, nach seinem Leben und seiner Lehrgeschichte von Geo. Joh. Th. Law.* Leipz. 1845. gr. 8.—*Geschichte der Waldenser von ihrem Ursprunge an bis auf unsere Zeit, v. Cph. Möhr len, Basel.* 1845. gr. 8.—*Strabonis Geographica Recensuit Gustav. Kramer.* vol. I. Berol. 1844.—*August Matthies in seinem Leben und Wirken zum Theil nach seiner eigenen Erzählung dargestellt von seinem Sohne Konstantin. Nebst einem lebensgeschichtlichen Abriss seines Bruders Fr. Chr. Matthies, Quedlinburg.* 1845. gr. 8.—*Das Reich Gottes. Eine biblisch. Theolog. Erörterung, alt Beziehung neuf die Kirchenfrage, von O Dietlein; Geschichte d. Offenbarung Gottes im neuen Testament, von E. Kirchener; Vollenden wir das Werk Luthers!—Ein Wort an Evangel. Christen, von G. Lisco; Die Bedeutung des Thomas Arnold, für d. Standpunkt der Kirchlichen Gegenwart, von A. Neander.*

Great Britain.

The ninth edition, in 5 vols. 8vo. of Horne's celebrated Introduction has been published, in which several alterations and improvements are alleged to have been made, especially in the matter relating to the Apocryphal books of the Old Testament, and the whole carefully revised. A work by Rev. Alexander S. Patterson, of Glasgow, is well spoken of, entitled a brief Commentary on the first Epistle to the Thessalonians. Mr. Patterson evinced considerable tact at popular exposition in a previous work on the Gospel of John. A Commentary on the Gospels by H. Mackenzie, is announced in parts, of which the first has been published. Rev. Ingram Cobbin, a well known familiar expositor, has published a manual of the Bible for the use of Sabbath schools and families, entitled the School Handbook to the Holy Bible. A work partaking something of an expository character has been published by Mrs. Webb, entitled Reflections on the History of Noah. Dr. Bloomfield has in press a work which is looked for with interest, entitled Epitome Evangelica. Rev. Dr. Harris, the author of "Mammon," has a work in press, the Pre-Adamite Earth. Rev. Wm. Walford, author of a new translation of the Psalms, has published a translation of the Epistle to the Romans, with brief critical explanatory notes.

An important undertaking has been set on foot, for the introduction of a selection of foreign Biblical literature, especially from Germany, through the medium of good translations, under the title of the Continental Translation Society. A numerous Committee of Selection, among whom are some of the first Biblical scholars and literary characters of the kingdom, decides upon the works to be issued, and efficient business arrangements appear to have been made for carrying the project into effect. The works already decided upon for the current year, are two recent works of Hengstenberg's, on the Authenticity of the Pentateuch, and on Daniel and Zechariah, to be translated by Mr. Ryland; Olshausen's Commentary on the Gospels, translated by Rev. H. Creek; Hagenbach's History of Doctrines, a comprehensive and most desirable work, translated by Mr. Masson; Neander's Church History; and Hengstenberg's Christology, a new and greatly improved edition of which is on the eve of publication in Germany.

Mr. Clark, of Edinburgh, well known as the projector of the Edinburgh Biblical Cabinet, has also given a new direction to his republishing enterprise, proposing to issue four volumes yearly, of about 500 pages each. Among the works advertised by him as forthcoming, are Lücke's Commentary on the Gospel of John; Dr. Julius Müller on the Doctrine of Sin; Hagenbach's History of Opinion; Hävernicks Introduction to the Old Testament; Hengstenberg on the Authenticity of Daniel; Hoffman on Prophecy; Pelt's Theological Encyclopedia; Usteri Pauli Lehrbegriff; Gieseler's Church History; Bauer's life of Beza; Neander's Life of Christ, &c.

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ARTICLE I.

THE RELATION OF THEOLOGY TO PREACHING.

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WITH reference to its practical influence and value, theology may be contemplated from many points of view. We may approach the Bible under the guidance of the ordinary laws of interpreting language, and inquire what theology is as contemplated there, without reference to its observed adaptation to human nature, and to its effects in the world. We may approach it, as viewed in its effects on mankind, and ask what has been its influence, how it has been modified in the changes occurring in philosophy and in society, or how it has originated or modified those changes. We may approach it by directing our inquiries primarily into the nature of man, and prosecuting the inquiry through that medium, making mental philosophy the basis, and asking what it does to develop the powers of our nature, and to elevate us in the scale of being. Or, we may contemplate it from the pulpit, and ask ourselves what is the theology which experience has shown to be best adapted to the ends of preaching, and which

we can preach with a hope of success. In the first case we look at it indeed speculatively and abstractly, yet with certainty as to truth, if we study the Bible with a right spirit ; in the second, we learn from its effects on the world what may be presumed to have been the theology which God did or did not intend to teach ; in the third, we judge that certain forms of theology which have always come in conflict with the laws of the mind, and the principles of just philosophy, cannot be the theology which the author of the human soul designed to reveal ; and in the fourth, we place ourselves in the pulpit, and look around on society, and ask what may be preached so as to answer the ends of preaching—so that men will perceive it to be true, and so that they will be converted to God.

This is the point of view from which I propose now to contemplate theology. I wish to make the pulpit a point of observation from which to look out on the world that we may obtain some lessons which may be of value to those who expect to occupy that position through life.

A natural arrangement of the thoughts which we wish to suggest will be to consider the kinds of theology which *cannot* be preached, and then that which *can* be ; or to show that there are certain kinds of theology which are not adapted to the pulpit, and then what kind of theology may be preached with success.

Under the first of these heads, we notice three kinds of theology which have prevailed, and which to a great extent still prevail in the world. These are briefly the following: that which, whatever beauty of sentiment or philosophy it may have, does not furnish the proper themes for the eloquence of the pulpit ; that which contemplates the propagation of religion mainly by other means than preaching ; and that which men are constrained to abandon in preaching.

Of the first of these kinds of theology, it may be observed, that, however it may seem to answer some of the ends of religion, it is not fitted to inspire the eloquence which we naturally expect in the pulpit, and when it is incorporated into a system designed to be preached, it lacks the highest elements

of oratory which theology in its best sense contains. We refer to that form of religion which repels what are regarded as the darker and sterner features of Christianity as it has been usually received in the world. This theology is founded on the beautiful and grand in the works of nature, or in the scenes of redemption. It finds pleasure in the contemplation of the starry heavens ; of hills, and streams, and lakes, of the landscape and of the ocean ; and is willing in these things to admire and praise the existence and perfections of the Creator. In the contemplation of these things, there is no reluctance to admit the existence of a God, or to dwell on his natural perfections ; for in the placid beauty of a landscape, in the silvery murmuring of a rivulet, and in the opening of a rose-bud, no attribute of the Deity is revealed on which the mind even of the gay and the wicked, is unwilling to dwell. This religion is found in all the departments of poetry, and in all the conceptions of mythology. It abounded most among the Greeks, a people who carried the love of the beautiful to a higher eminence than any other, and who embodied it in their unequalled works of art. Over each of the works of nature ; over every element, and every event ; over every tree, and flower, and breeze, and waving harvest-field, and fountain, they supposed a divinity to preside ; and all the skill of the chisel, and the harmony of numbers, were employed to embody and perpetuate their conceptions.

This is still the theology of poetry and romance ; and over a large portion of the world, claiming particularly to be ranked among the refined and the intellectual, it yet maintains its dominion. The names, indeed, which were used by that refined and elegant people with so much propriety to express their conceptions, are employed no more. Statues of breathing marble no longer embody their conceptions, but the ideas of virtue and of man, of the influence of religion on the character, and of the prospects which it opens in the future world, differ little from theirs. The heaven to which they look, differs little from the Elysian fields. That which is needful to prepare for that world, differs little from the virtues which a re-

finer Athenian deemed necessary to fit him for the world of beauty and of joy to which he looked forward.

This theology, of course, admits the existence of one God as the Creator and moral Governor of the universe, and dwells with rapture on what are regarded as the amiable and lovely traits of his character. It receives, under the Christian form, the great Messenger whom he has sent, as a moral teacher, and ascribes to him, in all respects, an unsurpassed, and in most respects, an unequalled perfection. It admits his authority to give laws, and to suggest the principles of morals. It receives the Bible as containing a revelation, and finds in that much to admire; for, whatever may be its other characteristics, there is no book which contains so much to commend itself to a religionist of this kind as the Bible. So far as man is concerned, this system regards him as indeed in a less desirable condition respecting religion and morals, than he may once have been, and as having some strong propensities to evil; but he is regarded as in such a state that what is needful for him is not a radical and total change, but the development of internal virtues still living within him; the cultivation of his noble and godlike powers. What this theology proposes to do is not to effect an entire transformation, securing the very beginning of goodness in the soul, but to cultivate the virtues already existing there, which need only to be unfolded.

This theology is not without its use in the world, and produces some effects on society. It finds its appropriate home in poetry; in moral essays; in the slight infusion of religion which a refined literature demands; in the deference to religion which the urbane and well-educated find it convenient to show; and in the obvious necessity for keeping up some kind of worship in the world.

But it is little adapted to preaching. It is not the kind of theology which men instinctively feel to be proper for the pulpit. It may have, indeed, all the elegance of language, and beauty of thought, and grace of scholarship, which the pulpit demands—and in these respects may furnish models

which men embracing and preaching a more correct theology would do well to copy—but it lacks the elements of power which we expect in the pulpit; it lacks the variety and depth and sublimity furnished to preachers by a different kind of religion. The Greeks never attempted to *preach* their theology. They inwove it into their poetry, and they gave it a permanent form in the master-works of the chisel; but they never *preached* it. Plato, Socrates, Zeno, and Epicurus, appointed no *preachers* to make known their doctrines to the world. Much as they valued the results of their speculations, and important as they deemed them for the good of mankind, they never seem to have supposed that their dogmas contained the elements of powerful oratory. Our recollections of the eloquence of Greece are not in fact associated with them, but with a far different kind of public speaking, for little of the recorded eloquence of Greece grew out of religion. It is not certain but that the speech of the Apostle Paul, on Mars' Hill, was the first specimen of true eloquence, connected with religion, that was ever listened to in Athens. We have among the Greeks, dialogues, disputations, poetry, essays on religion, but no *sermons*. Their patriotism furnished grounds of lofty appeal to men; their religion none. They embodied their religious conceptions in poetry and in marble; they reared temples, built altars, perpetuated the images of the gods in statuary; but Greece never sent out a *preacher* to convert the world to its faith. And who now would undertake to preach the theology of Seneca, or of Thompson's Seasons, or of the Spectator or the Rambler? We feel that whatever beauty or propriety these things may have there, they are ill-adapted to the pulpit. When men undertake to preach such a system, the topics of public discourse, always tame and powerless, are soon exhausted; there is nothing to seize strongly upon men, and to alarm their consciences, and to bind their powers to religion; they themselves soon become weary, and are ready to embark in some other profession; they cast about in passing events for new topics of exciting thought in the conscious barrenness of the themes of the pul-

pit ; war, the plague, a conflagration, or a steamboat explosion, become a "windfall" in furnishing a topic of public address ; and whatever may be the elegance of diction or of manner, every man feels that the *pulpit* is robbed of its great and peculiar power in moving the minds of men. For there is an instinctive feeling which all men have respecting the pulpit. Whatever else it is, it is to be a place of power. It is designed to discuss great and stirring themes ; it is intended to take a firmer hold of men than any topics which can be urged in the forum or the senate-chamber, to bring before men motives and thoughts which shall do more to sway them than all other causes combined. Every man feels that the pulpit is not a place in which to discourse on botany, or poetry, or the mere beauties of nature, or to pronounce eulogiums on man, or to furnish descriptions of imaginary fields of the blessed to which all will yet come. Nor can that philosophy which prevails in the world, and which lies at the foundation of the mental systems which are inculcated in the schools, be the basis of preaching. The philosophy of the world is wrong ; and there is a *jar* between that which prevails in the schools, and that which exists in reality. In those systems the great truth is overlooked, which in fact modifies every other truth in regard to man—that the mind is not to be contemplated as a perfect mind, but as disordered and in ruins. The grand questions which we are to contemplate in philosophy, are not what would be the laws of the mind, if it were not wrecked and ruined ; not what are the laws which regulate unfallen minds, but what is the human mind fallen and lost, disordered and diseased, under the control of evil passions, and a perverse and stubborn will, and corrupt desires. It is like contemplating the nervous system, not as it would be if never diseased, and if performing its functions in a state of healthfulness, but as subject to disease, and liable always to derangement. The thing to be done in man is not what philosophy contemplates—*development*, but it is *recovery* and *rescue*—a work peculiar to the gospel of Christ. Preaching addresses man as in ruins ; philosophy addresses him as what mind

would be if the fall had never occurred—and *that* is not a system which can be *preached*. The primary thought, every one instinctively feels, in addressing man from the pulpit, is that he is a sinner; the grand theme is redemption, and reconciliation with God; the issues referred to are an eternal heaven and hell; the world, though full of beauty, is a world of probation, from which the results of human conduct are borne ever onward into far-distant worlds; and in reference to these things, and to the eternal judgment, the most amazing and wonderful events have occurred on earth—the incarnation and the atonement. When these are the topics of preaching, men feel that, however imperfect may be the execution, the *themes* are those which belong to that place, and are the *only* themes which can invest the pulpit with dignity over the Academy, the Porch, and the Forum.

There is a second kind of theology which is not adapted to be preached. It is that which does not contemplate preaching as the principal means of its propagation and perpetuity. For its continuance in the world, and its extension—for of all the forms of theology this aims most decidedly at extension—it relies on other things than preaching. The main thing on which dependence is placed, is not truth applied to the heart, and accompanied by the agency of the Divine Spirit; not a system of doctrines commending themselves to the consciences and understandings of men; not argument, and powerful thoughts, and appeals to men contemplated primarily as reasoning and responsible agents; not those things in the ministry of a personal character, which give power to eloquence; but those things which have a very slight connection with eloquence in the pulpit, and which depend little on it. It is a theology whose main sources of influence in the world lie back of the pulpit, and apart from the pulpit; a theology which calculates on success with nearly equal degrees of certainty, whatever the pulpit may be. Its main reliance consists in regarding the church as the inclosure within which alone grace is conveyed; in the apprehensions entertained of the ministry, as being within a certain line along which, by a.

mystical power, salvation is imparted to men ; in the opinions entertained of the sacraments, as of themselves conveying grace to the soul ; in the influence of sacred places and vestments, shrines and altars, splendid rites and gorgeous ceremonies ; in processions and genuflexions and holy anointing ; in being baptized in a proper way, and buried in consecrated ground. In this system, religion is radically a different thing from what it is when *preaching* is regarded as the grand means of its propagation. It begins not in an inquiry whether the system contains *truth* that may be an element of power *in oratory* to move men, but whether the right *channel* for conveying grace has been found, and whether these are the right *persons* through whom it is conveyed. It is impossible to find in the system the elements of power viewed in its relation to public speaking ; but it has elements of vast power viewed in its relations to an influence over men that is essentially physical and mechanical.

In such a system of theology, preaching becomes, of course, a secondary thing. The arrangement of the chancel is the primary matter ; the pulpit is secondary. The altar and the reading desk are prominent ; the pulpit, if it is still retained, is removed into a corner ; is made unattractive in its appearance ; is seldom occupied. The services contemplated in the pulpit, are of the briefest character, and the entire arrangement is to place it in the back ground, and to make it as far as possible, forgotten. The altar at which the priest ministers is adorned with the highest works of art ; lighted candles always burn near it ; magnificent paintings attract the eye of the worshipper ; incense is wafted in the most sacred portion of the temple of religion ; and every thing shows that *preaching* is quite a secondary affair. It is always instructive to go into a place of worship, and a simple survey of the arrangements which present themselves to the eye, will usually disclose the kind of theology which is inculcated there. More than half the arrangements in the splendid cathedrals of the world would be useless if the main reliance were on preaching ; and if those arrangements are needed in religion, the

Saviour greatly misjudged when he made preaching the grand means of propagating his gospel.

In carrying out the purposes of the system of theology here referred to, a view corresponding to it is of course given to the ministry. The grand business of the minister of religion is not to be a preacher, but a priest. His work ceases to be one requiring high intellectual endowments, but becomes one requiring skilful mechanical execution. It demands but little intellect, little learning, and no eloquence, to be a priest. All the knowledge necessary for a Jewish priest, consisted in keeping up the order of the festivals and fasts; in acquaintance with the right methods of burning incense, and of killing, flaying, and offering animals on the altar. All this could be acquired in a brief period, and by any class of men, and might, therefore, be intrusted indiscriminately, to a whole tribe of men, without reference to any special endowments. And so all over the world, where the main reliance in the perpetuity and propagation of religion is on the performance of certain rites and ceremonies; on the proper administration of the sacraments; on the proper reading of prayers; and on the suitable interment of the dead, little learning or talent is necessary, and there is little to call forth the powers of an orator. The priest is essentially no more intellectual or eloquent, than the teller in a bank, or the superintendent of a cotton-jenny, or the engineer that works a steam-engine. It is as easy to become a priest as it is to be familiar with any other mechanical calling; and if, under such a system, a man is learned or eloquent, it is *in spite* of the essential tendency of his system. You can *act* those things on which the efficacy of religion depends; you cannot *preach* them.

All over the world, therefore, the priesthood, as such, with indeed some eminent exceptions—exceptions occurring only in the few instances where, as in the case of Bourdaloue and Massillon, under higher and nobler influences, men forget that they are *priests*, and rise to the dignity of *preachers*—has been little distinguished for talent, or learning, or eloquence, or even moral worth. And yet every where there is a tendency

to transform the preacher to a priest ; the form of theology which contemplates an appeal from the pulpit to the reason and the conscience, to that which contemplates success by ascertaining that men are in a certain line of succession, and by an influence that goes forth from the altar. For this is an easier form of religion. It imparts at once power as a man enters on his way, which in the other case can be gained only by reasoning and argument, and persuasion, and by learning, slowly acquired. The mere *priest* is always a man of power, if you will give him the control of the religious principle—for there is no principle so mighty to move men as that and he who wields that controls the world. There is power which can be gained through the truth, and by eloquence, indeed, but it can be secured by no mechanical means. No man can start with it when he begins his public way. It can be secured only as the result of patient study, and of untiring efforts, and of a personal character in which the world will see that it has reason to confide.

I need hardly say that there is now, as in fact there has been at all times, a tendency to the form of theology of which I am now speaking:—the theology which contemplates success not primarily from *preaching*, but from mechanical influences. Its home, its embodiment, its most finished form, is in the church of Rome ; its spirit is abroad in nearly all other churches, and it is striving, every where, for the ascendancy.

There is a third form of theology which may be noticed, in its relation to preaching, similar to those already referred to. It is that which men are constrained to *abandon* when they come to preach, or which will not bear the test applied to it, when they engage earnestly in an effort to convert sinners to God. It may be taught in the schools ; it may be defended by a venerable tradition ; it may be embodied in creeds, or in standard systems of theology ; but it cannot be preached. It contains dogmas so abhorrent to the obvious teaching of the Bible ; so repellant to the common sense of mankind ; so at variance with what are found to be just principles of philoso-

phy ; so much fitted to retard a work of grace ; and so utterly contradictory to what a man is constrained to preach when his heart is full, and when he has the most enlarged and elevated views of the work of his Saviour, that he *cannot* preach them. It would shock his own feelings ; it would contradict all his prayers ; it would be fatal to all his efforts to do good ; it would throw off the sinner to a hopeless distance, though he had begun to return to God ; it would present theology as at war with the elementary convictions which men have of what must be true.

There has been much of this theology in the schools ; and rare is it that one goes forth to preach who does not find many a jutting corner of his theology soon worn off by his contact with the world ; many of his theoretical views soon modified ; and many of the dark and frowning features of his system of divinity exchanged insensibly for those more bland and benignant and cheerful. There is no better way to test certain dogmas that have come down in the church, and that seem to be defended by apparently conclusive reasoning, than to attempt to *preach* them. Standing in the pulpit, with immortal beings before him, whom it is his great business to attempt to win to the knowledge and love of God, theology will seem to be a different thing from what it was when contemplated as an abstract thing. There are sympathies and feelings awakened in the bosom of the preacher which he had not when, from his room at the Seminary, he looked out on the world, and which they seldom have who teach theology without the remembered feelings of the pastoral relation. In the pulpit he is not the mere theologian ; he is a man, with all the sympathies and feelings of a man. He addresses men, not abstractions. His business now is to persuade men, not to demonstrate dogmas. He is to seek to move them by argument, by persuasion, by appeals that will commend themselves to their good sense ; and it is easy then to see that there are certain dogmas which will *not* move them, except to irritation ; and which, however strenuously he may have held them,

he cannot preach. They violate the spirit of his commission ; they are at war with all the finer feelings of his own nature.

Among those dogmas, we may mention the doctrine of limited atonement. It would be improper to deny that plausible arguments may be adduced in favour of that doctrine ; and still more that it has been held by men of great eminence in theology ; but it cannot be preached. It does not suggest itself to a man's mind when he is preaching ; it does not fall in with the design of preaching. When a man is most deeply engaged in his work it cannot be preached ; it must always be practically abandoned when, under the highest influence of his commission, and under the constraint of the highest motives which press on the soul, the preacher offers the gospel to his fellow-men. Then there is nothing that more cramps the powers, and fetters the hands, and chills the heart of the preacher than such a doctrine ; and though there may be, here and there, one so early and thoroughly trained in such a form of systematic theology, so fettered and bound by authority, and by the manacles of a creed, so wholly under the influence of a theology derived from past ages, that he will have the moral courage to stand up in the pulpit, and defend the dogma—freeze him though it does, and grate on the feelings of his hearers though it may—yet it is not a dogma that is, or can be, extensively preached. It never has been, it never will be. It comes so across a minister's commission—to preach “ the gospel to every creature,”—implying that the gospel is to be, without mental reservation, on the part of God or man offered to every human being ; it is so contrary to the current statements of the New Testament about the design of the atonement, as understood by the mass of readers of that book ; it is so chilling to the gushing feelings of a preacher when his heart warms with compassion for guilty men ; it is so contradictory to the prayers which he must offer in the sanctuary, and in his nearest approaches to the throne of mercy in private ; it is so cold and withering in its influence on the heart, that men will not preach it. If they

felt that it was an essential and necessary part of their message, they would abandon preaching altogether, and engage in farming, or teaching, or the mechanic arts; *any thing* rather than have their better feelings subjected to constant torture.

As a matter of fact, therefore, the doctrine of limited atonement, is not and cannot be preached. It is found in ancient books of divinity, written in a sterner age, and when the principles of interpretation were less understood, and the large and liberal nature of the gospel was less appreciated. It is "petrified" in certain creeds maintained by the church, made firm, like fossil remains in a transition state, when ancient opinions were passing to a more liberal form. It is taught in a few seminaries, where men feel themselves constrained to repress the warm emotions of their own souls, and are prohibited from allowing their own minds to reach conclusions which they can scarcely avoid. But the doctrine is not preached, except when the heart is cold and dead. It is not preached when the soul is on fire with the love of men, and when the cross in its true grandeur and glory rises to view. It is *never* preached in a revival of religion—a proof, not fable, that the doctrine is not true.

Akin to this is the doctrine of man's natural inability to do the will of God, to repent of his sins, and to believe the gospel. This doctrine too has been taught in the schools; it is found in books of theology; it is embodied in creeds; it is based on an ingenious philosophy; it has been held by not a few eminent men; but it is not a doctrine *to be preached*. If, here and there, a man has the moral courage to preach it, and means honestly to apply his philosophy, and to make "full proof" of divinity, as he understands it, he soon "has his reward," and will see abundantly the fruit of his ministry. For why should men make an effort to be saved, when they are told that all effort is vain? And why should they hear a message which is only to tell them that they have no power, and that all exertion is fruitless? And why should they put themselves under teaching which makes religion at variance

with every thing else that they do, and which, in a most active world, and where men *do* accomplish wonders by their efforts, tells them that effort is vain? How will they be persuaded that the same God is the author of the two systems; and that in reference to transitory and temporary matters he has so made man that he can accomplish every thing; in reference to things of real and permanent interest, nothing?

Thus too it is with the doctrine of the imputation of the sin of Adam—the doctrine that we are to blame for his transgression,—and condemned for an act which was performed ages before we had a being. Such dogmas so come athwart the common sense of mankind; they are so at variance with the principles on which men act in other things; they so much isolate theology from common life, and from what men know to be just principles, that a preacher who attempts to defend them goes against the common sense and the consciences of his fellow men, and against all the principles which prevail in the world, and they cannot be preached. Theology as viewed from an intelligent Christian pulpit, is often quite a different thing from what it is in the lecture-room. The theology which Baxter, and Payson, and Whitefield *preached*, was quite a different thing from what theology is in Turretin.

I proceed to inquire more definitely what kind of theology may be preached. I refer to that which will be an element of power in the pulpit; which, so far as theology is concerned, will make the pulpit what it should be. The inquiry is substantially similar to what the inquiry would be, what kind of doctrines would have been adapted to make the *βήμα* in Athens what it should be; or would be fitted to call forth the eloquence of Roman orators; or what kind of doctrines became the House of Lords, or the House of Commons in the days of the Earl of Chatham and of Burke. We wish to know what truths are appropriate to the place, and will stir up the soul to eloquence.

It is not enough to say that the end can be reached by grace of manner, or by any rules of enunciation or gesture,

or by the precepts which mere rhetoricians give, or by elegant diction and powerful declamation. The end is to be reached by the kind of theology which is taken into the pulpit, and which is habitually presented there. I refer to that kind of theology which will make the pulpit in the eyes of an intelligent community what it is designed to be; which will secure the largest measure of success according to the talent that is given us; which will make the pulpit what it should be in this age of the world, honorable and eminent among the places of influencing men by public speaking; and which will be best adapted to secure the progress of religion.

I refer, of course, in my own view of the matter, to the great system of redemption, and believe that these elements of power in the pulpit are to be found only in what are called the Evangelical doctrines, or the doctrines of the Reformation. I believe that the pulpit is ill-adapted to any other doctrines, and that when these are not the grand theme, the purpose of the pulpit is not reached, and it is shorn of its power. In those great doctrines of redemption, embodied in the Evangelical, and eminently in the Calvinistic system, there are more elements of powerful oratory, more to arouse, and thrill, and awe the soul, more to excite to action, more that may be wrought into efficient eloquence, than existed when Philip threatened Greece, when Burke impeached Warren Hastings in the House of Commons, when Cicero arraigned Catiline, or when Patrick Henry first taught the hills and vales of Virginia to echo with the notes of liberty. But it would not be needful here for me to state what those doctrines are, nor will I enter on the attempt, however much it invites me, to search out and state what would be found to be elements of power in oratory in the evangelical doctrines.

The line of thought which I wish to pursue is of a more humble, but not less practical cast,—to inquire, on the assumption that those doctrines are those which are to be preached, into the manner in which they are to be presented to meet the design of the pulpit, and the spirit of this age.

What kind of theology, then, may be preached, to make the pulpit what it should be?

1. First, it must be that which is based on obvious and honest principles of interpretation. The preacher, more than any other public speaker, is the interpreter of *a book*; and no inconsiderable part of his work consists in explaining the volume which lies before him. In the pulpit he is what the judge and the advocate together are in a court of law. The preacher is at once a grave and impartial expounder of a book, and an earnest advocate. The book which he expounds, too, is in the hands of the people whom he addresses, and they are presumed to be competent to make up their own minds as to its meaning, or at least to judge of the correctness of his interpretation.

The theology of the world has been determined by the views which have prevailed on the subject of interpretation. The success of preaching has been retarded, more than by any thing else, by the principles which have existed in interpreting the Bible. When you look over the history of a preached theology, when you look into theology as you find it in books, nothing is more apparent than that the views which have prevailed in interpreting the Bible are widely different from those which are acted on in interpreting other books. You look into the methods of interpreting an ancient classic writer, and then into the methods which have prevailed in interpreting the Bible, and you seem to be in different regions. Your old familiar rules in explaining the classics; in obtaining the sense from a line in Horace, and a word in Plato; in interpreting a dialogue of Lucian, or a treatise of Seneca, seem to be of no use to you when you come into the department of interpreting the words of David, Isaiah, or John. You have been accustomed to apply an obvious common-sense to ascertain the meaning of a written document; to suppose that men wrote to make themselves understood; that the modes in which their minds worked, and in which they used language, were substantially the same among the ancients and

the moderns, and that there were great laws of language which would be found to prevail all over the world. When you come to ask, however, in what way, in fact, the Bible has been interpreted by preachers and theologians, you are surprised to find that it seems to have been interpreted under the operation of quite a different system of laws. You find almost none of the old and familiar rules to which you have been accustomed in your classics, but are bewildered and confounded amidst a wholly new set of canons of interpreting language. You are in the midst of double senses, and mystical meanings, and proof-texts that prove nothing, and symbols and words that are understood to have any kind of meaning that can possibly be attached to them. You are told of the necessity of a new and peculiar sort of perception which can only be possessed by the initiated, in order to ascertain the meaning of the words; and when you say that proof-texts adduced seem to you to demonstrate nothing, you are told that the very fact that they *seem* so to you is evidence that you have not been enlightened from above to *see* their force; or, in other words, that your inability to see their force is no argument against it, but proves only that you are destitute of religion. Infidels and men of the world are approached with such arguments. They see no force in them. They are contrary to their usual methods of using words. They seem to be required to subscribe to canons in interpreting language, to see the justice of which requires a new revelation. They are not convinced by your arguments. They regard the Bible which you undertake to expound as wholly a *mystical* book—a book which they are not expected to understand—and they are willing to *remain* infidels rather than embrace a book to be interpreted in this manner, and they will leave you in your own self-complacency, comforting yourselves with the idea that you only are illuminated from on high.

One needs but little experience in the ministry, and but little acquaintance with theology, to be pained and sickened with the fact that such a multitude of impertinent and inap-

plicable texts of Scripture are adduced as proofs of Christian doctrine. He learns to feel that there is a strong presumption that if the proof-text were examined, it would have little or nothing to do with the matter in hand. You are not certain but that it might be found to be applicable to any thing else rather than the point for which it is adduced; you are not clear but that it would require a special illumination from on high to see that it had any bearing on the point, and that the *real* force of the argument relied on is to be found in one of the thousand significations of which the Scripture is supposed to be so pregnant. It requires some hardihood, I know, to question the reasoning powers of Edwards. But what is the exact state of mind in which even he is read by many of his warmest admirers? When he reasons; when he looks steadily at a point, and applies the powers of an intellect that had probably the highest capacity for ratiocination of any ever created among men; when he combats a foe, and beats down a position with such arguments as are drawn from reason, and the nature of the case, you are awed, and overwhelmed, and silent. But when he appeals to a text of Scripture, you almost never feel that there is force in the appeal, unless you have learned before to fall in with his views of interpretation. Great as he was, and pious as he was—exalted in personal religion as he was in his reasoning powers, to a position among those who are at the head of the race, you learn painfully to feel that the mere fact that he has attempted to fortify his position by an appeal to the Bible, is scarcely even presumptive evidence of its truth. You are silenced and convinced by his abstract reasoning; not by the texts which he has quoted from the Bible. In like manner, you may demonstrate by abstract arguments a considerable part, if not all, the propositions contained in the Westminster Confession. But who was ever convinced by the texts of Scripture appended to that document, and relied on as proofs? And who in an intelligent assembly would risk his reputation as an expositor by adducing those very texts as proofs of the truth of the doctrine?—So there is a

sort of admiration which a man may have for Turretin, and possibly there may be a class of minds that, like him, are the better for the very way in which he quotes Scripture; but what impression would his proof-texts make on an audience accustomed to the common laws of interpreting language? And who now would venture to go before such an audience with such proof-texts as Origen or Cocceius would adduce?

The truth is, that among the advances made on subjects connected with theology, there are none which are more manifest than those which pertain to the interpretation of the Bible. The point will at last be reached—it is not yet reached—that the Bible is to be interpreted as other books are, and that men cannot hide themselves in the mist of an occult meaning when they rely on proofs that shock the common sense of the world. I will not say, indeed, that such things cannot be *preached*, for in fact they *are* preached all over our country; but I will say that for the credit of religion such theology *ought* not to be preached, and that it *cannot* long be preached in this land. It is too late for a man who is to be a preacher to undervalue the intelligence of his hearers, or to *presume* that he can be successful because they cannot appreciate the force of an argument. That preacher will succeed best who addresses them, not as young preachers are sometimes counselled to do—as so many “cabbage-heads,” but as endued with what Mr. Locke calls “large, sound, roundabout sense.” In every congregation that may ever be addressed, it is to be presumed that there are shrewd and sagacious men; men who are accustomed to habits of reflection; men who can appreciate a good argument, and who can see the weakness of a bad one; and men who can appreciate a good sermon, if there is a good sermon to be appreciated. A preacher may, in many cases, presume safely that he understands more Latin and Greek than his hearers, but he is not always safe in coming to the conclusion that he has more good sense than they have; he may have a whiter hand, and may make gestures or flourish his handkerchief more gracefully; he may have better cadences, and may

“trill the R’s” better than they could ; but beyond that he cannot usually venture with much safety, and if he has nothing *but* these, he may be certain that they will very soon come to be valued only for what they are worth. No man can preach safely who does not suppose that in the plainest congregations there are those who can appreciate a sound argument as clearly as himself. No man who begins to preach with a different presumption will labour long without finding that he has been egregiously mistaken in his estimate of his fellow-men. No man, if he has any thing worth hearing, need to fear that there will not be ability among some of his hearers to appreciate it, or apprehend that it will be wholly lost to the world. If men are not heard in the pulpit, it is because they have nothing worth being heard ; if they are ultimately overlooked, it is because they deserve to be, and have only found their proper level.

2. That theology which can be preached must be such as shall commend itself to the common sense of mankind. It must be such as shall find a response in the laws of our nature, and be in accordance with the principles on which men every where feel and act. In other words, a man who undertakes to preach theology should be a man of common sense, and should be acquainted with what man is.

I have already said that a minister should not undervalue the good sense of his hearers. I wish now to say, in illustrating the importance of good sense as lying at the basis of the theology that we preach, that good sense—such as will appreciate an argument in preaching, is not confined to any location, or to any class of men. Some ministers suppose that all wisdom is in a city congregation ; some that behind a pair of spectacles there must be always some great ‘doctor’ in the laws, in medicine, or in divinity ; some that a graceful air, a genteel dress, or that jewels and rings, imply that there is a peculiar qualification for appreciating a good discourse in theology ; some that all wisdom is in the East, and that any thing will do for the West ; some that those of eminent attainments should be employed in a Christian land, and that much

more slender endowments may occupy the field in ministrations among the heathen. Hence, there are so many who feel themselves peculiarly called to labour in city congregations, and city congregations are so favoured with an opportunity to select a pastor from such a multitude who would be willing to serve them; and hence there are those who feel that it would be an absolute waste of talent if their lives were spent beyond the mountains, or among the heathen. Never were greater mistakes made than occur in regard to the ability of men to estimate a public discourse. Good sense, like air and water, necessities of life, are diffused about equally, and with great profusion over the world; genius and eminent talents, like gems, may be rare indeed, but like gems contribute little to the general happiness of the race. A man makes a great mistake who supposes that all are intelligent in cities; that none are capable of appreciating a good discourse in a country congregation; and equally does he err who supposes that his talent would be unappreciated in the West, or wasted among the heathen. There is, in this country most certainly, often a much higher ability to appreciate a public discourse in a country congregation than in a city congregation; and he who would make a small endowment of good sense go a great way, would often do well to direct his steps to a splendid city church. In the West, there is as high an order of talent developing itself as this age is likely to produce; and he who has talent, and who desires that it may be appreciated, would do well to set his face toward the setting sun. Henry Martyn found occasion for all the skill in dialectics which the University of Cambridge could furnish, among the Moolahs of Persia, and his talent was not lost—for he left a path of living light from the Ganges to the Euphrates.

There is nothing in which theology has been more defective than in the want of adapting itself to the ways in which men ordinarily think, and speak, and act. There is no one thing—take the world over—in which ministers are supposed to be so deficient as in regard to the maxims of common prudence, and a knowledge of human nature.

There is no one thing in which the theology of the books needs a more thorough reformation, than in adapting it to the maxims of common sense. A great part of the prevalent theology of the world is based on an old and obsolete philosophy. It has technicalities which the great mass of men do not understand, and which they cannot be *made* to understand ; or which, if they *do* understand, shocks all their notions of things. Its illustrations, unlike those of the Saviour, are drawn from things remote from common life, and from nature as she appears. There is a jar between theology and nature ; between the supposed teachings of revelation, and the works of God ; between what is held up as truth, and is required to be believed, and what men perceive to be passing in their own bosoms—the laws by which they ordinarily think and act. Ministers are often men who have little acquaintance with the world, and little of that good sense which is understood to influence other men. They manage their own affairs with less prudence than other men, and they advance and defend opinions which do not commend themselves to the habits of thinking among their hearers. As a class of men they are supposed to be those who are dissociated from the ordinary methods of thinking and acting in the world, and men, who, however they may succeed in a profession that is quite aloof from common life, would be little likely to succeed as merchants, or manufacturers, or farmers, as lawyers or legislators—and the honest Vicar of Wakefield is regarded as a type of the whole fraternity.

Now I will not say that this view is always just, or that wrong is not done to ministers of the gospel as a class of men. I believe that injustice is done them, and that as a class they have a more correct knowledge of human nature, than they obtain credit for. But still, there is some foundation for the charge, and some reason why those who are in the ministry, and those who are soon to enter it, should institute an inquiry into the justice of the charge, and ask whether a remedy may not be applied.

If I were asked what are the *causes* of this general impres-

sion, and what has led to the fact that it is so extensively true, I would answer, that one of the chief causes is the very thing which I am now adverting to—the kind of theology which is taught and preached. It is remote from common life, and common habits of thinking. It is based on a philosophy which does not commend itself to the common sense of men. It abounds in technical terms which convey no meaning to the mass of men. What is eminently needed in a theology that is to be preached is, that its philosophy shall be such as shall accord with the true laws of the mind; that it shall be adapted to human nature as it is; and that the ministers of religion shall show that they think and act like other men. It was one of the most striking peculiarities in the theology of our great Master, that, knowing all the secret springs of the human heart, and commending himself to his hearers by simple illustrations which every man understood, the “common people heard him gladly.”

In regard to this object, there are two material obstacles in the way of the theologian who preaches now. One is, that which has been already adverted to, that a large part of the theology laid down in books is based on false principles of philosophy; the other is, that a minister rarely sees men as they are. In the sanctuary he sees them in their best clothes; in his pastoral visits, and wherever he is understood to be a clergyman, he sees them in their holiday morals and manners. He sees them as they *prepare* themselves to see their minister—serious, respectful, calm, and devout—if with any plausibility they can assume the appearance of being devout at any time. He can rarely find them off their guard; compared with a county court lawyer, he has little opportunity to see and to study them as they are.

I know not that the evil can be well remedied, nor that the suggestions which I will make here would commend themselves to all men as wise. But, I will venture to say that the man who would preach theology successfully must study *man*—‘the proper study’ of the theologian as of other men—man in the great principles of his nature, and

when off his guard. But how shall he do this, and when? I cannot go largely into the answer to this question; but I will throw out a few hints. Let him, then, study man profoundly, as he is exhibited in the Bible, and feel habitually when he approaches that book which is to be his familiar guide, that he sees man as he has been drawn by Him who knows all the secret springs of the heart, and before whose eyes there was no veil or disguise when the character of man was drawn there—man as he always has been and will be.—Let him be familiar with Homer, and with the way in which kings and heroes and peasants talked and acted in his times—for so they talk and act every where. Let him not deem it a profanation of his sacred vocation to be familiar with the Bard of Avon, that man who seemed to look into the very soul itself, and see how it *would* act and speak in any situation of life; who drew his characters not from his knowledge of what *had been*, but from his intuitive perceptions of what *would be* if human beings should be placed in certain circumstances; that man who, “with no systematic knowledge or scholastic study comprehended all the powers and uses of the English language so as to speak as no uninspired man ever spoke; who understood all the springs of human motives, and entered into every human character, male and female, English, Roman, African, Danish, and Venetian, and put it on as though it were his own, and who could feel and speak as a king or a clown, the crazy or the sage, the lover, the politician, the glutton, hoary age and the little child;”^{*} and who seemed to be familiar with every human being that ever has lived, and to know what any one would do who ever would live. Let him go into a county court room, and see by what motives men are influenced, and how their passions and characters are developed when there are none of the restraints which exist where clergymen are present, and where no mask is *assumed* to hide what is in the heart. Let him like his Master, be familiar with children, and see how

* *Biblio. Sacra*, II. p. 692.

they think and speak before they have learned to act a part, and have become disciplined in the methods of hiding the emotions of the soul; before, under the design of concealment, they have disciplined the eye, and the brow, and the whole expressive countenance, so that they shall not betray the inward emotions of the soul. Nature, under all the disadvantages of our profession, is still open to the study of the clergyman, and, though shut out in certain quarters, we may still have access to her in others, and no kind of training is more needed in a preparation for preaching with success than that which will simply qualify a minister of the gospel to think and act like other men.

3. The theology that is to be preached should sustain a proper relation to the spirit of the age. I mean that it should be adapted to the habits of thinking, and the modes of doing things, and the enterprises of the generation in which we live. I do not mean that the minister of religion should be a time-server. There are great truths and principles which are the same in every age, and which are adapted to man as man, which never change. These are to be the 'burden' of his message, and these he is to preach.

There is no time to dwell on the point now referred to, but there are two or three things which I would suggest, as illustrating the idea that the theology which we preach should be adapted to the age in which we live.

(a.) One is, that each age of the world has its own peculiarity of thinking and methods of doing things; and that a man who wishes to accomplish any thing must be a man of that generation, and not a man of a by-gone age. The methods of thinking and doing things in his generation may be no wiser or better than what may have prevailed before, and may be far inferior to what will yet be; but in a matter in itself indifferent, it will be well for a man not to forget the times in which he lives, and not to act as if he lived in an age long since gone by. In many respects it is quite indifferent how men dress, and as a matter of fact the fashion prevailing now may be much less convenient or becoming than some

one that has existed ; but however convenient it might be, it would not be well for a man now to appear in the costume of the times of Elizabeth, or to borrow his fashion from the capital of the Sultan. Still less would it be wise to maintain that the same fashions shall prevail all over the world. Our age, in its modes of thinking, and its methods of doing things, has its own peculiarities, and they are as strongly marked as those of any that have gone before. It is not the age of Augustus, or of Venerable Bede, or of Duns Scotus, or of Leo X., or of Elizabeth, or of Milton. It may be in some respects inferior to some of these, but it is as strongly marked as any one of them, and a man formed under influences existing at either of those times, would be little at home in this generation. Neither Origen nor Augustine, St. Antony nor St. Dominic, Peter the Hermit nor Duns Scotus would be fitted for this generation. It is an age of enterprise and action ; of rapid changes ; of new forms of thought ; of a disposition to apply any suggestion in science or morals, however slight, or however bad it may be, to new experiments, and to make the most of it ; of methods of rapid interchanges of thought among men ; an age when old barriers of opinion, and interests, and religion, and laws, are every where tumbling down, and the nations of the earth are becoming one. Now he who intends to preach the Gospel, makes a great mistake if he does not study the age in which he lives, and does not appear as one *belonging* to that age. He would be as much out of place as the knight errant of the middle ages with visor, and helmet, and cuirass and spear, would be in doing battle now. He may have been a very valiant man in his day, and not a weapon that he had then, or a part of the armour of his person would have been useless ; but of what utility would they be amidst a shower of grape and cannon balls ? How much would lance and spear do in attacking a battery mounted with Paixhan guns ? Of as little use is much of the theology taught in the old books of divinity, and as wise is he who approaches modern infidels with exactly the methods of reply adopted in meeting Celsus and Porphyry.

(b.) Again. In a theology that is to be preached, the ministry should not only be endowed with the genial spirit of the age, but should be able to meet the new questions that are coming up in every generation, and to apply to them, in view of an intelligent community, the great principles of religion. In the time when Antony began to make the monastic system popular in Egypt, and Benedict in Italy, what was needed was a ministry so imbued with sound theology that *that* question—the great question of the age—could be met and settled by the true principles of the Gospel. In the time when an undue respect began to be shown to relics, to consecrated temples, and to burial places, and the church was degenerating into a base superstition, what was demanded was such a ministry as could have met *that* question, and apply to it the principles of sound philosophy and theology. So in every age, there are new questions that are to be met by the ministry; and unless they show themselves competent to apply to them the principles of their religion, they fall behind their generation, and show themselves incompetent to their work. Never were more such questions started than in this age, and never was there more need of studying profoundly the great principles of religion, by those who take upon themselves to be the guides of the public mind. The true questions which agitate this age are not those of the monastic system, or the crusades, or the points mooted by the ‘angelic doctors’ Aquinas and Scotus; nor are they the questions about the ‘three orders’ in the ministry, or the apostolic succession, or the inquiries that have been started at Oxford. There has been, indeed, and is, an attempt to foist these inquiries of by-gone years upon this generation, and it is well to be prepared to meet them; but those are not the things that are moving the mind of the world in this age. How limited, after all, is the circle which these inquiries can agitate! How few of the race at large can be interested in the question about the ‘three orders,’ or the ‘succession!’ There are deeper things moving on the public heart. Great questions of liberty, of government, of education, of freedom of thought, of temperance, of

slavery, of the right to the Bible, of exclusiveness, of war and peace, of the social organization, of the adaptation of the Christian religion to man, are the points which this age, as such, is looking at ; and a man may be an entire master of all the theology that can be made to converge around the questions that have come up at Oxford, and yet never awake to the inquiry whether he is in the eleventh or nineteenth century, and while he is re-arguing points which have been determined ages ago, society shall move on in strides which he will never dream of overtaking, towards the point which it is destined yet to reach, and all they of Oxford, and all who moot similar questions to those agitated there, shall be left far behind.

(c.) But further. A preacher should not only be able to appreciate his age, and to come up to it in adapting his instructions to the great questions which are started in the times in which he lives, but he should be in *advance* of his age. He should be able intelligently to take positions to which society in its progress has not yet come up, but which it will most certainly reach in its onward progress. He should be able to throw himself into the future, and, taking his stand on great principles which are to live in all times, and which are yet to be regarded as settled principles, he should be prepared to defend them, and to do what in him lies to bring the world to embrace them. There are not a few such in the Bible—in the comparatively unexplored views of divine truth, which are to be wrought out, and which are to make the world what it is yet to be. Whether those positions have been held in the past or not ; whether his own age adopts and practices on them or not, he who preaches the theology of the Bible should defend them, and should be able to show what important changes the fair application of the principles of the New Testament would make in the world. The men who have done much for the race have gone in advance of their age ; they have maintained positions, often in the midst of much persecution, which society had not yet reached, but to which it was destined yet to come, and have shown their greatness, and their sagacity, and their acquaintance with the oracles of

truth, by being able to take such advanced positions, and by holding and defending them in the face of the sneers and the frowns of the world. Such men were Luther and Knox; such men were the Puritans and the Pilgrims; such a man in relation to the rights of conscience, to war and slavery, was William Penn. Thus, now, we are to take our stations on the watch-towers, and defend not only what has been defended, and maintain not only what has been inwrought into the texture of society, but we are to search out and maintain those great principles which *will* prevail in the world's millennium, and to which, though slowly, yet most certainly, the world is advancing. The theology to be preached is not only that which has been settled as true in past times by experience; not only that which is fitted to the great questions of these times, but that which will be fitted to the state of the world when society shall have made its highest progress, and shall have reached the point on which the eyes of prophets and apostles were fixed.

I had designed to have made some remarks on another point, by showing that the theology which is to be preached, should be in accordance with the disclosures of science; and that the minister of religion should be able to show that the system which he defends is not antagonist with what is revealed by the blowpipe, the crueible, and the telescope; that nothing is gained in the end by making war on such men as Galileo, and that much is lost by leaving it problematical in the view of the world whether the friends of the Christian revelation can hold their system consistently with the revelations of science. But it would be unreasonable for me to attempt to illustrate that point.

If there were space, also, my subject would lead me, in the conclusion, to dwell on the aspects of preaching, of a most noble kind, as it might be, and as it should be; as a department of *literature*, and as a department of *oratory*. On one of those topics only will I make a suggestion.

From some cause there has been a sad divorce between the pulpit, as such, and large departments of literature. When

from the poetry that charms and pleases—from the reviews of Macaulay, and Jeffrey, and Sydney Smith—and from the Guardian, the Rambler, and the Spectator, and still more from the light and attractive literature of this age, men turn to *sermons*, they feel as if they were going from sunshine to gloom, from a clear to a murky atmosphere, from the saloons of pleasure and enchantment, the halls of the Alhambra, to the catacombs of Egypt. There are no public discourses which men in this age are so ready to *hear*, none which they are so indisposed to *read*, as sermons. The very name, considered as referring to reading matter, is synonymous with all that is dry and dull. While of all the people on the earth we are most given to *hearing* sermons, there is almost any thing which we will not sooner *read*. There is a deep demand in our nation and in our times for this kind of public instruction ; but this demand, so far as its literature is concerned, is not met. The most unsaleable of all books are sermons, and no wise man now publishes a sermon with a view to its being sold ; if sermons are published, it is done with a remote hope that they will be accepted kindly, if given away ; and happy does the author deem himself if his friends will receive them as a gift, even with scarcely an implied pledge that they will read them. The man who adventures a volume of sermons does it at the peril of his bookseller ; and of all the manuscript productions now in the world, those, the smallest proportion of which would bear to be published with a view to a sale, are probably the piles of manuscript sermons which are found in the studies of ministers of the gospel. It may be said, it is true, that they have answered their end, and that a valuable end ; it is true, that from the necessary sameness of the subjects in such discourses, it could not be expected that the public would demand or bear their publication. It is true, that even when a sermon has been written with much care, and then, after being preached, is laid aside for ever, and no one may wish to look at it, a man should not feel that his labour has been ill-bestowed ; or that his careful study in composing it, and his attention even to

the neatness of his chirography, or his manuscript, has been in vain, any more than the farmer feels when he has turned a handsome furrow, and his field, as a mere specimen of ploughing, is beautiful, that it has been in vain ; for it is one of the characteristics of a *good* farmer to lay his furrows thus ; and, though all that beauty shall soon disappear, the great object has been gained, in the waving golden harvest that follows. So the preacher may feel, that though his manuscripts may go no farther than his own pulpit, and then be forgotten or burned, still his care is not in vain. The ample result is not to be seen in the elegantly bound volume, but in the happy fruits of piety that shall spring up on the field that he cultivates ; a golden harvest more rich than any over which the zephyr waves.

But, while this is true, it is still true that the age and the circumstances demand that there should be a higher literature than there is in sermons. As literary compositions, they should be of the highest possible order ; they should be such as will not merely not offend, but as will attract those of delicate and refined taste ; they should be such as will not make the theology that is preached repellant to cultivated minds, but such as will commend it ; they should be such as will be in every way worthy the minds that have received the highest education which our country can furnish, and such as shall become those who, by their stations, must contribute more than any other class of men to form the public manners and taste. As none of the truths which God designs to teach in his works are rendered powerless and neutral by the exquisite beauty spread over the face of creation, the simple and pure charms in which they are conveyed to us in the stream, the flower, the vale, the landscape, so none of the truths of revelation will be rendered less powerful and efficient, by being conveyed in a dress that shall correspond with the methods in which God addresses us in his beautiful works. The world, as God has made it, is full of beauty. He speaks to men amidst the exquisite charms of the works of nature, and surrounds himself with every hue of light and love when he

approaches us in his works. The expanding flower, the rainbow, the variegated lights that lie at evening on the clouds of the western sky, or the gay lights that play in the north, the dewdrops of the morning, the fountain, the lake, the ocean, the waterfall, the flower-covered prairie, and the waving forest; these are the things through which God speaks to men in his works. So, with all that is attractive, and beautiful, and simple, and pure, and chaste in thought and language, should it be our aim that He should speak to men, when He conveys the noble truths of redemption to the world by our instrumentality; and so should the pulpit be seen to be the appropriate place for conveying the richest and noblest truths that have dawned on this part of the universe—the system of theology which He has commissioned us to preach.

ARTICLE II.

POLITICAL RECTITUDE.

By REV. CHARLES WHITE, D. D., President of Wabash College, Indiana.

By political rectitude is meant the rectitude of a people in their political relations—in their character as a society, or as a government, the organ and representative of a society. Political rectitude is a state and national interest of great magnitude. Strict probity and honour in state and national policy, plant a broad, grand basis for every noble institution, and furnish the elements of life and power to all industry, enterprise, and useful advancement.

In discussing this subject, the modes and forms in which political rectitude is violated, first demand a consideration.

There is one great and general wrong committed in filling the offices of the country with incompetent and unworthy men. This is done by the people in their sovereign character, and also by the government.

No mere man, since the fall, ever held power without being in much danger of abusing it, when interest or fear did not restrain him. It is the clearest dictate of an impartial judgment, therefore, that those alone who are defended against venality by personal integrity and honour, should be trusted with places of authority. But too little regard, however, is paid to this principle of propriety and safety. As a general fact, the moral worth of a candidate for office is the last quality inquired for; and the absence of that worth, the last circumstance which will prevent his election. If the true, unostentatious, pure-minded man, should, for his competency and his merit, be carried into office over the corrupt and clamorous partisan, it would attract general observation, as an exception and a marvel. The offices in the gift of the government are bestowed with equal recklessness in respect to character. The most vile and abandoned of the community are often the successful applicants for place. "The spoils to the victors" has been, if not the motto, at least the practice of every political party in the country for the last forty years. The motto means, the offices to the members of the triumphant party, with or without qualifications. As splendid prizes on broad sheets, for hungry lottery gamblers, or as the riches and sensual pleasures of a splendid city, promised to an army thirsting for rapine and plunder, so emoluments and honours are hung out and offered, at the opening of the political campaign, to whet appetite and to impel to more desperate struggles.

This is a fair exemplification of the spirit and the principle by which a large proportion of four hundred thousand offices are filled in this country. That the claims and qualifications of the high-minded, the intelligent, the uncorrupt, should be disregarded, and the incompetent and wicked set up to bear rule, is a dereliction of political rectitude, for which the land ought to be clothed in sackcloth and ashes.

State and national legislation often shows a great destitution of magnanimity and justice. There is first a narrow, sectional principle, governing public measures. The legislator, instead of regarding himself as he is, a representative of the

whole broad national domain, instead of guarding, with a large and impartial patriotism, the grand aggregate interests of his entire country, comes all the way down to look exclusively upon the claims of a little spot where resides his own personal constituency. He votes and advocates, not according to universal justice and utility, but according to lines of latitude and longitude. In respect to one-half the questions which come up for legislation, we correctly predict beforehand, at our fire-sides, how any one of the people's representatives will vote, simply by ascertaining where lies his farm, his merchandise, his clients, his patients, his personal interests, his dear political friends. We need, in order to be informed what course legislation will take in matters touching the great principles of equity and justice, not Montesquieu, Vattel and Blackstone, but the last published partisan print.

Too many of our politicians seem to limit their vision to immediate, as well as personal and sectional advantages. For the sake of a trifling good at hand, great, growing, permanent interests are unhesitatingly sacrificed. "They are the little hucksters, who cannot resist the temptation of a present sixpence, who reinvest every week, and derive their petty profits every night, instead of being the large-minded operators, who send their cargoes to the other side of the world, and wait years until the return of a fleet for their profits."

There is also a mode of carrying measures by a bargain and exchange of votes, which evinces an abandonment of the principles of equity and true patriotism. Different sections of the State have each their objects to accomplish. Now says a friend of one of these measures, "Vote for my bill and I will vote for yours." "Agreed! What are the reasons and considerations for your project?" "It will relieve and enrich an important portion of the community, by opening a thoroughfare for the surplus produce. It will increase the revenues of the State, by increasing the tolls on one hundred miles of railroad with which it is connected." "Good, very good! My improvement has advantages no less. It is a canal; it will afford water privileges, invite capitalists, erect

manufactories ; it will carry out produce, and bring in merchandise, population, wealth." " Enough ! very well argued, I go for it." In this method many wise and good measures may be carried, but the objection is, they are not carried on principle ; the evil is, sentiments of justice and of right are abandoned and outraged. It would be more admissible to buy men to do right, if we did not, in doing so, sell ourselves to do wrong, or at least sell ourselves to do another's bidding without inquiry. It would be more admissible to buy men to do right, if it did not appeal to them directly to act from interest and not from righteousness, and thereby turn legislation into a shameless system of unprincipled selfishness.

There is, on the part of some public men, a sacrifice of conscience and of personal opinion to a servile obedience to a constituency. This is a manifest dishonour to the principles of rectitude. The candidate, previous to his being up for public favour, was a man, an independent man ; he thought for himself, he acted for himself ; the moment the canvass commences he is transformed strangely ; his opinions now are the opinions of his political supporters ; his will is their will ; his whole being is shaped on their model. Had he remained a private citizen, he would have remained a man ; now he is an automaton of artificial springs and joints, and moves just as the blessed people pull the wires. O shame ! Creature of the Eternal mind, immortal intelligence, susceptible, gifted, powerful, thou wast not made for such pliancy ! Why become a bubble to float whither the wind is setting on, or to break and melt undistinguished into the common air ? Why be one of the figures of a puppet-show, when you might be a human being, independent, self-developing, self-instructing, self-acting ? A legislature, made up of men who give their votes and make their patriotic protestations, not according to any established principles of righteousness and duty, but according to dictations received from home, should have its sittings in a grand magnetic telegraph office, and each man be furnished with a wire bringing up opinions from his constituents on every question proposed.

A public dereliction of political rectitude has been evinced in respect to pecuniary obligations. Without avowed repudiation, there has been on the part of some of the states such laxness of sentiment, and such neglect of equitable liabilities, as to shock the moral sense and awaken the just alarm of all honest men. There has been a series of stay laws, appraisement laws, and insolvent laws, which have seriously impaired the validity of contracts, and though enacted possibly with benevolent intentions, have acted powerfully to sink punctuality, honesty, and good faith. Men thus made dishonest by law, have not been slow to make themselves more deeply dishonest by depravity, just as an army given up by authority to plunder to any the smallest extent, will give themselves up to an unbounded violence and rapine. In some parts of the country, such has been the looseness in principle and practice in respect to pecuniary obligations, both on the part of government and of people, as seriously to diminish the value of property. Every private and public improvement, every acre of land, every dwelling, every bushel of wheat, every pound of meat, every promissory note, suffered a serious depreciation; all pecuniary engagements became less reliable; general distrust, general hesitation in business, general embarrassment, portended ruin.

An alarming moral laxity shows itself on the part of the public authorities of the country, in respect to the punishment of crime. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed," stands the law of God unrepealed, unamended, unmodified. Several legislators, however, deeming themselves more wise than God, and more benevolent than Jesus, who intimated no abrogation, have sought to blot this solemn precept from the criminal code. The same disregard of rectitude appears in the refusal of juries to convict men for street-fighting, duelling, horse-racing, gambling. This state of things certainly shows a melancholy palsy of the public conscience.

Executive pardons, rendering convictions, when they are obtained, null and void, evince a sad and dangerous insensi-

bility to crime. This lessening and removing of penalties has greatly diminished the power and majesty of law in general, and thereby laid open the property and the peace of honest citizens to the unprincipled and the wicked. In this way, at the instigation of vicious lawbreakers, government has treacherously and ungratefully violated its solemn compact with the people, by which it covenanted to overawe violence and dishonesty, and afford them protection and peace.

There lies in the heart of this country an immense evil, a pregnant mischief, in the form of domestic slavery. This system, it is true, was originally introduced by private cupidity under the patronage of the government of the mother country. But, for its perpetuation as well as for its oppressions, there rests a fearful responsibility on those public authorities under which it has continued to exist and to increase. Said Thomas Jefferson, after alluding to the effects of slavery, "If God be just, I tremble for my country." Wherein the national legislature refuses to do what it can, wherein the state legislatures refuse to do what they can, to mitigate and remove this vast evil, full of dangers and unspeakable corruptions, there lies a great unpardoned sin at their doors. It is a huge wickedness in our public men, after adopting with enthusiasm the words of our declaration, "all men are created free and equal," then to turn away coldly from three millions of beings like themselves, crushed in physical power, crushed in intellect, crushed in heart, crushed in character, crushed in hope, crushed in life, crushed in eternity.

There are certain false political maxims originated and industriously circulated, usually by men of official dignity, which are flagrant outrages on rectitude and honour. One of these is the doctrine that all is fair in politics. You may not steal a neighbour's purse—'tis trash, 'twas and has been slave to thousands; nevertheless it is sacred! If you touch it, you will be branded as a thief; but "all is fair in politics." If this same neighbour is in the field as a candidate, of his good name, the dearest property a man has on earth, you may rob him without measure and without mercy. You may not turn

from your door the man who has a just claim upon you, arising out of business transactions. In matters of debt and credit, you must be an honest man, an honourable man; but "all is fair in politics!" You may, by underworking, falsehood, and treachery, prevent any citizen from obtaining an emolument or an honour, though almost within his grasp, though most nobly earned and deserved. You may not, by intrigue and fraud, eject a man from his dwelling and his home, and enter in and occupy it; but "all is fair in politics." If you wish to pull a man down out of his place, however worthy, and ascend into it yourself, there are no epithets in our language, which you may not use of him; there are no efforts you may not make, in buying votes, and duping the community, to accomplish your purpose. As a simple member of society, you must be ingenuous and sincere; but as a politician, you may be as hollow-hearted a hypocrite as ever fawned before a tyrant, or professed love at the dying bed of an intestate miser. In private life, you must be a good man; but in politics you may be as the occasion urges, true or treacherous, mean or honourable, dishonest or just, corrupt or pure; all is fair here. What morals will be fed by such doctrines!

Another doctrine, most corrupt and destructive, is couched in the captivating popular terms, "Our country, right or wrong." Our country! that dear phrase has pushed this sentiment into the creed and speeches of men, who, if they live long, will deeply blush that they have ever adopted it. It is truly a matter of surprise and astonishment, that it should be advanced and advocated in the nineteenth century. Never was there a despot upon a throne who acted on a lower principle, and if fully acted on, would invest our rulers with all the power which can possibly belong to a human government. Napoleon Bonaparte at one time held a power which actually rocked the world, and seemed as if it would soon be asking for another world to rock. But the President of the United States, if the doctrine in question prevail, has an equal prerogative, an equal authority. If he have not equal power,

it is simply because his personal energies are less, or the nation he presides over is inferior. He, the man of destiny, declares war with cotemporary nations, and instantly every town and city of France, and of every subjugated kingdom, espouses the quarrel, right or wrong. They vote subsidies; they pour forth their gallant legions into the ranks of war. Precisely this would occur here under a president, whom we imagine our constitution has deprived of nearly all independent authority. This doctrine, made rise among the people, takes away all boundaries from his power.

Suppose our government secretly connives at an extensive piracy on the coast of Cuba, so as to involve this nation in a war with Spain. "Our country, right or wrong," echoes and reëchoes through the land. Men and arms and money are ready for the conflict. A patriot army from the State of New-York, through the neglect or pretended ignorance of our public authorities, invades Canada, and occasions a war with England. "Our country, right or wrong!" Sustain the government; fight out the war; by taxes load the people with a crushing debt of millions; fill the land with widows and orphans; raise an army by conscription if need be! What tyrant ever wished for or ever possessed greater power? What government ever had the resources of the people more at control, for any projects of ambition or conquest? It is alleged that we ought to repel invasion, and defend our soil and our homes, even though it be the folly and wrong of our rulers which have provoked the aggression. The simple question in such cases is this. Is the movement of the enemy upon us right or wrong? If right, then our effort to prevent or repel it, is unjust and wicked; if wrong, such an effort to repel is right, and our watchword is "Our country right," not "right or wrong." Never, never, are we to support her in the wrong. It would be a monstrous wickedness. Our country right or wrong! It was not the principle which separated the colonies from the mother country. Our noble fathers! thanks to God, they never uttered such a doctrine; they never acted on such a principle. Our efforts at independence

would have met the contempt of the world, our republic died in its cradle. The effect of such a principle on general morals is fatal. Right or wrong! The very announcement intimates a confounding of moral distinctions, an abandonment of the holy injunctions of the Bible, and the adoption of the codes of robbers and thieves.

Nations, in their treatment of each other, are signal examples of a disregard of justice. Anciently, states prostrated each other, seized territory, demanded tribute, not when there was justifiable cause, but when there was sufficient adroitness and power. A treaty, instead of being a liberal compact of reciprocal advantages, was a bill of fare—an announcement by the stronger to the weaker, what dismemberment, what taxes, what humiliation, what service, were the basis and ultimatum of a peace. If ever the weaker party became predominant, it took exemplary vengeance, by exacting still harder conditions. International morals have not been greatly improved in modern times. Facts compel us to declare that noble, right principles, instead of characterizing the general policy of recent nations, mark the exceptions. If the world wishes to know what part any one government will take in a given national quarrel, it rarely institutes a single inquiry, or wastes a single thought about the course which justice would dictate. It inquires, what will be deemed by that government most likely to accomplish the purposes of its ambition, to enlarge its territory, to enrich its revenues, to bring splendid accessions to its power? Who would not be astonished to hear of either of the civilized powers of the world giving up a portion of valued territory to the claim of a weak neighbour, because that claim was just and right? Should a proud, sovereign people, without compulsion, yield up advantages within its power, and act honestly, it would be sounded round the world, as most unusual, most illustrious magnanimity. Diplomacy is understood not to be a keen insight into national rights, not an inflexible insisting on fair, even-handed justice, but a shrewd overreaching of a rival power, the obtaining of undue advantages by mere artifice and cunning.

He who cannot dupe the power he treats with into valuable concessions, will be recalled to give place to a more subtle and wary negotiator. Of any fifty treaties, now existing between civilized nations, there are not twenty-five in which both contracting parties seem to have sought after a frank, generous reciprocation of benefits and rights. Said the noble Roman moralist, "*nulla sancta societas, nec fides regni est.*" No friendship or faith is held sacred in the government of a kingdom.

There is not one government on this earth, which has not shown a disposition, in contravention of all humanity and justice, to swallow up feeble tribes and sovereignties. What heart does not weep for poor, crushed, dismembered Poland? Why should not this gallant and chivalric people have been left happy in their own beautiful and fertile country, and under their own chosen institutions? There are few honourable and benevolent men, who have not wept over the wrongs which the Indians, a nobler race than the Poles, have received at the hand of the American nation. All the deep grief of this people, as they have been pushed successively into the western forest before the urgent advances of the white man, will never be known except to the Omniscient One, whose compassions they must have always awakened. We see them, along the whole eastern border of our country, gather the ashes over the council-fire never again to be opened, turn from their loved hunting grounds, weep a farewell to the graves of their dead, and then, with hearts turned to stone, without uttering a word, with a grief too deep for utterance, move away into deeper solitudes. Almost as soon as fires were rekindled in their wigwams upon the banks of the lakes and rivers to which they retired, and they had begun to feel that the Great Spirit was with them in their new homes, deemed safe from encroachment, they are reached and assailed again. Their lands are wanted; avarice never ceases to want. Poor, friendless Indians! your valleys and waters are rich and beautiful, but you must leave them and go. The white man bends his eye upon them; he will have them.—

There is no rest for you! Treaties have been made with this persecuted people—solemn treaties; they have been repeatedly confirmed. Their father, the President, has exchanged with them the wampum belt, with them smoked the calumet of peace, told them that he was their friend, and assured them no white man should molest them. But all is treacherously disregarded, and they are driven still farther toward the setting sun. If nations are punished for their crimes, our people are yet to bend under the just judgment of God.

These are some of the deviations from political rectitude, which characterize our age and our country. These are the more visible forms of public cupidity, selfishness, and dishonesty. Such a destitution of probity and good faith involves immense dangers. It produces consequences which will soon be inevitable and fatal. It cannot fail to make the pure-hearted grieve. Every honest man should give serious heed to the signs of the times, and look earnestly after a change and a reformation.

We turn from this picture of a corrupt and destructive public policy, to some considerations in favour of strict, political rectitude.

There is but one code of morals for states and individuals, for a government and its subjects. Government is virtually and essentially an individual, an incorporation, one collected identity. It was not to be expected that Heaven should construct a lax and liberal system of morals specially for a government, because it is a collective individual, instead of a simple one. It would be a strange code, which should recognize an act committed under the dictation of one will, as worthy of condemnation, and yet when the same was the result of two wills in connection, pronounce it harmless; which should inflict a heavy penalty on a single man for murder or theft, but for several men united in the same deed ordain no punishment. It would be strange morals, which should denominate the overreaching of a private citizen, a fraud and a contemptible cheat, and then commend the same moral act, when committed by a

government, as a master stroke of glorious national policy. There are no such ethics in our Bible. There is no intimation there, that, while an individual man is accountable, several men, incorporated as a government, or associated for any other purposes, form such a balance of negatives and positives as to have no soul, no conscience, no responsibility. That is a monstrous perversion of morals, which condemns a subject to be hanged if he kill his neighbour in a family quarrel, but declares that government efficient and illustrious, which kills forty thousand in an effort to rob a weaker power of a portion of its territory !

If an individual who secretly takes his neighbour's horse be a thief, then is a society which takes its weaker neighbour's lands and property a robber and a bandit. If that individual be a cheat who obtains money on false pretences, who enters into liabilities he knows he can never discharge, who retains and uses money belonging to creditors, then is a society a company of swindlers which fills the pockets of its members with money borrowed for public improvements, which makes pecuniary contracts under a full belief it cannot fulfil them, and which refuses to pay its honest debts according to its ability.

The doctrine that a government is not under obligation to be just and honest, has arisen from the impression that responsibility is divided among those who compose and administer it, so as to leave but a small amount resting upon each separate member. Feeling thus distributively irresponsible, as individual portions of the government, they feel in the same degree collectively irresponsible as the whole government.

This notion of the diminution of responsibility by division is a wicked subterfuge, it is the doctrine of the Bucaniers. If a legislator, or any other officer or member of the government, give his assent to any public measure whatsoever, the sin or the praise of it lies at his own door, as truly and as fully as if he had stood alone in the transaction. He did all he could toward the act in question. Ability and opportunity not wanting, he would have performed it all himself. If,

then, the individual portions of a government be fully responsible, by what logic does it appear that the whole, formed out of these portions, is discharged from an obligation to rectitude? It is not so discharged. Government is an aggregate individuality, and as such is under the fullest responsibility, like every other individual, to be true and honest most scrupulously.

Government is an agent. It is an agent of both kinds—of the first, where services are to be performed precisely as directed by the principal; and of the second, where the great ends to be attained being designated, the methods of operation and accomplishment are left wholly to the discretion of the agent himself. The principal is the people. The instructions given are contained in the constitution. The great object to be accomplished, through the government's own wisdom and self-directed acts, is security every where under its sway, to person, to property, to character, to happiness.

Here, as an agent, the government certainly has full scope for the exercise of the purest honour and justice. It has the management of a complicated and an immense concern. By the law of agencies, well settled and understood, it is to compromise no one interest of the people whatsoever. But, divested of all intrigue, all dishonesty, all private aims, exercised vigorously to a benevolent care, and an unsleeping vigilance, it is to protect and advance every interest which the people ought to desire to have advanced and protected. That which has been committed to the government, is a sacred intrustment to inure wholly to the benefit of its subjects. The government is not to eat up the people as it eats bread, but to return, as a faithful steward, the ten talents committed to it, together with other ten, which these ought to have gained in its hands.

If a private agent be so strongly bound by every principle of natural justice to fidelity and honesty, that fraud and a betrayal of confidence consign him to infamy; then the obligations of a public agent, of a government, to honesty and

fidelity, are scarcely to be measured or comprehended. Far more precious, far more numerous interests are committed to its management.

The amount of life, the mass of property, the value of character, the capacity for happiness under the charge and responsibility of an individual *state* government baffles all calculations. Under the charge and responsibility of our general government, as an agent, are twenty millions of lives, and three-fourths of the products, cities, commerce, manufactures, civilization and power of a continent. The grand aggregate of character and of life, of intellectual and moral interests, of susceptibilities and of possessions, we make no attempt to estimate. But we declare most emphatically, that the agent, government, holding in charge these vast affairs, these immeasurable interests, must not be *dishonest and treacherous* ! It must maintain an unimpeachable rectitude !

Government in its true nature is paternal. The first government of the world was of this character. The venerable patriarch was the only acknowledged superior. The only perfect government now existing is paternal eminently. We refer to that of the Great Infinite Father of the Universe. Whatever be the designation, King, Autocrat, Emperor, Congress, Convention, Consulship, or Parliament, a sovereign power is right and good only in proportion as it partakes of the paternal character. There is not one duty of a government, not one provision, not one act of protection, not one discipline, not one encouragement, not one example, not one influence, that does not belong to it, in the character of a father.

We are never to part with the idea that our government is in the midst of us and above us as a venerable parent, grave with years, dignified with wisdom, rich with benevolence, benignant with moral worth, penetrated by a great and intelligent concern for every member of its large family.

And can a government thus bearing the character of a father—of a father, generous, noble, just, benignant—ever know, as it looks down upon its own family, the boundary

lines of party? Can it ever stoop to artifice to compass a sinister design in that family? Can it have any sinister designs? Can it need intrigue? Can it use intrigue? Can it ever hoard to itself, the money belonging to any portion of its own family? Can it misappropriate it? Can it abuse confidence? Can it pull down the worthy and set up the wicked? Can it be guilty of sacrificing the interests and prostrating the hopes of a single member of the great brotherhood? These things would be most unnatural and monstrous!

A great, civilized, intelligent, free nation, like our own, have a right to demand, are positively bound to demand in their government, all that belongs to the heart of a father. They are bound to demand all the liberality, all the ingenuousness, the kind carefulness, the inextinguishable interest, the equal justice, the impartial patronage, the pure outgoing-influences, the universal benedictions of the noblest, largest paternal heart that ever throbbed. The sun that looketh in upon all the families underneath him to renew their blessings, the clear atmosphere of night, that discharges refreshing dew on all the fainting vegetation, are a happy emblem of the communications which come down from a truly paternal sovereignty. If Heaven could be propitiated to do this people a benefit, correspondent to its own infinite benevolence, we know not whether there be, in the gift of Providence, one donation more munificent and valuable, than a government in all respects truly paternal.

Unbending rectitude on the part of a government tends strongly to produce a uniform legislation. Business and trade have a remarkable power of adapting themselves eventually to circumstances which surround them. Industry will find its facilities, enterprise reach its objects, exchange push its channels and bring home its accumulations, under any legislation, not positively suicidal, provided it be permanent and uniform.

American enterprise, if national policy so dictate, will go to Russia for raw iron, and to Birmingham for cutlery, without complaint, or, if a contrary legislation prevail, with pleasure will take pickaxe, drill, and powder, and push into the heart

of our own coal and iron mountains, stop our own waters to drive machinery, and produce all these articles at home. But she does pray to be permitted to do the one or the other permanently, without the danger of being so broken up by change of policy, as to hazard all her investments, sacrifice her acquired facilities, waste her labours, and discourage her activities. Doubt is as disastrous as prohibition. Let a community be left in total uncertainty whether a desolating army may not pass over their fields, the moment they are ready for their harvest, and the plough will stand still in the furrow, and the hand of the diligent fall down at his side or be folded upon his breast in despair.

These effects of fickle, capricious legislation, are not more apparent than is their remedy. The great principles of morals and of right are fixed and determinate. They are not subject to debate or experiment.

Let our political economy and our national policy, rest on these principles of morals as a broad, immovable basis, and ruinous vacillation and change would cease. It is a blind and headlong purpose, to carry out the doctrines of a party in power, right or wrong, or to subserve the interests of one isolated section of the country, irrespective of the rest, which produces these fatal uprootings, overturnings, reversals in legislation. True, there may be an honest difference of opinion. But if all dishonest differences of opinion were escaped from, under a just and magnanimous administration, there would be stability and harmony enough for the prosperity and protection of all branches of industry, and for the thrift of all classes of enterprising citizens. The farmers would feel an assurance of encouraging prices ; the manufacturers rely on steady markets ; the merchants on unembarrassed exchanges. Then, as a natural and sure result, the forests fall, the prairies are torn up, and the staple productions of the soil are speedily doubled ; then water, wind, sunlight, steam, gravitation, electricity, magnetism, the mechanical powers are all set to work, and every thing needed is wrought out, as if by enchantment ; then our vessels embark in every trade, ride over every sea, enter

every harbour, and bring us comforts, civilization, and wealth from every quarter of the world. The steady, permanent policy of an honest and honourable government would bring over the country an incalculable prosperity and power.

A righteous government promotes eminently national union. Disunion and civil broils rarely spring up under a just and pure administration of public affairs; it is the opposite policy from which such results are to be apprehended. Oppressive exactions to feed extravagance, contracting of national debt to pay the expenses of corruption, abuses of official agents, elevation to places of trust and emolument of the incompetent and dishonest,—these sins and delinquencies produce incurable discontent, deep-fed disorder and turbulence; these threaten a prostration of the government and a dissolution of the social compact. But whenever the legislature, honourable as well as intelligent, enacts just and wholesome laws,—whenever the judiciary, clear-minded and pure, metes out full and exact justice,—whenever the executive, mild, unswerving, impartial, carries such legislation into full effect, the peaceable and good have no cause of dissatisfaction or collision; the litigious and evil stand awed into gentleness and obedience by the majesty and the penalty of laws so founded in righteousness, so executed in just and mild inflexibility. Under such an efficient and righteous authority, every citizen, finding his rights respected, his interests encouraged, his life secure, his home in peace, turns to bless the government from which his good is obtained. A good and honourable government in binding its subjects to itself, introduces a strong element of union among these subjects themselves, just as the magnetic principle, in attaching chalybeate particles to its poles, attaches them all to each other.

There is almost no commotion of national elements, not even of popular passion, so turbulent and determined, that it will not yield to the bland influence of unstained honour, and of wakeful paternal guardianship on the part of the public authorities. True, there may be agitations in the mass of the people, not owing their origin to those who occupy the places

of power, but the waters are soon settled and calm when the powerful element above is still, and presses equally upon their bosom.

Of the full value of union, now alleged to depend essentially on the presence of clear justice in the government, it is not practicable to make an estimate. Disunited men defeat each other, neutralize each other's accomplishments, interests, and happiness. The great car of Juggernaut, pulled at by two grand opposite masses, moves with just the excess of power held by one of the struggling parties over the other. So in a distracted nation, the public affairs are moved heavily on, simply with so much force as the dominant possesses over and above the subordinate faction. A vast amount of national power is neutralized and lost by disunion.

Who will undertake to make a calculation and a statement of the accomplishments of a large community all acting consentaneously in one direction? Who has words for the sublimity and magnificence of the spectacle, when a great people, all in harmony, engage in the various parts and acts of appropriate national labours, and of a grand physical, intellectual, and moral progress? Union in states has never been too much praised. Thrifty commerce, productive agriculture, skilful arts, enterprising manufactures, internal improvements, facilities of learning, the activities of philanthropy, the devisings and embassies of religion, seem to have their life and breath and power almost entirely in a large union of minds, of hearts, and of labours. The great stones, costly stones, and hewed stones from under the hand of the stone-squarers, intended for the temple of Solomon, while lying at the quarries, separated and in disorder, were of little value or interest. It was when piled and cemented into one grandly proportioned structure, though without one additional stroke of hammer or chisel, that they assumed their beauty and their value. Then the divinity came and abode within the walls, which they constituted; kings came to admire their united aggregate splendour. The wheels and cylinders and shafts and bands and boilers and furnaces and gas-pipes of a vast

and complicated machinery, when lying on the bank of the river which is to put them into action, are capable of no accomplishment ; but all united and adjusted, and moving together, they will work wonders, they will perform the services of 2,000 men. A man of war, with its ribs and planks and spars and guns and carriages, wrecked and spread abroad upon the waters, or sunk to the bottom, is an unsightly and powerless thing ; the same man of war, with hull and masts and rigging and rudder and compass, all sound, compact, adjoined—holding, in quietness within, volumed thunder for any exigency—has majestic power. These are images of a great nation divided and united.

Let none speak lightly of our union ; its dissolution would involve the destruction of more valuable interests and great hopes than are connected with any other people upon the earth. This union, with all these immense interests and hopes, depends for its existence on the righteousness of our rulers. Heaven teach them their responsibilities !

Political rectitude secures the largest amount of rational, permanent liberty. The most perfect liberty is enjoyed when the greatest number of those personal rights, best manageable by the individual, are retained in his own hands ; when, for those given up to society, the greatest sum of benefits is returned to him, and when the aggregate, composed of what he originally retains, and of what government owes him, is the most secure and permanent.

It is a government strictly pure, just, and honourable, which accomplishes these ends with most certainty and perfection ; it is such an one that throws over the citizen the broadest and surest protection in the unrestrained possession and use of his own natural, unyielded rights ; and most efficiently contributes the advantages which he has a right to expect from society. It is under a righteous government that the beautiful vision of the prophet has its fullest realization, when every man sits under his own vine and fig-tree, with none to molest or make him afraid.

It is not therefore right of suffrage, not frequency of elec-

tions simply, not these chiefly, which constitute popular liberty, as seems to be the impression of one portion of the people. It is not the absence of restraint, leaving every man to do that which is right in his own eyes, which constitutes it, as is the impression of another portion of the people. The first, right of suffrage and frequent elections, might raise to power temporary despots to crush the people into temporary slaves; the last, the absence of restraint, might leave the people a mass of Ishmaelites, every man of them having his hand against every other man, and every other man having his hand against him. No freedom exists in this state of things.

When, under the righteous authority and excellent influence of the high-minded and just, every citizen is pushed to all his civil duties, restrained from all civil wrongs, and has a wall of defence thrown around all his civil rights and true interests, then there is enjoyed the highest and largest freedom capable of existing under human governments. The boundary of exact right marks out to each man the largest sphere which can possibly be appropriated to him; he may dream he should be more free could he follow his own desires, whithersoever they might lead, could he step over his own limit into the inviting possessions of others; but at the moment he is adding to his happiness from another's field, twenty men are taking the same liberty with his: he gained one advantage and lost twenty. If, under a skilful adjustment and defence of human rights and human interests by the sovereign power, a citizen moves in his own proper sphere, he will find no obstructions, no interruptions; that proper sphere is his fortress; and no man, not even the government, may enter it without his permission; this sphere is the place of his rest, and no man may disturb him; that sphere is the scene of his physical action and intellectual accomplishments, and none may impede or limit him. Permitted there, beyond espionage or rebuke, to acquire property, enjoy wealth, employ his intellect, exercise his affections, bless his fellow men, pass his life; what can make a subject more free?

Religion can ; this can make him master of his passions, free from himself, a freedman of God, an unbound traveller through all God's works and attributes, an heir to infinite immunities and honours. But society can furnish him no greater liberty than this which has been described ; less liberty no man ought ever to accept.

“ 'Tis liberty alone that gives the flower
Of fleeting life its lustre and perfume,
And we are weeds without it.”

It is right that every citizen should desire to possess himself, govern himself, employ himself, exalt himself. A government which, by oppression and dishonesty, imposes clogs and suffocations upon the independent spirit of the people, which sets up barriers to limit their intellect, to repress their enterprise, to forbid their developments, to retard their advances, to diminish their happiness, a great and noble people should not live under. They should cast it off indignantly, as the monarch of the forest does the impotent cords, which childhood has drawn over him in his sleep. They should place themselves under a regimen of equity and magnanimity, where every citizen could freely obey the divinity that stirs within him, and rise to the high privileges, accomplishments, happiness, designed for him. That craven, corrupted population, however, who elevate the wicked and the unprincipled to bear rule, ought to expect to mourn, ought to expect to be bound, and driven, and oppressed, and downtrodden. They who put themselves under piratical colours, ought to expect the tender mercies of freebooters. They who put themselves and their goods on board a ship under a drunken pilot, ought not to complain if they get on quicksands and sunken rocks, and split and go to the bottom.

Unbending rectitude on the part of government, exerts a valuable influence upon the integrity and morals of the people. Every example is followed, every thought is echoed, every feeling is reproduced, every thing done is done again,

every man multiplies himself. He does it, as if between concave mirrors, the images are larger than the prototype.

The power of example increases as we ascend. Official positions are high places, where character and actions are known and read of all men. They are seats of power. For this, for power, the world feels a natural deference. Even physical strength, in the absence of rank, talents, wealth, command, will attract the regard of men to it, as a distinction and an honour. Government is the embodiment of power. Every individual functionary is the personification of power. He has supervision, superintendence; he exercises authority, he dictates, he controls. Events and men are subject to his will. Both these—the possession of power so revered, and the occupation of an elevated, prominent, widely visible position—confer on a government collectively, and on rulers individually, peculiar and unequalled advantages for the exercise of a great, pure, moral influence upon the mass of the people.

A popular government of purity, acts happily on popular morals, by a mild method of exercising authority. Such a government is one of moral power, instead of direct force. The people are thrown upon their own accountability. They are left and committed to a personal sense of right and of magnanimity, instead of the impulses of fear and the restraints of authority. In rising to this noble position of a self-governing people, to this grand high basis of independent principle and personal integrity, they rise essentially and substantially in character. It is a pleasant spectacle, to see a government, by progressively relaxing its political power and strengthening the sovereignty of reason and conscience, lifting every subject farther and farther up from the animal to the man, from the crushed serf to the independent citizen, from the selfish profligate to the high-minded patriot.

In respect to obedience to human laws, which is certainly important to moral order and equal justice, the part taken by the government will, to a great extent, decide the part which shall be taken by the body of the people. While the laws

of law-breakers are ropes of sand, those of law-observers have a dignity and a power most salutary. When an Arab chief, warm from the plunder of a rich caravan, sits down in his tent to prescribe to his dependents, rules of reciprocity and equal justice between man and man, pausing in the midst of his teachings for the fresh robbery of a party of travellers, his followers will observe his code, just when it suits their convenience and interest. When a legislature passes the "No License law," and patronizes largely drinking establishments; votes to suppress gambling by severe penalties, and large parties of its members sit, the night after the passage of the law, at the card-table till morning; is in the affirmative on a bill against duelling, and connives at two challenges and two fights during the session, it will be perfectly understood in the community, that the grand object of legislation in that body is to get a fair code upon the statute book, that obedience is a matter of perfect indifference—at every man's option. But a conscientious observance by the law-makers, redeems law at once from inefficiency and contempt, and clothes it with honour and power. It presents it to the people, impressively sanctioned with the dignity and the character of noble, exemplary legislators. If rulers will obey their own laws, duelling will fall off two-thirds, murder, robbery and arson be materially diminished, mobs wholly cease, the entire criminal docket of our courts be reduced one-half. Truly immense is the responsibility which rests upon them, in respect to the crimes of the country.

Government is capable of exerting an influence still more direct on the integrity and morals of the people. The relation to the people, of the body of public functionaries who administer the government, is that of the heart to the whole physical system. If the great, central, vital organ of this nation act feebly and irregularly, if it send circulating through the country corrupt, noxious currents, emaciated consumption will mark the whole face of the country. If, on the contrary, the pulsations at the centre be sound and strong, and the streams setting outward be fresh and pure, through the nation

there will be felt the thrill and vigour of exuberant health, and be witnessed outwardly the most excellent moral activities. There is no action here, as under kingly rule, by authority and constraint ; but 'by emanating directly out of the people, by descending familiarly among the people, our rulers insinuate an influence, silent and invisible, yet intense and powerful, along every nerve and fibre and channel and organ and framework of the body politic.

Were our government to stop the mails on the sabbath, and close the post-offices in every city and village and hamlet of the land, thereby declining to compel a violation of the most important of the laws of heaven ; instead of receiving public congratulations with noise and parade ; instead of meeting for business, for drinking and gambling ; instead of being seen in the public conveyances, were all our state and national public servants to go reverently up to the house of God on the Sabbath day ; were it understood and settled, so far as public authorities are concerned, state and national, that no human being can be oppressed in this country ; that whether Asiatic, European, Indian or African, one has only to show that he is a *man*, to insure him protection and make all his rights sacred ; were it the undeviating principle and practice of those that rule to frown on all corruption ; were it established and known, that so far as appointment to office is in the hands of the government, or election to office in the hands of the sovereign people, that, wherever else the corrupt and wicked may find their way ; into the high places of official responsibility they shall never go ; were it a fact open and known to all, that our men of office are in their private and public character honourable and pure :—were all these things so, there would come a change upon the face of society, like the green living scene succeeding the universal chaos at the Creation. Such acts of justice and honour, such noble specimens of private morals and of a clean life on the part of public men, will effect vast good beyond their first and immediate influence. They quicken the whole moral sensibilities of the people. They elevate to respect all forms of justice. They

countenance and sustain all the attributes of virtue and all the honesties of life. It is a grand attainment that a people has learned to be honest and true and magnanimous, in any portion of its character or acts. Progress is easier than commencement. Virtues thrive by their own acts, as the repeated strokes upon the anvil successively nerve the arm for heavier blows. Every fresh feeling, act or advance of a people in the way of righteousness, gives them a new impulse and power in that direction, like conquests in an enemy's territory, where every captured fortress affords a fresh supply of men, arms, and ammunition.

A strong barrier against one crime is a good defence against many; and a conscience quick to prompt to one noble act of duty, will prompt to a hundred. O! if the high principles of integrity and honour and truth had in our government one unviolated sanctuary, from whence they should come forth, like the sun out of his chamber, to pour their heat and light among the people, there would be more of that awakening of conscience, which spreads into a wider and wider influence; more of the power and the progress of those virtues, which, once planted, live by their own life, grow by their own growth,* and conquer by their own conquests. Let us imagine twenty-seven legislatures of unsullied integrity, sending out influences pure and healthful, like gushing waters, to refresh all to whom they flow: twenty-seven independent judiciary systems, richer fountains still of sound morals and of great principles of justice: twenty-seven executives, standing in independent dignity and righteousness, and, with unfaltering honesty and justice, carrying into execution the decisions of an intelligent rectitude. Then let us contemplate a general and central government, holding in some respects a power equal to that of the twenty-seven states united, all instinct with conscientiousness and moral life, an illustrious model of the spirit and action of true honour, excellence, and magnanimity. Who could estimate the effect on the country of this vast accumulation of moral influence! I will not say that all the pulpits breathing the thunders of a violated law, and

announcing to the reclaimed, mercy from the throne of God, would be less efficient and impressive. It is sufficient to say, this moral power of a righteous government would be a grand assistance to the pulpit in virtue's great, sacred cause ; would so elevate this people as to attract to its character the observation and respect of an entire world. A few leading notes regulate the whole harmony of a musical composition. Give the people a few standard moral principles, and they will elevate or lower their whole code to be in good keeping with them. If the keys which the men of office strike, are low, they sink the whole moral principle of the country ; if high, they swell up the general moral tone to accordance. O for some grand, high key-notes from the powers that be ! They are ordained of God. They ought to catch them from the pure world, and then give them forth to the entire country.

Said C. J. Fox, "I am one of those who believe firmly, as much as a man can believe any thing, that the greatest resource a nation can possess, the surest principle of power, is strict attention to the principles of justice. I firmly believe that the common proverb of honesty being the best policy, is as applicable to nations as to individuals. Justice is the best foundation of all public policy, the surest pledge of peace. The nation deficient in justice is deficient in wisdom." It was a noble resolution of the Holy Alliance, "To take for their sole guide the precepts of religion, both in the administration of their respective states, and in their political relations with every other government, and to regard the precepts of justice as the only means of consolidating human institutions, and remedying their imperfections." It is humiliating that this profession of high regard to religion, proved to be deep hypocrisy, a mere mask to cover the corrupt schemes of envy and ambition. It however manifests the better decisions of the human conscience. It records a great, cardinal, universal truth. A dark shadow on the earth when a heavy cloud hangs above, and a bright light there when the sun is out upon a clear heaven, are not

more uniform facts, than that a corrupt government produces a degenerate, and a righteous government a virtuous people!

This subject of political rectitude should be regarded by all American citizens as a matter of special importance and interest. There is here a deep and permanent agitation, greater perhaps than among any other people. There is not calmness or leisure enough to permit a patient meditation on moral distinctions. Every thing is in a whirl. Government and people "are beaten and swept onward by a heady current which rolls all things along in its course." To set up pillars of truth and righteousness, in the pathway of this tide, is as important as it is difficult. The fact that the foundations are liable to be swept away while we are laying them down, renders it the more indispensable that they be *laid*, and laid immovably. The fact that, in the universal stir, the dictates of honour and rectitude are in danger of being disregarded, imposes on all who act in our public affairs an extraordinary obligation to take righteousness in their right hand in the sight of all the people.

There is also in our country an anxious pursuit of physical gratification, greater than in most nations, which exerts an unusual influence to thrust down important moral principles and practices from their due supremacy. There is a vast, corroding excitement here, in the direction of meats and drinks, equipage and buildings, lands and estates, railroads and manufactures, bonds and stocks, produce and exchange.

In the presence of these restless cravings of the people to enjoy physical good, the spiritual and the moral is likely to be deeply depressed. In the general rush and scramble for the gratifications of the outward man, who will look carefully after the boundaries between right and wrong? who conscientiously observe in all his ways the lessons and dictates of honour and philanthropy? This hungering and thirsting for the physical is so intense as to threaten to cut up government and people, judges and legislators, executives and citizens; and then to push them all recklessly over morals and religion,

rights and claims, wants and woes. Without overlooking or undervaluing individual and private duty, there is special need that public men draw visible lines, and set up strong barriers, between right and wrong, justice and fraud, malice and mercy ; that in all the seats of power there should be nothing but illustrious examples of truth, rectitude and purity, nothing but encouragement of the strict principles of morals, and the strengthening of all possible restraints upon corruption.

There is among the Americans a spirit of innovation unusually daring and bold. This also makes necessary in the government a steadier and stronger moral power. A reckless passion for novelty and change has been waked to special intensity and power here, by the circumstances of our origin and growth. The first act of the fathers of this people was an effort to burst away from established forms, from antiquated phases of thought, venerated modes of worship, stereotyped articles of faith. The movement was spasmodic and violent, and most determined. It has produced a vibration to the opposite extreme of innovation. It has created a nervous fear of uniformity, disrespect of ancient faith, contempt generally for the settled, time-honoured and revered.

The Americans, satisfied with nothing but the new, the untried, the advanced, the anticipated, march over every thing to realize the dreams of the dreamers, the vision of the seers, the splendid calculations of the daring and impetuous. But it is no part of merit to advance, or of prosperity to acquire, when we have reached the limit of honesty and justice.

This headlong spirit of innovation is doubtless valuable when properly restrained and directed : but in this country it has become to a vast extent but a personification of radicalism, irreligion, infidelity ; but the stalking disturber of all order, and the haughty despiser of all sacred customs.

How shall a government impotent, because rotten at heart, fickle because unprincipled, control and guide a people thus recklessly and urgently impelled ? Under the sway of corruption and inefficiency, into what lengths and excesses will a people rush, whose grand element is a defiance of all that

others obey, a mockery of all that others worship, an over-leaping of all the barriers at which others stop. No where else in the world is needed, so much as here, a righteous and a stable government to overawe, to guide.

Our country needs strict political rectitude, more than any other, from the democratic character of its government. Despotisms govern by force. Republics by moral power. Our government, therefore, unlike a tyranny, is imbecile just in proportion as it is corrupt; and imbecility is the next stage to despotism. That father, who cannot rule by his dignity and his character, rules by the rod. A free government failing, through moral delinquency, to maintain a vigorous authority, resorts to iron-handed force. Thus at one short step a republic becomes a despotism. It is to us a matter of the deepest interest, therefore, that our government possess purity and truth enough to maintain order, to protect life and property, without a resort to arbitrary power. Our government has no cordon of nobility to fall back upon, when by the loss of integrity it has become weak and contemptible; it has no church establishment to inspire veneration, when its civil authority is sinking; it has nothing to fall back upon, when its moral power fails, but artillery and bribery. Heaven so clothe our government with the majesty and the power of righteousness, that it may never even seem to be necessary that we should be crushed under military and despotic rule, in order to our submission and peace.

The great mission and destiny of the Anglo-Saxon race in America present a special argument in favour of government being administered here on the high principles of rectitude and magnanimity.

This race is evidently to occupy the whole of North America, to spread over it civilization, arts, learning and moral order.

The Anglo-Saxons have never yet found a boundary or a barrier, where they paused and reflowed, except barren wastes incapable of supporting life. Oceans and mountain ranges and untrodden forests only act upon them as a lure and an

invitation. By nothing earthly can you stop an Anglo-Saxon population, save that which forbids the habitation and progress of man. This people stands in no need of national cupidity, of the artifices and overreachings of diplomacy, of armies and navies, to fulfil their magnificent destiny. They have hitherto done something by *war*, too much ! Heaven forgive them ! It is pleasant to believe they have done far more by intellect, by enterprise, by religion. There lie within ourselves elements of moral power sufficient to diffuse over the immense territory lying between the Atlantic and the Pacific, the Isthmus of Darien and the Arctic Sea, all the civilization, order, freedom, happiness, which Heaven would love to see established there.

We perceive then our national duty ; we understand our grand mission ; we are informed with what instruments it is to be fulfilled. One of the most important of these, as we allege, is the maintenance by our government of an independent integrity, an unsuspecting and unsuspected justice and honour. Then our enlargements on every side will be like the conquests of the king of peace, the proffer of rich blessings to those who are without them, the conducting of liberty and light and happiness into regions which had not known them before. The banian tree of the east, which sends out its long arms to plant and root themselves all around successively for fresh sources of nutrition, of extension, of shade, from a whole circumference, is a happy emblem of what should be our peaceful, protecting, perpetual enlargements.

This government is a trustee of vast human interests, and bears corresponding responsibilities. To no nation on the earth, is opened so grand a career, so brilliant a succession of peaceful victories, so splendid an accumulation of power and of usefulness. At the age of seventy years our government has the care of twenty millions, at the end of another seventy it will afford protection to two hundred millions, *settled over three zones, and over more than one hundred degrees of longitude.* While receiving these vast accessions of dominion

and of power, our government will stand in need of proportionate additions of purity and honour.

Institutions and influences which are to reproduce themselves over this immense domain, should have underneath them the broad foundation of righteousness.

A people which is to introduce its families, its forms of society, its habits and character, throughout eight and a half millions of square miles, should be constructed and ennobled under a sovereignty of exalted worth. A government, which is to extend its laws and influence over one-eighth part of the earth, most certainly should be one of incorruptible, unimpeachable magnanimity and justice.

The Anglo-Saxon race in America has a larger mission still. It is to give encouragement and power to that spirit of prudent, safe, intelligent liberty, which is to go out beyond this continent over all the civilized world, and moderate all its monarchies and tyrannies; it is to mould the *coming age* to unaccustomed physical and intellectual industry; it is to communicate to religion apostolic expansiveness and enterprise; it is to kindle up a light before the face of all mankind, which shall not be extinguished, but brighten on until it melt into the light of eternity; it is to concentrate in this country a moral power able to move the world, and then to use it and move the world, and carry the world forward in a steady grand progress toward safer freedom, larger intelligence, purer religion. Be it the ambition of Russia and England, that the sun shall never set on their territory. Be it the nobler ambition of the Amerigo-Saxon race, that the sun shall never set on their free institutions, on their arts, on their learning, on their enterprise, on their moral power!

When our rulers shall be turned into the way of uprightness, the Deity will be propitiated, and be unto us a place of broad rivers and streams. The Lord will be our Lawgiver, the Lord will be our King: He will save us.

When God shall be known in our palaces, our condition will be one of unparalleled prosperity, our pathway will be one

of uneclipsed splendour. Beautiful for situation, the joy of the whole earth, will be our heritage ! The kings of the earth, as they assemble to contemplate us and pass by together, will marvel and be troubled and haste away. But all the intelligent, the high-minded, and the free, from every kingdom, shall come and walk about our nation, and go round about her, and tell the towers thereof, mark well her bulwarks, consider her palaces, that they may tell it to the generation following.

ARTICLE III.

DOCTRINE OF THE SPIRIT'S INFLUENCES.

By Rev. MILES P. SQUIER, Geneva, New-York.

THE doctrine of the Holy Spirit is fundamental in the system of Christian truth ; it is the central pillar of the edifice of grace, and should be intelligently regarded by all who serve at the altar, or labour for the coming of the kingdom of God.

The subject has intrinsic value, and a reference to it is especially appropriate now, when, though living under the promised dispensation of the Spirit, and near, as marked in prophecy, to the expected glories of the latter day, we mourn, as with one consent, his absence, and the declensions of Zion. Want of discrimination in respect to the doctrine of the Spirit, may in part have contributed to the evil complained of, and be among the impediments to a brighter day.

The work of the Holy Ghost in redemption is usually summed up under the heads of inspiration, miraculous gifts, and the spiritual renovation of the hearts of men. Dismissing the first two, as aside from the object of this article, we confine ourselves to the last. The children of the kingdom 'are born of water and of the Spirit'—'the love of God is shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy Ghost'—'we are saved by the washing of regeneration, and the renewing of the Holy Ghost.'

Our aim, in the ensuing pages, is to trace some of the characteristics of this work of the Spirit, as seen in the light of reason and the Bible.

1. This work is not for the supply of defective faculties of mind; it is not in place of any that are disparaged or wanting since the apostacy of man, or to amend deficiencies in the constitutional elements of his intelligent nature. He has all the faculties now which he had before the fall, or will ever have, and all that are needed and appropriate to his sphere of existence and responsibilities. He has all the susceptibilities which he had at the creation, and is inherently capable of all that lies within the range of his designed being; of becoming an angel or a devil, and that too in the way of the intelligent and conscious formation of character, under the responsibilities of law. We conceive these to be as truly the attributes of man now, as of any other responsible being. The claims of a perfect law are as appropriately applicable to him now, as when in the garden of Eden, or to the fallen or unfallen spirits of other worlds. Character in him rises from the use of the same faculties, as in them. His lapse, recovery, and confirmed holiness, are according to the same laws of mind. To give up the integrity of man's mental constitution, is to surrender the testimony of consciousness, and with it, both the sense of amenability to law, and the fact of its intelligent application to us. It is to blot out moral philosophy from the list of the sciences, and reduce man to the condition of idiocy or the brute. Every blow aimed at the elements of the intelligent nature of man, strikes equally at the doctrine of his accountability, and the position of our race in the moral universe.

2. The Spirit's work in conversion is not to render the mind capable of responding to truth. This capability is innate. The mind is constitutionally adapted to the apprehension of truth, and truth adapted to influence mind. The element of reason in man, embracing in the term all that in him which is the subjective ground of responsibility, is like reason in an angel, or in God himself. It is his image in man. It is of God's creating, and after his own likeness.

To it he reveals himself, as to that in man which can understand and appreciate his communications, and apprehend the true relations and fitness of things. Reason is essentially unique in the universe of moral beings, and alike in its legitimate intimations, whether situated in the divine Being, in angels, or in men. If not, there is no correspondence in the parts of the divine economy in this respect, and no “*νοῦ στῶ*” for the inception of a moral system. If reason is one thing in God, and another in angels, and still another in man, what foundation for intellectual intercourse can there be between the parties? What common reference to the same rule of right, the one same bond of relationship? The reason of man must be the counterpart of the reason of God, if God puts man in intellectual correspondence with himself,—extends over man his institutes of moral government, and holds him to the responsibility of acting according to the mind and will of God. In one moral universe, the elements of mind, finite or infinite, must be in kind the same, and hold the relationship of common elements of reason and moral being, and this is man’s intellectual relation to the universe of existent beings and truths. It is of the nature of his intelligence to apprehend truth and its relations, and to approve them. To this attribute of reason God appeals in all his communications, as the counterpart of his own intelligence, and which gives off intimations in accordance with his truth and will. He has but one standard of right and wrong,—but one law for angels and men, and holds all to the responsibility of understanding it alike, and understanding it aright. One economy of legislation answers for a universe of minds. God treats all as though the element of reason were alike in all, and, according to the fitness of things, like his own. Such is the verdict of human legislation. One law and one penalty are equally for the millions of the state or nation; a common responsibility attaches, where truth is known, and reason not dethroned. We exact the boon of right intentions from all to whom our intercourse extends, and plead it for ourselves. We commit our cause to the arbitration of posterity and the world, on the one principle of the

generic character of mind ; of the essential accordance of reason with the nature of things and the reason of God. We anticipate the same for it in the future world, as we rise up in knowledge and holiness to the measure of the stature of perfect ones in Christ. On this legitimacy of reason, and its likeness to the God of reason and the Bible, do we fix as the subjective ground of the exhortations of that book, and ask submission to its dictates. Otherwise we may as fitly preach truth to the brute as to man ; as well discourse on the high concerns of judgment and mercy to “the spirit of a beast that goeth downward to the earth,” as to “the spirit of man that goeth upward ;” as well urge obligation and destiny on the worm in his slime, as on him to whom “the inspiration of the Almighty hath given understanding.”

We speak here of the element of reason as created and constituent in man ; of its essential oneness of nature in the universe as the basis of thought—the percipient of moral truth—the source of authority, or the subject of command,—the responsible author of all mental and moral acts ;—that to which God has revealed himself, and with which he condescends to reason,—before which he submits the rectitude of his own conduct, and from which he challenges results, in accordance with the reason that framed the universe and governs it ; and it is to this characteristic of mind that we refer in asserting for it the inherent power of responding to truth, and which we regard as the basis of all our moral relations to God and duty, to probation and destiny. Hence,

3. The work of the Spirit under consideration, is not to make men responsible for the issue of truth communicated to them. Responsibility is inherently appropriate to man ; it is the natural result of beings constituted as we are ; it is an element—a law of our moral being. We consciously form character under the light of truth, and hold ourselves and each other responsible for right or wrong action, under considerations addressed to the mind. Increased light, means, privileges, and helps, enhance the measure of responsibility, but they do not lay the foundation for it, as an element of our

being. It springs legitimately from our own attributes and relationship to God as creatures. Responsibility to obedience does not depend on the presence of the Spirit of God. Of ourselves, and without his functions, we are fitly held answerable for all the truth that meets our eye, for all the considerations to right action which cross our path. Truth is obligatory without the Spirit. Men are bound to obey the Gospel, even if the Spirit be withheld from them; they would have been, if the doctrine of the Spirit had never been revealed, or if this element of mercy had never entered into the economy of the divine dispensations to man. Consciousness gives off this intimation of responsibility in respect to all our states and acts of mind which are related to law. The vilest of men reveal it in the excuses they invent for their wickedness. If it be not inherently resultant of our moral and intelligent nature, the impenitent man is free from the obligation to obedience, and the "finally lost" will find apology for the sad issue of the means of grace in respect to them. And hence;

4. The work of the Spirit in conversion is not to create a conscience. This faculty also is a constitutional element of our being, allied to and conjunct with reason, and its existence, as such, is evinced in considerations already adduced. We no more, evidently, have intellect to investigate and understand the relations of truth, than we have an inherent provision in our being, or a moral sense, to feel amenability to law, obligation to right action, and compunction for wrong. All that can or need be said about the matter is, that God has so made us, and that it is manifestly appropriate to the design of our being, that we should be so constituted.

A conscience is inseparable from us every where, and through every stage of our being. Early childhood evinces it; its scorpion sting extorts confessions from men steeped in crime; and its province in a future world we discover in the anguish of the worm that never dies.

Conscience may be stifled, for a time, but cannot be destroyed. It may be misinformed. The light that is in the understanding may be defective, and the conscience be poorly

conditioned to discharge its appropriate functions ; but it is an honest faculty. It accords with the reason in man, and the reason and will of God. So far as it has light and opportunity, its intimations are in behalf of law and duty. Its struggle is for the supremacy of right in the soul. It is the antagonist of sinful passion and propensity. With reason and truth and the Spirit of God, it forms the antagonist force to all that is wrong in man. It is God's vicegerent in us, for our recovery and restoration to his image and favour.

Conscience is of right the dominant principle in the soul, and where it is not, in fact, there is conscious wrong. Its legitimate privilege is to reign. *De jure*, it is king among the principles of action, and where it is not *de facto*, there is anarchy and all misrule. It may be overborne by lawless passion, worldliness, or premeditated sin, or vicious habit or propensity, but it will never abdicate the throne.

The contest it will never yield ; and if not successful, with the agencies which redemption brings to its aid, to reclaim the sinner during his probationary season, then may he anticipate its bitter reproaches to mingle in the ingredients of his cup, when the privilege of repentance is passed.

The reference to conscience as thus an attribute in man, is every where ready and unembarrassed in the Scriptures. To those who brought to the Saviour a woman accused of adultery, he says, " He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her. And they which heard it, being convicted by their own conscience, went out, one by one."

The story of the voluptuous Herod is full of meaning on this point. He had foolishly followed in the pathway of his passions and vices. He had beheaded John Baptist to please a guilty woman. But right reason revolted ; his conscience condemned him ; he could not wholly brave the light and reflection that would harrow up his soul, and fill his imagination with sights of terror—and he finds a John Baptist in every preacher of righteousness he meets.

The woman of Israel said to Elijah, " O thou man of God, art thou come to call my *sin* to remembrance, and to

slay my son?" And the brethren of Joseph, brought into trouble before the stern governor of Egypt, "said one to another, we are verily guilty concerning our brother, in that we saw the anguish of his soul and we would not bear; *therefore* is this distress come upon us."

5. The work of the Spirit, in the renewal and sanctification of the hearts of men, is every way in accordance with the laws of mind. Its aim is the legitimate action of mind, according to its constituent laws; its commerce is with reason and truth; its object, the rightful supremacy of conscience; its direct result in us, our conscious and responsible action in accordance with the highest reason.

Our prominent metaphysicians have been long in arriving at the very obvious conclusion, that the fruit of the Spirit is just *that* which is required of man—that his agency is at the point of securing right action in us—his work that of influencing to it. This is at length conceded, and heralded as a new idea in the science of mind,* while the wonder should rather be, that this conception is of so recent date. But attention has been so occupied about tastes and substratums, the imagination so spell-bound by the time-honored phrases of an antinomian theology, that we have been wont to exhaust the Spirit's work in the business of clearing away the obstructions to right action, which have accumulated in the mind's history, and which rest upon it, previous to conversion.

The grand misconception has been, that propensity is the law of choice—that one must act according to his disposition; or, in popular language, that passion must rule; and that, to secure right action in the soul, you must first destroy all the incentives to wrong action there. Prevalent doctrine on the subject seems to be, that reason and conscience and truth, conducted by the Spirit, are of no weight as an antagonist force to propensity—that an old and bad propensity or habit or passion, is not dislodged by the expulsive power of a new

* See Bib. Repos. Dr. Woods, 1845 and 6.

and good affection wrought by the Spirit, in the commerce of truth with the constituent elements of our moral nature, and thus changes effected in the mind on the subject of religion, as they are in respect to other subjects. No; but sinful propensity (says the theory in question) must *first* be cured—the effects of all the wrong action of the will be done away, and a new susceptibility be lodged in the soul, as a prerequisite to the influence of objective truth, and the capability of right action in the will, and from which right action there shall flow as a matter of course—and this too by a process untold and inscrutable, and in respect to which man has neither agency nor consciousness. Here we demur, and record our conviction that no change of volition, conduct and character, was ever so wrought. Adam or the angels could not have turned from holiness to sin, by such a process, nor do we from sin to holiness.

Defection from entire holiness cannot be thus accounted for. The scheme involves the twofold anomaly of a sinful propensity before there is sin, and of making God the author of that propensity. And yet there is a further difficulty in thus accounting for a change of volition and character. The theory is utterly suicidal. If propensity is the only parent of emotion or volition, it surely will beget its like, and change is impossible. A being created holy must be always holy, and one become sinful always sinful. Angels could never have sinned, or Adam apostatized, nor can man repent. If propensity is the unyielding law of choice, then character is stereotyped for eternity in the universe. What shall change it? Objective truth cannot, by this theory, or any motive-influence from without, and propensity will not: its force is in the direction of the past, and forever homogeneous in character. What, on this law of change, could have influenced angels to sin? All their history, habits and propensities, for an accumulation of ages, we know not how long, were on the side of holiness. How could they sin except against propensity, and through motive-influences otherwise derived? God surely did not deprive them of the benefit of that long experience, and arbi-

trarily annihilate their holy propensities, and prove so false to himself as to create within them, by some act of inscrutable sovereignty, a sinful propensity, which should lay in them the foundation of wrong action, and change their destiny to despair. Nor could our first parents have apostatized from the motive-influence of propensity. They had always been holy. Their history, habits, and inclinations, were on the side of a happy obedience; and propensities are not suicidal, if theories are sometimes. How came that change? One thing is certain, the theory we here controvert does not account for it; and more, the fact of such a change, in such circumstances, controverts the theory, and scatters it to the winds.

Changes of mind and character, in the matter of our relations to God, doubtless occur, as they do on other subjects, so far as the order of process and the *philosophy* of the change are concerned; viz., by the presence of considerations and influences adapted to produce them. A change of mental action otherwise wrought, would be destitute of intelligence, of intellectual virtue, or moral responsibility.

We are aware that the advocates of the theory here considered, are accustomed to view the fall of Adam and the angels as utter mysteries, to which no resort can be had, and no analogies traced, in investigating the laws of mind, and the facts of human history; and that they may be shocked at any reference to those apostasies, in treating of the ordinary laws of human conduct, as though such reference were quite profane. We confess that we have little sympathy with such a disclaimer. Is it so, that a fact "which brought death into the world, and all our wo," through which the race has lapsed, and needs recovery, is utterly inscrutable? Do either the Bible or enlightened philosophy utter this *caveat*, or is it rather the resort of defective theories, and untenable positions in the science of mind?

The considerations inducing a change of volition and character in the first woman are on record; and we venture to affirm, that no change in the voluntary state of the will has since, or ever *will* occur, except on analogous principles.

The incipient error in the view we controvert, consists in identifying *propensity* with the *predominant motive* in choice ; than which a more subtle *petitio principii*, or disastrous confounding of things in themselves distinct, does not often occur in investigating the principles of mental science. If previously formed propensity is identical with what Edwards meant by "the greatest apparent good," and must be, of course, the dominant element of the existent volition or choice, then indeed is there an end of the question, if not of choosing also. But such an issue mistakes the relative place of propensity, disposition, inclination, or desire, as originated phenomena of the mind. They are rather its resultant than its inceptive states. They are rather the accretions of its history in the direction of them, than the foundation of that history ; though, when formed, they tend to propagate and confirm that history. They follow the law of habit, and are broken up in the same way. We do not desire that, concerning which we are no way informed. The appetite of the drunkard comes by the use of strong drink ; a murderous disposition is the result of a training to sights of blood and slaughter—and a special propensity of any kind is usually traceable to an early history in the direction of it.

Propensities and biases once originated, doubtless have influence on the successive voluntary states of the mind. But it is a motive-influence in respect to those states—nor is it the only, nor is it, of necessity, the strongest motive-influence on the will for the existent volition. We are not thus constrained to a continuity of voluntary states of mind, in accordance with previously indulged propensity. The primary idea in the doctrine of choice, involves a contrariety of motives before the will, or the liability thereto. The will may follow those motives which are antagonistical to habit, or long-cherished desire or propensity, innate or acquired. Objective motives, coming in through the constituted channels of the mind, act immediately on the will, and in the direction of their nature. Whatever influence they have, is *sui generis* : it may be the strongest, and the will is inherently susceptible of being moved,

and acting either way. In respect to man now, propensity, innate or otherwise, constitutes not the only ground of choice or motive thereto, nor is the will necessarily enslaved to lawless passion. Objective truth may present its claims; reason may come in with statements, arguments and grounds of action, counter to the pleadings of propensity and desire; truth may fasten on the conscience, and the Spirit of God strike conviction into the soul, and thus form a motive to right action which shall outweigh the suggestions of appetite and passion, and gain the will against them.

Change is an attribute of finite beings. They are capable of, and liable to change from good to bad, or bad to good. This is implied in the doctrine of probation, and in all the instructions and motives we use for influencing childhood or riper years. Changes occur in the minds and courses of men in relation to the matters of this life,—in questions of prudence, politics, and morals, but always in view of considerations inducing them. Thus is it in religion: a man is brought to repentance, through considerations adapted to produce repentance. The commerce of the Holy Spirit is with the reason, and conscience, and intelligence of the soul. It has no direct communings with sin or sinful propensity, but comes in, with the armory of heaven, to help the will against their suggestions and motive-influence; as a *benevolent* agent in aid of reason, and conscience, and the truth, and the constituent elements of the soul, against sinful propensity and habit, original or acquired, and all the incentives to wrong action from the hereditary degeneracy of the race. It comes to give ascendancy to truth, reason and right in the will, and induce its action in accordance therewith; and this, too, though it be on the field of strife, and in the presence of inducements to wrong action, and of the strong biases of hitherto indulged sin: and thus by the introduction of a new, and paramount, and growing life, in accordance with the requirement of God, casting out the old man, which is corrupt, with his lusts, and gradually and progressively gaining an habitual ascendancy over all that has been wrong in previous history, habit, and

propensity ; and eventually gaining the whole man for God. The intimations of consciousness, and the experience of Christians, are challenged for the verification of this statement ; thus showing that the work of the Spirit is in accordance with the laws of mind ; that neither the doctrine of responsibility, nor any law of mental action, nor change of action as seen elsewhere, is outraged or belied in the change which religion contemplates, but that its nature and results are analogous to the recorded and known history of mind on any other subjects.

The agency of the Spirit on the depravities of the heart is indirect and consequential. By going with the truth of God to the constituent elements and susceptibilities of the mind, and gaining for God the predominant motive in the will, and the consequent right action of the will in repentance, or faith, or love, or whatever may be the form of the incipient right affection, volition and action, it breaks the empire of sin ; it begins the demolition of Satan's throne in the heart. By the Spirit's efficient agency, the will acts right in respect to God and religion, though it never did before. A new and right affection, through divine agency, is born of the constituent powers of the mind and will ; a new and counter life to the past begins, which, by the promise of God, the law of habit, and the continued agency of the Spirit, is sustained and prosecuted with increasing power and triumph against sinful propensity and lusts, until at length *their* lingering influence and effects are all uprooted from the soul, and the intended eventual issue of the Spirit is gained in the full and perfect man in Christ Jesus. As soon as the first right exercise of will occurs, it may be affirmed of the man that he is converted, regenerated, born again, and stands to God in the relation of a child ; and as soon as the last remains of sinful appetite and propensity are effectually and finally overcome and effaced, and all wrong action ceases in the full and uninterrupted energies of the new life in Christ, thus begotten and thus sustained, may it be said that he is wholly sanctified.

6. The work of the Spirit in the premises, is of the nature of an influence. Its efficiency is at the point of influencing the will, and inducing that voluntary action in man, which is of the nature of obedience to God, and thus making effectual, upon our intelligent and moral nature, the reasons why we should repent, believe the Gospel, and obey and please God. The Spirit does not repent, believe, or love in our stead. It does not detract from, but sustains every way our personal obligation, and the character consequent on moral action. Repentance, faith, and love, are truly the personal and conscious emotions of the sinner returning to God; yet as they never would occur without the Spirit of God, and as they do occur under his effectual, successful agency or influence, they are properly styled the fruit of the Spirit, and the sinner is said to be "born of the Spirit," and "the love of God to be shed abroad in his heart," or he is brought to love God, and to possess the graces of the Christian, by the Holy Ghost. While all the emotion and voluntary conduct of a moral agent, all that in him which is of the nature of obedience or disobedience, is personally and responsibly his, he may be influenced to it from without. Influences from without, from good or bad agents visible or invisible, and all contributing in harmony or mingling in conflict to form the predominant subjective motive, or ground of choice, do not destroy the personality or responsibility of that movement of the will. As the mind determines itself freely under motive-influence, so is it responsible for its moral and voluntary states, from whatever quarter, and in whatever amount, motive-influence comes. We are daily conversant with this principle. We hold a man responsible for murder, though, in the phraseology of the law, he commits it "under the instigation of the devil." We take pains to influence our fellow-men, and yet hold them responsible for their moral action and conduct under the influences thus derived. Thus, that a man is effectually influenced to right action by the gracious economy of the Spirit, sent down to his help, contravenes no law of mind, nor subtracts from his

personal responsibility in respect to all in him that is of the nature of obedience or disobedience to the requirements of God.

7. This work of the Spirit is in accordance with the truth as revealed in the Scriptures. His agency is co-ordinate with the truth of God. His aim and influence is to make truth effectual on the voluntary principle in men, and to bring them responsibly and cheerfully into obedience to the requirements of God. We are "begotten through the gospel." "The word of God" is "the sword of the Spirit," and "effectually worketh in them that believe."

8. The influences of the Spirit in the premises are *analogous* to influences otherwise derived for the action of mind; they are moral in their nature, and adapted to act on the moral susceptibilities of our being. They are designed to move the will in accordance with truth; they embody considerations to this end. The instructions of nature, of providence, and of revealed truth, are brought under contribution by the Spirit for this issue. The shining orbs of night, the death of a friend, or the faithful appeals of the pulpit in some favoured moment, may be the honoured instrument he uses to convict of sin, and challenge the soul for God. The process, we may believe, is one inherently adapted to move mind, and in accordance with its nature and susceptibilities as related to objects and influences from without, and which, for want of better phraseology, we term *moral* influence, and not physical or miraculous—an influence indicated and characterized by the nature of the work done, and the means of doing it, rather than otherwise.

An emphatic passage, and one throwing much light upon the point of the discussion at which we have arrived, occurs in John 16: 8—"And when he (the Spirit) is come, he shall reprove the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment;" and for it we must ask some special attention.

An accurate commentator of our own country (Barnes in loco) here uses the following language: "The word translated 'reprove,' means commonly to demonstrate by argument, to

prove, to persuade any one to do a thing by presenting reasons. It hence means also to *convince* of any thing, and particularly to *convince* of crime. This is its meaning here. He will convince or convict the world of sin, &c. That is, he will so apply the truths of God to men's own minds, as to convince them by fair and sufficient arguments that they are sinners. This is the *nature* of conviction always."

.So the upright and candid Scott, upon the passage, and the general subject of the nature of the Spirit's work which it presents: "When He shall come, he shall reprove, or rather convince, the world of or concerning sin, &c. The preposition here, properly signifies concerning, and this rendering seems to throw much light upon the subject. The principal meaning of the word seems to refer," he adds, "to the general internal operation of the Holy Spirit on the minds and hearts of men, when he leads them to believe in Jesus Christ for salvation. He deeply convinces them of many things concerning the evil desert of sin, and the sinfulness of numberless thoughts, words and actions, and omissions, which before they had scarcely thought of; especially he detects the sinfulness of their own conduct—their supposed virtues and their hearts—by discovering the glory of God to their souls, showing them their obligations and relations to him, turning their reflections to the spirituality of the law—to the hateful nature of transgression—to their own past lives—to their present behaviour, and to their inward thoughts, desires and motives; and thus the veil of ignorance, pride and partiality being removed, they are brought without reserve to condemn themselves, and to plead guilty before God." In similar language he proceeds for more than a column of his sensible commentary; and we have extended the quotation thus far that it may fully appear how this subject lay in the mind of a writer so eminently pious and practical as was Scott. But every Christian pastor who, in revivals of religion, or at other times, has attended the sinner over that transition period from nature to grace, can, if he has discriminated at all upon the subject, bear the same testimony. Conviction, under the influence of

the Spirit, has at every step been intelligent, and in view of truth, and usually deep and marked, in proportion to the clearness and distinctness of the dispensation of truth under which the subject has lived, until it issues in repentance and reconciliation to God. At first, perhaps, the fear of wrath has awakened the concern of the sinner, and the prerogatives of God troubled his soul. But further thought and progress convince him that God is right and his claims just, and that his own course must be condemned even at the bar of his own conscience. Sin grows more sinful in his view, and the record of his delinquencies more and more fearful. God, the law, reason, truth, conscience, all bring in the verdict of condemnation upon him ; self-righteous hopes disappear, and he stands self-condemned and helpless on grounds of law ; guilt presses on his spirit ; and weighed down by a sense of sin and ill-desert, and of his utterly hopeless condition while out of Christ, he sinks for mercy at the foot of the cross. As a rational agent, he acknowledges his sin, and casts himself on the provision of grace in the gospel. He repents, and from reasons inherently adapted to induce repentance : he believes, in view of truths appropriate to that affection : he loves God, from the apprehension of his loveliness : he submits to God, from considerations suited to induce submission. A course of right action commences in the will in view of the truths which urge it, and in the legitimate exercise of the proper functions of his being as a responsible creature of God.

Thus have the phenomena of conversion often presented themselves, and thus must they have fallen under the notice of the experienced pastor.

The process under the conduct of the Spirit is every way intelligent and rational ;—open as daylight, as the Bible designed it should be, on a subject the most practical and important, and the most seriously submitted to our individual responsibility and experience, of any with which the human mind is conversant ;—and one which should not be encumbered with the phraseology of the dark ages, to make it utterly enigmatic and unintelligible. The change is effected as the

mind is changed upon any other subject or concern, as to any question in mental philosophy appertaining to it. It is through the prevalence of considerations suited to it—by gaining the predominance of motive thereto, through reason and conscience, and the use of truth; thus gaining over the will, and thus securing the voluntary action of the man, in the right direction. It is by leading the sinner to do just what he ought to do of himself, and just what he has constituent powers of mind to do, just what his intelligence and the truth call upon him to do, and just what he never would do, after all, but for the agency of the Spirit sent down in his behalf. The greatness of the change in its fact or results, does not take it out of the same category of other changes of mind or will. The benevolent economy of the Spirit therein does not remove it; we cannot conceive of an intelligent and responsible change otherwise wrought. The Bible and common sense place it here. Every *exhortation* from the pulpit and the press, and all experience together, say it is here, and expect the reign of sinful habit and propensity to be broken up, and their influence and effects to be progressively worn from the soul, by the expulsive power of a new affection, and the growing energies of a new and divine life thus commenced and sustained by the Spirit of God.

We add the following remarks.

1. The work of the Spirit, in the department under consideration, is, in its nature, *resistible by the human mind*. All moral influences are. This is implied in the very nature of choice. The privilege of selecting between two objects, involves the power of selecting either. Not that two and variant volitions can occur at once; but that when two objects or courses of action lie before the mind, it can select either. This is the invariable showing of consciousness. It is involved in our honest convictions concerning responsible action, and no sophistry in the world can dislodge the impression. The guilty man feels that he need not have committed that deed of death, which is to send him to the gallows, but that he had, at the time of willing it, the power of contrary

choice ; and every attempt you make to convince him that he had not, only hardens his heart, or turns the reprobations of his outraged conscience back in indignant scorn upon you, as the apologist of his crimes and the tempter to his remorse.

Power of will correlates not with motive-influence, but lies in the intelligence back of it. Motive does not create our moral powers, though the condition of their exercise. They are the same in the presence or absence of motives to influence them. We may not logically infer that a man's acts of will, in "the appropriate circumstances of his being," could not have been otherwise than they have been ;—that because he has not acted differently, under the motives which have attended him, therefore he could not. Modify such a position as you will, and it contains the essence of fatalism. It is saying, that any sinner who has not repented, could not ;—that Christians cannot fall from grace, because they do not ;—that men cannot be perfect, because they are not ;—that Adam or the sinning angels could not have maintained their integrity, because they did not ; nor could the history of any being in the universe be otherwise than it has been. It annihilates the discrepancy between the *is* and the *can be* of human conduct. But common sense brings in a quite different verdict on the subject. It holds a man competent to do right, whatever may be his temptations to do wrong. Though motives run mountain-high to commit murder, it asserts his power to withhold his hand ; and every man feels the irrepressible conviction, that, in a thousand instances, situated just as he was, he could have done differently from what he did. This is an integral element in the feeling of regret and remorse ; efface it, and you extract the anguish of the worm that never dies. No responsible being was ever placed where he could not do right. The power of both right or wrong action is inherently, and under all circumstances, an attribute of all amenable to law. Any man can repent of his wrong, and do what reason, conscience and truth require. He can, whether he *will* or *no*. Deprive him of this power, and he is no longer a moral agent. The discipline of childhood is on this principle ;

—the laws of society and the laws of God. The existence of such a power is presupposed in every effort to induce its exercise, on the part of our earthly or immortal relations. It is the intelligent basis of the Spirit's influences, and of all presentation of motives for obedience to law, or conformity with God. The conventional distinction asserted, between natural and moral power, has been of little avail with the practical convictions of men. The biblical phraseology from which this distinction may have derived its origin, does not sustain it, as a generic classification of science, in our occidental languages. The Saviour, in undoubted reference to the subject in hand, said, "Ye *will* not come unto me that ye might have life." Convince any unlettered man that he has not power to repent of sin and do right, and you do but undermine his sense of obligation to repent and do right. Consistency teaches him that he may as well repent, as take acceptably any incipient steps thereto, and that all exhortation is misplaced, if he may not do *just* what God requires.

On the principle above elucidated we assert, that power of will does not correlate with moral influence, and of course not with the work of the Spirit in conversion. A man is converted, not because he cannot resist the Spirit, but because he voluntarily yields to his influences. A Christian makes progress in sanctification, not because he cannot "grieve the Spirit," and has not temptations thereto; but because he freely follows the leadings of the Spirit. Some are referred to in the Bible, as those who "do always resist the Holy Ghost:"—believers are exhorted not to grieve the Holy Spirit, and all warned of the sin against the Holy Ghost concerning which there is no forgiveness.

The classification of the Spirit's work in the theology of men, into common and special influences, has arisen out of the effects produced of success with the sinner in the one case, and the failure of it in the other.

This supposed distinction assumes, that all cases are of equal obduracy, or that the Spirit's influence cannot be increased in amount without being different in kind; but of

neither alternative is there proof. Facts, under the ministration of the gospel, look the other way ; and the Saviour says, " Woe unto thee, Chorazin ! woe unto thee, Bethsaida ! for if the mighty works which were done in you, had been done in Tyre and Sidon, *they* would have repented long ago, sitting in sackcloth and ashes." So also, in the philosophic language of Luke, " The seed is the word ; those by the way-side are they that hear ; then cometh the devil and taketh away the word out of their hearts, lest they should believe and be saved."

The purposes of God, touching the formation of moral character and its issues, are accomplished, not by irresistible and irresponsible influences, but in the compass of a probationary providence, which secures destined results consistently with the laws of mind, and its voluntary and responsible action.

2. The doctrine of the Spirit does not disparage the use of appropriate means, for giving success to objective truth on the minds of men, but stands in intelligent connection and correspondence with them.

All the laws of influencing the will, are in as full play, on the subject of religion, as on any other whatever. The superadded and benevolent economy of the Spirit does not confound and embarrass them, but is a helper to all, co-ordinate and direct. A sound mind and a good heart in the preacher—wide research and accurate theology—fair logic and cogent reasoning, making full use of the truth—acceptable words and happy illustrations—good rhetoric, and a wise regard to time, place, and circumstances—defined aims, and a judicious and skilful use of the appropriate means of conviction—striving after just that in the hearer which God requires, depending on the co-operating agency of the Spirit, in direct and immediate connection with the truth uttered, and the effort made.

Lack of expectation unnerves the efforts of the preacher ; an impression of the *fortuitous* presence of the Spirit neutralizes his engagedness. He is tempted to regard the dispensation of the truth in the light of a *merely* positive institution, and as

having no inherent and intelligent connection with the results it contemplates, and to administer the word at the required season, hoping that, as God has said it, he will at some period, and in some inappreciable way, dispose of the old propensity in the hearer, and "*implant*" a new one, and thus give him "*an ability*" to be influenced by the considerations presented. This antinomian dependence on the Spirit extracts all vitality from the pulpit, and all sense of direct responsibility to truth from the hearer, and reduces the administration of the word to an ordinance which is but one remove from the "*genuflexions*" and "*baptismal regenerations*" of the utter formalist in religion. Truth, in such relations, is shorn of the intrinsic value conceded to it on other subjects; the laws of conviction are outraged, and results anticipated in no intelligent connection with means used or light received.

3. The pulpit should hold intimate communion with the reason and conscience. They are God's image in man. They are of right the reigning principles of the soul, and the great effort should be to make them so in fact. They accord with objective truth in religion, and are its medium of access to the will. They endorse the requisitions of law, and are the handmaids of the Spirit in our submission to God. It is through their commerce with truth that he gains over the voluntary principle in us, against the pleadings of propensity and all the strong impulses of our previous history, and brings us under law to Christ. Conviction of sin is a direct and befitting feeling, in accordance with the light in the understanding. Penitence, faith, love, and all right affections, occur through the truth brought to the intelligence of the soul. That preaching will do little good which does not commend itself to the *conscience* of the hearer. It may be sentimental and imaginative; it may cater to the passions of men; it may strive to quadrate its arguments with the element of selfishness in them, but it will be like David in the armour of Saul, it will not stir the giant principles of the soul which correlate with truth, obligation, and obedience, or be much honoured of the Spirit in the conversion of men to Christ. Leviathan

is not so tamed. The perfections of God, his righteousness, the unyielding features of his moral government, and the cross of Christ as sustaining the claims of law and justice, while it provides a method of recovery, must be taken to the reason and conscience of the sinner, and reliance, under God, be placed here, for gaining the ascendancy in the will, and inducing the obedience which the gospel requires. As sin consists in the wrong action of this faculty, so does virtue in its right action as guided by reason and truth; and the position of Dr. Taylor is sustained by consciousness, when in the controversy with Dr. Spring he says, in substance, that regeneration takes place in the *honest* and *right* use of the faculties of the mind, and that the conversion and return of the sinner to God is *characterized* by the exercise of the legitimate principles of his being, although the statement is encumbered with certain views on the subject of self-love not needfully connected with it.

4. The conversion of sinners should be no matter of marvel. This event should not be placed among the miraculous and unaccountable dispensations of God, or movements of the human mind. The view often given of this matter is too recondite and enigmatical for common apprehension. It is too much wrapt up in the abstruse web of a technical theology, to be understood or appreciated in the ordinary walks of life. For fear of Scylla we strike on Charybdis. We would not be thought to hold fellowship with Arminius, and we sink in the lethean waters of antinomianism.

The subject is, however, a practical one. God commends it to the understanding, responsibility, and experience of men. Why should the return of the sinner to God be deemed a strange phenomenon, admitting of no intelligent solution from the usual laws of the human mind? Change of conduct and character we know to be incidental to finite beings. Entirely holy beings have become sinful, and why should it be thought unaccountable that entirely sinful beings should become holy? The Saviour evidently viewed the new birth as a first truth in religion—one of those earthly things so obviously intuitive as

to be even to the Jew no matter of marvel. True, the influences of the Spirit involved therein are impalpable, but are easily traced, like the wind of the desert, by the effects produced. The repentance of a sinner is, indeed, the highest reason. It is a responsible creature breaking off from his sins—ceasing to do wrong, and beginning to do right, from appropriate considerations, made effectual thereto by the super-added and benevolent dispensation of the Spirit. The occurrence of the first right affection is no more unintelligible than that of the fifth or seventh. The recovery of the sinner is no more marvellous than that of the backslider. The occurrence of a new affection is through the operation of the same laws of mind, as the recurrence of an old and suspended one. The difference is rather one of degrees. The total eclipse of the sun is of the same nature as his partial eclipse, and from the same cause; the illumination of a sphere, like that of any part of it; the commencing twilight of the morning, like the full-orbed day. So the beginning of holiness, in the experience of a man, is of the same economy with his progressive sanctification and eventual perfectness in Christ.

5. On the principles of this article impenitent men are *intelligently held obligated to do just that* which God requires. To preach defect of power and susceptibility, does but deaden a sense of obligation to right action. The mind has in some way to recover itself from the opiate administered, before it regains its wonted feeling of accountableness to the statements of objective truth. Exhortations from the quarter here referred to, usually have little respect from the impenitent portion of a congregation. They are regarded as rather the pastime of the hour, or the professional exorcisms of the pulpit, than as really intended for what the words import; and make but little impression, from their incompatibility with the known sentiments of him who utters them on kindred subjects.

The helplessness of man comes rather from the direction of his relations to law and government, than of his defective powers. “It was when we were without strength that in due time Christ died for the *ungodly*.” The remedy of the gos-

pel is here put in contrast with the claims of law. It was man, as the victim of violated law—powerless in the grasp, and under the curse of avenging justice—that Christ came to redeem, and not as one bereft of the attributes of a responsible being.

The pulpit should not shrink from covering the full ground of the sinner's responsibility. It must not advise the sinner to that which falls short of an essential and radical change of character and relationship to God, on the principle that he must do as well as he can under the old disposition and propensity, until new susceptibilities are given him, from which he can act right. It must not instruct him to read his Bible, and go to church, and pray *for* a new heart, on the ground that he cannot *now* repent, and in penitence obey God, and thus without more delay have a new heart. He must not be counselled to go on in the use of appointed means, "*waiting for converting grace*;" this would but quiet his conscience, and throw the responsibility of the issue elsewhere than on himself. No, let him cease to resist the Spirit, and obey truth and his conscience, and he will be saved the trouble of "*waiting for converting grace*"—a phrase which misplaces all the relations of the subject. Never may it be said that the sinner waits for God in the issue here contemplated. His remaining a moment longer impenitent is his sin; it is in resistance of reason, of the dictates of his own intelligence, of the authority of heaven, and of that very provision of grace which is appointed to reclaim him from his sins. To advise him to any thing short of repentance, or to what does not involve it, on the ground that he cannot and ought not at once to comply with the essential requirement of God to repent and believe the gospel, is only to take his part in his sins—to change rebuke to pity, and lose sight of the features of his sinfulness, in a morbid apprehension of the physical disabilities and calamity of his position.

The man who can pray can repent. He that can acceptably ask God to change his heart, can have any other right affection, and yield to that "Spirit of grace" who has long, it

may be, been striving to bring him to repentance, saying, "This is the way, walk ye therein."

Let requisition, then, cover the full ground of the sinner's responsibilities. Let him be advised to rest in no half-way house to the city of refuge; but at once, in the use of appointed means, to be a penitent man, and possess the feelings and be of the temper which God requires, and to which truth and conscience prompt. Of this is he constitutently capable; in nothing short of this will conscience be satisfied, and in the very attitude of compassing this, as required, does he comply with the movings of the Spirit—cease to resist his influence, and yield to the helps from above in his behalf. All the analogies of truth and claims of God are pointing him to this spot, and why should not the agencies of his moral being be concentrated upon it? To bring him to it, and for the issue decided here, the Spirit is striving with him; and why should he be turned aside by counsels which meet not the exigency of his case, and which may be complied with, and he yet remain in sin, and without forgiveness? Why should he be instructed to rest for a moment in any thing short of those affections of penitence, submission, confidence and love, which are the fruit of the Spirit, before which there is nothing right in the state of the affections, and in which are contained the first essential elements of return to God—the very inception of a state of mind and character which meets the terms of forgiveness and reconciliation? As the Spirit's influences bear upon this point, as no change of character occurs, and nothing effectual is done until this is gained, why not hold the attention of the sinner here, and count him as an alien and an enemy, resisting the Spirit and persisting in his wrong, and accumulating guilt until he yields here, and in penitence, and like a child, submits? Instruction short of this mistakes the real issue in his case, tends to embarrass his approach to the mercy-seat, and baffle the work of the Spirit in his behalf.

6. This discussion helps to develop the philosophy of revivals of religion. The disciples were daily, with one accord, in the temple, and in breaking of bread from house to

house at the Pentecost. Revivals take advantage of the social principle in man. They are usually promoted by the consecutive and continuous preaching of the word; by efforts to absorb the public attention of a congregation, and getting the public conscience of a community in habitual contact with the doctrines and claims of divine truth. The Spirit's work is according to the laws of mind, and the success of the word, on the generic principle of success in respect to any other public and general object. Christians must unite in it with a suitable spirit of dependence, prayerfulness, and activity. False gods must be put away out of Zion, and truth must have free access to the minds of men, and they be brought to habitual and unembarrassed consideration of the high behests of religion.

7. The failure of revivals is not to be attributed to the sovereign withholding of the influences of the Spirit of God. The reasons of "Zion's captivity" are on earth, and not in heaven. The hinderances are here, or from satanic instigation; they lie in the church, in the ministry, in the diversion of the public mind, or some defective use of the means appointed of God for salvation, or more success would attend the word, and more hearts submit. Some special obstacle is in the way often, some secret Achan in the camp, or some open and sanctioned iniquity, which obstructs the word and causes it to become unprofitable. On the part of Heaven, all is ready—ever ready. We know not how to understand the character of God, and the grand features of the economy of grace, if this be not so. The parables of Christ, and the instructions of apostles, announce this truth: the standing invitations of the gospel contain it.

We would give emphasis to this statement, and say again, that the failure of the word is to be viewed from the direction of the obstructions of earth, and not of the inscrutable purpose and will of Heaven. There are laws of moral influence, and they obtain in relation to this subject: let them be complied with, and results will follow, such as the gospel contemplates and Pentecost witnessed. The parable of the sower presents

this truth in happy contrast with that sentiment of dependence which resolves the want of success in the administration of the word, and the dearth of revivals, into the issue, that "the time is not come to build the house of the Lord."

8. Resistance of the Spirit is a prominent sin of Christendom. "To apply the merits of the redemption purchased by Christ," is the office-work of the Spirit. The New Testament refers to him as an abiding agent with the means of grace, and, for aught that is known, his presence may be co-extensive with the application of those means. Few, it is believed, pass through probation, under the light of the gospel, without sharing his influences. Few go on to a state of confirmed iniquity, and are given up of God to the way of their own heart, and to the condemnation to which it leads, without "resisting the Holy Ghost," and impinging on this ultimate provision of mercy. Multitudes, now in their sins, would before this have been rejoicing in Christ, but for the abuse of conscience, and "doing despite to the Spirit of grace." The Saviour sublimely prefigures the idea we would present, in his apostrophe to Jerusalem: "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem! how often would I have gathered thy children together, *and ye would not*: behold, your house is left unto you desolate."

Finally. The doctrine of the Spirit is the *grand encouragement* of the minister of the gospel in "*commending himself, through manifestation of the truth, to every man's conscience in the sight of God.*"

Truth, conscience, and the Spirit's influence, are correlates, in respect to the issue, termed conversion. Without the truth, there would be no intelligence in it; without the moral sense, no responsibility would attach to it, and without the Spirit, it would never be effected. Truth is the instrument, and conscience the medium, of the Spirit's influence in changing the will, and securing in it, and in human experience, all that redemption contemplates. Sanctification is "through the truth;" conviction is conviction of it in the conscience, and conversion is the first right movement of the will in view

of it. Such is the state of man in sin ; so many and prevalent the counter influences of propensity and habit, that this movement of will is never secured as the unaided result of truth, manifested to the conscience. The merciful economy of the Spirit supervenes ; the promise of God and the hope of Zion are associated with the co-operating and effectual agency of the Holy Ghost, with the means divinely appointed. Even this ultimate provision of mercy will be resisted by many of our race, the acme of whose guilt and condemnation will be, that they have not only " trodden under foot the Son of God, but have done despite unto the Spirit of grace." " Nevertheless the foundation of God standeth sure." All will not resist the Spirit. Multitudes have been, and multitudes more will be, begotten of Him through the truth. The word of God shall accomplish that whereunto he sends it, and an innumerable company, which no man can number, return and come to Zion with songs, and everlasting joy on their heads.

ARTICLE IV.

NECESSITY OF THE SUFFERINGS OF CHRIST.

It has often formed a very noticeable part of human experience, that the renewal of the heart by the Holy Spirit has greatly altered many of the religious ideas of the understanding. This result is an effect, indeed, to be expected in all cases of infidelity, wherein ideas of falsehood had previously controlled the mind. In all such cases, it seems to lie among the very first operations of the Divine Spirit to sweep away those refuges of lies, in which the carnal heart has entrenched itself ; and, by enlightening the understanding with truth, to prepare a sinner to take part with the Holy Spirit against himself, when that Spirit strives to make him sensible of his guilty and miserable condition. Truth, not error, is the instrument

of the Holy Ghost ; and as long as the understanding is enveloped in darkness or misled by error, it is not to be expected that the heart will yield to the Spirit of God.

But the idea which we desire to express, lies beyond this. There is a class of divine truths, which, in their full significance and in their true bearing, never reach the understanding, only as they reach it through the medium of the heart. There is a necessity of a sanctifying experience, down among the affections, in the inner chambers of the heart, in order to make some truths fully known ; and therefore, not errorists, infidels, and the ignorant only, experience the introduction into the mind of some new ideas when they are converted to God ; but the same kind of experience is common in some degree, to all men, who become new creatures in Christ.

These new ideas, which enter the mind through the channel of a sanctifying experience, are not, indeed, so much novelties in themselves, as in their extent of significance, their connection and importance. They are not so much new truths coming into the mind, as old ones coming into it in a new and just way. They are just the results of experience ; and they compare with ideas entertained aside from religious experience, just as our merely theoretical ideas compare with experimental ones, on any other subject. If they are the same ideas in their nature, they are so different in their extent, their vividness, and their mode of conception, and their influences, that they appear to the mind itself as almost entirely new. A blind man may have just ideas on the subject of light—a deaf man on the subject of sound ; but in both cases, they are signally defective. And in both cases, if the organs were restored, the experience of eyes and ears would wonderfully modify and extend all previous notions. There would be new ideas in reference to truths darkly known before, and ideas more vivid, more certain, and more extensive. Experience in religion is as instructive as experience in any thing else.

That class of divine truths, in respect to which the human mind is especially led, by the sanctifying influences of the Divine Spirit, to entertain ideas new to it, ideas more just than

former ones, is precisely that class of truths, which has immediate regard to the work of a sinner's redemption. The love of God, operating to save sinners through the sacrifice of his Son, is the very heart of the gospel. Any candid reader of the New Testament cannot fail to discern this. And the very essence, therefore, of that religion which the gospel demands, and which alone can save sinners, must lie just in meeting God on his own grounds, and taking him at his own proposals—just in requiting his love and trusting in the blood of his Son. Indeed the New Testament in all its precepts, promises, threatenings and comfortings, constantly directs our attention to one central spot—that spot where hangs the dying Victim of redeeming love. So that true religion, through the whole field of its exercise, has and must have the whole of its life-spring, its beginning, its continuance, its direction, comfort, and aims, from a just estimation of Christ's redemption, and a just accordance with it. And in this estimation and accordance consists the difference between a religious and an irreligious man. By faith a sinner will be led into new and just ideas respecting the great work of Jesus Christ our Lord.

And perhaps there is no one point on which the human mind is more prone to err in its unbelief, and a just understanding of which is of more moment, and on which the experiences of a sanctified heart produce more new or altered ideas, than the sufferings of Christ. His sufferings, prominent as they stand in the gospel, and interwoven as they are through all its framework, and constituting as they do the very life-spring of every item of its hope, are very seldom regarded justly till unbelief yields to faith. And it ought not to be overlooked, that in the more mature stages of Christian sanctification, when the mind becomes more enlightened, the heart more tender, the conscience more sensitive and strict, and the walk in life more careful and more comfortable, invariably the sufferings of Christ is an idea that hangs around the mind constantly, and at every stage assumes an influence more important, more efficacious, more sweet, subduing, and tender. Old and established Christians, ripe for heaven, and

waiting the call of the Master, dwell much on the sufferings of Christ. Their mind fixes there—there their heart reposes upon its rock.

If we examine into the nature of those systems which are false, we shall find, invariably, that the amount of their falsehood is in very near proportion to the degree in which they have flung the sufferings of Christ into the shade. It is instructive to notice how nearly, on this point, false religion resembles no religion at all. The corruptions of Christianity (those which are fatal) have all arisen from the desire to explain Christianity in such a way, as to suit an unrenewed heart. And hence, these corruptions, when they have not been able to make headway by an infidel's denials, have resorted to such explanations, as virtually amount to the same thing. They have left Christianity nothing but her name and bones. They have made her a labelled skeleton; and their act would not be so bad as it is, if the label were true. They have explained the facts laid down in the New Testament, both doctrines and history, in a mode well calculated to leave an unconverted sinner at ease in his sins, resting on his own righteousness. And hence, whatever difference there may be between the mental system of an unconverted sinner, and any of these corruptions of Christianity, for the heart they are very much alike. Indeed, they leave the heart to its own native tastes, to its native irreligion and enmity against God. The one may do it by indifference, the other by falsehood; but they both do the same thing. And the point where both fail fatally, is very commonly the precise point we have named, the sufferings of Christ. From this point, the heart of an unconverted sinner and the heart of an atheist turn away. They repose somewhere else than on the eternal rock.

We propose therefore, in this article, to name some ideas respecting the sufferings of Christ. We believe the doctrine of his sufferings vitally important in religion. We entertain the opinion, that that system of theology (whatever its name or form) will be most correct and beneficial, which really places the sufferings of Christ in the right spot, and employs

the doctrine in the right way. We entertain the opinion also, that if in recent times any advance has been made in the mode of handling the truth of God, and bringing it to bear more directly upon the hearts and consciences and hopes of men, so as to promote revivals of religion, by conspiring with the Holy Ghost to convince sinners, at once, of their undone condition, and of the open and blood-stained way into the full and free favour of God; we entertain the opinion that this improvement has all been occasioned by that grace, which has brought men (ministers and people) to have more just views and sentiments about a suffering Christ. And still farther we have an opinion, that evangelical religion among all our churches has more to fear from that indifference and those errors which make little of the sacrifice of Christ, than from all other obstacles which the carnal heart presents. And still beyond this, we entertain the opinion that, if great multitudes in our churches shall ever reach, on earth, a very mature and happy degree of sanctification, and shall live as Christians ought to live, very exemplary, very useful and very happy lives—the light of God's countenance shining on them, and the fear of death lost in the sweet hope of heaven—it is our opinion that these benefits will greatly result from a more just, more confiding, filial and tender regard to a dying Christ.

At another time we may speak perhaps of the sufferings of Christ, in some of the different relations of that great fact; but for the present we confine ourselves to the necessity of Christ's sufferings. We propose some thoughts on this subject.

It would be easy to name, in the ordinary manner of publications such as this, some writers whom we deem peculiarly happy in the manner in which they have treated this subject; and other writers whom we deem unfortunate or erroneous. But the object we have in view does not demand it. That object will be more likely to be effected by avoiding the odium which attaches to such a procedure. We will only remark, in general, that we think it augurs well for the cause of evangelical religion, that so many of our recent publications have

special reference to the atonement, and treat the subject in so solemn and tender a manner. There are some facts, and many principles now advocated, which seem to forebode that all evangelical denominations will yet meet round the cross, with one heart, one hope, one song.

I. The indispensable necessity of the sufferings of Christ, appears to be very clearly evinced from the manner in which the divine writers have uniformly spoken upon the subject. It were easy to give a multitude of instances; let one suffice. It is only named as an exemplification of their ordinary sense. Virtually the same thing is contained in a thousand other passages.

The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, makes a plain announcement of the idea we have mentioned, in the second chapter. He says (speaking of Jesus Christ), "In all things it behoved him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful High Priest in things pertaining to God, to make reconciliation for the sins of the people."

Now we do not mention this passage as containing a proof in itself (though it certainly contains one)—nor do we name it as a text which we propose to explain and apply in the ordinary form of sermonizing. But we desire to direct attention to the mode of the author's procedure; and we name this passage for the purpose of noticing in what manner the Holy Spirit led Paul to reason and feel about the sufferings of Christ. His mind and heart both felt the full necessity of the sacrifice which Jesus Christ offered up. And on that ground he mentions it here; not so much in the way of *teaching* a truth, as in the way of *using* a truth, essential to the very system of religion he was enjoining.

This is manifest from the connection and the clauses of the passage.

The passage is most intimately connected with the things laid down in the preceding chapter. There the inspired writer demonstrates in his own way (and no man could choose a better way)—he demonstrates the Deity of Jesus Christ.

In this chapter he commences a personal application of the doctrine ; that is, the greater and more solemn obligation of accepting him as a Saviour, since he is "God," whose "throne is for ever and ever." And he goes on to enforce faith in Jesus Christ by three remarkable considerations.

First, that the strict justice of God, which, under the ancient dispensation, inflicted "just recompense of reward" upon disobedience, cannot be expected, surely (when Jesus Christ himself has come into the world), to be less strict upon those who "neglect so great salvation." In this consideration the Deity of Christ is necessary to its force ; it would have no force without it ; and in a moment afterwards the author connects Christ's "glory and honour" with the idea of his "tasting death for every man." So important and needful does he esteem the sufferings of Christ.

The *second* consideration to enforce faith, is the testimony given of God—"signs, and wonders, and miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost." These were given at the birth of Christ, attended him through his life, and accompanied those who preached, after him, the special efficacy of his death. And it is not to be forgotten, that some of the most remarkable of these miracles constituted the amazing realities which hung such magnificence of wonder and awe around the dark hour of his crucifixion. That crucifixion is set forth in its importance by the emblems of omnipotence. The apostle considers it the vital matter.

The *third* consideration is, that this coming and crucifixion of Christ Jesus is the positive realization of that which God had foretold and promised, and the light of which was really the only light that beamed any where on the fields of the ancient dispensation. With this view, the inspired apostle quotes from the eighth Psalm, "Thou madest him a little lower than the angels," or (as it might be translated), "for a little while inferior to the angels." "Thou hast put all things in subjection under his feet." And he goes on to apply this to Jesus Christ, especially to Jesus Christ as a sufferer ; and, by a common sense argument, shows that it can

have no other application. He appeals to facts: he wants us to use our eyes, "for," says he, "we see not yet all things put under *him*," that is man. The eighth Psalm has had no such verification. How then has it been verified? What do we see? "We see Jesus, who" in fact "was made for a little while inferior to the angels, for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honour." Christ's sufferings and death, with the apostle, appear to be every thing: all else revolves around this centre: and then, to connect this exaltation of Christ with the humiliation of his crucifixion, where it belongs, the divine writer links the parts of his argument together. He has said, that "for the suffering of death—death tasted for every man—Jesus Christ is crowned with glory and honour." He takes up that idea, and carries it back among the now illuminated wilderness of the ancient promises. "It became him, for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the captain of their salvation perfect through sufferings." His death fits him to be a perfect Redeemer. He came down to the nature and the place of men. "He is not ashamed to call them his brethren." This is one link in the chain of argument; and the apostle makes it draw after it the whole burden of the ancient economy, and all the grace of the ancient prophecies and promises; for he immediately quotes from the twenty-second Psalm, which commences with the Saviour's exclamation upon the cross, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me!" in which Psalm Christ calls his redeemed ones his "brethren;" and then, the eighth of Isaiah is quoted by the apostle, "Behold, I and the children which God hath given me!" Fit exclamation for Jesus Christ to make over the communion table! Thus, by carrying back the light of the Christian dispensation, among all the dimness and darkness of the ancient dispensation, and finding in the facts of the crucifixion (for this is the very point) an entire realization of what God had promised from the beginning, and what patriarchs, and seers, and prophets had rejoiced in, the author enforces faith in Christ crucified,

by inducing the necessity of abandoning the Old Testament, or else taking in the New. One is thus "shut up unto the faith." He is argumentatively bound to be a Christian, or be an infidel ; to be a Christian, or *not* be a Jew.

These three considerations—the danger of neglecting "so great salvation," the testimony which enforces its acceptance, and the fact that in a crucified Christ is found the realization of all that God foretold and promised—constitute the groundwork of the author to persuade sinners to take Jesus Christ in his Deity and in his atonement. The apostle links these two things together. And so do human hearts ; and no creed, that we have ever yet seen or heard of, written by the pen of mortal, ever took in the one, and put out the other. The Deity and the atonement of Christ must, and do, stand or fall together. The sufferings and death of Jesus Christ, as affirmed in the New Testament, and employed in its argumentation, are things indispensably necessary to make the whole economy of the Old Testament, its promises and prophecies, any thing better than absurdities, contradictions, and a crazy dream.

In this style of reasoning, therefore, wherein we have an example of the common mode of persuasion pursued throughout the New Testament, we find that, according to the ideas of religion entertained by the inspired writers, there was a necessity that Christ should suffer. This matter of his suffering comes out to view every where. It comes, when there is manifestly no design to teach it as a doctrine ; but when the sole intent of the writer is to employ a truth, for conviction, for comfort, or some other religious purpose. The truth about Christ's sufferings and atonement is employed by every writer in the New Testament, precisely as if it were a truth, necessary and vital to the system of religion which is enforced. On the assumption that the sufferings of Jesus Christ were only incidental—that they made no real and positive atonement for sinners—that such an atonement was not indispensable to the salvation of sinners—the whole system of the New Testament procedure is unmeaning and

futile ; its promises are scattered to the winds ; its comforts are as cold as atheism ; while all its reasonings and persuasions are more fit for the madhouse, than for any sober and rational purpose.

II. If we turn, now, from the apostle's argumentation to the particular clauses in which he expresses it, we shall have another testimony to the same thing. His particular, as well as his general ideas, show the necessity of the sufferings of Christ. Let the same passage stand for an example : " In all things it behoved him to be made like unto his brethren." Men, redeemed sinners, are his brethren. He became like them, in every essential thing, so far as there was any possibility of it without sin. This was needful for his redeeming work. He became a man. He became " a man of sorrows." He was subject to every human infirmity, and want, and grief, so far as these can exist in a sinless being. He took man's place under the law, and obeyed it. He took man's place before the penalty, and satisfied it. He was tempted of the devil. He feared, and prayed, and hungered, and wept, and died, and was buried. And friends mourned for him, and enemies exulted over his fate ; when his mangled body went down to the only earthly spot where it ever rested in peace—the borrowed sepulchre of Joseph of Arimathea. All this was needful to his redeeming mission. " That he might be a merciful and faithful High Priest in things pertaining to God ;" to become such was the reason for his being " made like unto his brethren." There are no priests under the Christian dispensation. Jesus Christ is the only priest in the universe. And even he is not now a priest to offer any sacrifice ; but only to plead in heaven the one sacrifice offered up on his cross, " once for all," as the Scriptures affirm. Made as he was, and suffering as he did, he is prepared to be merciful. He was tempted ; and he knows how to succour the tempted. He was tried ; and he can sympathize with those in the furnace. The Father was faithful to him, and he was faithful unto the death ; and having been so, every follower has his life-blood

testimony to look upon, and know that he will be faithful to him whenever he buffets the billows, whether billows of life or death. His suffering was needful to his mediatorial work. "In all things pertaining to God." To be a mediator, and make peace between God and sinners; to satisfy for their sins; to answer the law; to be the Lord our righteousness; and, as the end of all priesthood, to present us before the throne of God the Father, the price and purchase of his own blood, Jesus Christ was fully prepared by his incarnation and crucifixion. "To make reconciliation for the sins of the people," Jesus Christ needed a body, and he had it; he needed a reasonable soul, and he had it, and it was often wrung with bitterness and anguish; he needed to stand under the law, and he stood there, and it spent its thunders upon his bared head; he needed to die, and the sacrifice was ready; he went willingly up to Jerusalem, and the prayer of the garden nerved his holy soul for the wrath of the cross; on that bloody tree "it was finished," he made reconciliation for the sins of the people; and guilt, and God, and law, and hell, and heaven, can ask no more.

These are some of the particular clauses in which the apostle clothes his persuasion to faith in Christ; and, precisely like his general argumentation, they all go to demonstrate the necessity of the sufferings of Christ.

If we may judge by what we hear from the pulpit, or by the published sermons of our modern authors, the ordinary preaching of our evangelical ministers is becoming more and more topical. Our ministers seem to have abandoned expounding. Expository preaching is only casual, not common. But if our ministers would mingle with their present excellent method a little more of the old way—expound more and labour on themes less—we are fully assured, that the great redeeming work and the character of Jesus Christ would be quite as well understood by themselves and their congregations. Exposition, whether it laboured upon the scope and argumentation of the divine writers, or upon their particular expressions, would make the necessity of the Saviour's sacrifice as clear as

the sun shining in his strength. We should like to hear such preaching, as Dr. John M. Mason's lecture on the twenty-third Psalm.

III. We have another idea on the subject before us. We believe that the necessity of the Saviour's sufferings will be peculiarly manifest to the mind, if any one will take the trouble to make for himself a general and connected statement of the doctrines of redemption, among which the subject belongs. We do it thus :

Man is a fallen sinner. By transgression of the holy law of God, he has incurred its penalty, everlasting punishment ; he has departed from God, his Maker ; is justly liable to his final anger ; and is utterly unable to do any thing, or suffer any thing, which shall avail to expiate his sin and reconcile his offended God.

To make such an expiation for man's sin, and reconcile God toward sinners, God the Father did, out of his own free love, give up his own Son to humiliation and death ; consenting to take his sufferings and death in the place of the punishment of sinners, and to free them for ever from deserved condemnation, and receive them for ever into his covenant love and favour, on account of what Jesus Christ should do.

Jesus Christ did take willingly the law place of sinners, and became their surety, and stood in their stead, under the penal sanction of God's holy moral law ; and did give his life a ransom for sinners' souls.

The ransom has been accepted ; and the open testimony of its acceptance is registered in the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, and his ascension into heaven ; and therefore we know now, that God can be just and yet forgive, and love, and save sinners.

God, then, does forgive and save sinners on precisely this ground, justifying them freely by his grace, through the redemption of his Son—the humiliation, and especially the atoning death of Christ, and not the sinner's own deservings or worth, being the meritorious ground, on which salvation for sinners all proceeds.

These facts, all this salvation, have been laid down in the gospel ; and this gospel message constitutes the sure and only warrant for a sinner's expecting salvation unto eternal life.

To attain this salvation, it is indispensably necessary that he should believe in it, and close with it, taking God at his own word, and trusting the mediation of Jesus Christ to remove the obstacles to his salvation, which sin has flung across his pathway into heaven.

This faith in Jesus Christ (and its kindred actions) is, at once, the sinner's duty and gracious privilege, the very moment he hears the gospel ; and there is no other way of salvation known, and never can be ; so that, if he rejects and refuses this, he must die in his sins and perish for ever.

But however guilty he may be, it now must be not his guilt, but his unbelief, which can ruin him ; and if he will believe in Christ, repenting of his sins and coming unto God as he invites him, he shall be forgiven, accepted of God, and finally made like him, and happy with him for ever in heaven, " for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it."

Whatever obstacles to the acceptance of this Christ and this salvation there may be in the depravity of a sinner's soul, the same love which gave Christ now offers to the sinner the Holy Spirit to remove the obstacles within him, as fully as Christ *hath* removed the obstacles without him ; and this Holy Spirit does his work by just leading the sinner to faith in Christ ; and is offered to men, as one of the " gifts" procured for them, by the mediatorial work of the crucified Redeemer.

This is a general statement of the doctrines, among which the subject before us belongs. There can be no question, but the minds of all evangelical Christians substantially agree with this statement.

And now what we would remark is this ; that the sufferings and atonement of Jesus Christ are necessary to this system in general, and to every item contained in it. Count the sufferings of Christ as only incidental, and not *the* essential

thing in his work, and this whole system is utterly broken into pieces, and every item of it becomes marred, and as unmeaning as an idiot's dream. We will not make the trial. We leave that to the reader. We only express the wish that not only Socinians and Arminians, but that all Calvinists also, would more deeply contemplate the relation of Jesus Christ's sufferings to the whole system of Christianity. Such a contemplation, we believe, would tend most powerfully to correct the understandings of the two former classes, and to make the piety of the last class more solemn, affectionate, and tender. We would rather trust such a contemplation, for head or heart, than all the controversy that was ever written.

And this idea introduces us into another, and not less agreeable field of demonstration. We leave the exemplifications and doctrines of the Bible, and turn to the properties of human nature.

Our idea is, that for the purposes of man's salvation, which we have named above, there was a necessity that Jesus Christ should do as he did. "It behoved him to be made," as he was made; and to die, as he did die, to make reconciliation for sinners.

We do not mean by this, that he was under any obligation to this guilty and lost world, so that any sinner could ever utter a word of complaining if Bethlehem and Calvary had never been heard of—or any thing that lies between the cradle and the cross of the suffering Son of God. But we do mean that precisely this course which Jesus Christ took, especially when he died to make this reconciliation for sins, was, in the very nature of the case, necessary—if he would, in love and grace, redeem man and reconcile him to God, it behoved him to die. We mean that human nature itself, its mind and affections, demands precisely this thing as necessary to religion.

We have several different considerations on this point.

1. This, or something like this, is indispensably requisite to the common-sense ideas of the *human mind*.

In this atonement and bloody redemption of the Son of

God, we have a new work of the Deity. We allow it is something new and strange—something beyond nature, and beyond all possible inventions of human reason. It is God himself operating in a new way; stepping forth upon that theatre where sin had commenced its mischiefs, where death and devils were let loose to do their work, and where the sufferers, their victims, employed their own powers willingly in a way to ruin themselves; and upon this same theatre of mischief, it is God, with new wisdom (to us), with new power, and with a new exhibition of divine supremacy and sovereignty, grappling with the enemies of man and of himself, and opening a highway for the lost and guilty to return into *their* felicity and *his* favour. There was, in this redeeming transaction, all the singularity which infidels and scoffers have ever attributed to it. They are right, perfectly right, when they affirm that this atoning transaction has no parallel in nature—no analogy in God's creation, or his government of the universe. It has none. It stands alone—a new exhibition of God. And this singularity of the procedure, which *they* make the ground of its rejection, *we* make the very ground of its acceptance. On this point we join issue with them, and we maintain that this, or something like this (if a sinner is to be forgiven), is indispensable to the human mind; that, aside from this, no reasonable mind can have any ground to rest upon in the expectancy of pardon.

And the truth which we maintain, it seems to us, is level to every body's comprehension. It lies just here: there is a moral law; moral and accountable creatures are under the judicial government of God. They are bound to obedience, which men have not rendered. And if the law has no penalty, then it is law no longer, it is only advice; and a moral being may break it or keep it just as he pleases. And in doing the one or the other there is neither virtue nor vice. Virtue! what does it mean? Let common sense answer. It means disposition or conduct conformed to some good rule—a rule which is good, because it emanates from just authority, and because good is to grow out of its observance. Vice!

what does it mean? Common sense answers, it means disposition or conduct contrary to some good rule—a rule which *is* good, because it emanates from just authority, and because evil will result from its violation. Remove the penalty and the law is gone—virtue is virtue, and vice is vice, no more. No matter whether I love God or hate him, if he has no will in the matter, and if the results of love and hate are the same. No matter whether I love my neighbour or hate him, if God has no authoritative will in the matter, and if the results of my benevolence and malignity are the same. Moral right is conformity to the will of God; and moral wrong is opposition to it. But it is not pretended that God has no moral government. Even infidels (all except atheists) maintain that he has; and in their self-formed theories they have many proud speculations about the administration of government over accountable creatures. Even they will admit that the moral law is supported by sanctions; and that the truth and dignity and justice of God are involved in the maintenance of his authority through the law's sanctions. God's moral law has a penalty attached to its violation.

Now let us take one idea more, and we shall be prepared for the conclusion of this argument. That idea simply is, the law of God has been broken by man. Nothing more. We want no more for our argument. The law has been violated. Man is a sinner. No matter for the extent of his sin; he is a sinner.

Now, what shall he do?—whither shall he turn himself? If he marches up to the law of God for safety, he is hurled back by its gathering thunders; it knows no mercy. His mind, his common sense, cannot let him rest there. If he looks to his character; sinner, sinner, sinner, is the terrific voice uttered from the mind, the conscience, and the heart within him. He is driven off from the field of his character, to find any thing for his mind to rest upon and be satisfied with. Again he ventures up, and examines law, government and God; and again he is hurled off, because he has not obeyed them. What *shall* he do? Where can his mind, his

common sense rest? Tell us, ye proud reasoners, tell us where ye can fix on any thing to satisfy reason? What can you see to demonstrate to you that pardon and salvation can be expected by sinners? I do not wish to rush into eternity like a fool. I want to understand something about a moral matter, connected with which my few years of experience—experience of this mind, this heart, this conscience—tells me so much of my felicity lies. Tell me *where* I can find any thing to show me, to convince my *mind*, that sin is pardonable, and my soul salvable?

The heavens of God are above us; his earth is around us. But you cannot find, in the one or the other, one single ground of assurance. Such a ground exists nowhere in all the handwriting of nature. You may say, evil flows from sin, and the evil the sinner himself experiences is the penalty of God's law, and the sinner's whole punishment. But what law of nature, what tree, what rock, or star, tells you this is all? How are you certified? Show me the mountain on whose granite the declaration is graven; or lead me to the ocean in whose mighty roar it is echoed, that man suffers here all the penalty of sin. How do you know it? You do not know it. You cannot know it. To say nothing of sin's extent or malignity, to admit simply its existence is enough to show that the mind of a reasonable being, in order to have hope as a sinner, *must* see God himself doing a new work, and laying a new foundation for hope. Man is an accountable being. He has sinned. He is liable to God's law. And certainly, in order to live reasonably in peace, or die reasonably in hope, he does need to see, somewhere, a proof of salvation for sinners. He does need to see God undertaking for him. In the sufferings and death of Jesus Christ he sees this. And this new and perfectly singular manifestation of God in the work of atonement, is the thing, the very thing, which a reasonable mind needs to rest upon. It is singular enough. It stands alone. It is a new exhibition of God, and has no analogy in the universe. And because it is such, without parallel and without analogy, strange and pe-

culiar, it is perceived to be sufficient to meet that evil, sin which is without parallel and without analogy also—a strange and peculiar mischief.

The sufferings and death of Christ, therefore, are needful to that mind of man, which, under a just conviction of sin, cannot rest upon law, upon human character, upon any thing seen in nature, or known of God, aside from the peculiar work of redemption. “It behoved Him to be made like unto his brethren, that He might be a merciful and faithful High Priest.”

2. The same conclusion will come upon us with additional force, if we consider the *human conscience*.

The moral sense, it is true, is ever connected with a reasonable understanding ; but it has its own peculiarities. And as connected, also, with a class of very vivid sensibilities, it needs some ground to rest upon, which shall soothe and satisfy them all. And it often goes beyond mind, in its fearfulness and forebodings about sin, feeling that it has good reasons to anticipate ills, whose dimensions no mind can measure. Something is requisite to satisfy a sinner's conscience. He is sensible of moral obligation. He cannot easily convince himself, or others, that his conscience is a mistake, a fancy, a hobgoblin, a dream. He will carry moral judgment along with him, in all his paths and in all his worlds. At times, here, it will sleep, especially when he resists the influences of the Holy Spirit ; but some of its “compunctious visitings” will be occasionally experienced ; and alarm, if not from the heart's tenderness, at least from the heart's cowardice (and we care not which, for argument's sake), will be a serious trouble to him. Even in sinning, man is often made unhappy by this voice from within. And this conscience will not cease its troublesome visitations to a sinner, till he reaches in his sins the spot, where the fumes of the very pit stupify him, and in “strong delusion he believes a lie.” If, among very stupid and hardened unbelievers, some instances can be pointed out where there was little or no concern of conscience—like Hume laughing and joking about death and the judgment—it no

more proves that conscience does not belong to human nature, than the fiend-like hardihood of a pirate proves that man has not kindly affections. These are alike exceptions; that is, they are instances in which habit has overcome nature—in which sin has wrought its evil in the one case, to the extent of darkening the understanding and stupifying it towards God, and in the other, of hardening the heart utterly towards man. Extinguished sensibility is no proof it never existed; and there is nothing in the unconcern of any infidel, to furnish any thing but proof of an extinguished conscience towards God. Its owner will find it again, in another world.

In all the ordinary moods of man (and especially when he has, or desires to have the Holy Spirit to be with him) his conscience is accessible to a little of the truth. He knows that in the inner man there is estrangement from God. He knows that he cannot stand a comparison with God's spiritual law. He knows that selfishness has too much power over him. He knows that he loves the world too well. Every time he climbs the mount of contemplation (as sometimes he must), and looks off towards the unseen world before him, he knows well, that in his spirit and aims he has come short of eternity, and the God who inhabits it. And if he will pause in his career of passion and worldliness for a single moment, and recollect his history, he will find in that history many a long space when God has not been cared for, or even thought of; when he lived according to his own will simply, utterly regardless of the arm that held him up, and of the high moral destiny to which the finger of God pointed him. And hence, conscience will accuse him. It will not let him off lightly. It will bring the condemnation of God against him, and all that is wrapped up in the inconceivable fearfulness of his anger. The more he meditates, the more terribly will his conscience torment him, and remorse and fear both will reach an awful extent, when the mind dwells on that most dreadful of all ideas, the anger of God.

Now what shall satisfy this conscience, which belongs to human nature? The trial has been made, and is still making.

Toilsome rounds of supposed duty have been run. Costly sacrifices have been offered. "The fruit of the body" has been given for the sin of the soul; and heathen have gone back from the murderous sacrifice of their children, as hopeless and remorse-stricken as ever. None of these things reach the spot. They form no good ground to hope upon, or die upon. They are all human. They are not divine. They come from the compunctions of man, but they do not reach the spirituality of God. They do not reach his majesty. They are very anxious and very agonizing strugglings of souls convicted of sin, trying to get hold of something which God will accept, and conscience rest upon, when a sinner has offended God. But they fail. And what shall be done? Where shall the soul turn? What shall open before it a door of hope into another world?

There is no place to flee to, except in this new and strange work of an atoning God. God himself must do something which shall wear the signet of his own high authority. He must step forth from behind the curtains of eternity, and in this world of sin must write somewhere the demonstration of a satisfied law, and a satisfied God. If it is only the act and agency of a creature that undertakes for a sinner, how shall the conscience of the sinner be assured it is enough, and that his sins are, therefore, pardonable? There can be no such assurance. But when the sinner sees Jesus Christ undertaking for him, standing in the sinner's own nature, and the sinner's own place, arraigned as his surety, held as his surety, dying as his surety; never giving back till he has met the very last item, and going down into the grave to sanctify and sweeten that last trial-spot of the believer; and when in the opened portals of the tomb, and in the ascension-track of the Redeemer from Olivet to glory, he sees the evidence of God's pacification; when he hears from God's own mouth the declaration, "the law is magnified," "he that believeth shall be saved;" in this new and strange work of God, he finds some foothold for conscience to stand upon. It is just this: Christ has become accountable for him; Christ has met the

blow prepared for his head ; Christ has died for him ; Deity has grappled with death and the devil ; the tomb has owned a conqueror ; and away up by the throne of God bursts the exclamation of angels, " Lift up your heads, O ye gates, even lift them up, ye everlasting doors, and the King of glory shall come in."

Conscience can rest here ; it cannot accuse beyond Christ ; it cannot bring up any thing in sin's dreadful evil, which lies beyond the reach of this Saviour, " travelling in the greatness of his strength, coming up with dyed garments from Bozrah." God says it is enough. " It behoved him to be made like unto his brethren." Now, the conscience-smitten sinner may stand up and exclaim, " Return unto thy rest, O my soul, for the Lord hath dealt bountifully with thee."

3. The necessity of Christ's sufferings will still farther appear, if we consider the *evil of sin*. We know some of its evil, but not all. That it is a violation of God's just government is bad enough, but it is not one act simply. Its worst evil is not to be ascertained by its dimensions, but by its existence. Its nature is the only measure of its own malignity. It has no parallel, no analogy. It opens a fountain of evil. It does its worst mischief, in forming a character to perpetuate its perpetration. If there is any truth in the gospel, or rectitude in enlightened reason and conscience, no man can estimate sin's evil till he can use the arithmetic of eternity, and gauge the dimensions of God's final anger. This evil, sin, stands between the sinner and life everlasting. This evil, which has flung the soul off from God—which has filled earth with misery, and built hell—this evil rises up between the sinner's soul and his longed-for eternal felicity.

Now, on what ground can he hope ? Where is that joyous demonstration to be found among the miseries of sin, that these miseries are working out their own cure ; and that the period is posting on, when the term of suffering shall have expired, like the term of the convict, and, like him, the statute and the sentence shall let him go free ? The convict, under an earthly justice, has hope, on some visible ground,

if he is not a convict for life. He marks the sun's motion, the year's roll. He keeps a careful calendar of his imprisonment. Each hour is wearing away something from the length of his sentence. As years end, as months pass, when the clock strikes, hope sees the end coming nearer. And it becomes every sinner on earth, who rejects the strange work of God's redemption through the blood of Christ, and rests as a mere natural religionist, to show a parallel. He cannot; he can show nothing like it. He may be as miserable as a thousand convicts, but he cannot produce any thing like an argument, that his days of misery are wearing in, a single item, upon the long period of his liability. But look farther. If this convict in prison offends there, in the time and place of the penalty which has come upon him, the discipline and duty of the spot bring him under another law and another penalty, and he must bear the twofold burden. So this suffering sinner, deep as his woes may be, and bitter as his tears, if he offends still, instead of nearing the end of the penalty (if it had any), would be pushing it farther off. And can any man produce the demonstration of a sinner's innocence in his sufferings? Can it be shown, that this man, now suffering as a sinner, sins less than before nature's or God's punitive justice arraigned him, and commenced his punishment? Where is the proof? Does he now love God or man any more, than before his punishment began? He is poor. Well, does that make him pious? He is sick. Well, does that make him virtuous or godly? He is starving. But can you starve him into the love of God? Do you find the most punished the most perfect, and the raggedest drunkard now the most innocent man?

There is nothing in sin to work its own cure. It only works its perpetuity. And if there are remedial operations in God's world of nature, and if thunders purify the atmosphere, and widely extended breathings of the pestilence exhaust its malignity, you can find nothing like it in God's world of moral spirits; and you can employ no arithmetic of centuries to tell how long a sinner must keep on in his woes, before he

reaches the end of the sentence, and shall have exhausted the penalty. You do not know where the end is. Nature does not tell you ; reason does not tell ; nor does any thing else. And you cannot gauge the dimensions of the anger of God. That anger must be great. He is infinitely benevolent. He infinitely loves souls. But still he lets them blast all their felicity for both worlds (if they will not turn unto him), and go down into that "everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels."

We ask then, in view of such an evil as this, what can a reasonable mind trust to atone? Where did God ever work, what did God ever do, to furnish a single argument for expecting the pardon and cure of such an evil? The evil is unparalleled ; it has no analogy in the universe. Sin is an exception in the universe ; it is a violence ; it springs from no law of economy, contrivance or discipline. And how can we hope, how dare we hope, if God himself does *not* make an exception, and, overstepping all other works, come out in that work of bloody atonement, where the Sinless suffers, as the Eternal Son travels in the greatness of his strength? So he has come. He has done a God's work, to undo sin's evil. He has grappled, at once, with its power and its penalty. He has reached the deepest spot of its offence in the angered heart of a just and holy God. He has provided

"That sinners may live since the Sinless hath died."

He has, therefore, precisely met our necessity. And we see now, that God can do that strange work, which he is doing for believers ; can pardon them, even while they are still sinning ; and by their confidence of faith in his pardoning, gradually draw them off to his love and his service. This strange work of atonement meets the strange evils of sin. There was a necessity that Jesus Christ should suffer. Just his sufferings—the sufferings of a sinless One, of an infinite One—just this prepares him, as an infinite exception in the universe, to tread, in recovering power, along the dark track of that awful exception, sin, ransoming and redeeming by his blood. Such a Saviour can be trusted.

4. One thing more. After all, law and penalty are not their own. Something lies back of them, from which they originated. They are only indications of an unseen disposition and will. If man could find, (as he cannot,) among the common works and visible governing of God, any argument to show that a sinner may escape the announced penalty of law, or exhaust it; all that would not be enough to answer a sinner's purpose. A worldly mind may not feel it, but a spiritual mind certainly will, when we affirm, that a creature like man wants something more than reconciliation to law, and the hushing up of his quarrel with it: he needs reconciliation to *God*, and the establishment of a filial and affectionate intercourse with him. Human sentiments follow the unworthy beyond the spot where the penalties of human law leave them. Men are not accustomed to welcome dismissed convicts into their families, and make them their bosom companions, just as if no stain were upon them, and would not attach to themselves, if found in the heart-intimacy of their fellowship. In the exercise of Christian virtue you may forgive an enemy, and love him; but it must be the height of that virtue indeed, and nothing but copying Christ will bring you to it, if you receive him into your intimacy, and treat him the same as if he had never done you an injustice. A sinner does not want mere freedom, he wants friendship. He does not merely want God to let him go, not visited in vengeance; he wants God to take him back, and spread around him the arms of an everlasting love. He needs God to forgive him; and then, beyond that, he needs God to love him. As a creature of tastes, sentiments and sensibilities, as a being of heart, as a weak and frail child whose wants and fears are many, and many of which words can never explain nor economies provide for, he wants a Father to flee to when the storm is rising, and the death-bed spreading, and the opening portals of eternity are disclosing to him the "great white throne," and the destinies beyond it. Even here, much of our felicity depends upon our fellowship. The best of it does. To love and esteem others, and aim to do them good; and to be esteemed of them in return, and have

ground of confidence in their disposition to do us good, is the source of many of our joys. Mingling hearts are necessary to our felicity. In the other world we shall meet God. We are sinners unworthy and vile. Will he meet us, as a Friend and a Father, and introduce us into the fellowship of his heart and his heavens? Will he love us? What tells us so? Where is the trustful demonstration of it? *Nowhere*, except in Calvary's cross, and Calvary's Victim! There is a new and peculiar work of God. There I see something, beyond nature, beyond law, beyond reason—the heart-work of that Infinite One, who has now demonstrated to me the thing I wanted, that God infinitely loves sinners! Oh! I see, he is infinitely in earnest to save them! I see, he is a Father still. I am not more guilty than he is good. His heart is open to me. His Son dead—the devil baffled—the tomb opened—the heavens pouring down the spirit of holiness and love; these new works, all of them works of an infinite compassion and love, demonstrate to me, that in the heart of God Most High there is still a place for the love of his unworthy child. I could not do without this demonstration. My heart needs it. My fears, my weaknesses, my sensibilities to needed friendship and fellowship with my God, as his forgiven and cherished child, need it. I see now that my God and my Saviour have done for me something more than merely consent to let me escape. The curse, lifted off from me, has been borne by another. Infinite love has suffered for me, and the suffering has shown me this glorious truth, needful to raise my heart's confidence, tenderness, and delight; that this sacrificing God is something more than a governor, and in the blood of everlasting love is willing to write his name,

“My Father, and my Friend.”

This is enough—enough for God to do, and for me to ask of him. His heart is demonstrated to me, and I rush into his arms.

The views which we have here presented, have by no means exhausted the subject, but we must break off in the middle.

We trust that they will substantially accord with the views of all the truly pious, and that such will recognize in them some faint traces, at least, of their own experience.

This subject is one of vital moment. It was needful that Christ should suffer; and it is needful that any sinner, to be saved, should take Christ *for* his Saviour on the ground of his suffering, and thus meet God where God proposes to meet him.

And if it were in our power to gather together all the unconverted readers of this paper, and might speak to them on this vital matter, we would employ the following language: You who stand aloof from this new work of God, this suffering Christ, would do well to consider, that you have nothing to stand upon. Nature gives you nothing—reason nothing—law nothing. The ground which you imagine to be so firm beneath you, will give way under your feet; and if you do not meet God in this way of a gracious redemption, you will sink and perish for ever! He is better than you think him. We charge your unbelief with the sin of dishonouring his character and his love. He is better than this earth and these visible heavens proclaim him; and you will never believe in him and feel towards him as you ought, till you take him at his word, and close in with this peculiar and unparalleled work of his redeeming transactions. Why will ye die? God has been in earnest to save you. Christ was in earnest when he came from heaven to the crucifixion. The Holy Spirit is in earnest when you are compelled to tremble in view of the distance which separates between you and God. Turn ye to the strongholds, ye prisoners of hope.

And could we address the readers of this paper who believe that they have found reconciliation to God through Jesus Christ, we would say to them: As Christians you are in a new state, and ought to have new sentiments. Jesus Christ is your life. You profess to meet God not on the ground of nature, but on that of grace. You need faith at every step. You need a heart to believe in the love of God for sinners; such a love as all his worlds, and all his works, save one,

could never demonstrate. Have you got it? As a communicant, when you lift the cup, can you rest on the covenant? Can you look up to heaven and say, Christ died for sinners, and I drink this cup, taking God at his own proposal for my guilty soul; I humbly believe in his love; I trust in the blood of his Son; nothing, nothing but Christ for me; here I give my heart to the God of an infinite mercy and infinite redemption, and meet the demonstration of his love with the humble requital of my own? If our readers, with all godly sincerity, can say this, they have good ground to hope that through a merciful and faithful High Priest, they will yet see the glory of God, and enjoy his presence in heaven.

ARTICLE V.

THE ANCIENT IDEA OF A FUTURE STATE.

By REV. ALEXANDER YERRINGTON, East Windsor, Ct.

ALL nations have entertained some ideas respecting the existence of the soul in a future state. These ideas, which have differed in some respects, corresponding in a measure with the intellectual character and cultivation of those that have entertained them, we purpose to notice, taking the sixth book of the *Æneid* as our standard of comparison.

The first thing which will demand our attention, in an attempt of this kind, is the local habitation of the dead. This was supposed to be deep in the earth, as far removed from the surface as the latter from the firmament above, dark and gloomy, shut out entirely from day and the light of the sun. A minute description of this place, according to the ideas entertained by the Romans in his time, is given by Virgil. Darkness broods over it; walking in it is like walking by the faint glimmering light of the new moon, when it is every now and then obscured by clouds. Upon the confines of this, old

Pluto's dusky realm, clothed with a kind of aeriform body, are the various calamities which befall mankind. There sit Sorrow, and vengeful Remorse ; here dwell wan Disease and morose Old Age ; here Fear and evil—persuading Famine and squalid Poverty—forms terrible to behold ; here, too, dwell Toil, Death, and Sleep, his brother ; while over against them is pernicious War, and the iron heels of the Furies ; and frantic Discord, with locks of vipers. In the midst of this locality, a great aged elm throws out its huge arms, upon whose leaves perch delusive dreams. Within the shadow of this dream-tree are found many spectres of savage beasts—the Centaur, a monster half man and half horse ; the double-formed Scylla ; the old hundred-handed giant, Briareus ; the seven-headed, or, as some have it, fifty-headed Snake, which Hercules slew ; the Gorgon and the filthy Harpy. All these monsters occupy what may be called the vestibule of the infernal regions. Separating this vestibule from the main part of the lower world, is that terror of the ghosts, the river Styx, and upon its bank, the inexorable old ferryman Charon, ready to convey over those who are buried, but sternly repelling all others, until they have wandered about a hundred years. The first object which meets the eye after passing the river, is the old three-headed dog Cerberus, with all his mouths wide open. The borders of this interior of Hades are occupied by three classes of the dead—the first, infants, whose wailings are continually heard ; the second, those put to death wrongfully, and by an unjust sentence ; and the third, those who, innocent in other respects, commit suicide, and who would most gladly return to life, but that the odious Styx, nine times flowing round, prevents. Not far from these, in a forest of myrtle, are the retired haunts and walks of deceased lovers ; and beyond these the ghosts of warriors. Farther on still, upon the left, is Tartarus, with its walls of adamant, which neither men nor gods can demolish, and with the flaming river Phlegethon flowing around these walls ; and upon the right, Elysium, with its flowery fields and sunny skies. Within the former are confined the Titans, or giants who had

the impious audacity to attempt to scale heaven and dethrone Jupiter, and were cast down for it, blasted by lightning, to the lowest hell. Here, too, is confined Salmoneus, who attempted an imitation of the thunder and lightning of Jupiter, for which daring impiety he was struck dead by a thunderbolt. Here Titius, suffering continually the most excruciating torment conceivable, the gnawing and devouring of his vitals daily by an immortal vulture, which are as often renewed; here Lapithus, bound to a wheel, hung round with frightful serpents, which he is doomed eternally to turn; here Sisyphus, rolling his huge stone up the hill, which, just as he thinks to force to the top, is always sure to roll back to the bottom. On the right, in delightful contrast with the gloom which reigns here, are seen the green fields of Elysium, whose inhabitants are engaged continually in the most agreeable sports and exercises, some wrestling, some dancing, some singing; while old Orpheus warbles from his harp, music as sweet as that by which trees and stones were charmed. Such, according to Virgil's description of its several localities, is the lower world.

Similar ideas respecting it, though not so fully and distinctly developed, were entertained by the ancient Greeks, as is evident from Homer, of whose description Virgil's is little more than a copy, with various additions and modifications. The ancient Israelites, also, whose ideas upon this subject it is particularly interesting to notice, supposed the abodes of departed spirits to be down in the lowest parts of the earth. This is evident from numerous passages in the Old Testament. "A fire is kindled in mine anger, and it shall burn to the lowest hell." "Canst thou, by searching, find out God? canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is high as heaven, what canst thou do? deeper than hell, what canst thou know?" "If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there!" "Hell from beneath is moved for thee." "Thou shalt be brought down to hell, to the sides of the pit." "Though they dig into hell, thence shall my hand take

them ; though they climb up to heaven, thence will I bring them down." "There is something," says Lowth, "peculiarly grand and awful in this under-world of the Hebrews. It is an immense region—a vast subterranean kingdom ; it is involved in thick darkness : a land of darkness as darkness itself, where the light is as darkness—filled with deep valleys. 'But he knoweth not that the dead are there, and that her guests are in the depths of hell,' shut up with strong gates. 'I said in the cutting off of my days I shall go down to the gates of the grave,' or hell ; from it there is no possibility of escape. 'As the cloud is consumed and vanisheth away, so he that goeth down to the grave (or hell) shall come up no more.' Whole hosts go down there at once, as Korah and his company, 'quick into hell ;' and heroes and armies, with all their trophies of victory ; kings and people are found there." We meet with allusions to the same ideas in the New Testament, as in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, and the question of Paul, "Who shall ascend into heaven ? (that is, to bring Christ down from above,) and who shall descend into the deep ? (that is, to bring Christ again from the dead.)"

In the case of each of the nations we have mentioned, there is a gradual development and an obvious increase of distinctness in their ideas respecting the place of the dead. In the time of Isaiah, all dwell together, the good and the bad ; but in the time of Christ, as the parable above referred to shows, though they were supposed to be in the same general locality, yet they were separated from each other by an impassable gulf. So in Homer, those who are punished are in the same place with the other shades. But the opinions of the Greeks and Romans gradually improved, and at length became what we find them in Virgil. This is the theory of the Platonic philosophy, and represents an Elysium for a select few, "the salt of the earth," an intermediate place—to use a phrase which has since come into use—for the great mass of mankind, in which they remain until purified from all their pollution, and a Tartarus or hell for the daringly

impious, where they are to suffer excruciating torments for ever. This idea is similar to the Catholic doctrine of purgatory, and is the source from which it is evidently derived. They suppose a heaven for the most distinguished saints to enter immediately, and a purgatory or place of purification for the great mass of the faithful, where they are purified from the sin which cleaves to them when they leave the world, and a hell for heretics and incorrigible sinners. From this source, too, is doubtless derived the idea of some in the Church of England, Bishop Horsely for example, of an intermediate place, in which the dead are to remain until the resurrection.

The idea that the world of shades is subterranean, and the varied and gloomy imagery with which it is associated, is supposed by some to have been derived, in the case of the Greeks and Romans, from the Cimmeri, a people of Campania, who are fabled to have dwelt in caverns deep under ground, and in perpetual darkness. As respects the Jews, it is supposed they may have derived the same from the construction of their tombs. "These tombs," says Lowth, "were extensive caves or vaults, excavated from the native rock by art and manual labour. The roofs of them were in general arched, and some were so spacious as to be supported by colonnades. All round the sides were cells for the reception of sarcophagi. These were properly ornamented, and each was placed in its proper cell. The cave or sepulchre admitted no light, being closed with a great stone, which was rolled to the mouth of the narrow passage or entrance. Now," says he, "figure to yourselves a vast, dark, dreary sepulchral cavern of this kind, where the kings of the nations lie, each upon his bed of dust, the arms of each beside him, his sword under his head, and the graves of their numerous ancestors round about them. Behold! the king of Babylon is introduced; they all rise and go forth to meet him, and receive him as he approaches. 'Art thou also come down unto us? Art thou become like unto us? Art thou cut down and withered in thy strength, O thou destroyer of nations?'" Other

nations are supposed to have derived the idea from a similar source, from the fact that the dead are deposited beneath the earth.

Closely connected with the place of the dead is their state. Some things pertaining to this have already been mentioned ; but its importance demands for it a more distinct and full consideration. And first, we have to notice their employments. These are supposed to be the same as in the present world ; and they are supposed, too, to occupy the same stations. Those who had been kings, are represented by Isaiah as still kings, who all rise from their thrones at the approach of the king of Babylon. And so Achilles is represented by Homer as ruling the dead far and wide. Such, too, were the ideas entertained by the aborigines of our own continent. And hence we have to account for the very singular custom, said to have prevailed among the Mexicans and other nations, when their king died, of slaying his wives, servants, and courtiers, that they might perform for him the same service in the other world which they had performed in this ; and hence, too, the custom among many tribes of killing the dog of the deceased, that he might serve him in hunting. It follows, if men are engaged in the same employments in the other world as in this, that they carry with them their present habits and dispositions. They carry with them the remembrance of their present life ; they still keep up a delightful social intercourse, and converse of the things which happened to them when alive. Anchises is found by Æneas in a green and flowery vale, entertaining his fellow-spirits with a recital of his own exploits, and the various fortune of his friends. They harbour their resentments for affronts, or ill treatment received in the present life. Of this we have plentiful illustrations, among others, in the case of Dido, Ajax, and Agamemnon. Æneas espies Dido wandering in the great wood, and approaching, addresses her : “ Unhappy Dido ! It was then true, too true, the report I heard of your death. Alas ! that I should have been the cause of that death. I swear by the stars, by the great gods, that I left you against my will ; but

the same gods compelled me to do so who now compel me to visit these gloomy regions. But stop, do not run; why do you fly from me? I converse with you for the last time." But in vain; no longer is she charmed by the sight of that face, or by the sound of that voice, though it be heard in the melting accents of love. Her love, once so fervent, so strong, which led her to die upon the funeral pile by her own hands, is turned to hatred, and she heeds neither his cries nor his tears, but leaves him to indulge in bitter, it may be, yet fruitless lamentations. And so Ajax, when Ulysses finds him among the shades, and entreats him, in the most passionate strains, to forget their former differences and become reconciled, departs without deigning to say a single word in reply. So also Agamemnon, who it will be recollected was slain by the contrivance of his adulterous wife, vents his spleen to Ulysses against her, and, because of her, against the whole female sex, in the following words: "My wife has disgraced all the women that shall ever be born into the world, even those who hereafter shall be innocent. Take care how you grow too fond of your wife. Never tell her all you know. If you reveal some things to her, be careful you keep others concealed from her. You indeed have nothing to fear from your Penelope; she will not use you as my wife has treated me. However, take care how you trust a woman."

The dead retain their affection for their friends left behind, and take a high degree of interest in their welfare, and are greatly rejoiced at hearing of their prosperity. Of the former we have a most touching example in the case of the mother of Ulysses, who, as soon as she sees him, with tears bursts out, "O my son!" Of the latter we have a fine example in the case of Achilles, who inquires with the greatest earnestness after his son, and when he learns that his heart alone is firm, when that of every other hero quakes for fear, is so delighted and proud of him that he stalks with more than ordinary majesty over the meadow. From this interest which the dead are supposed to take in the affairs of the present world, doubtless originated the custom of the invocation of saints.

We have to notice the state of the dead as happy or miserable. On this point, the ideas of men have been vague, especially in the infancy of their intellectual cultivation. Their state was represented in early times as not wholly miserable, and still as not altogether desirable. "Curse the shades," Achilles tartly replies, when congratulated by Ulysses upon his singular good fortune in that he was adored by the Greeks while alive, and reigned over the shades after death; "talk not to me of reigning over them, for I had rather be the veriest day-labourer that walks the earth." No rewards and punishments were supposed to be allotted to them, at least in places specially designed for each. Tartarus was the place of punishment of the giants alone, and Elysium was the abode only of heroes or demi-gods. But the conceptions of the Greeks gradually advanced in distinctness and correctness, until at length they came to suppose that men were admitted to Elysium and sent down to Tartarus. They even then, however, seem to have supposed only the grossest crimes were there punished. In Homer only one is mentioned, that of perjury. As they advanced in intellectual cultivation, and their moral ideas came to higher perfection, they supposed other crimes were punished, and finally that every virtue met its due reward, and every vice its due punishment; such, in imitation of Plato and other philosophers, is the representation of Virgil. The ideas of the ancient Israelites seem to have been in like manner indistinct and defective, so much so, that some have contended that there is no allusion at all to the future existence of the soul in the Old Testament.

It may be proper here briefly to notice, in what future rewards and punishments were supposed to consist. We have already spoken of Virgil's description of Elysium: it was the counterpart of Italy, a sensual paradise, where heroes reposed from their toils after they had shuffled off their mortal coil, and amused themselves as they saw fit, in sports and conversation. Of the nature of the punishments the soul is to endure, the Platonists had a very beautiful theory. "They suppose every passion which has been contracted by it during

its residence in the body, remains with it in a separate state, and that the soul, in the body or out of the body, differs no more than the man does from himself when he is in his house or in open air. When, therefore, the obscene passions in particular have once taken root and spread themselves in the soul, they cleave to her inseparably, and remain in her for ever after the body is cast off and thrown aside. Thus the punishment of a voluptuous man after death consists in this: he is tormented with desires which it is impossible for him to gratify, solicited by a passion that has no objects adapted to it. He lives in a state of invincible desire and impotence, and always burns in the pursuit of what he always desires to possess." Virgil has given this idea a beautiful poetic dress:

"They lie below on golden beds displayed,
And genial feasts with regal pomp are made.
The queen of furies by their side is set,
And snatches from their mouths the untasted meat,
Which if they touch, her hissing snakes she rears,
Tossing her torch, and thundering in their ears."

Such a punishment, too, seems to have been drawn in the description of Tantalus, who was punished with the rage of an eternal thirst, set up to the chin in water, which fled from his lips whenever he attempted to drink it. The sensible images by which the happiness or misery of the soul in the future world is represented, are in all cases those things which are looked upon with the greatest desire or dread by those that make use of them. The Jews' figure for the consummation of future bliss, is the garden of Eden; that for the intensity of future misery, the being consigned to a fire, of which that kindled in the valley of Hinnom, continually burning and smouldering, is a faint emblem. The Indian imagined his heaven an immense hunting-ground, abounding in every kind of most precious game, where "the deer doth bound in her gladness free," and the buffalo roams over the vast prairie. He is said to have had a singular idea of future punishment as respects the Spaniards, drawn from their greediness for gold: he

supposed them placed either in a molten sea of this metal, or else the same, red-hot, continually poured down their throats.

Another point which deserves notice, is the forms of the dead. They are supposed to bear an exact resemblance to their forms when alive, so that they are at once easily recognized. They are enlarged, however, in size, to giant proportions, and are shadowy; they are seen, but cannot be felt. Of this many illustrations might be given. Æneas attempts to embrace his father, but to his surprise, finds nothing but air, thin air. A spirit is indeed before him, and he discerns the form thereof, but it is something which cannot be felt, an "*imago par levibus ventis volercrigue simillimee somno.*" Achilles attempts to embrace the shade of his friend Patroclus, but it eludes his embrace, and in astonishment he exclaims, "Heavens! every thing in Hades is spirit and shadow; of substance there is none." So Ulysses, when he attempts to embrace his mother,

"I ardent wished to clasp the shade
Of my departed mother; thrice I sprang
Toward her, by desire impetuous urged,
And thrice she flitted from between my arms,
Light as a passing shadow or a dream."

We have to notice one other idea, that of transmigration. A belief in this, under different forms, is found to have prevailed among many nations. Some have supposed the soul to pass from one human body into another, some into the bodies of beasts, or even into plants and stones. "The belief in this doctrine," says Knapp, "seems to have rested at first upon a certain supposed analogy in nature, where one body is always observed to pass into another, and even when it seems to perish, only alters its form and returns in different shapes. Or it may have sprung in part from the almost universal idea that every thing in the whole creation is animated by a soul, especially every thing possessing internal life and power of motion." This doctrine was a prominent article in the religious creed of India, of some of the nations of our own continent

and of Egypt, and from this latter country it is supposed to have been introduced by Pythagoras into Greece, and thence into Rome. The doctrine as held by the philosophers of these last countries was, that "the souls of men exist in a separate state long before their union with their bodies, and that upon their immersion into flesh, they forget every thing which passed in the state of pre-existence, so that what we call knowledge is nothing else but memory or the recovery of those things which we knew before." The poetical version of the same as given by Virgil is, that the souls, to prepare themselves for living upon the earth, come to the river Lethe, and quaff the waters of oblivion. Other nations, particularly in India and other parts of the East, have supposed that the soul passes into the vilest animals. A singular story, arising from this belief, is given in the Asiatic Researches, from the literary annals of the Burmese. "A priest died, and, according to custom, his fellow-priests proceeded to divide among themselves his effects. When they came to the robe and were about to cut it a louse was discovered, and showed, by his frequent going and coming, and by his extraordinary gestures, that the division of the robe would be nowise agreeable to his feelings. The priests, all astonishment, consulted God upon the occasion, from whom they received information of the character of this louse; that the soul of the priest had passed into it, and were commanded to delay for seven days their intended division, that being the length of time allowed for the life of a louse among the Burmese."

From the doctrine of transmigration, as thus held, may have arisen the idea that it is unlawful to kill animals, and that whoever does so is to suffer death, and also to be punished hereafter, according to the nature of the animal killed, the manner of killing it, and the use made of it. Those who kill oxen, swine, goats, and other such animals, are to suffer between two burning mountains two thousand years; those who kill animals by immersing in boiling oil or water, are to have their bowels consumed by fire entering their mouths, and this is to last four thousand years; and all who, besides

killing, skin, roast, or eat these animals, are to be transfixed on an iron spit, while they are cut and torn by the demons, and this is to last sixteen thousand years. This prohibition and punishment would seem very natural, upon the supposition that the soul passes into these animals, for in killing or eating them, one might kill and eat his neighbour, or even his own father. This idea is beautifully expressed by Ovid, as translated by Dryden.

“ Thus all things are but altered, nothing dies,
And here and there the embodied spirit flies ;
By time or force or sickness dispossessed,
And lodges where it lights in bird or beast ;
Or hunts without till ready limbs it find,
And actuates those according to their kind ;
From tenement to tenement is toss'd,
The soul is still the same, the figure only lost.
Then let not piety be put to flight,
To please the taste of glutton appetite,
But suffer inmate souls secure to dwell,
Lest from their seats your parents you expel ;
With rapid hunger feed upon your kind,
Or from a beast dislodge a brother's mind.”

Hence too, perhaps, the care taken in some parts of the East of old worn-out or useless animals, such as old horses, oxen, cows, dogs, cats, monkeys, and reptiles. Of an establishment for this purpose among the Mahrattas, we find an account in the *Missionary Herald* for 1841–2. In this establishment, the writer says, were about 100 old horses, 175 oxen and cows, about 200 dogs and cats, monkeys and reptiles, whose numbers he does not give. These are furnished with whatever they may need as long as they live.

The kind of animal into which the soul of a person enters, has been sometimes supposed to be that which he most resembles in his manners. For example, the soul of Orpheus, who was musical, melancholy, and a woman-hater, enters into a swan ; the soul of Ajax, which was all wrath and fierceness, into a lion ; the soul of Agamemnon, that was rapacious and imperial, into an eagle ; and the soul of Thersites, who was a mimic and buffoon, into a monkey.

The doctrine of transmigration, similar to that of the Greeks and Romans, seems to have been held by the Jews before and at the time of Christ. Hence the question of John the Baptist, "Art thou Elias?" hence the report Peter said was abroad respecting Christ, "Some say thou art Elias, others Jeremias, or one of the prophets;" and hence, too, the question put to Christ by the disciples respecting the blind man, "Master, who did sin, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?"

Such are some of the ideas of the ancients respecting a future state; many of them erroneous, many absurd, but at the same time containing many germs of truth, which a more correct philosophy, the offspring of revelation, has more fully developed and confirmed. The perplexing doubts and fears, the absurd conjectures and ridiculous fancies of these have been swept away, and the light of revealed truth has broken in with a brightness which has for ever dispelled the mists of error and superstition which hung for so many ages over every thing pertaining to the future world.

ARTICLE VI.

LASCARIS ; OR THE GREEKS OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY.

From the French of M. VILLEMAIN, late Minister of Instruction, France.

[The following is a version of a singularly erudite and interesting sketch of the Revival of Learning in the Fifteenth Century, on the capture of Constantinople by the Turks, and the flight of the Greeks into Europe, written for the *Revue de deux Mondes*, by M. Villemain, who occupied for years, and until lately, the post of Minister of Instruction of France, and Professor in the University of Paris. His well known name, as the colleague of Guizot, Michelet, Arago, Quinet and Thierry, and as one of the most erudite classical scholars in France, gives some value to the article, above its intrinsic merit, as a striking picture of one of the great turning points of modern civilization. Its slight drapery of fiction does not interfere with, but rather facilitates, the author's design. We are indebted for the excellent translation to Mr. J. W. MAY, of Burlington, Vt.—Ed.]

In the year fourteen hundred and fifty-three, some Italians of noble family passed over to Sicily to visit Mount Etna, and examine more closely those smoking summits which have for

so many centuries attracted the curiosity of travellers. They were young men of Venice and Florence, who had been carefully trained in the learning of the schools, understood Latin, and occasionally courted the Muses in their mother tongue. Accomplished as they were, Sicily seemed to them a barbarous country. There was nothing to remind them of the beautiful cities of Italy, or the rich commerce of Venice and Genoa. They passed their time in wandering about, and viewing with astonishment, an island so unfortunate amidst a profusion of nature's gifts, and in spite of the fertility of a soil warmed by the heat of the volcano. They strolled beneath the shady walks of palm trees which descend from Taurominium to the foot of Etna, while on the one hand rose thriving vineyards, like an amphitheatre, and, on the other, the sea presented an unbroken perspective of its waves, and mingled its roar with the bellowings of the mountain.

But this grand spectacle could not entirely detach their thoughts from what they had been accustomed to admire in their own land. In beholding, on so fertile a soil, a people so sparse, so poor and so rude, both in manners and language, they saw what art and industry can do for man, and repeated some verses of Petrarch to the glory of Italy. More than once, too, wearied of this incessant contemplation of ruin, and seated among the scattered fragments of some old Greek temple or Roman circus, they recalled some of those sportive fictions which had rendered the names of Boccaccio and Poggio so famous throughout Italy. Such, at that time, was the taste and genius of the Italians. That enthusiastic and warlike fervour which had animated the Middle Ages, and which was now beginning to wane throughout Europe, had long since lost its power over them. The court of Rome; the democracy of Florence; the policy, commerce, and voluptuousness of Venice; all these were alike repugnant to the habits and usages of chivalry.

The young travellers had indeed heard, before leaving Italy, that the Sultan, Mahomet II., was soon to besiege Constantinople with a formidable army; but this news had

excited in their minds only a moderate interest in favour of a schismatic people, foolishly obstinate in an error, which, at the last Council of Florence, they had faithlessly promised to retract. It was no longer the time of the crusades, and Byzantium was not Jerusalem. The announcement of the peril of the imperial city, therefore, seriously occupied the attention of none save a few merchants of Pisa and Venice who traded in the Levant, and seized this opportunity to fill their coffers by supplying both the Greeks and their invaders with ammunition and arms. But Sicily was, at that period, so destitute of commerce and industry, that no one there thought of such an enterprise, nor did they know even of the condition and danger of Constantinople. A blind zeal for the Roman religion rendered the very name of Byzantium odious among the people, who regarded the Greeks as impious enemies of God and the holy images.

One evening, while our travellers had stopped at the east of Catania to contemplate the last rays of the setting sun, as they threw a reddening light over the smoky top of Etna, and seemed to repeat, in the waves, the fire of the volcano, the sight of a vessel approaching the shore attracted their attention. The lateen sail, half furled around the mast, with the cross which surmounted it, announced a Christian ship. She draws near the shore ; and while the Turkish slaves, chained to their benches, discover a kind of insulting and ferocious joy, a number of men, venerable in years, and of noble but dejected mien, appear upon the deck, and mournfully salute the approaching shore. They go ashore, fall upon their knees, and thank God for their deliverance. The women, children and wounded follow. Covered with long white robes, their countenances veiled—in their retiring modesty forgetting even their misfortunes—these women, as they stood motionless upon the shore, seemed, in the beauty of their forms, a group of antique statues. One of the men, who, by his commanding look, seemed their chief, turning towards those who had come down to the seaside, exclaimed :

“ We fly from Constantinople ;—our brethren are dead or

captive ;—the Emperor has perished ;—the temple of Saint Sophia is polluted by Mahomet, and we come to seek an asylum in that Christian Europe which would not help us.”

These words, and this appearance of sadness, together with the sudden advent of so great a misfortune, made a deep impression upon our travellers, as well as upon some of the inhabitants who had gathered around. The superstitious aversion, which attached to the name of Greek, was overcome in the Sicilians themselves, by the eagerness of zeal and curiosity. They surround the strangers, and conduct them to a monastery built upon the shore, whose outer apartments, according to custom, were appropriated as an asylum for the distressed. Time had been when the monks of this convent would have feared to open its doors to schismatics of the Eastern Church ; and the Greeks of Byzantium would have thought themselves profaned by crossing the threshold of a Roman cathedral. But these sad antipathies were forgotten in this moment of misfortune.

Among the Italian travellers, one of them, a younger member of the house of Medici, in particular, could not restrain his lively grief at the sight of these remnants of a great people.

“What have we done !” he exclaimed. “Has Constantinople, that city which they told us was so powerful, has she fallen into the hands of the Turks ? Had you not riches—immense treasures—the envy of Europe ?”

“There was no love of country among us,” replied the chief of the fugitives ; “each citizen took care of himself and his riches, and left the state to perish.”

“What !” said Medici ; “do not the Genoese occupy your suburbs ? Are they not your allies—your merchants ?”

“They it was who betrayed us,” said the unfortunate Greek. “And why should they have been faithful ? Will they not carry on the same traffick with the Turks ? The disinterested valour, the religious faith of Europe could alone have saved us.”

The stranger then mournfully recounted, in a few words,

how Mahomet had brought from Asia, against Byzantium, an immense force, both naval and military, having laid his whole empire under contribution to besiege a capital, which he regarded as a city snatched from his conquests.

“And what,” continued he, “could we alone, against such ambition and such power? For forty days, animated by the example of our Emperor, we held out against the attacks of the barbarians. The sea, though filled with their vessels, was still in our favour, and seemed to promise us aid from the West. An iron chain of incredible strength shut up the entrance of the port of Byzantium, and was only drawn for the admission of friendly vessels. But with this obedient and brutal force of a million of slavish arms, Mahomet caused to be transported, in one night, and thrown into the otherwise inaccessible harbour, a fleet completely furnished with arms and soldiers. What was our astonishment, at break of day, to find war in our surest asylum, the rest of the world separated from us, and every where Mahomet! Then our generous Prince, recalling all the ancient majesty of the Cæsars, assembled the nobles, the people, and a few faithful foreigners, to announce the last conflict and the last day. When Constantine, on that last sad night, after having asked the pardon of his subjects, came to receive the communion at the foot of the altar, it seemed as if that Roman Empire, which, already old twelve centuries ago, had been rejuvenated by the power of Christianity, was about finally to die. The day following did not deceive us. We saw the Emperor fight in that horrible assault till the last moment. We heard him send up that last shriek of the dying empire:—“Will not some faithful Christian cut off my head?”

While saying these words, Lascaris seemed overcome by the horror of the recollection; his strength failed him, and the blood spirted anew from a wound which his garments but poorly concealed. Reanimated by the kind attentions of the strangers who surrounded him—

“And I, also,” he exclaimed, “should I not have died, who am descended from the Emperors, and so nearly allied

to that glorious blood which the last Constantine has just consecrated by his martyrdom? Unfortunate fugitives! Are we not culpable? Strangers, Sicilians, tell me, do you not despise us that we still live?"

While a murmur of respect and admiration seems to assure the brave Lascaris that he has no cause for remorse, he thus continues:—"Religion commanded us to use all our efforts to save from barbarian fury some of these feeble victims, whom the license of victory most cruelly threatened. On that frightful day, when a countless multitude of Turks was pouring into Constantinople, over our ruined walls and through our mutilated ranks, a pious trust had gathered our trembling families and the virgins of our monasteries into the church of Saint Sophia. They hoped, upon the faith of an ancient legend, that, at the very hour when the barbarians should approach the gates of the city, an angel of the Lord would descend and exterminate their sacrilegious cohorts. But alas! I had learned from history, and from religion also, that God leaves old empires to fall; and that, if sometimes it be his pleasure to uphold them, the miracle of his hand is to send them a great man. The heroism and virtue of the last Constantine had not been able to save us, and what had we longer to expect? I hurried away from the sacred but feeble asylum of Saint Sophia a few illustrious women of the blood of the Comneni, and, gathering around me a few friends, I made my way, sword in hand, through the scenes of blood, debauchery and impiety, which already filled the vast circumference of Constantinople. Great God! what crimes, a hundred times more terrible, of those savage hordes let loose in the midst of the brilliant sojourn of civilization and art, were presented to my sight!* Execrable enemies! Ah! may

* The Greeks doubtless exaggerated the splendour of Constantinople. Still, at the time of the conquest, it was filled with the choicest monuments of ancient art. That such was the opinion of the Romans, we may gather from the testimony of Pius II. "Constantinople had remained, until then, the asylum of letters and the temple of philosophy. Constantinople is now to learning what Athens was in the time of the Roman Empire."

none of your European cities ever know such a victory ; and may they never experience the pitiless horrors of a war, in which murder ends only where slavery begins. Fleeing into Galata, among allies of doubtful fidelity, we succeeded in safely embarking even amid the tumult of that horrible conquest. We bring into Italy our Christian name, our misfortunes, and our immortal treasures—the works of the great geniuses of our country—those *Dii Penates* of ancient Greece, which I have snatched from the ruins of Constantinople, as Æneas carried forth in his flight the sacred fire of Vesta.”

The words of Lascaris, and this vivid picture of the great catastrophe redoubled the interest and respect of his listeners ; and while they left him and his companions to a brief repose in the asylum which had been offered, the news of their disaster and arrival spread far and wide. Not all, however, were touched alike with the sentiment of pity. They said the disaster was the consequence of heresy. But the nuns were at once more alarmed and more compassionate, and offered prayers both for the conversion of the Greeks and the extermination of their enemies. The Greek women were immediately conducted to the convent of the Sisters of Saint Benedict, in the neighbourhood of Catania, and received with Christian charity. Many of them had said that they too were nuns, and had been consecrated to the Lord ; but when, afterwards, they threw aside their veils and discovered the dark waving tresses which covered their heads, and animated the regularity of their features, this usage, peculiar to the oriental monasteries, seemed to the sisters of Saint Benedict scarcely less than a scandalous profanation, and proof sufficient of all the errors which the doctors of the Western Church had charged upon the Greeks. Thus did some trifling differences of costume and habit so long foster animosities between two Christian nations who ought to have been to each other a mutual source of light and strength. The sisters of Saint Benedict, however, before withdrawing from the unhappy fugitives the asylum which they had proffered, resolved to write to the Bishop of Palermo ; the young Greeks, mean-

while, remaining under the severe injunction of seclusion and penitence which was imposed upon them, making a solitude even in the midst of the monastery.

In the mean time, the Italian travellers, who united in their characters the enthusiasm of youth with the learned curiosity which was then becoming common in their country, were impatient to return and listen to the story of Lascaris. Modern Italy had already received some passing glimpses of Grecian art; but the stories which tradition recited of the monk Barlaam had nothing like the image of this generous Greek flying from the midst of Constantinople with the archives of ancient genius. Up to that time nearly all the Greeks who had come to Italy were obscure grammarians, or theologians, who were rather filled with the spirit of religious controversy, than with a passionate love of the arts. All trace of their presence was very soon effaced, and the divisions excited at the Council of Florence had interrupted this intellectual commerce in the infancy of its revival. Besides, while Constantinople existed, it seemed that there would always be opportunities of consulting this depository of sciences, which fortune was careful to preserve. But now the fire was but just gone out, and all had irrevocably perished. This thought dwelt in the mind of the young Medici, who was worthy of the name of his father, and zealous, like him, for the restoration of the arts.

When, at break of day, Lascaris went down to the sea side to see if he could discover in the distance any ship freighted with his unfortunate fellow-citizens, he found Medici and his friends already there before him. One of them, a young painter whose pieces were one day to reflect honour upon the Florentine school, was engaged in sketching the scene of the previous evening;—the fugitives disembarking—the vessel at anchor;—but upon the poop he placed Minerva looking towards Italy. Another of them, Bembo, who had been nursed in the bosom of the Venetian aristocracy, more curious in the history of the people themselves than of their arts, was meditating upon the so long decline and so sudden fall of the Em-

pire of the West ; and half disposed to make light of sciences which do not save states from destruction, could not forbear to express these thoughts to the illustrious fugitive.

“ Alas !” said Lascaris, “ the arts are the noblest title of a people, and the only testament which it can leave to the future ; but the arts cannot survive the corruption of the law. With the fall of this they fall themselves. For years have we been languishing beneath the vices of a tyrannical government, and a degenerate society. It belongs to the people of Europe to restore us, and begin a new epoch. This thought, I declare, was long since coupled in my mind with a sad presentiment of the destiny of Constantinople. While yet a youth, when I saw our religious disputes, the weakness of our Emperor, the luxury of our nobles, I turned to the study of the monuments of another age, which our language held in deposit, but which it could no longer equal. I gathered around me those precious masterpieces, and multiplied copies as a present reserved for the human race. I said to myself, If we must perish, let Europe, at least, inherit the genius of our fathers. Like the navigator who is about to be swallowed up by the waves, I sought to preserve the records of past discoveries.”

“ The language and the works of Greece,” replied Medici, “ though too little known among us, are nevertheless held dear by the wisest men. Our great poet, Petrarch, having received from the East a copy of Homer, was grieved that it was useless in his hands. His friend Boccacio, taught him the language, and interpreted for him the poems of Homer.”

“ May they be heard by all the world—those sublime poems !” exclaimed Lascaris. “ It is the imagination and the philosophy of the Greeks ; it is our orators and poets, who are to reanimate and enchant Italy, and thence pass to the rest of Europe, which you yourselves yet call barbarous. Beneath the sky of Greece there dwelt, for a long time, a race of men favoured by the happiest climate and the noblest liberty. There was born the inspiration of patriotism, and there

glory raised the souls of men to those great deeds which are the secret type of the fine arts. Homer invented the beautiful in poetry ; Plato introduced it into morals, and reason became more sublime than enthusiasm. Under such auspices was formed, and more than once renewed, a galaxy of great poets, orators, and philosophers, which we, unfortunate exiles from Constantinople, are about to give to Italy. Never did the vanquished carry forth in their flight a rarer treasure. Never will hospitality be remunerated by a more magnificent return. We shall give still more than we ourselves possess. Among us, a fallen people, the models of the grand and beautiful are faithfully preserved—but sterile and without an imitator. They enrich our archives, but no longer inspire our souls. Our very respect for monuments so pure prevented all effort towards new creations, and our dejected spirit retired within a narrow circle, as our empire itself was shut up within the walls of Byzantium. But let these models, transported among you and among the barbarians of the West, animate new languages and new nations ; and then shall spring up a new age of light and glory for Europe. You especially, Italians, with the liberty of your peaceful dominions, and your republican cities, will be the first to discover something of the happy leisure and beautiful genius of Greece. The arts, by turns changing their sojourn, are like those gleaming signals of which our Æschylus speaks ; those fires kindled from height to height to announce the victory of Agamemnon, which succeeded and reflected each other from the summits of Ida to the mountains in the neighbourhood of Mycene. May that flame which, kindled by the Greeks, burned on the shores of Ionia, of Sicily, of Egypt, and of Ausonia, revive at this day in Christian Rome. While the barbarians are pushing their conquests in the East, let Europe be instructed and enlightened ; she will be victorious.”

Medici, Bembo, the painter Alberti, and Calderino, who afterwards introduced Greek literature into France, listened to the venerable man with eager attention, and seemed animated with his enthusiasm. Lascaris continued to converse with

them for some time on the genius of Plato, and rapidly set forth some of those exalted ideas which had soared in advance almost to the sublimity of the Christian law. Then, as if to reproach himself for indulging in such discourse :

“ The empire of the Greeks,” said he, “ is no more ; and I, a feeble citizen, am recounting to strangers the marvels of our fathers who no longer have tombs ; as once before did the captive Athenians, in this very Sicily, chant the verses of Sophocles and Euripides. But they had lost their liberty only. Their country still remained, and its recollections gave poignancy to their servitude. I, indeed, am free—but alone in the world. Pardon me if I seek to find a present image of Greece in the remembrance of our arts ; I have no other country.”

The conversation was here interrupted by the news that others of their unfortunate brethren had landed not far from Messina, in search for their compatriots. These new fugitives were from Peloponnesus and Attica, whither Mahomet had not yet carried the war. The most celebrated among them was Gemisthus Pletho. Though many years ago called to the court of the Emperors, and employed as ambassador to the Italian states, an unconquerable love for the most beautiful memorials of Greece caused him to retire to Athens, where he might foster his enthusiasm for the works of Plato. Byzantium, the capital, situated as it was on the extreme border of Thrace, seemed to him only a semi-barbarous colony, too remote from the true metropolis of art and genius. Surrounded by the monuments which Athens still contained, and passionately fond of all that recalled to his mind the ancient glory of his nation, this eloquent and eccentric philosopher had not escaped those religious persecutions which, even in the midst of their tottering empire, did not cease to distract the wretched Greeks. He was anathematized, and banished from his country, whence so many others were fleeing for their lives. They accused him of entertaining an impious preference—a sacrilegious love for the ancient divinities of Greece, and of a design to resuscitate in himself the illusions and pur-

poses of Julian. The Olympus of Homer, they said, had become, for this idolater of art, a sort of mystic symbol which his imagination adored, and in which, mingling enthusiasm with subtlety, and ecstasy with allegory, he almost believed. Gemisthus, although he had formerly lived amid the honours of the Court, wore the mantle of the philosophers; his commanding stature, his broad and open forehead, his long white beard, an eye full of fire, and the air of meditation and enthusiasm which rested upon the majestic singularity of his features, gave to him something of that look which enters into our idea of Pythagoras and Plato. But he had fallen from that simplicity which belonged to the nobler ages of Grecian history, and was only an imitator of Plotinus and Porphyry. Nevertheless he inspired a respect mingled with surprise. Many learned Greeks had gathered round him, and both at Athens and at Byzantium he had many disciples. From his school came the celebrated Bessarion, who, foreseeing the fall of his country, had long since renounced the faith of his fathers, and gone over to the Latin Church. A Greek by birth, he became an Italian from policy, preserving nothing of his origin save his erudition and that artfulness which was peculiar to the Court of Byzantium. Elevated to the cardinalate by Pope Eugene IV., he providentially became the hope of the Greek fugitives; and Gemisthus, relying upon the attachment of his former disciple, promised them his support.

Medici and his young companions were filled with astonishment at his appearance, and charmed with his language, so full of elevation. He had none of that restless sadness, none of that grief, of the man and of the citizen, which entered into all the thoughts of Lascaris, and tempered his enthusiasm for the arts. Gemisthus lived in an ideal world, away from the pangs of earthly sorrow. His imagination always looked beyond events, or rather, transformed them at its pleasure, and tinged them with its colours. Perhaps at this moment he looked back upon the fall of the Empire with a kind of sad and doubtful joy; perhaps, in the midst of the victories of Mahomet and the commotions of Europe, he saw the return of the

Grecian festivals, and the liberty of ancient times. He thanked Medici and the young Italians for the kind attention which they had shown to his countrymen, and with an air of pride and confidence in the future—

“Young man,” said he to Medici, “you do well in your admiration of Greece ; you are worthy of your father, whom I saw in Florence during the fruitless debates of the Council. He was curious to learn some of the truths of our philosophers, but he was too much occupied with the narrow cares of vulgar politics. His first purpose was to govern his fellow-citizens, and he did not give himself up to the sublime thoughts of the master of sages. He had not time for the contemplation of high truths, and comprehended not the reform which awaits the universe, and may yet depart from Greece.”

“We are well aware,” replied Medici, “of the wisdom and renown which the arts of Greece may impart to our country. Come to Italy. Bring with you the works of the great geniuses, of which you are the worthy interpreter. Lascaris has shown us how our Italian cities may emulate the elegance of Athens, and enrich herself with her ancient masterpieces of art and literature. Greece will revive amongst us ; she will pass beyond the mountains and carry thither her letters and her eloquence.”

A smile upon the countenance of the venerable philosopher seemed to indicate that such words responded neither to his thoughts nor his hope.

“We will return to this subject,” said he. “I am awaiting letters from Bessarion. I wish to know what he has to offer to his fellow-countrymen or to Greece, to which he has turned apostate.”

Gemisthus refused to accept an asylum in the monastery of Saint Benedict, so generously opened to his compatriots ; but he promised to see them frequently and visit with them some of the extraordinary sites and antique monuments which surround Catania. The next day, on one of those evenings when the gentle sea-breeze mellows the scorching atmosphere of Sicily, the fugitives were reposing, after a long ramble, on

one of the peaks of Etna. Medici and his friends were with them, and a young friar of the convent of Saint Benedict, who had conceived a lively interest in the learning of the strangers. Here were assembled around Gemisthus many illustrious Greeks: Hermonymus, of Sparta; Argyropylus, educated in the school of Aristotle; George, of Trebizond, famous for his quarrels and his eloquence; Andronicus, the master of Lorenzo de Medici; Demetrius, of Athens, the most ingenious interpreter of Homer; Theodore Gaza; and Michael Apostolus, the admirer and disciple of Gemisthus. The subject of their conversation was the recent news from the East announcing the transfer of the Turkish Empire to Byzantium. Mahomet had made a mosque of Saint Sophia, and a harem of the palace of the Cæsars. Numberless families, collected from the different parts of his empire, replaced, in Stamboul, those which war and slavery had destroyed or dispersed. The Greek worship was preserved among the vanquished, and Mahomet accorded to them a Patriarch, whom he himself had decorated with the honour of the pontifical cross. For the rest, the Sultan was fast devouring every remnant of the Empire, and threatened the entire subjugation of Trebizond and the Morea, which had already become his tributaries. These details redoubled the grief of Lascaris:

“The feeble remnant of our country,” said he, “is more than annihilated. Mahomet stops the carnage only to preserve an image of the vanquished people in servitude. At Byzantium, Christianity is in bondage to the Alcoran,—a Christian bishop appointed by the profaner of our temples. Alas! for religion itself.”

Most of the company appeared to share in this grief. Not so Gemisthus. He was preoccupied by other thoughts, and seemed possessed by a hope which he did not avow.

“Why talk ye,” he exclaimed, “of destruction and slavery? Do ye not remember the words which the priest pronounced at the entrance of the sanctuary, in the light of the sacred flame? Arise, and be pure. Greece died because

she lost the tradition of the elders. She will revive when she drinks again at the fountains whence our fathers drank."

While he thus spoke, blending mystery with enthusiasm, one could easily imagine, from his venerable aspect and snow-white beard, that he was some priest of Delphi or Eleusinia ; or rather the wildness of the spot where the Greeks were assembled, together with the neighbouring volcano, reminded one of Empedocles tormented with the great secrets of nature, and ready to plunge into the abyss of Etna.

The singular prejudice, not only for the arts but the faith of antiquity, which seemed to sway the soul of Gemisthus, was not wholly unexampled, at that time, even in Italy. The taste for Roman literature, kept constantly alive by the monuments and ruins which covered the site of ancient Latium, rekindled also the recollections of polytheism. At this period lived Pomponius Laetus, who, descended from an illustrious Neapolitan family, adopted an old Roman name ; and, surrounded by his disciples, fanatics, like himself, in their love for profane Rome, erected an altar to Romulus, upon which he secretly imitated the sacred rites and ceremonies as sung by Ovid. The young Bembo had recently seen him at Venice, where he had taken refuge, being suspected, with some others, from their literary paganism, of a conspiracy against the papal throne. Struck with this recollection, Bembo was the more attentive to the enthusiastic words of Gemisthus, listening, nevertheless, with a subdued smile, while the young friar of Saint Benedict beheld the extraordinary scene with clasped hands and almost speechless terror.

Entirely occupied with the illusions and poetic images which filled his soul, Gemisthus with warmth continued :

" Was not that, Greeks, a noble idea of our master Plato, which peopled the heavens with so many protecting divinities, under the high power and protecting regard of one supreme God ? You, Lascaris, who would carry our arts into Italy, where will you find in that barbarous land the divinity which gives inspiration and eloquence ? What will you do with those splendid works, which, among a people ignorant of our

ancient mysteries, will be but a dead letter? When Plato visited the sages of Egypt, was he satisfied with admiring the form of the characters and symbols which were engraven on the front of the temples? Would he not penetrate their meaning and mystery? What are our arts, separated from our worship and faith—the life of our fathers? Remember the words which a Roman once addressed to his friend: *You are going to Athens. Adore, then, the gods.* Perhaps, Lascaris, you, —half stranger as you are, retained amid the vain disputes of Byzantium on the borders of Thrace, and far from our sacred streams,—perhaps you do not feel this intimate connection of our memorials, our genius, our arts, and our ancient traditions. If you had dwelt at Athens, and had beheld the Parthenon in the light of dawning day; if you had fancied that you could trace the very steps of the divine Plato, and the very ruins had appeared to you immortal and holy, how far would you be from reducing the genius of our fathers to the perfection of art and language! This form of the beautiful which you perceive in their writings, is it not a copy plucked from a divine original, which is read in the heavens? Let us elevate our souls towards this celestial beauty, and then shall we find it more bright and more true in the traditions of our fathers.”

This speech had its effect upon the young Michael Apostolus. He was animated by the example of the venerable Gemisthus, but with an enthusiasm less confident than that of the old man. There was doubt in his illusion, and what the ardent imagination of the old Platonist fully realized, he saw only as seductive promises. He was not persuaded—he was moved. He fully shared with the Byzantine Greeks their contempt for the civilization of the Romans.

“For myself,” said he, “though without a hope for the regeneration of that which is falling under the blows of the barbarians of Asia, I will not live in the West. I prefer to retire to some island of the Ionian sea, to Cyprus or Crete. What can we do among a people who are strangers to our arts? When will the ignorance of Europe be dissipated

during the fierce contentions which divide it? On the ruins of Rome, herself barbarous when compared to Greece, twenty nations have sprung up, in whose most refined language we find only the wreck of the Roman tongue."

At this moment the attention of the company was attracted by the voice of some stroller, who was amusing his descent from the mountain by singing some of those verses of Dante which an instinctive admiration had long since rendered familiar to the Italian people. He was chanting the fine passage of the first canto of the Purgatory :

Sweet hue of eastern sapphire, that was spread
O'er the serene aspect of the pure air,
High up as the first circle, to mine eyes
Unwonted joy renew'd, soon as I scap'd
Forth from the atmosphere of deadly gloom,
That had mine eyes and bosom filled with grief.

CARY.

These words were altogether a prediction so happy, and a picture so striking of the regeneration of art in the West, that both the fugitives and our travellers remained silent for some minutes.

"Do you think," said Medici, breaking the silence, "that the idiom capable of such accents is unfit to receive new inspiration from the science of Greece? You see that even in the chaos of our still barbarous manners a noble spirit has breathed forth songs almost divine. What could we not do, were we animated by the great models and elevated genius of Greece?" Lascaris, who had read Dante as well as Homer, and whose profound erudition enabled him to pass judgment upon both, seized upon the occasion to explain the error of Gemisthus ; and turning towards him—

"You hear," said he, "the response which time makes to your system. The human mind has long since entered upon a new era, which has its religion, its poetry, its high truths, its popular faith ; and may yet receive instruction and models ; but it cannot bury itself in the past, which is gone ; nor transform itself into another era. In our ancient games

the couriers did not stop on receiving the sacred torch, but darted forth with renewed vigour, the flame kindling as they ran. This is a type of that emulation which shall excite nations in the career of art and social life. The old world is gone ; but it will hold sway over the imaginations of men, by the monuments and recollections which it has left behind. We will be the interpreters of that learned antiquity ; we will publish its marvels ; and if, perchance, there shall be found among the multitude some happy genius kindled by the breath of our words, he will feel himself, as it were, lifted up above his contemporaries, or even himself."

"We have already begun this great work," replied Medici. "Every where, throughout Italy, are we engaged in searching the ruins and bringing to light the records of Roman genius. Cosmo de Medici, my father, is the friend of the learned. He spares no pains nor expense in the collection of the rarest manuscripts ; and his vessels, trading to Persia, Egypt and India, have more than once brought back works which he holds as his choicest treasures. And may he not receive you ? We are like forsaken children wandering among the ruined palaces of their fathers. Teach us the value of the treasures which we are daily discovering, and bring with you those which you yourselves possess."

"It is not for you," replied Lascaris, "to go back to the customs and traditions of the ancient Romans. You dwell in Italy, it is true ; but you are a new people. Your priests and scholars make use of the ancient language of Rome, but all is changed save the words, and these sound among them like some sterile echo of the past. Instead of servilely following in the paths of the Latins, instead of being the imitators of an imitating people, go directly to the sources whence their great men drew. Ancient Rome is at once too near and too remote from you. Her genius overwhelms you ; ours must inspire you. In art, as in life, there is an eternal truth and a fleeting form. The truth touches the depths of the human heart ; the rest is only a vestment, which changes with the season and according to the caprices

of custom. The error of enthusiasm is that it clings too fondly to some of these changing and secondary forms, and mistakes them for the reality itself."

"I know, indeed," said Bembo, "that you do not bring with you the pomp of the ancient Greeks. But then, how shall we learn the genius of your fathers, whose language, customs and religion are so different from our own? Shall we celebrate those religious festivals where poetry lavished her richest gems before the admiring presence of your fathers? The mysteries of our holy religion are occasionally exhibited before the Italians, and even in the countries beyond the Alps; but our learned men look upon these gross amusements with pity. How could we ever reach the pomp of pagan Greece, some vestiges whereof are here before our eyes?"

Here Bembo pointed to the gigantic ruins of an ancient theatre near, Taurominium, still the wonder of travellers—a vast assemblage of half broken columns, with a magnificent circuit, whence is discovered, in the distant background, the Mediterranean and the smoking heights of Etna.

"Ah!" said Lascares, "I fear you will never revive the marvels of the Athenian stage. You must conquer the barbarians before you can, like Æschylus, exhibit their defeat upon the stage. But the great works of the human intellect need not inspire imitation in order to profit the race. Is it nothing for a people to receive such lessons? Must they not refine their manners, elevate their thoughts, and awaken that enthusiasm which precedes and prepares the creations of genius? I have no hope that Greece will ever deliver herself from barbarian bondage by virtue of her recollections. But if her regeneration should ever happen, it will doubtless be due to the science and civilization of which she has so long been the repository. There are, in the world, only two forces—physical and intellectual; and however unequal at first sight the strife may appear, the latter always triumphs; for it sways the former, and transforms barbarity into refinement. Let the precious writings of her sages, therefore, be preserv-

ed. This is henceforth the only support of Greece, and the distant hope of her deliverance."

Without interrupting the conversation, Lascaris and his friends returned to the city with a view to hasten their departure for Italy. There they found letters from Rome which afforded some little consolation. The lot of Byzantium had already been foreseen at the papal court, and they were in daily expectation of news of the entire subjugation of Greece. Bessarion wrote to his old compatriots with an expression of real sorrow, leavened, however, with a bitterness which flowed from a recollection of his former quarrels. He deplored the inevitable ruin of Constantinople, the triumph of the barbarians, and the injury done to Christianity. He informed them that Nicholas V. had fitted out a fleet in aid of the Empire ; but, at the same time, did not fail to intimate that the schismatic obstinacy of the Greeks had wounded all hearts zealous for the true faith. " You have," said the letter, " you have tempted God. You have preferred to perish at the hands of the barbarians, rather than retract your errors in the bosom of your brethren. The Sovereign Pontiff has applied to your case the parable of the Evangelist :—If the fig-tree bear not fruit for three years, it shall be cut down, destroyed, cast into the fire. It is the third year." Nevertheless, in the letter addressed to Lascaris, Bessarion promised all the Greeks the protection of the Pope, who was himself a zealous friend of the arts ; urged Lascaris to come to Rome, and ended by saying that in spite of the many and important duties with which he was charged, he still continued to cultivate the philosophy and literature of the Greeks, pursuing his studies even during his embassies to the courts of foreign princes. Another letter of Bessarion was addressed to his old master Gemisthus, with no reproaches or reflections upon the errors of this zealous disciple of Plato. " Since they have banished you from Greece," said Bessarion, " come to Rome. You will here find a refuge in the library of the Vatican." The rest of the letter touched upon various points of the Platonic philosophy, upon which, him-

self an ardent admirer, the learned cardinal consulted his former teacher. Besides these letters they received a bull from the Court of Rome, in favour of the king of Cyprus ; which Bessarion said was a proof of the solicitude which the Sovereign Pontiff felt for those Christians of the East who were faithful to the Roman Church. As Lascaris cast his eyes upon these letters—the only succour which the West gave to Greece—he remarked the new form and regularity of the characters, which seemed not to have been written by hand.

“What is this strange writing ?” said he. “We knew nothing of it at Constantinople, nor have we ever seen it in the letters which we have heretofore occasionally received from the Church of Rome.”

“It is a very curious invention,” replied the messenger of the cardinal, “which has just come to light among the barbarians beyond the mountains, in a German town. They conceived the idea of making wooden or leaden characters, from which they might take as many impressions as they pleased. The inventors were accused of magic, and of commerce with the devil, but very wrongly ; for our Holy Father, the Pope, has summoned them from Mayence to write the briefs and numerous letters of the Apostolic chamber. They have already begun to copy the longest works in this way.”

Lascaris listened to these details with breathless attention, keeping his eyes constantly fixed upon the holy bull. Carried away with joy and wonder, he exclaimed :

“Fortunate effort of human industry ! Source of new—immortal safeguard of already discovered truths ! All the inestimable treasures which I have snatched from the flames of the barbarians are henceforth safe !—even from the ravages of time ! They may be multiplied without limit. They will penetrate every corner of the universe, and make known, in all parts, the name and the glory of Greece. To-day—in the midst of our overwhelming calamities—I see the certain dawn of a great epoch for the human race.”

The learned Gemisthus, whose mind constantly lingered

among the traditions and usages of the past, seemed to pay but little attention to this discourse. Enthusiastic as he was, he had no enthusiasm for the future. His very hopes were his recollections. But the younger Greeks fully appreciated the grandeur of these new promises. Medici, especially, was charmed with them. He had also received a letter from his father, and handing it to Lascaris :

“See !” said he, “Florence awaits you. . She will dispute with Rome the glory of gathering up your shipwreck.”

Here are some passages of the letter of Cosmo de Medici :—“ Our commercial returns have this year proved very favourable, my son. Our vessels trading to Alexandria and Bassora have brought back large freights of the richest tissues, perfumes, diamonds, and many valuable Greek and Arabic MSS., which I have deposited in the museum. But they bring sad news from Constantinople. Mahomet laid siege to it in all parts, and you are doubtless already apprised, where you are, of the fall of that unfortunate city. They will do nothing here to aid her. God and the Christian princes have abandoned her. The Pope, though a friend of learning, cannot pardon, in the Greeks, their persistence in schism. They talk, nevertheless, of a new crusade ; but no more will be done for reconquering Byzantium, than has been done for defending her. We, at least, will do all in our power for the unhappy exiles who may escape the disaster. Our vessels have gone to all the Grecian seas, to receive them. Do you, my son, if in your travels you meet with any of these illustrious Greeks of Thessalonica and Byzantium, who preserve all the genius of antiquity, be prodigal in your attentions to their comfort. They are rare and sacred men, my son. Bring them home with you, to our country and our house. With them your presence will be all the more grateful. My son, cherish letters ; embellish Florence with all the riches of learning. Thus shall we merit to rank first among our free fellow-citizens. We are mere merchants, say the Albizzi ; but we will do more for learning and Greece than they have done for kings.” The letter

also mentioned the discovery which had just been made in Germany. Cosmo at the very first had fully comprehended its importance. "I have ordered from Germany," he writes, "that marvellous invention. The Court of Rome shall have no advantage over us. Who knows the ways of Providence? Perhaps this new art is an indemnification for the triumph of the barbarians in the East."

The expression of such noble sentiments drew tears from the eyes of Lascaris.

"Ah!" said he, "though overwhelmed with misfortune, we shall not at least be a burthen to those who may receive us. Though we have no longer a native land to serve, we may yet deserve well of the human race. We will introduce these noble studies into Italy—these treasures of thought, of which we are the depositaries, and which are looked for with such generous aspirations. We will profit by this new discovery. Perhaps some descendant of the Byzantine princes may labour with his own hands at this new art, which is to perfect and spread abroad the sublimest works of reason and genius. We will follow you, my dear Medici, with more confidence than is usually entertained by the unfortunate and exiled."

Lascaris was the more in haste to depart with his companions, as the distrust and religious aversion of the Sicilians seemed on the increase. The singular illusions of Gemisthus had got abroad, with a thousand odd interpretations. The Greek sailors, entertaining all the blind hatred of the Byzantine Greeks for the Roman Church, made no secret of the repugnance with which the Latin worship inspired them—not unfrequently applying to the members of that communion the opprobrious epithet *azimite*. The Greeks would not join in the prayers of the Roman liturgy. Popular rumour accused them of impiety, and murmured against them the charges of infidelity and schism. The arrival of a martyr of the Eastern Church, Marcus Theodorus, Bishop of Ephesus, far from silencing, tended to fortify these rumours. Zealous for the privileges of the Greek Church, he had been amongst the

most inflexible adversaries of the union proposed at the Council of Florence. His name, therefore, as might be expected, was loaded with anathemas by all the doctors of the Latin Church. His presence seemed to carry dismay into the monastery which had at first received Lascaris. Escaped from the outrages of the Turks, and, notwithstanding his contempt for life, saved by a thousand chances, the Bishop of Ephesus landed in Sicily, plundered, maimed, disfigured by fire and sword—but calm and intrepid as an apostle of the early times. The stern severity of manners which the Greek Church opposed to the, at that time, too common license of the Italian priests, was relieved, in him, by the misfortune and still recent marks of the suffering which he had experienced; and never did the Patriarch of Constantinople—the equal of the Pope in dignity—while celebrating the oriental Passover amid the splendours of the temple of St. Sophia, appear more venerable to the prostrate multitude, than did, at that moment, the Bishop of Ephesus, proscribed and mutilated for the faith, in the eyes of the unhappy Greeks.

The Bishop was full of indignation, and full of hope. In spite of the bitterness of his zeal against the Latins, he promised himself the aid of their arms in avenging the capture of Constantinople and the blood of so many martyrs. He had seen the triumph of Mahomet, and the dead body of the unfortunate Constantine drawn from the heap of the slain and exposed to the public gaze, as a trophy of the conquest. But he could not believe that God would long permit this sacrilegious victory. Europe, he thought, would move from centre to circumference to wipe out the stain. He severely rebuked, in his brethren, their want of confidence, and their trembling faith.

“First of all,” said he, “we must offer the divine sacrifice of the mass for the living and the dead—for the salvation of these, and the preservation of the others.”

But there was, in Catania, no consecrated place open to the fugitives for the performance of such a duty. They hesitated for some time as to where they should go, that they

might not be molested. One proposed that they retire without the walls of the town to the subterranean ruins of an ancient city which had been buried by an eruption of Etna.

“No,” said the Bishop. “Whatever may be the wickedness and injustice of men, the Cross must not now hide itself in caverns and tombs, as in the first ages of Christianity. We will render thanks to God, our conductor, in the full light of heaven, and on the shore where we landed. Our faith is not criminal, and Christians will not finish the martyrdom which the Turks have commenced. To-morrow, at break of day, let all our brethren assemble upon the hill thickly covered with wood—the first in the chain of Etna. I will there offer the divine sacrifice before we embark for Italy, that God may give us strength to guard our faith among the Christians of the West, as among the Barbarians of the East.”

The active faith of the Greeks seized, with eagerness, the words of the pious Bishop. Lascaris, who had for a long time hoped for a termination of the unhappy division between the two churches, respected, nevertheless, the devotion of the Bishop of Ephesus, and beheld with admiration a faith confident and unshaken amid the ruins of the empire.

During the night the entire company of fugitives repaired to the place which the Bishop had pointed out. By the light of torches, which they procured from the woods about Etna, they slowly traversed the valley, and the morning saw them assembled, on the summit of the hill, under a gigantic tree, which is still standing, and which they call *the chestnut of a hundred knights*, as such a number may be sheltered under its thick and spreading branches.

This tree, according to the popular belief, was consecrated to Saint Agatha, whose veil, still preserved in the principal church of Catania, as they affirmed, protected the city, and was alone sufficient, when displayed in the air, to arrest the flames of Etna, and stay the fury of the torrents of lava. Knowing nothing of this tradition, Theodorus made ready for the holy ceremony under this gigantic tree. They had brought with them a golden chalice, formerly presented by

Constantine the Great to the sanctuary of Saint Sophia, and saved in the flight of the Greeks by a nun allied to the family of the last emperor. They placed it upon a shelf of the rock which seemed to have been artificially hewn for some other purpose. The leavened bread of the sacrifice had, according to custom, been kneaded by a virgin, who imprinted upon it some sacred words which promised the victory of the cross. The Bishop, clothed with the long white robe of the Greek pontiffs, and with a crown upon his head, having inclined thrice towards the east, began the holy ceremony with the same religious care and the same solemnity which he would have observed in Ephesus or Byzantium. The Greeks were ranged around him, standing, and, with covered heads, repeated, in the most harmonious accents of the human voice, *Holy God, Mighty God, Immortal God, have pity upon us!* When Theodorus had arrived at that point of the service when, by the ritual of the Eastern Church, it is the duty of the priest to address the assembled people, he exclaimed,

“Great God! Christian Greece is not destroyed, since, in this desert place, beneath this wild shelter, we still offer our prayers to Thee. Mahomet has polluted Thy temple; he has broken the images of Thy saints; but our faith, all spiritual and pure, does not perish with these perishable signs. Vouchsafe, great God, to sustain the faith of our brethren amid the trials of captivity and the temptations of misfortune! Save our holy religion from the cruelties and the protection of Mahomet. Pardon our priests who have received their commission at the hands of that impious master; and deprive them not, all unworthy as they are, of the power of sanctifying the people by the divine word! Grant that I may return to the East, to die for the faith which I have guarded! My brethren, in the chances of exile, in whatever land your lot may be cast, preserve the religion of your fathers. In vain has Greece been subjugated, and her people reduced to slavery, or driven from their homes; you will be a people so long as you preserve your worship. Religion—the sharing at the same altars, and faith in the same hopes—this is the

first and most holy of all father-lands ; with it we shall recover, nay, we shall never entirely lose, our glorious land of Greece. The altars of our God will, one day, return to us the sepulchres of our fathers. Are we not the elders of Europe in religion as well as art ? Did we not give the gospel to the Roman empire ? Athens and Corinth listened to the voice of St. Paul. Ephesus is one of the seven faithful cities mentioned by the apostle. The pontifical chair in which the great Chrysostom once sat is still preserved at Byzantium. Alas ! what a flood of light shone forth from the Greek church during the early ages and glorious advent of Christianity ! But now she is obscured—covered with mourning—repudiated by the Latins, and outraged by the Barbarians. Yet may she live, preserved in the midst of servitude and anathemas, by the sacred fire of hope ! My brethren, we are accused of resisting union with the Latins ; we are reproached with our inflexible hostility. I have shared this holy opposition with those bishops who have been justified by martyrdom ; and must I, at this day, retract ? It belongs to the vanquished and fugitive to hold fast to their faith, and to guard the truth as their last and only treasure. Besides, who can foresee the counsels of God ? Who knows but that the people of the North, bound to us by a common faith, and whose sovereigns were once allied to the race of our princes—who knows but that they are the instrument which Heaven reserves for our deliverance ? Their example will reawaken the zeal of the Latins, who will blush for our misfortunes while they respect our fidelity. However it may be, it is in free Byzantium alone, in Greece victorious and regenerated, that the divisions between the two churches, reconciled by so great a pledge of affection, can ever cease. Until then, let us guard our faith uncorrupted and unshaken ; let us pray without ceasing for our brethren in bondage ; let us suffer and hope. The life of a nation is long, and Christianity is eternal.”

After this discourse, the pious Bishop repeated with a loud voice the service of the Byzantium Church, dwelling,

with emphasis, on the peculiar sacramental term which distinguishes the two communions. Then, having bowed three times toward the earth, he was about to consummate the awful mystery, when suddenly, the devotion of the assembly was interrupted by the most frightful cries and clamorous threatenings of a swarthy and furious multitude, who, pushed on by a superstitious terror, came pouring in among them from all directions. They were shepherds and labourers of a neighbouring village, who, struck with the strange costume and unknown language of the Greeks, thought that the tree of St. Agatha was about to be profaned by some sacrilege, and that the fires of Etna would overwhelm their fields henceforth without defence. Ignorant and ferocious, the more fearful by their very fright, they rushed upon the Bishop. Lascaris first sprang between him and the furious crowd; and, sword in hand, beat back the boldest of the assailants, a mountain brigand, a superstitious avenger of St. Agatha, who had already raised his hand to cleave down the master of the ceremony. The intrepidity of Lascaris and his friends, who gathered round him, arrested for a moment the blind rage of the Sicilian peasants. But their number increased. The people of the hamlet of Giari, situated on the seaside at the foot of the mountain, sounded the alarm; signal-fires were kindled from height to height, and the air reëchoed with the shouts of the terrified population. At this crisis, Lascaris, placing the Bishop of Ephesus, with the sacred utensils, in the midst, took the lead of his compatriots, dispersed the crowd, and opened the way to Catania, in spite of the fury of the savage populace. But while the intrepid and holy procession moved slowly along the skirts of the wood, and over the field of cultivated lava which extends from the canton of Montagnuol to the city, new assailants poured in every where along the route. On the vague rumour that the heretics had profaned the tree of St. Agatha, the citizens of Catania even, without, however, partaking in the blind ferocity of the mountaineers, had been seized with indignation and dismay. The continual fear in which these men live, with the fire always suspended over their heads,

and the earth trembling beneath their feet, gives superstitious vivacity to the already lively imagination which characterizes the people of the south of Europe. While the Greeks were thus threatened from behind, another crowd of men and women, terrified like the first, came rushing headlong from the city. Ghastly looks, cries of indignation, terrible stories, heard and repeated with inexpressible alacrity :—all betokened a most horrible popular sedition.

Meanwhile the Spanish captain who commanded the city in the name of Alphonso of Arragon, sovereign of the two Sicilies, had sent a body of cavalry to quell the disorder. Medici and his friends, prompted by a generous sentiment, hastened to interpose their efforts in behalf of the Greeks. The violence of the tumult had begun to subside from the length of time which it had continued. Nevertheless a thousand voices were vociferous for the blood of the Greeks, as a punishment for their impiety. Lascaris, who had despised the menaces, and repulsed the violence of the crowd, betook himself to the palace of the Governor, followed by his accusers. This officer was an old soldier who had served in the revolutions of Arragon and Naples, was faithful to the conquest of Alphonso, and looked with contempt upon the vanquished Sicilians. Very indifferent himself to the recollections and traditions of Greece, he knew, nevertheless, that Alphonso was fond of these strangers, and curious in their arts. He had, on a former occasion, received a magnificent sword, as a reward for a Greek manuscript which, in the sack of a city, he had picked out from among the ruins and presented to his Prince.* He therefore received the Greeks without any signs of indignation, not even mentioning the peasants who had been wounded in the attack on Lascaris.

“But wherefore,” said he “have you, heretics as you are, approached the tree which protects the city, and exposed us to the danger of being buried under the lava, as was the ancient city which lies near us. The whole people are mad

* Anthony of Palermo, in a book, *De Gustis Alphonzi*, gives these details with many others, concerning Alphonso's passion for letters.

with fear, and were I not a Spaniard I should be alarmed myself. But I cannot release you here. The populace would revolt as they did at Palermo. Fortunately, our great King, Alphonso, is just arrived at Syracuse, and to his high decision I shall commit you."

The Greeks were committed for the night to the citadel of Catania, while the fright and fury of the people exhaled in a thousand stories. The next day every thing was prepared to conduct them to Syracuse. The Governor informed them, at the same time, that by order of the Archbishop of Palermo, he was going to send the Greek nuns who were at the convent of St. Benedict, to Rome, where they would be converted to the Catholic faith. The bishop of Ephesus was very solicitous to see them before their departure. The ruin of his country and the uncertain fortune of his brethren were almost forgotten in his anxiety lest their feeble and unaided minds should be won over to the Roman communion. His prayer was granted. He entered alone, the convent of Catania, and was conducted to the place which had been set apart to the Byzantine nuns. It was a building of Arabic construction, which had formerly served the conquerors of Sicily as a mosque, and which, afterwards, had been consecrated to the holiest purposes. The young Greeks were seated in a spacious hall, in the centre of which, according to a custom introduced from the East into Sicily, played a beautiful fountain. That they might not give offence to the Sisters of St. Benedict, they had covered their flowing tresses with a white veil; but they resolutely refused to take part in the public prayers of the monastery. Alone, by themselves, they observed a rigorous fast; they chanted sacred hymns in their own language, and now and then one of them among her companions in tears, as if suddenly inspired, would break forth in some verses upon the loss of her parents, who had perished in the siege of Constantinople. Attracted by their voices, the nuns of St. Benedict would gather round to hear them, and though unable to comprehend them, they could not but admire the beauty, sweetness, and harmony of their songs. Educated in

a strict seclusion, the noble daughters of Byzantium, even before their consecration to a religious life, were never permitted to see strangers, and spoke the Greek in its ancient purity. The vulgar dialect was unknown to them. Afterwards, retired within the walls of a monastery, they were conversant only with the sacred books, and the writings of the great apostles of the Eastern Church. They could not, however, entirely forget the songs which they had heard in their infancy ; and there was scarcely a monastery throughout the East where the influences of climate and solitude had failed to inspire some one of the nuns with a genius for poetry.

When the Bishop of Ephesus entered the apartment of the young Greeks, one of them named Aurelia, was deploring the martyrdom of the Greek clergy who had been slain by the barbarians. She called upon God ; and charged the fall of the religion of the Empire upon His providence. At the sight of the holy bishop she stopped—full, at once, of sadness and joy ; and all the nuns fell upon their knees as if the Lord had listened to their prayer, and sent them a confessor.

“ O my father !” cried the young Aurelia, “ God has preserved you to be a living martyr. But tell us, will He cause His holy name to triumph in Greece ? Shall we ever again be permitted to see the *Panagia* of Byzantium, or must we die in a profane and desert land ?”

“ Arise, my children,” replied the holy and venerable man, “ and listen to my words. Your days of trial are hardly begun. You are soon to depart for Rome—the new Babylon. Such is our misfortune that our refuge must be in the very place where our faith is in the greatest peril. Go to Rome ; but promise me that you will never abandon the holy ceremonies of our fathers, nor even recognize the perjured union of Florence.”

“ Never, father !” was the immediate and unanimous reply. “ May the *Panagia* protect us ! May your holy words sustain and defend us ! Never will we follow the error of the Azimites. Never will we be shorn of our dark hair, nor put off our veils, like the profane virgins of Italy.”

Here the Bishop drew forth the golden chalice which he had brought with him :

“ Aurelia,” said he, “ I give you this sacred pledge of a Church which once existed at Byzantium. This gift of the great Constantine will serve, at least, to protect the daughter of the Emperors. His name is regarded with veneration in the West. It will be of service to you in the presence of the Roman Pontiff. Further trials are in store for us, and this treasure of our faith will be safer in your hands than in ours.”

Theodorus then gave his blessing to the young daughters, and retired.

Preparation had already been made for their departure. By the order of the Archbishop of Palermo, a Romish priest and two nuns of St. Benedict were to conduct them. These the superior of the convent was careful to instruct to obtain a bull of absolution from the sin incurred by harbouring such schismatics. Neither she, however, nor the other recluses could part with nuns who were so modest in their demeanour, and sung with such sweetness, without regret. Embarking on board the same vessel which brought them thither, they set sail ; the sailors chanting the Canticle of the Panagia, while they themselves talked over the solemn words of Theodorus.

Meanwhile, Lascaris and his companions, mounted on mules, had departed for Syracuse, under an escort of Spanish cavalry. Medici and his Italian friends would not remain behind, but resolved to follow and assuage, as much as was in their power, their evil fortunes. It was a touching spectacle to see these Greeks, whose ancestors had, time and again, conquered and civilized Sicily, now travelling across a beautiful country, and every where recognizing monuments of their ancient arts, while their own name had become odious, and their language unknown. In the ninth century the Byzantine emperors still possessed Sicily, which was afterwards wrested from them by the Saracens. Every where were to be seen edifices, ruins and inscriptions, which recalled the different ages of the Greek domination ; but no trace of the

Greeks themselves was left among the present generation of the Sicilians. So true is it that the memory of men is the most perishable of monuments !

The abject condition of Sicily, and the want of practicable roads over a region which had been repeatedly desolated by the ravages of nature and war, compelled the Greeks to seek Syracuse by a circuitous route. They descended towards the sea, that they might avoid the high hills and entirely uninhabited plains ;—covered, nevertheless, with the Grecian olive, and some of the richest Asiatic plants. Here and there they passed a deserted city, sometimes turning aside to visit the ruins ; for, to these Greeks, whose minds were almost constantly turned to their lost home, it was a sort of consoling diversion, a kind of mournful pleasure, thus to contemplate misfortunes quite as great and more ancient than their own. But every thing in Sicily seemed to suggest to them the same thoughts,—inhabited tracts and cities, no less than deserts and ruins. After a journey of four days, across an immense uncultivated plain to the south of Catania, they arrived at Syracuse ; which, however, notwithstanding its admirable harbour—surpassed only by that of Byzantium—and the magnificence of its ruins, they could scarcely believe to have been that formidable rock upon which the power of Athens herself had been broken.

Alphonso had just left Syracuse. A new sedition had summoned him to Palermo. Syracuse was an unimportant city, which a few soldiers could easily hold in subjection. But a few people dwelt within the precincts of the ancient walls, and these, of mixed race, and degraded by the numerous conquests of which the island had been the theatre. In their apathetic ignorance, they made no distinction between the Greek, Roman and Arabic monuments which were crumbling about them ; but devoutly offered prayers in the chapel of St. Mercury, and piously showed the wells of St. Juno. Our enlightened Greeks smiled at this simplicity, and Gemisthus thought he could recognize in it the invincible power of those sacred symbols which had once enchanted the world.

Young Michael Apostolus, animated by the more pleasing recollections of Greek poetry, made search after the fountain Arethusa ; but barbarity had destroyed even this work of nature. Nothing was left of it but a turbid and brackish pool, where were piled up the ruins of the monuments with which Greek genius had once ornamented the borders of this sacred fountain. Lascaris and his young friends mounted the *Epipolæ*, to get a panoramic view of Syracuse ; and as they looked down upon the vast circumference which was no longer stirring with the bustle and din of commerce,—as they beheld the desolate port, the unequal ruins scattered here and there, the theatre which the Spanish victors had not yet succeeded in entirely demolishing :—“ Athens is avenged,” said they, their eyes filling with tears, and their thoughts turning to their native land.

The young Italians looked upon the sad spectacle with more equanimity ; they were born for social life, and were full of hope. “ What a favourable seat for commerce and empire !” said young Bembo. “ Venice herself is not better protected, or better served by the sea ! But then, the destiny of places changes like that of men. Commerce no longer brings hither her riches from the East. She goes to Venice ;—that Venice which was hardly above the waves of the Adriatic when Syracuse was queen.”

“ Yes,” said Lascaris, “ nothing is so withering as commerce. It destroys even the genius of the places where it has its seat, and the beneficence of nature. Venice will know this some day.”

The Greeks now received orders from the Spanish commander, at Syracuse, to pursue their journey to Palermo. Their guides, who cared nothing for the monuments of antiquity, urged them to be on their way while the freshness of evening tempered the parching atmosphere of Sicily. After traversing the suburbs they slowly ascended a high hill, which is still called *the Greek ladder*, and passing on, lost sight of Syracuse, where every thing, except the inhabitants, reflected the image of Greece.

Their route, stretching away through the hamlets of modern Sicily, offered but few objects of interest. Occasionally, however, the remains of some Moorish castle—a mixture of Arabic and Norman architecture—attracted their attention. On such an occasion, the commander of the Spanish escort would depart from his usual cheerless taciturnity, and, pointing out some insignificant embattlement of the Arabs, relate, with considerable spirit and animation, the exploits of his countrymen among the Moors of Granada. Hatred towards the Mussulman formed, as it were, a new bond of union between the Greeks and Spaniards.

“Your schism,” said the Aragon chieftain, “must have been a terrible thing, to warrant your opponents in withholding their aid against these miscreants who have caused us so much trouble in Spain.”

At the same time he could not help admiring the austere calmness, the majestic look, and even the wounds of the Bishop of Ephesus, and observed, with a soldier’s simplicity, “It is very strange that a man should be a martyr, and not a good Christian.”

A march of many days, now along some old dilapidated way which had been constructed by the Romans, now through one of those desert tracts in which Sicily abounds, offered to the travellers nothing but different ruins, some of them, perhaps, inhabited by a few poor families. At length they were roused by the announcement of the rising columns and huge walls of a distant city, and made all haste to arrive there before sunset. The monuments, but dimly visible, seemed to bound the horizon, while, here and there, without the vast circumference which contained them, they could discover huge blocks of stone and marble which appeared to have been transported thither by an almost superhuman power. “We shall always find an asylum there,” said the Sicilian guide, who had wandered somewhat from the ordinary route. A few hours of strenuous effort brought them to the site which they had been able to discover at so great a distance through the transparency of the Sicilian atmosphere. It was deserted,

like the rest, but differed from them in its grander and more perfect ruins. Our travellers experienced a surprise almost approaching to consternation at finding themselves in the midst of such devastation, when they had thought they were hastening to a living city. Here they beheld a temple of immense height, whose columns were still standing, and preserved the traces of their Doric origin. There, at some distance, arose two other temples, while the interval was filled with the shafts of Grecian columns, and half-ruined walls, covered with wild roses.

“What!” said Lascaris, “can this be Selinus, one of the most ancient colonies of Greece, which our historians record as having been destroyed even before the Roman conquest? Sad picture of destiny! The life of ruins is longer than that of States. Such grandeur do we find in the ruins of a city which has had no existence for more than two thousand years!”

While, impressed with this sentiment, he was wandering about in the windings of the ruins which covered the entire table-land of a mountain, the solitude of the place was broken by the confused sound of a human voice proceeding from a rude hovel, concealed behind an old ruin, and whose side rested upon the vestibule of a temple. Lascaris and the Bishop of Ephesus drew near; and how inexpressible was their surprise at hearing the sounds of their native language come up from the depths of this solitude! A loud and clear voice was repeating the beautiful evening prayer of Chrysostom. “Who are you?” shouted the two Greeks as they rushed into the hut and found there a venerable man kneeling before the image of Christ, near which a torch was burning, according to the rite of the Oriental Church. They stopped a moment. It was Nicephorus of Heraclea, the most illustrious of those Greeks who had, at the last Council of Florence, given in their adhesion to the Latin Church. Nicephorus, finding the union rejected with indignation by the people of Byzantium, and himself the object of their suspi-

cions and reproaches, had left Greece, and gone they knew not whither. As soon as his eyes fell on Lascaris—

“ You here ! ” he cried. “ Ah ! yes, it is you. Byzantium is destroyed. In vain was the sacrifice which God would not receive, or rather, for which he now chastises us. O Byzantium ! Light of the world ! Paradise of the East ! How art thou fallen under the blows of the children of Hagar ! ”

Here, discovering the Bishop of Ephesus, shame and tears prevented his utterance. The Bishop had, however, retired at the sight of the Pontiff of Heraclea, as if the divisions which had wrought the ruin of Byzantium were to survive it. Thus these two men, venerable in years, in virtue, and in genius, the one bearing the traces of martyrdom, the other bending beneath the weight of a rigorous penitence, seemed, nevertheless, separated by an insurmountable barrier. They even feared to encounter each other's looks. Lascaris, interrupting the reproachful silence, confirmed the sad presentiment of Nicephorus respecting the fate of Greece. He pressed him to abandon that solitude and join his exiled countrymen.

“ Will they receive me at this day ? ” quickly returned Nicephorus. “ Did I not voluntarily abandon my country ? Far from Greece, which reproaches me ; far from Italy, where honours would have rewarded my change of faith, have I lived in this desert place, among the ruins which foreshadowed to me the fall of Byzantium. Daily, on my knees, before God, have I groaned over the divisions of two Christian nations, and the indifference which renders them useless to one another. Often have I retracted, by my grief, the fatal abjuration of Florence. Shall I say it ? I have returned, in this desert place, to all the rites of our holy religion, as an emblem of my lost country. But where is now the temple of St. Sophia, that I may be solemnly reconfirmed in the faith of our fathers ? ”

At these words the Bishop of Ephesus, who had remain-

ed silent and frowning, suddenly advanced and grasped the hand of Nicephorus. "Come," said he, "be absolved by sharing our calamities." Other Greeks now came forward, and learned with the greatest joy of the unexpected meeting with Nicephorus. It was for them a kind of pleasure to find a countryman whom their presence could console, and who was eager to return and bear with them the yoke of sorrow. They press around him with words of friendship, tell him of the last misfortunes of Constantinople, and explain to him their wishes, their hopes, and their projects. They even recall to mind their past divisions. Sad accident of fortune ! Here were found assembled together the representatives, as it were, of all the beliefs and all the opinions which had divided perishing Greece ; the enthusiastic and almost idolatrous Platonist, the passionate lover of the arts, the virtuous sectary, the penitent, and the martyr. Seated upon the shattered marbles of Selinus, they conversed with the lively imagination which belongs to their nation, and that elasticity of hope which never deserted them throughout their trials. Medici was near, a deeply interested spectator of the scene. Sometimes he joined in the conversation, warning them not to place too much hope in the arms and generosity of the European princes. The Bishop of Heraclea, who had been a long time engaged in the debates at Florence, spoke the Italian with grace and fluency. Educated in the celebrated convent of Mt. Libania, he had imbibed there those treasures of ancient learning yet unknown in Europe, with something also of the oriental genius. His words were full of sweetness and elevation. He had none of the austere vehemence of Theodorus. His province was rather to persuade and touch the heart. After listening to him, the Italians still more admired that intellectual superiority of a people, which discovered itself in so many different ways. A few paces from this interesting scene, sat the Spanish chief, smoking a long Arab pipe, motionless, demure, and unsocial. The monotonous apathy of his looks was almost worthy of a Turk. The dawn of day found the fugitive company encamped among

the ancient ruins, which they could not leave without emotions of regret. Nicephorus kneeled down for the last time in the humble retreat where he had passed years of penitence. Gemisthus and Lascaris spent their time in contemplating the magnificent architecture of the temple, illuminated by the first rays of the morning, while the Spanish soldiers negligently detached their horses from the columns, for which they had not the least concern.

A few days sufficed to bring them to Palermo, where their lot was to be decided. Medici, in following them, did not doubt that he might be of service to them before Alphonso, though he was then at war with Florence. Nevertheless, he counted upon the generosity of a prince who had been surnamed the Magnanimous, and who had only been cruel in driving from the throne the unfortunate Jane of Naples. He encouraged the Greeks with this hope, never forgetting the great objects of his solicitude—their arts and learning. As they approached Palermo, the Greeks could not refrain from contrasting the feeble efforts of modern art with the ruins which they had left behind at Selinus. Entering by the southern gate, their escort halted near an old palace, which attracted their attention by its odd mixture of Gothic, Norman, and Arabic architecture. The avenues which led to the palace were fringed with heavy iron cannon, both by way of ornament and protection. Spanish soldiery watched its gates, and here and there were the instruments of punishment, necessary to check the inflammable and seditious humour of the inhabitants of the city. This was the royal residence of Alphonso. The Greeks entered, not without reluctance, the citadel of a Spanish conqueror. But they were expected ; and orders had been given for conducting them into the presence of the king. They were introduced into a vast hall which presented to their observation the strangest variety. From the ceiling depended torn flags, arms, and standards ; trophies taken from the Moors, Genoese, and Venetians, and in the middle of these, upon a shield, was conspicuous the singular device of the king—an open

book. On an immense marble table were arranged some ancient medals of the Cæsars. In an ivory casket were some rude astronomical instruments, and near this were numerous manuscripts covered with odoriferous wood richly ornamented with gold, and fastened by strong steel clasps. The walls were decorated with the battles and famous adventures of Alphonso. One sketch represented him at his coronation, surrounded by the court of Aragon, tearing up the list of the nobles who had conspired against him. Here he had carried Marseilles by assault, and was seen checking the fury of the soldiery, and refusing the rich present which the women of the city offered him. There, he was represented as defeated—but nobler even than in victory—a captive on board a Genoese vessel, in front of the isle of Ischia, resolutely refusing, at the peril of his life, to give orders to the garrison, which was fighting in his name, to lay down their arms. And here again, he was entering Naples victorious, with all the pomp of an old Roman triumph. Besides these decorations, the hall was ornamented with a number of statues, which the king had taken in his wars, whose artistic perfection strikingly contrasted with the barbarous architecture of the palace. They carried joy to the hearts of the Greeks. At the farther extremity of the hall sat the king, surrounded by some of those celebrated men who then gave lustre to the Italian name. Among these was Poggio, a man of profound erudition, known in Europe chiefly by his playful stories; Anthony of Palermo, the most learned of the Sicilians; Æneas Sylvius, whose eloquence and love of letters won him the papal throne, and many others at this day forgotten.

Alphonso held in his hand a life of Alexander, and was discussing it with the learned confidants who composed his entire court. The countenance of the king was singularly bold and intellectual. Age had whitened his locks, but a proud and stately carriage, and an eye restless and full of fire, still imparted to him all the vivacity of youth. He wore the short cloak and military dress of a Spaniard. His unique device was imprinted in the handle of his sabre, and across

his breast was displayed the scarf which he had received from Lucretia Alania—the last object of his inconstant love. Before such a king, and in such a place, were the Greeks presented as culprits.

“Look around you,” said Alphonso, addressing them ; “you are not on the soil of an enemy.”

Nevertheless, as he administered justice to his subjects with the most scrupulous attention, he opened the letters of the governor of Catania, and interrogated Lascaris as to the details of the event which had brought the Greeks before him. After hearing their recital, he gave himself up entirely to the lively curiosity with which the strangers inspired him, expressing his deep regret at the loss of Constantinople.

“Unfortunate Christians !” said he, “why do we waste ourselves in perpetual wars, while the barbarians are daily advancing into Europe? What a warning for us, is the capture of Constantinople !”

At the same time he inquired what monuments of art, and what books had been saved, seeming scarcely less occupied with these than the fall of the Empire. “Would that I had armed for so holy a cause ! But I was engaged in a war with Florence, which has just offered a favourable peace ; and I have now to take vengeance upon Venice and Genoa. Meanwhile old age approaches. Still I hope to meet the barbarians on the Bosphorus as I once met them at Tunis. I will arouse the Christian princes. I will call upon France beyond the mountains. But you, Greeks, do you pay me for my hospitality. Disseminate your learning in my dominions. Establish schools at Naples, where I often go to listen to our ablest masters. Remain among us. Rome abandons you ; I will receive and avenge you.”

Alphonso here ordered the present to be brought which the Florentine nobility had sent him, and which disarmed him of all resentment. It was a manuscript of Livy ! Happy time, when, to purchase peace, they ceded a book instead of a province ! The Greeks themselves were astonished at the estimation in which the scholars and potentates of the West

held the writings of antiquity. They accepted it as an augury of a better future. They were now more anxious than ever to pass over to Italy. In vain did Alphonso lavish his efforts to retain them at his court; they preferred the free hospitality of Florence. He could only make them promise to stop at Naples, some of them, and introduce the arts of Greece.

Embarking at Palermo on board a Spanish galley, they quickly arrived in Italy, whither the news of their disaster had already preceded them, and softened towards them the bitterness of religious hatred. Landing at Naples, they found the people rending the air with shouts of consternation. The name of Mahomet echoed through the crowd, with prayers to God and all the saints in heaven to avert from Italy the scourge of his wrath. Long processions went forth from the churches and carried the sacred images among the people, who fell on their knees as they passed. They recounted a thousand prodigies which foreshadowed the fall of Byzantium. They had heard the shock of armies conflicting in the air. Showers of blood had fallen from heaven, and the relics of the saints had been found scattered without the sanctuary. The sight of the fugitives increased the panic. They thought the fleets of Mahomet had come, and his terrible janizzaries were about to bring destruction and death into happy Italy. The women fled with their children in their arms, and the men ran to the priests for a blessing, as they were soon to fight and die.

But fear produces pity, and as a result of this fright the Greeks found a hospitable and generous disposition. The effeminate character of these people, and the softness of their climate, rendered doubly fearful an invasion of those hardy Asiatic barbarians, who profaned temples, destroyed cities, and carried the people away into slavery.

Lascaris, seeing their terror, exclaimed, "Where then shall be the asylum of art and learning against the oppression of the barbarians? Where are to be preserved these noble treasures of the human mind which we yet possess?"

"You must not," replied the Venetian Bembo, "judge of Italy by Naples, by a subjugated city. These poor creatures are alarmed, as if they were not already conquered. Free Venice can cope with the Turks. Her fleets shall be the rampart of Europe."

Thus spoke Bembo. He was young and fond of glory, and had not yet taken his seat in the Venetian Senate. Arriving home a few days after, he found, to his surprise, that that body had entered into a treaty of alliance with the Turks, whereby they had consented to the oppression of the Greeks for the sake of a dominion, which was destined to be short, over a few towns of the Morea.

The Pope, however, it was reported, was going finally to arm all the princes of Europe for the recapture of Constantinople; and ten galleys were now ready to put to sea. Such a feeble preparation to meet the countless multitudes of Mahomet, awakened in the Greeks a feeling of sadness rather than of joy. As they advanced farther into Italy the irreparable loss of their country became more apparent, and weighed still heavier upon them. They found an asylum every where, but nowhere aid and vengeance.

Divided into numerous rival states, Italy was alive with a zeal for knowledge and social refinement hitherto unknown. Antiquity was springing forth from its ruins in all parts, and with it a love for the arts. In the cities, dwellings of a still gross and imperfect architecture began to be decorated with statues drawn forth from heaps of rubbish, or dug from the bed of the river, where they had lain buried for centuries. The presence of the Greeks excited their curiosity. They flocked to hear them discourse, but seemed far more taken with their learning than their misfortunes.

Impatient of these fruitless attentions, the Bishop of Ephesus made haste to Rome, not yet renouncing the hope of the so long promised crusade.

"Let us separate," said he to Lascaris. "Our arts and the genius of our fathers shall plead for Greece. God suffers this profane means of interesting the princes of the earth in his worship."

Lascaris accompanied Medici to Florence. As he approached the shores of the Arno, he was again sadly reminded of the country which he had lost. Here was the mild climate of the finest regions of Greece ; and here, too, was a land of exile. But the generosity of Cosmo de Medici had already collected around him many of the fugitive Greek families, and every day witnessed some fresh arrival of the unhappy victims. All his care seemed rewarded by the presence of Lascaris, and the treasures which he brought with him.

Then commenced that noble mission of Greek genius in Italy. Here was established the Academy of Platonists, who awakened enthusiasm while they disseminated science. Cosmo de Medici received them into his palace, adorned by the art of Donatello. Here those men whom we have seen wandering with Lascaris, took refuge. Here their eloquent words interpreted the great geniuses of Greece, and the light shone all around. Narrow and barbarous scholastics were abandoned for these nobler studies. The sublime idea of the beautiful reappeared in the arts of design, as in the inspirations of poetry ; and the Italians themselves called Florence the city of Homer.

Delivered from the long commotions which had agitated the Republic, and peaceful master of his fellow-citizens, Cosmo aspired only to the encouragement of letters and the arts. He already bordered upon old age, and his youthful vivacity was now tempered with a majestic sweetness. He loved to substitute the agreeable conversation of his accomplished guests, at his pleasant retreats of Fiesole and Careggi, for the activity of commerce and the intrigues of public station. Here the adroit dictator of Florence was only an ingenious philosopher, absorbed in the pleasures of science. His two sons imitated his example ; and Lorenzo, while yet a youth, promised to sustain, in this particular, the reputation of his family. Cosmo had assembled round him some young Italians, who had imbibed the same love of the arts with himself. Their lively imaginations were ravished with the philosophy of the Greeks, in which reason was set forth, clothed

in all the charms of poetry. It was refreshing to Cosmo thus to spend his time in the contemplation of these ennobling thoughts. "Come," wrote he one day to Masilio, the most celebrated disciple of the Greeks, "and bring with you Plato's book on *Sovereign Good*. There is no subject of investigation with which I am more engaged. Come, and don't forget the lyre of Orpheus."

The cultivation of the arts and the study of the genius of the Greeks were carried so far, that they celebrated, in the palace of Medici, the feast of Plato, which had been neglected for twelve centuries, even at Athens. The statue of the philosopher was inaugurated in the gardens, designed after the grove of the Academy, and enriched with some of the choicest specimens of Grecian art. The sky of Tuscany threw over this feast a light as brilliant as that of Greece. The disciples of Plato seemed to have met. They read a passage from the *Immortality of the Soul*, and another from the *Beauty of Virtue*. They recited hymns in his praise. They thanked Providence that it had vouchsafed to the world so virtuous a man, and so exalted a genius. The Italians were intoxicated with admiration, while the Greeks felt a pride in such honour paid to their country's genius, after so many centuries. Gemisthus fancied himself at Athens, rescued from the Barbarians.

But Lascaris, whose chief aim in the promotion of letters was to serve, and, perhaps, regenerate Greece, was unhappy amid the festivals and quiet of Florence. Often would he, in the course of his lectures to the young Italians, who had come thither from all directions, upon ancient literature, turn aside to allude to the oppression of his country. And their hearts were moved with indignation and pity. But their noble ardour passed away with the peculiar mobility which belongs to the Italian character. Besides, the policy of Cosmo was to have no part in adventurous wars. He thought it sufficient to enrich Florence with the returns of commerce and embellish it with the splendour of art. "Make yourself contented among us," said he to Lascaris. When the project of

the Pope to take the lead, in person, of another crusade was announced to him: "Aye," said he, "an old man undertakes an enterprise which belongs to a young one."

In the mean time the Bishop of Ephesus, with Nicephorus, had arrived at Rome, which still echoed with the prayers ordered for the deliverance of Christianity. They learned also that beyond the mountains, among the French, the news of the destruction of Byzantium had roused their deepest indignation. Many pilgrims who had come to Rome to obtain indulgences for the crusade, spoke of a remarkable feast in the palace of the powerful Duke of Burgundy, where the valour of the knights was inflamed by an extraordinary spectacle. During the festivities of the banquet, a young woman, captive, and clothed in mourning, appeared in the hall seated upon an elephant, which was led by a Saracen of gigantic size. While all eyes were fixed upon her, as if representing the Church in the hands of the Infidels, she uttered a mournful lamentation to call to her succour the worthies of France and Burgundy. Faith, Hope, Charity, and all the Christian virtues, each represented by a young woman clothed in white, followed in her train, chanting verses, which were calculated to arouse the souls of the faithful. At the sight of these, all the knights, with the duke at their head, swore by the Golden Fleece, by the Holy Virgin, and by the Pheasant—a symbol of the Occidental Knighthood—to fly to the rescue of the Cross.

These ideas and customs were new to the Greeks of Byzantium and Ephesus. But the reputation of the Franks for courage, always celebrated in the East, inspired the fugitives with new confidence. Theodorus, in the ardour of his faith, already fancied he saw the victorious standard of the Cross planted upon the walls of Constantinople, and the temple of St. Sophia consecrated anew to the worship of the Lord.

The strength of this hope seemed for the time to have got the better of his repugnance for a deserter of the Greek faith, and he was eager to see the Cardinal Bessarion. He betook himself to his palace, at the foot of Mount Quirinal,

near the Church of the Holy Apostles. As he crossed the peristyle, the Bishop of Ephesus was struck with the riches of the Roman Court. Under an immense portico were collected the precious marbles of ancient Greece, broken vases, and statues—the immortal monuments of an abolished paganism. All these newly-discovered treasures, all this splendour of renaescent antiquity, adorned, though somewhat in disorder, the residence of the learned cardinal ; and the priests of the Church of Rome took care, as they passed through, lest they should entangle their gowns in the remains of some mutilated god. All did not, however, equally praise the zealous curiosity of Bessarion. Some did not fail to remark, in a tone of irony, that these profane anxieties evidently betokened a Greek, a neophyte, an old disciple of error. Withdrawn into the most secluded part of his palace, the cardinal was, just at this moment, engaged on a question of philosophy, which, in his opinion, was badly explained by Aristotle. Nevertheless, on being informed of the arrival of Theodorus, he immediately left his studies to wait upon his distinguished countryman ; and whatever may have been their former division, their first words betokened nothing but mutual kindness. Bessarion was not young. Travels, study, and the disappointments of ambition had furrowed his brow, which still however retained the Italo-Grecian stamp—a singular blending of shrewdness, vivacity and enthusiasm—tempered with the haughtiness of a cardinal. His manners were simple ; his dress that of a recluse of St. Basil ; and he still wore, according to Oriental custom, the long beard which Louis XI. made a jest of at the formal audience which he once gave him as the ambassador of the Court of Rome.

Received by his old adversary, Theodorus promptly acquainted him with the fortune of the young Greeks who had been summoned to Italy, and of the respect which they still entertained for their faith. Bessarion questioned, in his turn, the Bishop of Ephesus, concerning the monuments of profane Greece, and seemed to reproach himself that he had collected so few.

“But what,” said Theodorus, “what avails this idle curiosity? Know then that the Gospel is trodden under foot of the impious. Our brethren of the East are hanging between apostacy and slavery. Soon there will be no Christians in Greece. You Pontiffs of Italy are zealous in your efforts to collect the traditions of Athens and the books of the Gentiles, but leave the true faith to perish.”

“The true faith,” interrupted Bessarion, “is at Rome, in the sacred College.”

“The true faith,” replied the Bishop of Ephesus, “is that of the martyrs; it is engraven upon the last stone of our destroyed churches, and in the hearts of our slaughtered Pontiffs.” Saying these words, he left the hall in a passion.

Bessarion, nevertheless, lavished his attentions and his wealth upon the Greek fugitives. Furnished with an asylum, the recluses of Byzantium observed with strictness the peculiar forms of their religion. A large number of families of the Peloponnesus and the islands of the *Ægean*, had been collected at the port of Ostia, and many others had been redeemed from slavery. The Pope showed equal charity towards their misfortune, and admiration for their science. He envied Florence the Platonic Academy which had been founded by Cosmo de Medici, and spared no pains to promote the same studies at Rome. Among all his apostolic dignities, Bessarion was Superior of the monastery of *Crypta Ferrata*, situated in the *villa* of Cicero, at Tusculum. Hither he would often invite some of his eloquent countrymen, and it seemed as if the shade of the genius of Greece was wandering about these ruins which had once illustrated the genius of Rome. How many times in their conversations did they hope to see Greece freed from the barbarians! How many times did they promise themselves the aid of the princes of the West in their holy purpose! Lascaris left the repose of Florence and the friendship of Medici, to arouse Bessarion, and rekindle in him a zeal for his country through his love for the arts. Often, amid the ruins of Tusculum, did he set forth in liveliest colours the barbarity which was threatening Europe, and Mahomet,

as it were, already pursuing Greece, even in her place of refuge. The Cardinal was moved by these representations far more than by the haughty prayers of Theodorus. When he saw around him these ingenious and enthusiastic men, whose countryman he was, he forgot the religious quarrels and distrusts of the Court of Rome ; he was animated, like them, by the remembrance of the glory of his lost country ; he shed tears at the thought that the home of Homer and Sophocles was the prey of the barbarians ; he listened with a sort of illusion to the vivid words of Gemisthus, dreaming of the restoration of Athens to liberty, and her temples to philosophy and the arts. He was moved by such thoughts ; he became again a Greek because he was a Platonist, and promised to use his zeal, his efforts and his influence in the Sacred College, to hasten the crusade ; especially if the Greek Church would finally acknowledge her errors, and accept, with a teachable spirit, the union of Florence.

But such promises did not correspond with the ardent wishes of Theodorus. He was solicitous for the faith of his brethren in their sojourn at Rome ; he was even more inflexible in exile than at Byzantium, and reproached himself for having sought the tardy and dangerous assistance of the Latins. In vain did Nicephorus, equally zealous, but more mild, seek to calm this harsh vehemence. He was feeble before the Bishop of Ephesus ; he respected his invincible firmness, but he feared lest he should appear, a second time, to have abandoned his brethren in misfortune, and, in his opposition to Theodorus, subject himself to the charge of perjury.

Thus the Bishop of Ephesus, after a long struggle, was forced to relinquish the hopes which he had formed for the salvation of Greece. Pontiff after pontiff ascended the throne. Bessarion himself was near obtaining the supreme dignity, and nothing but the old jealousy of the Latins against the Greeks, and distrust in a new convert, zealous as he was, kept him from an honour to which he was entitled both by learning and genius. Despairing of aid from this quarter, the Greeks exhausted themselves in vain efforts. Their very zeal re-

stricted their influence. The pride of the Latin Church was afraid of the haughty confidence of these priests, who, proscribed fugitives, without country and without altars, clung nevertheless to their faith with such inflexible fortitude, and refused to purchase the salvation of their country at the price of repentance.

But Europe, at length, seemed touched with their complaints, or rather by a sense of its own peril. Æneas Sylvius, a passionate lover of the arts, and zealous for the glory of the Christian name, was elected Pope; while Mahomet was pushing his empire to the banks of the Danube, and carrying his arms, at once, against the North and South of Europe. Venice threatened, Belgrade besieged, all the countries bordering upon Greece subjugated like herself, carried terror to the nations of the West. The Roman Pontiff made a last effort to appease the animosities of the Christian princes; to excite the ardour of the people; to unite them in a crusade, and drive back the barbarians beyond the boundaries of Europe. With this hope, he convoked a council at Mantua. Here were assembled the ambassadors of France and Poland, those of the King of Naples, of the Duke of Burgundy, and of the Republics of Italy. The Duke of Milan, Francis Sforza, was also there. Envoys from Lesbos, from Epirus, and the Morea, set forth the evils under which their country was suffering. The Pope and the Cardinal Bessarion were eloquent in their harangues. War was resolved on. Bessarion immediately departed to solicit the aid of the German Princes; and the sovereign Pontiff gave orders to the crusaders to rendezvous at the city of Ancona.

But the kings, in spite of their promises, were distracted by their ambition and quarrels. Alphonso of Aragon was dead, without concluding peace with Venice. The Duke of Burgundy had grown old while projecting a crusade in the midst of the festivals of his court; and now he feared the ambition of Louis XI. Germany was poor and divided. England was agitated by the bloody wars of her two royal families. The Princes of Italy were watching one another. The

tithes demanded by the Court of Rome began to weigh heavy upon the people. The Emperor of Germany abandoned Hungary. None obeyed the summons of the Pope, save obscure men without name and without influence. Nevertheless, the hearts of the fugitives beat with joy, and they hoped soon to return to their native land to fight for its deliverance. But the death of their greatest benefactor, the Pope, annihilated their hopes. The efforts which were necessary to so great an enterprise were too much for the already feeble old man. He expired at Ancona, praying for the Christians of Greece, and calling upon Europe to take vengeance upon their oppressors. But the religious zeal which had been awakened by a great man, perished with him. The milder habits of the times, and the activity of commerce, were uncongenial with distant and dangerous wars. The Venetians alone remained still in favour of marching against Mahomet. But their motive was their own defence ; and they treated for peace when there was no longer any hope of advantage from war.

Thus sacrificed to the interested policy of Europe, the Greeks continued to enlighten those who had abandoned them. In a few years, these apostles of letters had introduced their language and their philosophy into all the Italian cities. The masterpieces of Greek antiquity, every where brought to light, excited an enthusiasm till then unknown. The exclusive attention with which the Italian scholars at first gave themselves up to the study of antiquity, seemed to enervate the national originality ; but it put forth again with greater vigour under the influence of so rich a culture, and shone conspicuous in the great names of the sixteenth century. But the banished Greeks—the harbingers of this great epoch—have little of its glory. Their power was in their words ; and, like these, it was fugitive. They inspired a new admiration and love for the arts ; they stirred up to action the human mind ; they saved the finest portion of the monuments of Greece from destruction ; but themselves—they created no monuments. Thus their memory has been lost in the

glory of the men taught by their instruction, and the very magnitude of their services has contributed to a more rapid oblivion of themselves.

After the death of the Pope, the Bishop of Heraclea, despairing of the aid of Europe, returned to the East, to encourage the faith of his brethren under the trials of bondage. "It is there alone," said he, "that I can expiate my former weakness, of which Rome constantly reminds me." It is said that he lived some time in Constantinople and the Morea, always distinguished by the warmth of his charity, and by his efforts to alleviate the sufferings of his enslaved countrymen; which neither the terrors of the plague nor the scimitar could compel him to relinquish. Mild as he was fearless, he calmed those religious animosities between the two communions, which the Christians of the East harboured even in their chains. He bestowed his aid alike upon all, and preached to them the same gospel. He was no longer a sectary: he was a Christian; and from his lips the divine Word inspired a faith full of vigour and patience. He perished in the midst of his holy works. The Turks, while they suffered the Greeks to purchase their life and their religious privileges by the payment of an annual tribute, at the same time wrested from them a portion of their young children to be brought up in the Mussulman faith; and punished with extreme cruelty every Christian priest who should venture to inspire them with a horror of such an apostacy. Accused of a wish to reconvert some of these hostages of Islamism to the faith of their fathers, Nicephorus suffered a most frightful punishment. His body, having been mangled beneath the huge hammers of a forge, was thrown into the sea, lest the Christians should honour it. But his name remains sacred in Greece, as that of a martyr.

Before learning the glorious end of Nicephorus, the Bishop of Ephesus had also left Italy, but with a different hope. On the shaggy heights of Epirus lived a tribe of semi-barbarous shepherds, who had for a long time been regarded as rebels by the Byzantine rulers; but who, having never been

corrupted by any mixture of foreign barbarity, still preserved, in their habits and courage, the distinct impress of the national character. These Greeks, who had ever defied the Roman power, had been subdued by the power of Christianity ; and this yoke, the only one which they had ever borne, inspired in them, so much the more, a hatred for the oppression of the Turks. It was among these that Theodorus took refuge, determined to devote his life to the service of his faith and his country. Thrown upon the shores of Epirus by an Italian vessel, he crossed a desolate country and arrived among the mountains, with no other treasure save the gospel, and the cross—the badge of his holy office. These warlike men, who lived in constant fear, whether from the assaults of the Turks on the one hand, or from the privations of a rigorous climate on the other, hailed with joy the holy man who seemed to have been sent to them by Heaven. Their villages had been burnt by the incursions of their barbarous enemies. They had no other refuge for their families than the caves among the rocks, and some huts, rudely constructed in the most inaccessible places, and exposed to the peltings of the storm. By night, they encamped in the open air, by the side of their fires. By day they were continually engaged in attacking the posts of the janizzaries ; and when they fell into their hands they perished by the most horrible tortures. But hitherto they had been free ; and the life which they led tended to strengthen their patriotism and courage. Theodorus thanked Heaven that he was permitted to share in such severe trials, which promised to be crowned with martyrdom. Among these warlike bands, whose race is still extant in the mountains of Greece, he dwelt for a long time. From this retreat he occasionally visited the monasteries which are scattered among the hills of ancient Arcadia, to revive the drooping faith of the recluses, discouraged under the load of Turkish oppression. He appeared among them, a representative of the ancient Church ; and when, at the return of the feast of the Passover, he celebrated, upon the mountain, the divine sacrifice, and chanted the hymn of the

glorious Saviour, at the words—*Christ is arisen, Christ is conqueror*—the shepherds and labourers, who had assembled from all quarters, seemed to themselves to hear a prophetic voice announcing the deliverance and regeneration of Greece. A common joy spread from the sanctuaries of the convent on the mountains to the villages of the plain in subjection to the Turks. Thus did religion sustain that afflicted people, and keep alive its hope. How many times did Theodorus, in the wildest retreats of Epirus and Thessalia, perform the sacred ceremonies among the mountaineers, softened by his words! How many times did he reanimate their constancy in defeat, and render them humane after victory! The gospel taught these uncultivated Greeks virtues worthy of their valour. Amid the reprisals of a daily and terrible vengeance, the spirit of generosity was not entirely wanting. They had pity on the defenceless, and respected their female captives. “The holy Bishop,” said they, “will bless us.” He was, as it were, a visible conscience for these wild and ferocious men. He gave them their country in their religion; and when his faithful words pointed out to them the temple of Saint Sophia, the golden cross, and the holy table, polluted and destroyed by the infidels, they resolved to die freemen and Christians. Often did the mountains of Epirus and Thessalia, and the summits of Pindus, hear the chant of the ruin of Byzantium. In the desert and in slavery they repeated that poetic prophecy which breathed the whole hope of Christian Greece. “Oh, holy Virgin! Sovereign Mistress! Be still. Weep not, nor groan. With time, with years, both the city and the great monastery—all these things shall be to you anew.”

Thus did the Bishop of Ephesus keep alive a love of country and a hope of deliverance among those faithful and ignorant tribes, who had scarcely known the Empire in its splendour. He consoled himself with the thought that, one day, would depart thence the avengers of the cross, and the liberators of the temple. He preferred their rude simplicity and their simple faith, to the luxury and the new arts of the

West. In this apostleship, with nothing but hope to sustain him, he lived to extreme old age. Occasionally, by the hand of some foreign trader, or some travelling monk of Mt. Athos, he would send news of Greece to his countrymen dispersed at Rome, Florence, and Mantua. He told them of these uncultivated Greeks, once despised by the Empire, where he had again found his lost country. "You seek to move a polite people," wrote he to Lascaris; "I to animate our barbarous brethren. You are disseminating the arts in Europe; I am preserving religion in Greece." While occupied with these cares he died, full of days. The mountain shepherds made his grave in the rock where he had lived. They divided his garments amongst them as holy relics. The leaves of his copy of the Scriptures were divided among the wandering families of the tribe. They offered prayers on his grave, and never, in combat or flight, did they suffer the Turks to approach it. Long afterwards, fathers would show their little children the stone where the Bishop used to sit; the stream, now dried up, where he used to celebrate the divine mystery; the tree to which he had suspended an image of the holy Virgin; the summit where he had animated the courage of the Greeks; the dark and narrow defile, where he had saved from slaughter some Turkish prisoners, who had been captured in the plain. The memory of a man preserved a people.

While Greece was slowly recovering from barbarity, her ancient arts were vivifying Europe. Under the early patronage of the Pontifical Court, the printing press had introduced the choicest remains of Athenian civilization, and ignorance fled before the light of such sublime models. Thus was accomplished that happy revolution which Lascaris had foretold. As for himself, satisfied with having put his hand to the great work, he constantly turned his eyes towards Greece. The same longing for his native, though enslaved, land was still more intense in the heart of Gemisthus, the venerable and enthusiastic disciple of Plato. The blandishments of Rome and Florence could not long retain him. He prefer-

red to go and end his days under the dominion of the Turks and among the ruins of Athens. Held by some powerful charm, he would die in the places sacred for him ; like those priests of polytheism, who, when their idols were broken in pieces and their temples were destroyed, when the flame of the sanctuary was extinguished, could not be torn from the place where they had worshipped divinities which were no more.

Without sharing in this blind worship of the soil of Greece, disfigured by slavery, Lascaris desired, nevertheless, to be nearer to his unhappy country. After having, at Florence, at Rome, and Mantua, fulfilled his noble mission ; when he had seen a new generation spring up around him ; when he was assured that the inestimable deposit which he had saved by his efforts was henceforth the property of the human race, in spite of the solicitations of the Republics and Princes of Italy he returned to Sicily.* He preferred this country for his last asylum, because he should there be oftener in the receipt of news from Greece, and be better able to afford relief to such of his countrymen as might escape from the oppression of the Turks. Sicily was ignorant and wild ; the useful arts were almost entirely neglected ; science was unknown ; and the use of paper very rare. Yet Lascaris, by his presence alone, founded here a school which soon became celebrated, and attracted scholars from all the cities of Italy, from the other countries of Europe, and even from the British isles. Here it was that this generous Greek, more than thirty years after the fall of Constantinople, still conversed of his sad recollections and his noble hopes, already nearly accomplished. During this long period, Europe had formed many projects for the deliverance of Greece. The pontiffs of Rome had demanded it, and kings had promised it ; but nothing was

* Bembo mentions in his letters, and in the dialogue on Mount Etna, before alluded to, his acquaintance with Constantine Lascaris, while he resided in Sicily. "*Nihil illo sene humanius, nihil sanctius,*" says he. Such was the ascendancy which these expatriated Greeks acquired over the first intellects of Italy.

done. The death of Mahomet had freed Italy from terror, but left Greece in the fetters of Bajazet. Meanwhile the human mind was becoming enlightened ; the arts were making rapid progress ; and a new branch of industry, at first marvellous, was now almost universal. Lascaris received, from time to time, from Rome and Venice, the works whose precious originals he had brought to Italy, now reproduced by an art which secured them against all danger of destruction. One day, as he had just finished the interpretation of the passage of Plato, which recounts, under a half fabulous form, the old Egyptian traditions concerning the island Atlantis, he learned that a Genoese pilot had just discovered a new world ;—that other hemisphere, perhaps, which antiquity had known, or Plato had divined. Beautiful epoch of modern history ! Fortunate age of the human mind, when the still young and artless spirit was fed, at once, with the sweets of science and the delights of discovery !

Lascaris, the liveliness of whose imagination old age had not weakened, shed tears on learning this new conquest of the genius of man. During the last years of his life, he would often make this revolution the topic of conversation with his young pupils. He would recall all that had happened, of the great and the new, in Europe, for the past thirty years ;—letters flourishing, the genius of the ancients recovered, their thoughts interpreted and understood, and producing new thoughts ;—in fine, the boundaries of the domain of man extended, as his mind became enlightened. Occupied with these sentiments, and still animated by that spirit of proselytism for the arts which had distinguished his youth, Lascaris, one day, a short time before his death, conducted the young foreigners to the place where, for the first time, he had debarked in his flight from Constantinople. Among the company were the successors of those generous Italians, whose aid he had then received. The most brilliant among them, and the most enthusiastic in his love for the arts of Greece, was the young Bembo, the son of a Venetian Senator, before whom Lascaris had once defended, on the same shore, the arts and sciences of Greece calumniated by her fall.

The sage old man took pleasure in recalling those times, and in bringing before their minds those first interviews, as if certain of transmitting them to posterity by confiding them to the memory and talent of his scholars. "I must soon die," said he; "and I leave nothing of myself behind. But I have formed you to a love for the arts, and the noble sentiments which they inspire. After my death you will return to your respective countries; you will follow, in the career of art and genius, that movement which, commencing in Italy, will include entire Europe within the circle of its influence. What beautiful creations will you see spring forth! With what glory will you yourselves be associated! The human mind, quickened by the leaven of antiquity, is every where in a ferment. Our master Plato has said, that the souls of men, on coming into this life, recover by recollection all that they had known in another world, and that, for these to learn, is only to remember.* Thus the genius of antiquity is daily becoming the inspiration and, as it were, the thought of modern times. While you are playing a part in this revolution, and sharing in its glory, think of enslaved and unfortunate Greece. Remember the day when our fugitive vessel brought you the monuments of the ancient Hellenes. Will not Europe some day feel the debt of gratitude which she owes to our country? Will not the new world, but just arisen from the ocean, at some future day, instructed in our arts, of which at present she knows not the name, interest herself in our calamities, and send us her soldiers and her liberty? And must civilization take so large a circuit before reappearing upon the soil whence she has so often departed? Yes," continued Lascaris with a sort of prophetic warmth, "entire Europe will seek this glory, and at some future day the inspiration of our arts will raise up avengers for us among the inheritors of the genius of our fathers."

The old man did not long survive this interview. His

* Cicero, in his Essay *De Senectute*, records the same idea, but more fully. The whole section is in Cicero's best style, and, indeed, the entire Essay is not inferior to the best extant in any language.—Tr.

death was mourned throughout Sicily, to which he had given the idea of a milder civilization and a better life. His disciples, scattered through the cities of Europe, bore with them the recollection of his words, and that happy tradition of Greece which lived in him. For many years was to be seen, at Messina, in the church of the Carmelites, the monument of white marble which the citizens had erected in memory of Lascaris ; but, afterwards neglected, it has perished without recovery. Indifference is more destructive than time ; and, Lascaris, the saviour of the arts of Greece, to whom Europe owes so much, has left no traces of himself, save some recollections transmitted through his affectionate disciples, which we have endeavoured to collect.

ARTICLE VII.

THE IDIOMATIC USE OF CERTAIN HEBREW NOUNS IN CONSTRUCTION.

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It is well known that the Hebrews had but comparatively few adjectives, it having been regarded as more in accordance with the oriental style of thought to use nouns for this purpose. Many, therefore, of our qualifying words denoting a property, attribute, or habit, were expressed by an abstract noun or name of a thing, designating the attribute, preceded by some general name of a person as the subject. In this idiomatic use of certain nouns, they, when either followed by a concrete or abstract noun, were put in regimen.

The difference of meaning, however, existing between such nouns has been too much overlooked. On this subject the Grammars and Lexicons in use are defective. The remarks in Gesenius' Gr., eleventh edition, § 104, 2, and in Roediger's revised edition, are extremely brief, and indeed unsatisfactory. Ewald (Gr. § 498) has but little more on the subject, though what he has is distinguished by the philosophical discrimina-

tion of this celebrated scholar. Nordheimer (Gr. § 817) while he treats this idiomatic use of nouns at some length, fails to distinguish between their respective meanings. Nor does Hoffmann in his *Grammatica Syriaca*, or Winer in his *Chaldee Grammar*, in which languages the same idiom occurs, treat the subject more satisfactorily. The lexicons afford but little more information. It cannot then be considered useless or improper to investigate this subject, which has an intimate bearing not merely upon the interpretation of the Hebrew Scriptures, but on that of the Septuagint and the New Testament.

The nouns to which particular reference is made are the following: viz., 1, אִישׁ (אִשָּׁה, אִישׁ); 2, בַּעַל (בַּעֲלָה); 3, אָב (אִמָּה); and 4, בֶּן (בִּתּוּלָה). These differ materially from one another in the meaning which they convey in their idiomatic use, and are not by any means to be regarded as synonymous. They will be considered in their order.

I. אִישׁ (אִשָּׁה). This is an indefinite, and oftentimes indeed abstract, expression for a person—a man generally—about whom something is to be stated indicative of quality, attribute, &c., without reference to its origin, or to its peculiar manner or degree of development. Thus אִישׁ דְּבָרִים means an eloquent man, without referring to the origin or degree of the eloquence, but merely stating a general fact. So also אִישׁ בְּלִיַּעַל a wicked man, אִישׁ מִלְחָמָה a warrior, אִישׁ חָמֵר a handsome man, and many other such expressions. The plural form also frequently occurs, as אֲנָשִׁי לְבָב intelligent men, אֲנָשִׁי מִלְחָמָה warriors. This usage is also found in the Chaldee. Thus in the Targum of Onkelos we meet with גַּבְרָא דְּמַלְיָא. The usage of ἀνὴρ in the Septuagint is in some places (as ἀνὴρ δυνάμεως) nearly allied to that under consideration. Indeed so general is the use of אִישׁ in the connection and meaning above referred to, and so readily is it supplied, that it is sometimes omitted, as with תַּבְּלָח Ps. 109: 4, שָׁלַל, Judg. 5: 30, אֲנָחָה Prov. 14: 1.

The feminine אִשָּׁה is similarly used, as אִשָּׁה חָכְמָה a capable woman.

The plural noun מְחִיִּים is construed in the same manner, e. g. מְחִי שָׂא. This seems to have been more common in very ancient times, as we may perhaps infer from its use in the singular in proper names, e. g. מְחִישָׁל, מְחִישָׁל, also in Punic מְחִי מְחִי, מְחִי עֲשָׂרִית.

II. בָּעַל (בְּעָלָה). In this word the sense of *possession* appears to be the primary one. The meaning of the verb בָּעַל in the Ethiopic (see Ludolf's Lex.) and the Arabic (the Camus, Golius, &c.,) indicates this. Correct, therefore, is Vitranga in his remark,—“בָּעַל proprie ó ἔχει, habens quamcunque rem in sua potestate, quare ad maritum refertur per ellipsin, qui integre dicitur אִשָּׁה בָּעַל habens mulierem. Exod. 21 : 3.”

This word is therefore to be distinguished from אִישׁ in its idiomatic use, since it expresses that relation which exists, when a thing *subordinated* to a person is in his possession (Steiger). Even in some passages in which at first view the difference between this word and the former does not appear, it, on closer examination, is found, as where the men of Jabesh are styled אֲנָשֵׁי 2 Sam. 2 : 4, 5, בְּעָלֵי 2 Sam. 21 : 12, and יִשְׁבֵּי 1 Sam. 31 : 11. The word “citizens” or “inhabitants,” may indeed be used to translate either passage, but the idea of *dwelling* must not be excluded in the last instance, nor that of *possession* in the one immediately preceding it. The word בָּעַל in the usage to which we now refer, is in fact more expressive than אִישׁ on this very ground, that while the latter has no respect to *degrees of superiority or inferiority*, the former carefully denotes these. It is thus used with אִישׁ in more than one passage to increase the signification, a circumstance which in itself proves the diversity of meaning in these two words. Thus אִישׁ בָּעַל שָׂרִי is stronger than אִישׁ שָׂרִי. The one means “hairy man,” in a *general sense*, the other, in a *peculiar and pre-eminent degree*, as wearing the hair dress, peculiar to the prophets.

Thus, then, from the primary meaning of the word, and from its use with אִישׁ, the peculiar force of בָּעַל over אִישׁ may perhaps be considered as established. Nor does it appear to

us that any one passage requires us to regard the two words as identical in meaning.

We proceed now to cite some examples of the use of **בָּעַל**. **בָּעַל חֲלֻמֹת** means, as indeed the context seems to require, a "celebrated dreamer," "professed dreamer;" one who, as it were, makes a business of it, has dreams at his beck. **אִישׁ ח'** would merely mean "a dreamer." The expression **בָּעַל בְּרִית** differs from **אֲנָשֵׁי בְרִית** Obad. 7, since the former were "allies" of *long standing*, the latter simply "allies." Indeed **בָּעַל** in its idiomatic use frequently conveys the sense of *habitual possession* and therefore development. Thus **בָּעַל אַף** Prov. 22: 24, and **בָּעַל חֶמָּה** Prov. 29: 22 indicate habitual anger, and are therefore stronger than **אִישׁ אַף** Prov. 29: 22, and **אִישׁ חֶמָּה** Prov. 22: 24. Indeed, in these passages the gradation of meaning which is visible further supports our view as expressed above. In Prov. 29: 22 **חֶמָּה** in the latter clause is stronger than **אַף**. Now with the former word we have **בָּעַל**, with the latter **אִישׁ**. In Prov. 22: 24 the comparative weakness of **אִישׁ** is compensated by the plural form of the same strong expression **חֲמוֹת**. The difference between **בָּעַל** and **אִישׁ ר'** is too plain to need remark, although Gesenius (Lex. voc. רבר) makes them the same in meaning. First, however, in his Schul-wörterbuch, Steiger in his Com. on Peter, Ewald in his Gram. § 498, and others, agree in giving to the former the sense of "one having or instituting law-suits," and to the latter that of "eloquent" merely. Indeed, so obvious is this difference of meaning that Gesenius himself (Lex. voc. בעל) in another part of his Lexicon plainly confesses it; not the only instance by the way in which this eminent scholar contradicts himself.

The word **בָּעַל**, in consequence of its peculiar meaning, is sometimes applied to animals and inanimate things, with which **אִישׁ** is not found. The words indicating *relation* among men are frequently used with reference to the lower orders of 'creation, to express certain shades of meaning, but never those which indicate man as such, in distinction from all other created objects. This is the reason why, while the

latter are not used with reference to animals and inanimate objects, the former are frequently so found. Thus a bird is termed *בֶּעַל קָנָה*, a ram *בֶּעַל הַקָּרְנִים* and a threshing-drag *בֶּעַל פִּיטוֹת*; *אָב* is so used in Arabic, and *בֶּן* (*בֵּן*) both in Hebrew and Arabic.

This word is used in the sense above mentioned in the Targums, as *בֶּעַל סֶעֱרָן* Gen. 29: 1, and in the Rabbinic writings (Buxt. Chald. and Rab. Lex. col. 333); in the Arabic, in which language a usage similar to this prevails very extensively; and also in the Syriac, of which Hoffmann, in his excellent Grammar, gives several examples. See § 108, 4, d. ,

III. *אָב* (*אִם*). Although these words indicating source, control, &c., are idiomatically used in Arabic (for examples see Golius in his Lex. Arab. col. 10—11, and 147—150; though these, it must be confessed, belong rather to the artificial, sportive, and later language, as Ewald correctly asserts), the Ethiopic (Ludolf's Lex.) and the Syriac (Hoffmann Gr. Syr. p. 286); yet they are not found in this connection in Hebrew, unless we may regard the former as so employed in proper names. The word *אָבִי* in the old construct state (Roediger's Gesenius' Heb. Gr. by Davies, pp. 131, 132) often occurs in such names, sometimes written in full, as *אָבִירֵל*, *אָבִירֵל*; occasionally shortened by the omission of the *י* of construction, see *אָבִיר* 1 Sam. 14: 51, in v. 50 *אָבִיר*; now and then still further softened when a Yod follows, *אָבִירָה*; and twice more abbreviated still in *אִירָה* compared with *אָבִירָה* Josh. 17: 2.

The opinion that the usage above referred to, existing in very ancient times, gave rise to these as epithets, which afterwards became proper names, is defended by Gesenius in his Thesaurus, and still more recently in the last edition of his Lexicon. Ewald, however, entirely dissents from it. He thinks that the first member of each compound did in very early ages indicate the father of the son named in the second member, and that subsequently the word "father," as a term of dignity, distinguished the elder or favourite son.

There is much to favour this opinion ; for, 1. The second member of the compound term is often found alone, as, *Dañ*, *Abidan* ; *Ezer*, *Abiezer* ; *Noam*, *Abinoam*. This even occurred in the same family, as *Abner*, the son of *Ner*. 2. This serves to explain other adjuncts, e. g. *achi*, “brother,” in *Ram*, 1 Chron. 2 : 9, *Abiram*, Nu. 16 : 1, *Achiram*, Nu. 26 : 38 ; *Noam*, *Abinoam*, *Achinoam*. To *chamu*, “brother-in-law,” these remarks also refer. Thus we find *Abital*, 2 Sam. 3 : 4, *Chamutal*, 2 Kings 24 : 18. 3. This opinion seems to be further sustained by the word אֲבִימֶלֶךְ Gen. 10 : 28. 1 Chron. 1 : 22. This person seems to have been the founder of the Arabic tribe אֲבִימֶלֶךְ, the *Múls* of Theophrastus, the *Μελῦτοι* of Strabo. Yet it must be confessed that this adjunct is frequently found in the names of females, viz. אֲבִיגַיִל, אֲבִיטָל, אֲבִישֶׁג, &c. Now although in remote antiquity this prefix might in such connexion have designated the father of the daughter mentioned in the last member, such was evidently not the case subsequently. Probably in the absence of male offspring, or from some other genealogical reason, the name of dignity peculiarly appropriate to the representative of a family, was conferred on certain females.

Traces of this idiomatic usage we have noticed as being found in Arabic, &c., are occasionally to be met with in Greek and Latin writers ; see Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon, voc. *πατήρ*, and notice the use of “*pater cænæ*” in Horace.

IV. בֶּן (בְּנֵי). The idiomatic use of these words is frequent. “*בֶּן*,” says Steiger, “designates the begotten, in reference to that which begets : *offspring*, *product*, therefore son, grandchild, posterity, (trop. scholars), youth, shoot,—without distinction. But in the oriental way of contemplating things, purified and sanctioned in the Bible, the general is not only recognized as a reality, but as something more real and earlier than the individual that holds of it, and hence considers this as its offspring. Hence so many expressions that appear to us strange and incongruous, but which we

must not, in translating, soften down and explain." Thus a fruitful hill is styled *בן פרי*, literally, a son of fruitfulness, as derived from it—impregnated with fruit and therefore fruitful, being like its mother. So *בן חיל* indicates more than *אנשי חיל*, since it denotes that the men were not merely strong, but as it were born of strength. The expression *בן הבריה* means *belonging to beating*, as a child to its parent, and *בן לילה* that which has sprung up in a night, and is dependent on it (see Ewald's Heb. Gr. § 498). *בני רעם* "sons of lightning," are birds of prey which fly as swiftly as though born of the lightning, and characterized by its speed. A similar usage occurs in Onkelos, &c., Gen. 7: 17, 5: 32, &c. (see Buxtorf's Chal. and Rab. Lex. voc. *בן*, *בר*, *בה*); in Arabic (see Golius Lex. Arab., sub voc.); and in Syriac (Schaaf's Lex. Hoffmann's Gr. Syr. 287). It is found too in the Septuagint, where *τέκνον* (*τὰ τέκνα ἀδικίας*, Hos. 10: 9, *τέκνα ἀπωλείας*, Is. 57: 4) and *υἱός* (*υἱοὶ τῆς δυναμέως*, 2 ch. 25: 13) are thus used. It also explains the peculiar force of some passages in the New Testament, in reference to which we shall cite from Winer's Grammar of the New Testament Idioms:—"Instead," says that eminent scholar, "of concrete adjectives, which would be taken substantively, in conformity with Hebrew usage, we find nouns with *υἱός* or *τέκνον*, which, according to the lively perceptions of orientals, denote the most intimate connection with (dependence on) something (Vorst Heb. p. 467. 19): e. g. *υἱοὶ ἀπειθείας*, Eph. 2: 2 (*children of disobedience, born, as it were, from the ἀπειθεία, raised, attached to her like a mother*), *τέκνα φωτός*, Eph. 5: 8, *τέκνα ὑπακοῆς*, 1 Pet. 1: 14, *τέκνα ὀργῆς*, Eph. 2: 3, *τέκνα κατάρτας*, 2 Pet. 2: 14." To these examples may be added many others, as *υἱοὶ βροτῆς*, Mark 3: 17, *υἱὸς εὐφροσύνης*, Luke 10: 6, &c. For instances of this usage in ecclesiastical writers, see Epiphan. Opp. i. p. 380.

The same remarks hold good when *יָמָא* is used with reference to time. "The time itself," says a German critic, "is taken abstractly as mere form, or concretely, so that it com-

prehends in itself the entire facts." The "son of fifty years" is one then who has been, as it were, produced by, and is alive in this period of time, and is characterized by its events. This usage is common. It is found in Syriac (Schaaf's Lex. 66. Hoff. Syr. Gr. p. 587,) and in other cognate tongues.

The word under consideration is frequently found in proper names, viz. *בן-חור*, &c. It sometimes, in such a connexion, suffers contraction; see *בן-חור*, *בן-חור*. See Roediger de Lib. Hist. Interp. Arab. p. 20, 21.

Thus, then, *בן* in the usage referred to, is an indefinite expression for a man about whom something indicative of quality, &c. is stated; *בן* is less general, and expresses that relation which exists when a thing *subordinated* to a person or thing is in his or its possession—*בן* if ever used, even in proper names, possesses the peculiar ideas connected with the paternal relation, in which *production*, *dissemination* and *authority* are prominent—and *בן* refers to an intimate connexion with, and absolute dependence upon, the *בן* or *בן* to which the word with which it is in regimen refers; to those particular ideas, in short, suggested by the *filial* relation.

POSTSCRIPT.

[The following letter from Professor Johnson, in reply to the strictures published in the April number, we are constrained to admit as a matter of justice to one who supposes himself misrepresented. The matters of difference between the reviewer and the Professor are hardly of sufficient importance to justify any further allusion to them in these pages.—ED.]

Mr. Hopkins had proposed an investigation of a fact—whether the passage in Joshua, 10: 12–15, were genuine or spurious! He considered it an interpolation, and gave his reasons. I considered those reasons not sufficient to authorize us to reject the passage, and sought to show this in the Methodist Quarterly Review for October, 1845, thinking we should admit arguments which go to mar the integrity of the sacred writings with great caution. It is in the reply of Mr. H. which appeared in the Biblical Repository for April, 1846, that he has unfortunately erred so greatly.

Before pointing out these errors, I am willing to confess to the respected readers of the Biblical Repository the wrong I have done to Mr. H., for which he charges so freely, "misrepresentation," and want of "veracity" (pp. 292-3, Bib. Rep., April, 1846); for in such a discussion I would wish always to be candid and honest.

On page 521, Methodist Quarterly Review for October, 1845, I quoted the language of Mr. H. respecting this sentence in Habakkuk, "The sun and moon stood still in their habitation," as follows: "This passage should *not* be thought to have had a reference to any event which ever *actually* took place." And a little below, "No one supposes for a moment that a single one of the remaining declarations (of this chapter) ever referred to a transaction which at any time *literally* occurred." (This language of his is found in the Bib. Rep., January, 1845, pp. 123-4.)

To this I remarked, "We confess we do not understand that part of the hermeneutic science which would teach that a prophet of the Most High could occupy a whole chapter in extolling the majesty and glory of His acts on the earth, and not employ a *single expression which could for a moment be supposed to have reference to any act that ever transpired.*" This was my language, not his, and my offence is, in not using the word "*literally*" before *transpired*; when I thought, in the simplicity of my understanding, I had embraced all his *meaning*.

This confession made, I only ask room to *verify* a few of his quotations.

He had recited at considerable length the testimony of Josephus respecting the "Book of Jasher" (see Bib. Rep. Jan. 1845, p. 110), to which I said,

"That Josephus so far from giving an opinion at full length, and specifically, as quoted above, concerning the 'Book of Jasher,' has never once named the name of Jasher throughout the whole of his histories, nor so much as intimated that he ever heard of such a book." (p. 511.) And respecting the place in Josephus referred to, where he speaks of "*the books laid up in the temple,*" I said,

"The inquiry is, then, What 'were the *books* laid up in the temple?' We can easily see that it is not among the wildest of conjectures that have been made, to suppose that the *book* of Jasher was intended; and *that point assumed, the further conjecture that the other items above-named were also* of Josephus's opinion, gains a strength of probability amounting perhaps to inference. But remove this substratum, and the fabric it supports goes with it. And we claim that such a conjecture is entirely independent of the *data* which might have guided it." (p. 512.)

I then showed that I thought Josephus could have meant none other than the "Hebrew Scriptures."

Mr. H. quotes me thus:

"'We can easily see,' adds this reviewer, 'that it is not among the wildest of conjectures to suppose that the book of Jasher was intended.' Nay, he admits, that 'this opinion gains a strength of probability amounting, perhaps, to inference.'" (p. 282.)

About the poetry of the passage, Mr. H. quotes thus, (p. 285):

"'The characteristics,' he says, 'by which we are accustomed to distinguish poetry, are these, to wit—the determination of the verse by a certain number and fixed order of feet, ascertained by the num-

ber and quantity of syllables in each.' " He then refers to Job, the Psalms, etc., and says, " Will the learned Professor deny that (these) are poetry? And can he find here his 'determination of the verse,' etc., etc."

What I had said, and which he professes to have quoted, is this, (p. 515):

"That all the *obvious* characteristics by which *we are accustomed* to distinguish poetry, to wit, the determination of the verse by a certain number and fixed order of feet, ascertained by the number and quantity of the syllables in each; in fine, the entire subject of prosody *as it exhibits itself from the ancient Greek hitherward, was wholly unknown to the Hebrews.*" I then referred to the doctrines of the grammarians, and named Nordheimer as containing "the condensed substance of what is *known* on the subject."

On pages 294, 5, Mr. H. gives what he calls a *conjecture* of mine about the difficulty in ver. 15, and indulges in quite an air of triumph to find that the same conjecture had been made by Dr. Clarke, and so could not be original with me; and after many grave things about the man "who can furnish us with such a 'suggestion' as the above," adds, in quotation marks, thereby claiming it to be my exact words—"Hagilgallah,' in the Hebrew character, 'is formed of letters so nearly resembling those which are combined in Makkedah, as to be easily mistaken the one for the other;'" and with a surprise adds—"And the man who says this professes to understand Hebrew!" (As if, forsooth, it needed any further knowledge of Hebrew to form an opinion on such a question than to have eyes to see the letters!)

Now it was very unfortunate in him to have written that, and much more to the same effect; for it happens to be gratuitous, every word of it. I made no such conjecture as he supposes. I never wrote a word of what he professes to quote from me. The idea of that way to explain the difficulty in verse 15, was never in my mind till I saw it on his page. I did offer a conjecture, but one as widely different from that which he attributes to me, as light from darkness. It is recorded and can be read (ut supra. p. 523). But I will not trespass on your indulgence. These are specimens. It so happens that he has failed to present my arguments in whole and in part. Save the three or four pages occupied with the description of his modern Jasher, there is barely one page on which these misunderstandings, misstatements, misconceptions, or misrepresentations (I am at a loss what to call them) do not occur, and on some pages not less than half a dozen.

In sincerity, I am sorry a Christian minister should have done so. I did not intend to provoke the man, but only to deal candidly with his arguments.

One word on the original question. Those who have read the two articles of Mr. H. will have seen that he relinquishes the opinion he first held, that Jasher was an ancient book of miscellaneous poems, composed, certainly in part, in the time of David, and thinks now there was no ancient Jasher, but only this modern one, of which all the world heard enough a few years ago; composed, as he thinks, by some idle monk, "about the commencement of the middle ages," since which time, the passage in dispute has been, from such a source, foisted into the sacred text. I have simply to say, that from that position, the argument is a short one, merely a question of historic fact,

—Was that passage in Joshua before the middle ages? Without exhibiting proofs, we say only—It was; and Mr. Hopkins has himself quoted the historic testimony which demonstrates it.

With many thanks for the privilege of justifying myself thus in part to your worthy readers, believe me, with high regard,

Your obed't servant, H. M. JOHNSON.

Ohio Wesleyan University, 28th July, 1846.

ARTICLE VIII.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

- 1.—*A Greek-English Lexicon, based on the German work of Francis Passow.* By HENRY GEORGE LIDDELL, A. M., and ROBERT SCOTT, A. M. Edited, with additions, by HENRY DRISLER, A. M., Professor in Columbia College. Harper & Brothers. pp. 1700, 8vo.

The reproduction, in this noble style of typography, and at this cheap rate, of Liddell and Scott's edition of Passow, is a matter of just pride and congratulation. There is scarcely no part of our educational apparatus in this country so defective as in the matter of a Greek Lexicon. The manuals mostly in use are not only exceedingly meagre, but constructed in such disregard of all true lexical principles, and so inadequately present those shades of meaning which the age, the genius, or the dialect of the writers created, that they as often mislead as assist. It will rejoice every lover of sound learning among us, that we have access to a work of such decided superiority as must necessarily displace them.

This work is pretty well known to the learned world. It is based upon the famous work of Passow, which stands without a peer or a rival in Germany, and is justly considered a masterpiece of its kind, exemplifying, as far as it goes, as scarcely no other work does, the true principles of lexicography. Passow's great design was not only to trace the origin and express the meaning of a word, but also to develop the history of its changes, the nature and quality of its usage, its rank and character, and its modifications by the taste of different writers, by idioms and dialects, beginning with its earliest appearance, and descending through the successive eras of Grecian literature. Thus the real signification is displayed in its minutest shades, and all the history of a word needful for its intelligent use or clear apprehension. This gigantic work none but a German would have attempted; and Passow's life was spared to execute the task only in part. He carried his investigations through the era of Homer and Hesiod, but left the matter, as it relates to subsequent authors, pretty much where he found it. Liddell and Scott, in translating it, wisely carried this searching examination through the remaining periods of Greek literature, though it cannot be said with the same exhausting thoroughness that characterizes the German. The Attic writers, however, received a

good recension; and the entire field was so well gone over as to afford a fair historic development of every word, with a precise indication of its origin, growth and changes, and the sense as used by every prominent writer in the whole cycle of Greek literature. We have not the space to notice much at large, the close adherence which the work observes to all the principles and maxims of good lexicography; but we have said enough to show its incomparable superiority, and the prodigious labour and scholarship which its preparation has demanded. Though it is not yet complete, and more extended and thorough reading of Greek authors will add to its exactness and comprehensiveness, yet it is already a monument of erudition, perseverance, and good sense, which is not likely to be exceeded very soon.

The American edition appears under the auspices of Prof. Drisler, who has had the valuable assistance of Prof. Anthon. The labours in the direct line of lexicography of Prof. D. are confined to extending the reading of Liddell and Scott, and consequently adding to the number and completeness of significations. A large number of words are added, which indicate great diligence, and increase the value of the work. The great and responsible task of supervising the press—itself a prodigious work—he has executed with creditable accuracy. Besides this, he has incorporated, in alphabetical order, all the Greek proper names found in the best authors, of the utility of which there will be a difference of opinion. It increases the bulk of the work, but has the merit of convenience, and in some instances of unquestionable propriety. We must also strongly commend the clear and tasteful typography, the paper, the binding, and the price—all qualities of first-rate importance, in a work of this kind. We have no doubt it will command a wide sale, and ultimately take the place of all others.

2.—*Harpers' New Miscellany of Sterling Literature.*

The following volumes have been added to this valuable series of reprints during the past quarter: Bell's Life of George Canning—an admirable biography of one of the most interesting public characters of modern times. Brief, but comprehensive, and abounding in those apt illustrations and selections from the subject's writings and speeches, as to afford a complete and lively portraiture of the life and powers of the man.

The seventh edition of Mrs. Somerville's celebrated work—*The Connection of the Physical Sciences*—a most erudite, yet popular digest of the leading principles of the Natural Sciences, so arranged as to afford mutual illustration of the subjects discussed, and an increasing interest to the reader. It is a book whose value will not soon depreciate.

Legends of the Talmud and Koran, translated from a German work by Dr. G. Weil,—very curious alike to the scholar and the general reader, as an exemplification of oriental superstitions, and by the contrast, furnishing a striking proof of the divinity of the Scriptures.

The Modern British Plutarch, is a series of graphic sketches of some thirty eminent British characters in the various walks of life, from the polished and lively pen of Dr. Cooke of Dublin.

Borneo and the Indian Archipelago, by the Hon. Capt. Henry Keppell. The principal value of this work consists in the full sketch

it presents of the extraordinary achievements of Mr. Brooke in Borneo, who, obtaining the sovereignty of a province of that wild and unknown territory, has erected a kingdom, and accomplished a work of civilization and moral good, surprising as well for its amount as its unexpectedness. The narrative is pleasingly written, and discloses to the reader a new world full of promise of great things. We think each and all of the books of this series possess more than ordinary value, and shall be glad if it preserves its present high character.

3.—*Elementary Classical Works.*

The Messrs. Harper have issued a Latin Chrestomathy, which strikes us as possessing unusual merits in some particulars, and as especially worthy the attention of teachers. It is entitled the First Book in Latin, and prepared by Professors McClintock and Crooks, of Dickinson College, Pa. Its chief peculiarity consists in the prominence it gives to those exercises in writing and speaking the language which are so essential to fix the principles of grammar and language in the pupil's memory. The lessons proceeding in a philosophic manner, the variety and frequency with which each point is brought up, to be conned over and over, cannot fail to familiarize the pupil with the subject, before he proceeds to another. It appears to be a fine application of what are now known as Ollendorff's principles to the acquisition of this noble tongue.

An Elementary Greek Grammar, compiled from the larger work lately issued, by Dr. Ralph Kühner, has been published at Andover. The excellences of the original, which are now well known, and are probably unsurpassed by any other work among us, are preserved in this, and adapted to the use of the learner. We commend with pleasure its beautiful typography, as well as real worth.

The Harpers have issued an edition of the Eclogues and Bucolics of Virgil, with Prof. Anthon's Notes. It is uniform with their edition of the Eneid. We are quite pleased to see the different parts of this great author published separately. There will be a much better chance of their being read.

We must also mention the publication of a new treatise on Algebra, by Prof. Loomis, of the N. Y. University. It introduces in a very lucid manner, adapted for elementary use, some of the higher principles of the science, which have hitherto been excluded from this class of works. In arrangement, and ingenuity of illustration, it appears to be very happy; and though comprehensive, not too concise for convenient use. Published by Harper and Brothers.

4.—*The Trees of America, Native and Foreign, pictorially and botanically delineated.* By D. J. BROWNE. Harper & Brothers.

The publishers have finely aided the author in bringing out a beautiful and valuable work in a barren and needy department of our current literature. The delineations of the writer are illustrated by numerous drawings, which add much to the accuracy of the reader's conception. There is a happy union of science, practical information and of pleasant gossip, relative to the whole literature of trees, so arranged as to throw light upon every point, either of the botany, the history, the uses, the management and culture, the pathology and the

poetry, of all the trees of our country, whether indigenous or exotic, that any reader can desire; while the good taste and real ability with which all is accomplished, enhance its authority and add to its interest. For the gentleman whose taste seeks a beautiful expression in the arrangement and ornamenting of grounds, or the practical cultivator, or the scholar, or the mere reader, we should suppose the volume to possess more than ordinary attraction and value.

✍ We have to regret again the unavoidable exclusion of a large part of our Notices.

ARTICLE IX.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Continental.

Dietlein W. O. *Das urchristenthum. Primitive Christianity: an examination of the conjectures of the School of Dr. Baur of Tübingen, concerning the Times of the Apostles.* A very conclusive refutation of the opinions of one of the most decided and extravagant of the Rationalistic School; and is said to be valuable not only on its own account, but as a striking indication of that change of opinion which is going on in the religious literature of Germany.

Heringa, J. *Opera Exegetica et Hermeneutica, Edidit, &c. H. E. Vinke.* A valuable digest of the principal exegetical works of Heringa, especially those relating to the New Testament. These are known to scholars to be valuable.

Von Raumer, R. *Die Einwirkung des Christenthums auf die Althochdeutsche Sprache.* An ingenious attempt to show the effect of Christianity upon the development and establishment of the German language. The work is spoken of as falling short of the distinguished author's fame, and as being hardly worthy of the interesting subject.

Theremin, Dr. F. *Demosthenes und Massillon.* A treatise on Homiletics, viewed in connection with Oratory in general, which is highly spoken of as ingenious and striking. The highest praise is bestowed on Massillon, as an orator. Such a work is much needed.

Noack, Dr. Ludw. *Der Religionsbegriff Hegels, Ein Beitrag zur Kritik der Hegelschen Religionsphilosophie.* This work was published in Darmstadt in 1845, and is said to expose the radical misconceptions and errors of the Hegelian religious philosophy with great acuteness and candour.

Schegg, Peter. *Die Psalmen übersetzt und erklärt für Verständniss und Betrachtung.* Schegg is a Catholic, but his work has great merit for its industrious comparison of the old versions, and its faithful adherence to correct principles of interpretation. The old interpretation of the Messianic Psalms is adhered to.

Niebuhr, B. G. *Geschichte des Zeitalters der Revolution.* The famous Lectures on the times of the Revolution, delivered by Niebuhr in the University of Bonn in the summer of 1829, are here first gathered together. The long delay has been owing to the indifference or unwillingness of Niebuhr's son, who assumed the editorship of his papers. The frequency with which they have been referred to, and the distinguished fame of the author, have given them great interest. They are said, however, somewhat to disappoint the high expectations that have been raised.

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